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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis represents the first monograph on Cassius the tyrannicide for almost a 
century, and the only one in English. It provides a detailed treatment of his career 
down to 44 BC, and, in particular, re-assesses Cassius’ role in Caesar’s assassination. 
It is organised into six chapters. Chapter One examines the problematic source 
tradition, which displays notable biases regarding Cassius. Chapter Two explores 
Cassius’ ancestry and family. And Chapters Three through Six assess Cassius’ life 
and career down to the assassination, focusing in particular on the following episodes: 
his service under Crassus and after Carrhae; his actions during the civil war between 
Caesar and Pompey; and his role in the conspiracy against Caesar. A series of 
Appendixes provide supplementary information on Cassius and his family. The thesis 
concludes that Cassius was the architect of the conspiracy against Caesar, and should 
be considered a Republican figure whose historical significance is equal to –if not 
more important than– Brutus’.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
On more than one occasion, C. Cassius Longinus1 found himself at the centre of 
landmark events in Late Republican history. As Crassus’ second-in-command on the 
ill-fated Parthian campaign, for instance, he was left to restore order in Roman Syria, 
and repelled repeated Arsacid attempts to capture chunks of the Roman frontier. As a 
tribune of the plebs at the outbreak of the civil war, he found himself charged with 
assisting Pompey’s naval blockade. And, most importantly, in 44 2  after publicly 
opposing additional honours for Caesar, he fathered and co-led the conspiracy to 
assassinate the dictator perpetuo, an event which one classicist has recently described 
as history’s most famous assassination.3 The importance of Cassius, then, in the Late 
Republic is undeniable.   
And yet, of all the important figures in the final years of the Roman Republic, 
few –if any– have been more overlooked by scholars than Cassius. Indeed, in a 
seminal article written in 1986, Elizabeth Rawson remarked on the puzzling fact that 
Cassius had been “extraordinarily neglected”.4 As Chapter One explains, part of the 
reason for this neglect may be the gaps in the historical sources, a fact that perhaps 
made the prospect of an extended study too forbidding. There has, moreover, also 
been a tendency to view Cassius as an ancillary figure to Brutus, a view that does not 
(as this thesis will argue) reflect the historical reality.5 Whatever the reasons may be, 
neither the source problems nor prevailing opinions are entirely insuperable – or so 
 
1 Cassius (pr. 44) will be referred to throughout either as Cassius or the tyrannicide. The latter phrase is 
only employed as a descriptive marker, not as an endorsement of his career. Cf. Wistrand (1980), n.4 
below, who likewise describes M. Iunius Brutus (pr. 44) as “the Tyrannicide”; cf. Badian (1971) 
141n.37; Sedley (1997) 43, who both use ‘tyrannicide’ as a means to identify Cassius.    
2 All dates are BC unless otherwise stated.  
3 Strauss (2015), who subtitles his work: “The story of history’s most famous assassination”.     
4 Rawson (1991) [1986] 489. Cf. Dettenhofer (1992) 123 with n.4; Wiedemann (1998) 22; Chausson 
(2003) 113n.39; Armstrong (2011) 111, who notes the complete lack of biographies of Cassius. Little, 
then, has changed since Rawson wrote; the existing scholarship on Cassius is either dated or 
encyclopaedic: Drumann-Groebe (1964) [18992] 2.98-128; Smith (1844) 2.799-801; Fröhlich, s.v. 
“Cassius” [59] RE 3.1727-36 (1899); Broughton, MRR 3.51; Cadoux and Seager, OCD4 (2012) 289; 
Elvers, BNP 2.1165-6; Clarke (1981) 33-4. In English, Tyrrell and Purser (1933) 6.102-4 remains one 
of the fullest treatments of Cassius’ career. In German, Dettenhofer (1992) 123-8, provides a brief 
summary of Cassius’ career. The only monographs focusing on Cassius and his family specifically are: 
Schmidt (1877); Cody (1968), but see Survey of Literature, section 1.3 below.        
5 Or they have been assimilated together: see below. There are several biographies of Marcus Brutus, 
although even he is yet to receive a classic treatment: Bynum (1897); Gelzer (1917); Radin (1939);  
Breuil (1945); Möbius (1959); Bengtson (1970); Kniely (1974); Wistrand (1980); Clarke (1981). That 
Cassius is considered a second-rank historical figure has been noted in recent years; see, for example, 
Armstrong (2011) 111; cf. Cadoux and Seager, OCD4 289: “More keen-sighted and practical than 
Brutus, Cassius seems nevertheless to have been less respected and less influential.”  
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the present work hopes to demonstrate. A detailed study is thus long overdue and 
hardly in need of extended pleading.  
This thesis represents the first modern monograph on Cassius in English, or 
any language for that matter.6 Immediately, it is important to define what this study is 
not. Though predominantly chronological in structure, this thesis is not –nor could it 
be– a complete biography of Cassius. The uneven nature of the source material makes 
such a feat difficult, if not impossible, and to suggest otherwise would be dishonest.7 
Rather, this thesis will offer the fullest treatment of Cassius’ career (though not 
always in seamless analytical narrative) through to Caesar’s assassination.8   
Several additional arguments underpin this study. First, as E. Rawson once 
mooted, Cassius should be considered a figure of equal importance to Brutus.9 As this 
thesis will argue, he was the architect and leading spirit of the conspiracy, even 
though Brutus in some ways became the totem around which certain members of the 
enterprise rallied. Nevertheless, despite his move against Caesar, it is important to 
appreciate that Cassius was not always a dyed-in-the-wool, recalcitrant Republican, as 
his acceptance (however unwilling it was) of Caesar’s clemency aptly illustrates; nor, 
conversely, was he simply a jealous political malcontent, as is sometimes asserted.10  
This thesis strives to move beyond such over-simplified characterisations. To do so, 
long-standing views of him must be jettisoned.  
This thesis also seeks to re-assess Cassius’ character. Certainly, he was far 
more complex than the Plutarchan “Cassius” of the Life of Brutus. 11  Plutarch’s 
Cassius consistently serves as a foil for Brutus, and he is repeatedly ascribed the more 
unsavoury of the Republicans’ deeds  (Brut. 1.4). However, as this thesis will argue, 
Plutarch’s characterisation of Cassius is highly unrealistic. He was not simply a 
choleric man, as he is repeatedly made out to be by the ancient sources; rather, at 
times he could be witty12 and compassionate: he looked out for fellow Republicans 
after Caesar’s triumph at Pharsalus. If these arguments are accepted, a clearer picture 
 
6 See further Survey of Literature, Section 3 below. 
7 On the perceived problems of biographies of ancient figures, see Syme (1939) 7, and Marshall (1981) 
281; cf. in response, Tatum (2008) 122-4, for the benefits. See I.4, on methodology.  
8  For the rationale of Caesar’s assassination as an end point, see further Section I.2 below. See also I.4, 
on methodological challenges.  
9 Rawson (1986) 102.  
10 On Cassius as a jealous malcontent, Plut. Brut. 8-9, is the locus classicus.  
11 For an analysis of Plutarch’s Cassius, see Chapter 1, Section 9. 
12 This side of Cassius needs stating in view of Clarke (1981) 33, who describes the tyrannicide as  “a 
hot tempered man with a sharp tongue and without wit.” Cf. also the Conclusion, on Cassius’ humour.  
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of Cassius’ career and importance can begin to emerge; and hopefully a better 
understanding of his early career will ultimately lead to a better appreciation of the 
Late Roman Republic.        
 
I.2 SCOPE OF STUDY  
The terminus of this study is Caesar’s assassination in 44, a date which calls for 
justification. Orchestrating and co-leading the conspiracy was the watershed of his 
career, even more so than Philippi. His principal role in one of the flashpoints of 
Roman and European history cannot be understated, though it has often been 
understudied. From 44 to his suicide at Philippi, Cassius remained the most important 
military and (arguably) political figure of the Republican cause. But his assumption of 
Cato’s mantle was not inevitable.13 Like Brutus and many other aristocrats, Cassius 
had surrendered to Caesar after Pharsalus, abandoning the diehard Republicans, some 
of whom continued to fight on until Munda. His capitulation garnered a legateship 
from Caesar, but he quickly retired from public life. After the Republicans’ defeat in 
Spain, he returned to politics and seemingly looked to play a part in Caesar’s new 
Roman order: he was appointed to the praetorship. Yet only a few months later he 
publicly opposed new honours for Caesar, and soon began to recruit like-minded 
dissidents into the conspiracy. An examination of the events leading up to, and 
Cassius’ principal role in, Caesar’s assassination is at the heart of this thesis.     
 Focusing on Cassius’ early career also serves as a partial check on later 
hagiography and (more often) invective. Much of his earlier career has been treated 
less fully than his later life, perhaps with the exception of his service under Crassus. 
And what has been written about Cassius’ earlier career has (almost predictably) often 
been written with a view towards his later deeds.14 A study of his career before the 
assassination also accentuates that he was a figure fully independent of Brutus. This 
argument needs stating in view of the fact that Brutus and Cassius have often been 
assimilated in the historical and scholarly tradition. 15  To separate the ideas and 
 
13 On Cato’s significance in the Late Republic, see Marin (2009). Cato was Cassius’ uncle-in-law. Cn. 
and Sex. Pompeius also continued the Republican fight: Welch (2012).      
14 See, for example, Plutarch’s Faustus Sulla anecdote as evidence (Chapter 3, Section 2). 
15 Huß (1977) 115: “Daß die Gestalten des Brutus und Cassius, der bekanntesten Caesar-Mörder, in der 
Tradition zu Unrecht weithin zu einer Einheit verschmolzen sind, wurde in der Forschung gelegentlich 
vermerkt.” Cf. Clarke (1981) 33. MacMullen (1966) 18, notes perceptively that in the early imperial 
period “Cassius was remembered chiefly in connection with Brutus.”  So closely associated were they 
that in the medieval period they were even assimilated into one person, ‘Brutus Casium’, by the 
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motives of Cassius from Brutus, then, will help to further cement the observation that 
the conspirators were not an ideologically unified movement (not Ronald Syme’s 
“party of the Liberators”),16 but had mixed reasons for joining the conspiracy. 
To be candid, there are also practical considerations. It would be beyond the 
scope of a doctoral dissertation to cover in detail the years 44-42 as well, not least 
because these are some of the best-documented and well-tilled years in Roman 
history, if not all antiquity.17 Proceeding down to Phillipi, then, whilst it may provide 
closure, would be impractical; and at any rate, as will become evident, there is plenty 
to discuss about Cassius’ career to 44.      
  
I.3   SURVEY OF MODERN SCHOLARSHIP ON CASSIUS  
No detailed modern study of Cassius exists, despite his historical importance. The 
fullest treatment available is the monograph-style entry in Drumann-Groebe’s 
Geschichte Roms (1906), a work that is now over a century old, and prone to 
favouring Caesar. Several brief summaries of Cassius’ career have also appeared, but 
these rarely transcend the information contained in major classical dictionaries and 
encyclopaedias. Of these latter, Franz Fröhlich’s brief RE entry provides the most 
detail (a relative term indeed), and it has done little to advance Cassian studies.18 
Whilst extended studies are scarce, a handful of useful articles have appeared that 
provide some texture to Cassius’ career.19 By far the most important is E. Rawson’s 
“Cassius and Brutus: The Memory of the Liberators” (1986), which exposed the 
uneven historical tradition that she believed placed too much emphasis on Brutus and 
too little on Cassius, a trend reflected in scholarly work.20 Careful analysis of the 
evidence, she argues, suggests that Cassius was at least as important to the 
 
English poet Geoffrey Chaucer inter alia. On this amalgamation, see further Silverstein (1932) 148-50, 
with references therein.   
16 Syme (1939) 59.  
17 Matijević (2006) has completed an enormous doctoral work (now published) that treats one calendar 
year between Caesar’s death and Mutina over some five hundred pages. 
18 Fröhlich, s.v. “Cassius” [59] RE (1899) 3.1727-36. This work is also thoroughly outdated. A mere 
nine columns in length, Fröhlich provides a cursory synopsis of Cassius’ career, and subtends the 
evaluation of Drumann.  
19 Bellinger (1944); Huß (1977) 115-25, on the relationship between Cassius and Brutus, which he 
believes to have been more tense and estranged than the source tradition reveals; Ryan (1999) 145-54, 
on Cassius’ alleged aedileship in 47; Keaveney (2003) 232-4, on the Parthians who served with Cassius 
at Philippi; Pianko (1968) 203-10, in Polish, on Cassius’ amicitia with Cicero as revealed in several 
letters; Chastagnol (1963) 65-8, deals only with a Cassian coin found in France; Schwartz (1997) 102-
12, dates Cassius’ capture of Laodicea to the summer of 43.   
20 Rawson (1991) [1986] 491. Consider Wistrand (1981), whose work is entitled The Policy of Brutus 
the Tyrannicide; see, too, Bengtson (1970), who devotes little space to Cassius.      
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Republicans as Brutus, perhaps more so.21 Only after Philippi did Brutus gradually 
supplant Cassius as the leading figure of the Republican cause.22 Contemporaries, 
however, knew a rather different version of events: Cassius was the dux partium.23 
Rawson’s contribution forced scholars to re-assess the Republican movement and its 
chief proponents. But Cassius, if only for his role in Caesar’s assassination, still has 
not received the attention he demands.  
So far, the dearth of scholarship on Cassius has been illustrated. But what is 
the scholarly communis opinio of him? Cassius is a polarising figure so it will come as 
no surprise that he has been lionised and vilified in equal measure. Even scholarly 
assessments of him –those few that do exist– are not immune from this tendency.24 
Thus, although it is an invidious task, it is necessary to offer a brief survey (not a 
doxography) of modern opinion on the tyrannicide.  
While Cassius was not without his early scholarly admirers, the majority of 
writers in the nineteenth century, especially those of the German school, were highly 
critical of him.25 Take, for instance, B.G. Niebuhr, who concluded that Cassius’ chief 
motivation for assassinating Caesar was simply personal hatred of the dictator. 26 
Though a pioneer of historiography, Niebuhr failed to appreciate in this instance that 
the sources he drew on were prejudiced.27 He was not alone. In their Geschichte Roms, 
Drumann and Groebe tendentiously characterise Cassius as a man who was driven to 
murder Caesar by unsatisfied ambition (“Unbefriedigter Ehrgeiz”).28 It speaks of the 
dearth of works on Cassius that their short monograph has still not been superseded, 
 
21 Rawson (1991) [1986] 507.   
22 Rawson (1991) [1986] 489-90, succinctly outlines some of the reasons for Brutus’ predominance. 
See also, Chapter 1, Section 1.  
23 On Cassius as dux partium, see Tac. Ann. 16.7 with Rawson (1991) [1986] 490.  
24 There are only two dissertations that specifically treat Cassius or his family, cited here in full: O.E. 
Schmidt, “De epistulis et a Cassio et ad Cassium post Caesarem occisum datis”  (Diss. Leipzig, 1877); 
J.M. Cody, “The Coins of the Cassii” (Diss. Bryn Mawr, 1968). As will be abundantly clear, however, 
neither of these works is biographical in nature, and in fact both are rather specialised.  
25 Pierre Bayle, the French philosopher and historian who wrote the prodigious Dictionnaire Historique 
et Critique, called Cassius “one of the greatest men of his age.” Bayle (1734) [1709] 2.347. 
26 Niebuhr (1844) 2.93: “The motive by which he [sc. Cassius] acted was nothing but personal hatred 
of Caesar, and disappointment at not having obtained the city praetorship.” Grant (1978) 197, argues 
that Cassius assassinated Caesar because he had not been “sufficiently rewarded”. In OCD4 (2012) 289, 
Cadoux and Seager argue that there is “no convincing evidence” Cassius was moved by petty motives.    
27 Even Plutarch realised that his sources were partial and untrustworthy: Plut. Brut. 9; cf. 1.4. 
28 Drumann and Groebe (1964) [18992] 2.128. See Dettenhofer (1992) 123, 252, on the tendentious 
nature of Drumann’s assessment. Cf. Ryan (1999) 151. Nonetheless, Huß (1977) 116, accepts as 
correct Drumman’s opinion. For the French school, see Boissier (1897) 336-7: “Cassius was bitter in 
raillery, uneven in temper, hasty, sometimes cruel, and we can well understand that he would not have 
shrunk from an assassination ... An aristocrat by birth and temper, his heart was full of the hatred felt 
by the vanquished aristocracy; he must have a bloody revenge for the defeat of his party, and Caesar’s 
pardon had not extinguished the anger that the sight of his oppressed caste aroused in him.” 
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despite its age. Since these historians were writing at a time when both Caesar and 
monarchy were still in favour, perhaps their evaluations should not cause surprise.29      
   Even in the nineteenth century, however, revisionist –or at least more sym-
pathetic– assessments followed.30 The most prominent of these studies are those of 
W. Ihne and V. Gardthausen. According to the former, Cassius had to indulge his 
feelings of violence against the dictator, an assessment that sounds more like 
exculpation than scholarly evaluation. 31  Gardthausen, moreover, believes that the 
Republicans would have been better served if Cassius alone had been their leader –
without the burden of philosophical equity.32  But this is unfair to Brutus, whose 
charisma and influence brought much to the table of the conspirators. As will be 
apparent, then, more sympathetic treatments of Cassius were not necessarily more 
accurate ones. 
 In Anglophone scholarship, R.Y. Tyrrell and L.C. Purser proffered an 
assessment of Cassius that is still one of the most detailed in English.33 Exposing as 
“small-minded” those historians who misrepresent the motives of Cassius in his 
conspiring against Caesar, they maintain: “Perhaps Rome never did in after ages 
produce a man who united such military skill and courage with unrelenting hostility to 
the monarchy”.34 However, even they insist that he was fired to conspiracy by his own 
“selfishness”, citing as proof a very hostile passage from the late, anonymous source, 
De viris illustribus.35 They also unfavourably regurgitate a tradition that Cassius was 
“no statesman”, accepting uncritically the teleological judgment of the tendentious 
 
29 See Linderski (1996b) 562, who notes Geschichte Roms is “an immortal assemblage of facts with a 
thesis: glorification of monarchy, both Roman and Prussian, and denigration of republicanism.”  
30 No less a scholar than Theodor Mommsen describes Cassius as “prudent and resolute”, at least in his 
capacity as pro quaestor pro praetor of Syria: Mommsen (1894) V.318; Syme (1939) 184 notes 
Cassius was more resolute than Brutus.     
31 Ihne (1890) 7.229: “Von seiner streng republicanischen Besinnung machte er sein Hehl...Er musste 
seinen persönlichen Gefühlen Gewalt anthun, als er sich entschloss, gegen seinen grossmüthigen Feind 
die Mörderhand zu bewaffnen.” Cf. Fröhlich, “Cassius” RE [59] (1899) 3.1736. 
32 Gardthausen (1891) 1.20-22. See also Clarke (1981) 72-3, on Garthausen’s assessment of Brutus.      
33 Tyrrell and Purser (1933) 6.xci-xcvi. Before Tyrrell and Purser, Smith and Anthon (1844) 2.798-801, 
is now an antiquity in itself. Nevertheless, the article in Smith notes (p. 801): “His abilities were 
considerable; and though he would certainly be incapable, like Caesar or Augustus, of governing the 
Roman world, yet he excelled the rest of the conspirators in prudence, resolution, and power of ruling.” 
However, this relatively favourable assessment is tempered by the pointed conclusion (p. 801): “It was 
his high estimate of himself, his envy for Caesar’s position, and mortification at becoming an inferior 
and a subject, which led him to become a murderer of the greatest man Rome ever produced.” Tyrrell 
and Purser is still one of the few references cited by R. Seager and T.J. Cadoux in their OCD4 entry.   
34 Tyrrell and Purser, (1933) 6.xci, xcvi. Like the article in Smith, however, they also note that Cassius 
was “no statesman” because he was “blinded” by his passion (p. xciv).    
35 Tyrrell and Purser (1933) 6.xciv. 
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Velleius Paterculus, who (despite repeated scholarly attempts at rehabilitation) must 
be said to present the Augustan view of history.36  
 The most recent, though not extended, treatment of Cassius is that of M. 
Dettenhofer, whose Perdita Iuventus studies the careers of seven aristocrats of the 
“verloren” generation of the Republic.37  These men had their careers snuffed out 
prematurely by Caesar, who damaged and offended their dignitas, frustrated their 
ambitions, and moved them to assassination. 38  On Cassius’ career specifically, 
however, Dettenhofer can transgress the slim limits of the sources and imply a 
historical reality that is far from certain. One example, symptomatic of a wider 
practice, will suffice. On the issue of Cassius’ support of Pompey during the civil war, 
she writes: “Auch wenn sich sein Bruder und seine Vetter für Caesar entschieden, 
scheint er durch ein Freundschaftsverhältnis an Pompeius gebunden gewesen zu 
sein.”39 Is there any firm evidence for this so-called Freundschaftsverhältnis? Nothing 
that Dettenhofer adduces is convincing.40 As will be argued below, Cassius was more 
likely anti-Caesarian (or pro-Senate) than he was pro-Pompey.   
In sum, earlier scholarship on Cassius can be characterised as tendentious, 
oscillating between prejudice and paean, while later and current scholarship is 
characterised by neglect and indifference, as well as an inclination to overemphasise 
the importance of Brutus at Cassius’ expense. Ultimately, there is much that still needs 
to be said and understood about Cassius. It is thus time to address Cassius’ neglect and 
to shed light (as much as the sources will permit) on his life and career, successes and 
failures, and aims and aspirations. Much ink –perhaps too much– has been spent on 
Caesar; it is only fitting and fair that some attention is now given to the architect of his 
assassination.  
 
I.4 METHODOLOGICAL CHALLENGES  
There are many gaps in our knowledge of Cassius’ career. As Chapter One explores 
in more detail, there is no extant ancient biography of Cassius, and only a handful of 
his letters are preserved. If textual evidence is limited, archaeological evidence is 
even more so. No elogium has been discovered, nor (unlike Brutus) are there any 
 
36 Vell. Pat. 2.72.1-2; Tyrrell and Purser (1933) 6.xciv. On Velleius’ bias, see Chapter 1, Section 8. 
37 Dettenhofer (1992) 123-8.    
38 See further, Balsdon (1958) 92. 
39 Dettenhofer (1992) 128. Further, the “Vetter” she refers to, Q. Cassius Longinus (tr. pl. 49), was 
actually Cassius’ brother, though this is a common attribution. See Chapter 2, Section 4.      
40 See Dettenhofer (1992) 124, with n.15. 
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verifiable portrait busts. A couple of coins minted whilst he was quaestor in the East 
survive, and there are, of course, the famous LEIBERTAS coins minted after the 
assassination. Overall, however, the evidence for Cassius’ career is hardly an 
embarrassment of riches. It is therefore all the more important that the evidence that is 
available be subjected to vigorous (and cautious) source analysis. Throughout this 
thesis, moreover, the interpretations of modern scholars regarding Cassius’ career will 
also be scrutinised closely; not infrequently there will be a need to question and re-
evaluate long-standing conclusions. 
 Aside from the uneven source tradition already alluded to, another problem is 
that often little is known about the early careers of most Late Republican politicians, 
and the scant material that is available is often magnified retrospectively.44 Cassius is 
no exception in this regard. 45  Attempting to plumb his personality based on the 
meagre and (often) biased ancient evidence is a task fraught with difficulty, but not an 
entirely forlorn exercise. If nothing else, this thesis will hopefully serve as a check on 
those scholars who have painted Cassius’ character and temperament in broad, if not 
entirely misleading, strokes. 46  Before this thesis is pigeonholed as an attempt at 
rehabilitation, however, it is important to stress that there will be no attempt here to 
whitewash any of his character traits that may be deemed ‘flaws’.47 Rather, it attempts 
merely to redress an imbalance in the one-dimensional depiction of Cassius’ 
personality that frequently emerges in academic works. 
  
I.5 THESIS OUTLINE  
Chapter One, which deals with the sources, identifies the attendant problems faced by 
students of Cassius. As the chapter notes, there is no ancient biography of Cassius,48 
and, whilst some scholars have described Plutarch’s Life of Brutus as a “dual” 
portrait,49 it remains the case that Cassius serves as a foil for Brutus, designed to 
accentuate the latter’s virtues. This chapter also surveys both the major sources no 
longer extant (e.g. Oppius and Messala) as well as the extant primary sources, such as 
Cicero. In so doing, this chapter will illustrate the competing traditions surrounding 
 
44 Paucity of early career material: Syme (1938) 116; Taylor (1941) 113.  
45 Faustus Sulla anecdote: see Chapter 3, Section 2.  
46 See n.27 above for scholarly examples of this, especially Syme (1939) and Boissier (1897).  
47 See the character assessment in the Conclusion.   
48 A brief summary of his career is contained in the anonymous work De viris illustribus. On this work, 
see Chapter 1, Section 1. 
49 Rawson (1986) 113; Geiger (2002) 97.  
9 
 
the career of Cassius, and the implications for source criticism. The Caesarian loyalist 
Oppius, for instance, wrote a vita of Cassius, which we can safely presume was a 
hostile indictment in the vein of similar invectives, such as In Pisonem, Anti-Cato, 
and the second Philippic.50 Messala Corvinus, in contrast, who referred to Cassius as 
imperator suus, likely wrote as a Cassian apologist. Ultimately, especially after the 
Ides,51 Cassius’ career and character became a battleground of competing political 
interests. Students of Cassius, then, must be alert to the strong potential biases of the 
sources. 
 Chapter Two, which treats Cassius’ ancestry and family, begins by offering a 
short overview of the Cassii Longini’s place within the Roman nobility. Although the 
Cassii were neither the oldest nor the most successful plebeian nobiles, from the 
Middle Republic onwards they achieved a feat that few families could boast, 
especially in the late second and first centuries: they attained the consulship over 
several, consecutive generations. Thus they possessed considerable political clout and 
talent, and so Cassius would have grown up with the burden of maintaining (even 
surpassing) the family’s prior successes, particularly as the eldest scion. Military 
glory, as this chapter explains, was one area in which he sought to improve the clan’s 
reputation. He sought to build a reputation for military excellence, which he carefully 
cultivated throughout his career. This chapter also seeks to explore common 
assumptions about the Cassii, such as the notion that they were consistently 
populares.                
 Chapter Three treats Cassius’ life and early career from 54. It examines his 
birth and early childhood, his first steps in the forum, his supposed support of Cicero 
during the latter’s exile, and his election to the quaestorship. It also addresses 
chronological issues (e.g., the year of Cassius’ election to the quaestorship), as well as 
parenthetical issues, such as his physical appearance and whether or not he was a 
member of a religious college. The problems and limitations of the source material 
are explained throughout. This chapter also highlights the conventionality of Cassius’ 
early career up to this point, inasmuch as he looked for forensic opportunities, and 
made a useful marriage. 
Chapter Four examines Cassius’ career down to 49. It begins with his duties 
under Crassus as quaestor, examines his actions before and after the Battle of Carrhae, 
 
50 Plutarch warns his readers about Oppius’ unreliability. See further, Chapter 1, Section 4.  
51 His service under Crassus also received mainly positive treatment: Chapter 1, Section 5. 
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and looks at his performance as acting governor of Roman Syria. Though Cicero does 
not give Cassius as much credit as he deserves, his forces outlasted a Parthian siege 
and set a devastating ambush for the Arsacid army. By the end of his service, as this 
chapter shows, Cassius had established a sound military reputation, all the more so 
because he operated in very testing circumstances when the Roman hegemony of 
Syria (a very new province) was in genuine peril. 
 Chapter Five provides an examination of Cassius’ career from 50 to the end of 
45. It traces his role as an anti-Caesarian tribune before the outbreak of the civil war; 
his appointment as a prefect of the fleet; his prevarication over accepting a pardon 
from Caesar after Pharsalus; his sinecure as a Caesarian legate, and his hasty 
retirement from public life; his adoption of Epicureanism; and his return to public life, 
wherein he campaigned for the praetorship, only to begin conspiring against Caesar 
just months later. Throughout this period, Cassius becomes steadily more 
disillusioned with Caesar, especially after being overlooked for the urban praetorship. 
Caesar had crossed the Rubicon in defence of his dignitas; Cassius, as will be seen, 
acted with similar conviction to remove the dictator (“for life”) from power, although 
at least the tyrannicide had a better claim to be acting in the interest of his class.  
 Chapter Six explores Cassius’ role in Caesar’s assassination. It begins by 
making the case that he initiated the conspiracy, after assembling a group of 
likeminded dissidents. It will then be seen that these men were responsible for initial 
acts of opposition to Caesar before Cassius incorporated Brutus into the conspirators’ 
fold. The second half of the chapter examines Cassius’ various motives in moving 
against Caesar. The dictator’s repeated interference in Cassius’ career should be 
understood as the chief reason that the tyrannicide instigated the plot.  
 The Conclusion offers a summary of Cassius’ career and an analysis of his 
significance in the Late Republic. It further provides a fresh character assessment, 
which seeks to add nuance to the prevalent view that he was a choleric man. Though 
Cassius appears to have possessed a mercurial temperament, he could nevertheless 
demonstrate great compassion and, perhaps equally surprisingly, urbane wit. It is time 
to excise the one-dimensional view of him as dour and violent.52   
 
 
52 After the thesis proper, there are a series of Appendixes. Though not integral to the arguments of the 
thesis, these Appendixes provide important supplementary material on Cassius and his family. Indeed, 
where limited space within the thesis does not permit a sufficient explanation of an issue, it has been 
addressed in an Appendix. 
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 CHAPTER ONE 
THE SOURCES 
 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
Cassius garners his fair share of opprobrium in the ancient sources. For Valerius 
Maximus, the imperial author of Facta et Dicta Memorabilia, Cassius was nothing 
less than a parricide (1.8.8).1 Parricide was the worst crime imaginable to a Roman, 
but, for Valerius, Cassius had taken the wicked act to a new level of depravity by 
murdering Julius Caesar, the parens patriae.2 Like Dante in the Renaissance,3 
Valerius argues that Cassius had betrayed both Caesar and Rome.4 To be sure, 
Valerius ranks as one of Cassius’ harshest critics; but similar sentiments are expressed 
by Velleius Paterculus, who, in his brief Roman history, still finds time to censure 
Cassius as atrocissimi auctor facinoris (“the initiator of a most terrible crime”; 
2.46.4).5 Notably, Velleius’ uncle had served as a prosecutorial subscriptor in 
Cassius’ show trial for Caesar’s murder, so his tendentious view is perhaps 
unsurprising. Still, these two authors aptly illustrate the potential bias and obloquy 
that Cassius’ contentious career can provoke in the ancient sources.     
And yet, as Cremutius Cordus is said to have argued, Cassius also enjoyed his 
share of literary apologists –or, at least, even-handed commentators.6 Asinius Pollio, 
for instance, was said to have garlanded Brutus and Cassius with praise; Messala 
Corvinus longed openly for the days when he had served under Cassius; and Livy 
spoke of Brutus and Cassius as insignes viros.7  Thus, the ancient source tradition 
concerning Cassius is often antipodal, as traditions that deal with figures of his 
divisiveness often are. This chapter, then, examines the ancient evidence concerning 
Cassius’ career. After a brief survey of the general state of the source material (which 
is piecemeal), it analyses the persuasions of the attested non-extant sources (1.1). As 
 
1 Freyburger (1998) 114-15, on Cassius’ depiction in Valerius Maximus.  
2 Caesar as parens patriae: Fam. 12.3.1, Off. 3.83, App. B Civ. 2.106. Suet. Iul. 88, notes that the day 
of Caesar’s assassination was referred to as parricidium by the enemies of the assassins. See also Val. 
Max. 6.4.5 and Cic. Phil. 2.31, on the murder of the parens patriae being the worst kind of murder. 
Fam. 12.3 is the letter in which Cicero notes Cassius is being publicly accused of parricide by his 
enemies. On Caesar and the title parens patriae, see Stevenson (1998) 257-68. 
3 Dante, Inf. 34.61-7. On Dante’s characterisation of Cassius, see generally Belliotti (2011).   
4 Dettenhofer (1992) 123.   
5 Cf. Val. Max. 6.4.5. 
6 Tac. Ann. 4.34.  
7 For all references, see below.  
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mentioned, Cassius’ role as the initiator of the conspiracy naturally inspired mixed 
reactions from contemporary authors, many of whom wrote with the chief purpose of 
either defending or defaming his career. Accordingly, it is important to be alert to the 
tendentiousness of these sources, as they may often provide the extant sources with 
the information that make up the scholar’s principal evidence. The second section 
(1.2) continues on this path by offering a brief sketch of Cassius’ depiction in the 
major extant ancient authorities. 
The chief obstacle to reconstructing the early career of Cassius is that no 
ancient biography is extant. Only a cursory précis of Cassius’ career has survived in 
the obscure and late catalogue of important Romans, De viris illustribus.8 Whilst this 
source is not without value, at fewer than one hundred words it is hardly an 
embarrassment of riches, and occasionally betrays a hostile bent.9 Bereft of an ancient 
biographer, Cassius’ career must be reassembled from the piecemeal literary and non-
literary testimonia, all of which have their own attendant problems.   
However, the absence of an ancient biography of Cassius is not the only 
serious impediment. Unlike Cicero, Caesar, and even Brutus, Cassius does not appear 
to have bequeathed to antiquity a significant literary inheritance.10 He seems to have 
penned only a handful of letters to Cicero,11 of which three are preserved;12 and 
though he engaged in literary and oratorical pursuits, there is no hint that he 
disseminated his work in the same way that Brutus and Cicero did.13 It has been 
claimed (and accepted by some) that he wrote memoirs of his service during the 
 
8 [Aur. Vict.] De vir. ill. 83. The identity of the author is unknown, although the work is not to be 
confused with the eponymous work of Jerome: Sweeney (1968) 191-2. The De viris illustribus 
contains eighty-six mini-biographies, spanning the Alban kings through to Queen Cleopatra VII of 
Egypt (the only non-Roman). Keil (1850) 103-4, provides a dated but useful commentary; more recent 
is Braccesi (1973). The work can reasonably be dated to the first half of the fourth century AD: 
Schmidt (1989) 5.187-90; Bessone, ANRW (1982) 1257-63; Konrad (1994) xlix. However, Sherwin 
(1972) 145-6, (1973), does not include the last nine lives of DVI, including that of Cassius, which he 
appears to consider spurious, but cf. Sumner (1973) 209-10. 
9 Certain information about Cassius’ career is contained only in DVI: the anecdote about Cassius’ 
ironic moniker (Caryota, ‘The Date’), his comments during the assassination, and the reaction of 
Antonius to the news of his death. The hostile bent may derive from the sources the author used, as his 
treatment of Brutus is more favourable. Sage (1980) 184, has argued that the work is laudatory to 
Augustus.  
10 Collections of letters are reported by the ancient sources for both Antonius and Brutus: Ovid. Pont. 
1.1.23; Plut. Brut. 2.5. 
11 The small collection of Cassian letters in Cicero may only reflect the fact that, before the civil war, 
Cassius and Cicero were not on familiar terms. See Section 6 below.  
12 Cassius’ extant letters to Cicero: Cic. Fam. 12.11, 12.12, 15.19. Jointly with Brutus, he also penned 
letters to Antonius in 44: Fam. 11.2, 11.3. 
13 Rawson (1991) [1986] 489, notes Brutus’ predominance in the tradition in part because he left a 
literary record of speeches and philosophical tracts.  
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Parthian campaign, and that these were incorporated into Plutarch’s Life of Crassus. 
As this chapter explains, however, this hypothesis is unsubstantiated and unlikely.14 
Unlike Sulla, who was afforded the opportunity to defend his career in later life, 
Cassius left no traceable memoirs. Nor, unlike Brutus, did he receive the same level 
of posthumous laudation: only Messala Corvinus is suspected to have been an 
apologist.15 Orations and dicta are also in short supply. Two speeches survive in 
Appian, but, as will become apparent, these are of questionable veracity;16 and several 
dicta (including a few of his bons mots) are reported.17 The paucity of the information 
from Cassius’ own hand is a fundamental (occasionally insuperable) problem.  
This source problem is alleviated slightly by non-literary evidence, although 
even here there is a dearth of ancient material. Coins, gemstones, inscriptions, portrait 
busts, and even archaeological evidence can be pressed into service to illuminate 
Cassius’ career, or details of the Cassii Longini.18 The non-literary material is 
predominantly numismatic. Two silver tetradrachms that he minted in the East as 
proquaestor survive, as do the famous LEIBERTAS coins that were commissioned after 
Caesar’s assassination.19 Subordinates minted these latter coins, and it is unclear how 
much input Cassius had on the iconography and sloganeering. Whilst no elogium is 
known, a tentative portrait bust can be put forward.20 Inscriptions also help to 
elucidate his family tree and client connections.21  
The nature of the source tradition is also important. Cassius was the focus of 
both praise and polemic. Rawson, however, has claimed that he appears to have been 
the target of more Caesarian vituperation than Brutus,22 and he certainly does not 
seem to have had the same number of defenders celebrating his career. A catalogue of 
some of the known contemporary non-extant sources is thus in order.   
 
 
14 See section 1.2.V below, on “Cassius’ Memoirs”.  
15 See section 1.2.IV below, on Messala.  
16 See further, Chapter 3, Section 10.   
17 Quint. Inst. 6.3.90; Plut. Crass. 29.4; Sen. Suas. 1.5.   
18 One scholar argued he had discovered a villa of Cassius, but this proved incorrect (see Appendix F).   
19 For the coins that Cassius minted in the East, see Chapter 4, Section 10. 
20 See Appendix I.  
21 See Appendix H.  
22 There are two reasons for this, I believe: one, he was the mastermind of the assassination –and thus 
to Caesarians the most responsible for the dictator’s death; two, Cassius’ family and ancestry had 
occasionally been connected with attempts at overthrowing the sitting government, for example Sp. 
Cassius (cos. 501) and L. Cassius Longinus (pr. 66). For further discussion, see Chapter 2, Section 2.  
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1.1 NON-EXTANT SOURCES 
The pitfalls and dangers of Quellenforschung are many and well known; even the 
mention of the word runs the risk of inviting censure. But to understand the source 
tradition that exists, it is necessary to pursue (as much as the ancient authors permit) 
the ultimate authorities behind the extant sources, even if such an exercise is reliant 
on probability and will never be comprehensive.23 However, it is to be hoped that a 
greater appreciation of Cassius’ apologists and critics –the material from which our 
sources may often draw their information– will empower the reader to make informed 
decisions regarding the veracity of subsequent evidence on the tyrannicide. Certainty 
on such points is often elusive, but it is not a pointless endeavour. Cassius’ career 
would definitely invite moralistic comment, which ideally must be separated from the 
cold and hard facts of history. Can, for instance, an anecdote that claims he despised 
tyranny from boyhood be trusted? Was he really motivated to conspire against Caesar 
because the latter had stolen some lions he had procured in anticipation of aedilician 
games? Knowledge of the authorities –or even the type of authorities– behind these 
stories can only aid any subsequent analysis.  
I.  POLLIO 
Asinius Pollio is generally supposed to have written about Cassius and Brutus without 
prejudice. His Historiae of the civil war period was perhaps chronicled in seventeen 
books and seems to have taken as its starting point the year 60.24 It has sparked 
unabating debate.25 Of note is that in a speech which Tacitus puts in the mouth of 
Cremutius Cordus, Pollio is said to have decorated Cassius and Brutus with praise: 
Asinii Pollionis scripta egregiam eorundem memoriam tradant.26 This is important as 
Pollio is widely believed to be an integral source for many of the later histories that 
still survive, for instance Appian and Dio.27 Commended for his supposed objectivity, 
 
23 In defence of Quellenforschung, see Richardson (2011) 155-67.  
24 Hor. Odes. 2.1.1. Morgan (2000) 54. Havas (1980) 25-36, dates the start of Pollio’s work to 69; 
Woodman (2003) 191-216, to 109. See Pelling (2011) 45, with n.106, in response. See also Cornell, 
FRmH (2013) s.v. “C. Asinius Pollio” (56), 430-45.    
25 On Asinius Pollio, see Peter, HRR ii.LXXXIII-LXXXXVII, 67-70; André (1949); Coulter (1952) 32-
6; McDermott (1979) 55-60; Morgan (2000) 51-69; and esp. Pelling (2011) 44-7, with further 
bibliography cited therein (esp. p.45 n.110). Seventeen Books: Coulter (1952) 34. The testimony for 
this fact rests solely on the Suda, s.v. Ἀσίννιος Πωλίων.  
26 Tac. Ann. 4.34. On Cremutius’ trial, see Meier (2003) 91-127.   
27 Pollio was an important source for Appian and Dio according to Gowing (1992) 40. Source for 
Plutarch: Pelling (1979) 74-86, (1984) 88-103, (2011) 44-7. And supposedly Nicolaus of Damascus: 
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Asinius Pollio’s history is vaunted for its sagacious political insight and his 
employment of autopsy, or his asseveration to that end.28 Even the artistry with which 
he stitched together and narrated his account won compliments from no less a figure 
than Horace.29 However, his even-handed treatment of Cassius and Brutus does not 
necessarily mean he was a sympathetic Republican; far from it.30 In fact, he may have 
been responsible for the ironical observation that, in striving to restore the Republic, 
Cassius acted like a king (rex), a charge the tyrannicide denied.31 Pollio may also be 
the source for the information regarding Caesar’s comment that Brutus rather than 
Cassius must be urban praetor.32 Overall, the claim that Tacitus put in the mouth of 
Cremutius Cordus (which is a highly rhetorical passage after all) should be considered 
with caution. All that may be said confidently is that Pollio was a fairly neutral 
source, who may have dished out praise and censure in equal measure.33    
II. BIBULUS AND EMPYLUS 
Calpurnius Bibulus has the capital merit of being Brutus’ stepson, which makes him a 
source at the very heart of the Liberators’ inner circle.34 He appears to have composed 
a memoir, which Plutarch describes as a “small book of anecdotes about Brutus”.35 
There is nothing to suggest that this book discussed Cassius, though it is possible. But 
it is true that scholars sometimes credit him as the source of information about the 
 
Scardigli (1983b) 121-3. Velleius Paterculus: Wright (2002) 178-84. Not to mention, Suetonius: Suet. 
Iul. 30.4, 55.4, 56.4.  
28 On Pollio and his so-called ‘autopsy’, fundamental is Morgan (2000) 51-69. Clarke (1981) 80, notes 
that all the major historians of the Augustan age (Livy, Messala, and Pollio) wrote with supposed 
objectivity.   
29 Pelling (2011) 45. Hor. Odes 2.1. Narrative skill: Moles (1983a) 287-8; cf. Coulter (1952) 34, with 
n.8; Pelling (2011) 47n.114. Neutral: Suet. Iul. 56.4, containing his criticism of Caesar’s misleading 
commentarii. Asinius was the main patron of Vergil’s Ecologues: Cairns (2008) 49-79. Letters to 
Cicero: Gelzer (1972) 297-312. 
30 Those who argue Pollio was not a Republican sympathiser are: Bosworth (1972) 441-73; cf. Rawson 
(1975) 260; Tatum (2008) 15-16. Of course, Syme (1939) 482-6, maintained that Pollio was an 
outspoken critic of the principate till the end. See also Kornemann (1896) 590-600; Mendell (1928) 
201-3. Pollio’s political career does not necessarily reflect Republican sympathies: Vell. Pat. 2.63.3.    
31 Plut. Brut. 30.3 with Moles (1979) lvi. When Cassius is hailed by the Rhodians as a king, he 
responds, that he is not a rex but the slayer of a rex. The irony is obvious, however. Caesar, too, had 
denied being a rex in a famous exchange: Suet. Iul. 79.2, with Deutsch (1928) 394-8; Rawson (1975) 
148-59.      
32 Plut. Brut. 7.4. The ramifications of Caesar’s statement are discussed further in Chapter 6, Section 8.  
33 Peter HRR II.Lxxxiii-Lxxxvii, 67-70, identified only a handful of fragments that can with certainty 
be attributed to Pollio. Cf. Cornell, FRmH (2013) s.v. “C. Asinius Pollio” 56.  
34 Son of M. Calpurnius Bibulus (cos. 59) and Porcia: Syme (1986) 206n.48.  
35 Plut. Brut. 13.3: καί τι βιβλίδιον μικρὸν ἀπομνημονευμάτων Βρούτου γεγραμμένον ὑπ' αὐτοῦ 
διασῴζεται. See also, Plut. Brut. 23.7. Modern discussion: Peter, HRR II.LXVII.51-2; Moles (1979) 
lvi;  Hillard (1987) 33;  Pelling (2011) 51; Tatum (2011) 183.    
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estrangement and reconciliation of Cassius and Brutus before the assassination, as 
well as their friendship in general.36 This is, of course, speculative. Less uncertain is 
the political colouring of his work, which presumably extolled the cause of Brutus 
and Cassius.  If he presented the cause of the Liberators in favourable terms, however, 
some believe he was also partial to Brutus at Cassius’ expense.37 Even Plutarch 
concedes that, in the historical tradition he inherited, all noble Republican deeds were 
credited to Brutus; ignoble ones to Cassius.38 This trend accentuates a crucial point. 
Whereas friends and family lauded Brutus’ career –Bibulus, Empylus, Volumnius39– 
no such aggressive literary campaign seems to have been waged on behalf of Cassius, 
perhaps with the exception of Messala Corvinus.40 The tyrannicide does not appear to 
have had the same apparatus in place (or the inclination to engage in self-promotion)41 
to hand his memory down to posterity.      
               Like Bibulus, Empylus knew Brutus and Cassius personally.42 He had taught 
Brutus (and possibly Cassius) rhetoric at Rhodes and was later invited to stay at his 
house as a ‘philosopher in residence’.43 Close access to Brutus allowed Empylus to 
write, in Plutarch’s words, “a short but valuable book on Caesar’s assassination”, 
which was titled after its protagonist –Brutus, not Cassius.44 T. Hillard suggests that 
Empylus may be responsible for the so-called ‘reply’ in Plutarch’s Brutus defending 
Cassius’ honour as a tyrannicide rather than a petty Caesar-hater.45 Empylus may also 
be responsible for stories about the quarrels of Brutus and Cassius.46 Just like Bibulus, 
Empylus’ focus was clearly on Brutus, and he may have been prejudiced in favour of 
 
36 Plut. Brut. 7.1-5, 10.3, 28.3, 34.2-4, 35.2-4. 
37 Plut. Brut. 26.7-8, 34.1-35.3. For discussion, see Moles (1979) lvi.  
38 Plut. Brut. 1.4.  
39 Publius Volumnius mocked Cassius: Plut. Brut. 45.6-9. Volumnius was a friend and fellow student 
of Brutus, who was with him throughout his campaigns and with him at his death.    
40 On Brutus’ lionization, see briefly Tatum (2011) 183. As Tatum observes, Brutus was well aware 
that his deeds would be recorded by others, especially Empylus and Bibulus. For Messala, see 1.2.III 
below.   
41 Brutus depicted himself on the famous EID MAR coin (RRC, 508/3), whereas Cassius seems to have 
stuck strictly to imagery perhaps for propriety’s sake. In this regard, Cassius may have been more 
conservative than Brutus.    
42 On Empylus, see Pelling (1979) 87, (2011) 51. Empylus is perhaps the reason that Appian as well as 
Dio (who may have derived information from Appian) knew that Cassius attended Rhodes. 
43 Plut. Brut. 2.4.  
44 Plut. Brut. 2.4; FrGrH 191; Peter, HRR ii.LXVIII; Sedley (1997) 45; Pelling (2011) 51.   
45 Hillard (1987) 33. See Section 10 below. 
46 For instance, Plut. Brut. 7.1, 7.6-7, 8.3-6. 
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his student and friend to the detriment of Cassius.47 Regardless, the focus was Brutus 
and this is reflected in the source tradition.   
III. MESSALA 
Messala represents the other side of the coin. Dio writes that he was a close friend of 
Cassius.48 He served both Cassius and Brutus at Philippi, before joining M. Antonius 
(cos. 44).49 He wrote a history, perhaps entitled Commentarii de bello civili,50 in 
which he referred to Cassius as imperator suus, an indication of its favourable 
nature.51 Whilst the scope of Messala’s work is unknown, he appears to have been 
employed by Plutarch in his biography of Brutus, especially for much of the material 
on the Battle of Philippi.52 Rawson speculates that he may also have been responsible 
for treating the earlier parts of Cassius’ career, perhaps his service under Crassus, 
where the tyrannicide comes off rather well in Plutarch’s account.53 Details in 
Frontinus showcasing Cassius’ military ability may also derive from Messala.54 
Moreover, Plut. Brut. 29.1-2 and 30.1-2 are likely derived from him as they are 
favourable to Cassius at Brutus’ expense and serve as a counterweight to the pro-
Brutus material of Bibulus and Empylus. Overall, Messala has the great value of 
being an intimate of Cassius (he even saw him the night before the first Battle of 
Philippi).55And like Asinius Pollio he appears to have been an integral source for 
Plutarch.56 Messala is likely to have been the ultimate source for Appian’s more 
favourable portrait of Cassius in his synkrisis of the Liberators, especially as it 
foregrounds military concerns.57 The potential problem with Messala, of course, is 
that he may varnish much of Cassius’ career and this brings the historian no closer to 
 
47 Moles (1979) lxi.  
48 Cass. Dio 47.24.5.   
49 On this relationship, see Vell. Pat. 2.71.1. 
50 Moles (1979) lvii.  
51 Tac. Ann. 4.34. On Messala Corvinus, see Peter, HRR ii.LXXVIII-LXXXIII, 65-7; Valvo, ANRW 
1663-1680; Syme (1986) 200-26; Scardigli (1995) 23. Obviously, the sentiment behind the phrase is 
something akin to Whitman’s “O Captain! My Captain!” Welch (2009) 195-223, has argued that 
Messala played an integral role in establishing the tolerance of Augustus and his new regime. 
Naturally, an apologetic account of Cassius is to be expected (cf. Plut. Brut. 43.4). 
52 Plut. Brut. 40, 41.5, 42.5, 45.1, 45.7, 53. Moles (1979) xl; Syme (1986) 201. Messala was almost 
certainly the source for the story of Cassius’ suicide: Plut. Brut. 43.4-9 Peter, HRR. 2.82; Moles (1979) 
xlii.   
53 Such is the suggestion of Rawson (1991) [1986] 504. See further below, “Cassius’ Memoirs”. 
54 See, e.g., Strat. 4.2.1, which describes how Cassius’ troops were better trained than Brutus’ at 
Philippi. See also Syme (1986) 202.  
55 Plut. Brut. 40.4. 
56 Moles (1979) xliii-iv. Messala in Appian, perhaps: App. B Civ. 4.123, 4.133.  
57 App. B Civ. 4.123, 4.133. 
 18 
an accurate portrait of the tyrannicide. Still, it is useful to have positive information 
about Cassius.   
IV. BALBUS AND OPPIUS 
A minority of sources now lost are suspected to have been hostile. Caesar’s private 
secretary, L. Cornelius Balbus, is known to have written a memoir of his patron.58 
While such a work is likely to have been eulogistic in nature, it is not unreasonable to 
conjecture that it tackled the issue of Caesar’s death, a subject of intense debate then 
as it is now.59 It is possible that he, like Oppius perhaps, questioned the motivations of 
Cassius in assassinating Caesar.  Only the slenderest vestiges of Oppius’ works are 
extant.60 Unquestionably, he was a close friend and fervent supporter of Caesar, and 
owed much to him.61 It should cause no surprise, then, that soon after the Ides he set 
about writing a “panegyric” of Caesar.62 Plutarch and several other sources evidently 
drew on this work.63 However, Oppius did not simply write about his deceased friend. 
He is attested to have written vitae of both Scipio Africanus and (most importantly for 
this discussion) Cassius.64 As a loyal Caesarian, it has to be presumed that his work de 
vita Cassii was hostile, and in the mould of such invective pieces as In Pisonem, Anti-
Cato, and the second Philippic.65  Even in antiquity, Plutarch (for one) was wary of 
drawing on Oppius, as he makes clear in his Pompey: 
Ἀλλ' Ὀππίῳ μέν, ὅταν περὶ τῶν Καίσαρος πολεμίων ἢ φίλων διαλέγηται, 
σφόδρα δεῖ πιστεύειν μετὰ εὐλαβείας· 
But when Oppius discusses the enemies or friends of Caesar, one must be very 
cautious about believing him.66 
 
58 Suet. Iul. 81.2, Ap. Sid. Ep. 9.14.7. Cf. Plut. Caes. 60.8.  
59 Varius, a friend of Virgil and Horace (Hor. Od. 1.6; Verg. Ec. 9.35) wrote a poem entitled De Morte, 
probably based on Caesar’s death: Macrob. Sat. 6.1.39-40, 6.2.19-20. 
60 On Oppius and his work, see Peter, HRR ii.XLIII-IIII, 46-9; Strasburger (1938) 30-3; Geiger (1985) 
83-4; Townend (1987) 325-42; Pelling (2011) 49-50.   
61 Their association may have began as early as 61 (Suet. Iul. 72), but they were certainly intimate by 
54 (Cic. QFr. 3.8.1, Gell. NA 17.19.1) and with Balbus he served practically as a regent of Rome in 
46/45, or so Cicero implies: Att. 13.19.2, 13.27.1, 13.46.2. Caesar, in turn, showed Oppius affection 
and kindness:  Plut. Caes. 17.11; Townend (1987) 329.  
62Townend (1987) 325; Peter, HRR ii.XLIII-IIII, 46-9; Strasburger (1938) 30-3, notes that there is no 
confirmation Oppius wrote a biography of Caesar. Cf. Pelling (2011) 50. 
63 Plut. Caes. 17.7, 11; Suet. Iul. 53. For discussion, see Townend (1987) 329-30; Pelling (2011) 50. 
64 Peter, HRR ii.XLIII-IV, 46-8; Pelling (2011) 50n.124, notes a biography of Marius is “not unlikely”.  
65 Rawson (1991) [1974] 424, (1991) [1986] 491. If one accepts Wiseman’s (1998) 1-9, reconstruction 
about the publication of De Bello Gallico, Balbus and Oppius would certainly have had the apparatus 
in place to disseminate an invective against Cassius.        
66 Plut. Pomp. 10.8-9. 
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Bearing this statement in mind, the unfriendly pen of Oppius may be detected behind 
at least one anecdote about Cassius. It is again contained in Plutarch, this time his life 
of Brutus, and once more the Chaeronean is alert to the hostility of his source. A 
criticism that was evidently levelled against Cassius was that he murdered Caesar 
solely as a result of personal animosity towards the dictator (μισοκαῖσαρ).67 So what 
was the cause of their antagonism? Cassius’ detractors claimed that it stemmed from 
Caesar’s confiscation of lions that the tyrannicide had gathered in preparation for the 
aedilician games.68 As to the merits of this accusation, Plutarch is unusually 
trenchant: “In the case of Cassius, then, they say this was the chief reason for his 
plotting against Caesar; but it is not so.” (Τῷ δ' οὖν Κασσίῳ ταύτην μάλιστά φασιν 
αἰτίαν ὑπάρξαι τῆς ἐπιβουλῆς, οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγοντες.)69 Here the evidence suggests 
that Oppius or an anti-Republican source sought to paint Cassius as a malicious and 
petty enemy of Caesar, and certainly not an idealistic Republican acting on political 
principle. That Plutarch does not accept this account is revealing. In fact, he rebuts the 
unnamed author by citing a source more favourable to Cassius, perhaps Empylus70 or 
Messala. Truly, Cassius had always despised tyranny, this source avers. Proof can be 
found in his thrashing of young Faustus Sulla, who bragged that he would one day 
excel his father’s proscriptions.71  
               Further hostile information about Cassius –for instance, that his freedman 
Pindarus murdered him and that, as pro praetor in Syria, he trafficked in dates– may 
also stem from Oppius.72 But a caveat is required. There is an obvious danger in 
attributing all anti-Cassian material to Oppius.73  After all, Cassius and Brutus 
attracted criticism from many quarters. Nonetheless, it will suffice to conclude that 
Oppius is an anti-Cassian source whose most lasting impact was probably to present 
Cassius as a man motivated by personal hatred to kill Caesar. While it is unwise to 
 
67 Plut. Brut. 8.6. Modern discussion: Affortunati (2004) 57. See further Section 10 below.  
68 Plut. Brut. 8.6-7. Affortunati (2004) 5; Ryan (1999) 145-54. For this episode, see Chapter 6, Section 
7. Moles (1979) liv, suggests that Empylus was the authority behind this story, which seems 
implausible.   
69 Plut. Brut. 9.1 with Affortunati (2004) 57. Hillard (1987) 35-6, suggests that Oppius was the source 
of the anecdote about the lions. Moles (1979) l, does not wish to weigh in on Plutarch’s use of Oppius 
in the Brutus.     
70 So Hillard (1987) 35-6. 
71 Plut. Brut. 9.  
72 Murdered: Plut. Brut. 43.6;  Dates: [Aur. Vict.] De vir. ill. 83: Dein eo quod coemptis Syriacis 
mercibus foedissime negotiaretur, Caryota cognominatus est. Another hostile anecdote in the same 
source indicates his bitterness and fury during the conspiracy: Vel per me, inquit, feri.  
73 Scholars have detected Oppius’ hand in many places: see Delvaux (1991) 88-91.   
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plumb too far Oppius’ reasons for writing, given his unique friendship with Caesar 
such an explanation for Cassius’ actions is to be expected.74 Even if other detractors 
followed in his footsteps, he was nevertheless one of the earliest critics of the 
tyrannicide. How influential Oppius’ work proved to be is another matter. It may have 
thoroughly discredited Cassius; but there is also the possibility that, as with Hirtius’ 
attack piece on Cato (commissioned by Caesar), it had the opposite effect to the 
author’s intention and ended up glorifying the tyrannicide.75  
Most other known contemporary sources who treated either the political 
protagonists or the civil wars are little more than names.76 
V. CASSIUS – MEMOIRS 
It has not gone unnoticed that Cassius comes off rather well in Plutarch’s account of 
the Parthian campaign.77 This favourable depiction has occasioned plenty of debate, 
particularly regarding the source (or sources) behind Plutarch’s information.78 Several 
theories have been advanced, all worthy of discussion. However, of most interest here 
is whether Cassius himself was the ultimate authority for Plutarch’s narrative, a 
proposal that has been mooted repeatedly ever since the hypothesis of R. Flacelière, 
which was accepted by B. Scardigli.79 This theory posits, a priori, that Cassius 
 
74 Consider the case of a certain Lenaeus, who wrote a bitter attack piece on Sallust because he called 
Pompey (Lenaeus’ former master) a man of honest face but shameless character: Suet. Gram. 15. 
Cassius had done far worse to Caesar.   
75 On Hirtius’ unsuccessful critique of Cato (which Cicero recommended be circulated widely), see 
Cic. Att. 12.40.1, 12.41.4, 12.44.1, 12.45.2. Even Caesar’s Anti-Cato failed to bring his nemesis into 
disrepute; quite the contrary: Gelzer (1969b) 303.       
76 Potamon of Mytilene wrote in praise of Caesar and Brutus: FrGrH 147; Socrates of Rhodes wrote a 
Civil War: Athen. 4.29.147E; FrGrH 192. Boethus of Tarsus wrote an epic poem about Antonius: Str. 
14.674; Serv. Ecl. 9.36; FrGrH 194.  
77 Marshall (1976) 177; Rawson (1991) [1974] 424. Cassius in Crassus: 18.4, 20.2, 22.4, 23.3-4, 27.5, 
28.4-5, 29.4.   
78 Scardigli (1979) 108-9, for references.  
79 Flacelière (1972) 194: “Enfin je voudrais avancer une hypothèse. Je suis frappé par le grand nombre 
des passages où C. Cassius Longinus, quaestor de Crassus et future meurtrier de César, est nommé 
dans cette biographie; il apparait comme un sage conseiller du proconsul dont celui-ci eut le grand tort 
de négliger les avis. Cassius n’aurait-il pas laissé un récit de cette campagne, ou des Mémoires, que 
Plutarque aurait consultés directement ou aurait connus à travers un auteur qui les aurait utilisés?” See 
further, Adcock (1966) 59; Pelling (1979) 87n.96; Garzetti (1987) 215; Scardigli (1995) 24, who 
speaks unabashedly of “the history of Cassius”. Cf. Moles (1979) 101; Brenk (1977) 152n.8. Several 
scholars accept that Cassius may have written memoirs: Ward (1977) 295n.25; cf. Sherwin-White 
(1984) 281-2; Rawson (1991) [1974] 424; Retso (2003) 393; Regling (1899), discusses the sources and 
suggests more than one was employed, though Timagenes is a prime candidate. Brodersen (2010) 41, is 
very assertive: “Plutarch’s account derives ultimately from C. Cassius”.      
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penned memoirs about his time on campaign.80 It is best to address this hypothesis 
before considering alternative explanations. 
               Cassius sent letters to the senate after Carrhae detailing his on-going efforts 
to combat the Parthian menace.81 Updates of this sort were necessary.82 Yet there is 
no indication that he anywhere discussed Crassus’ conduct in these letters, although it 
is definitely possible that he had done so previously.83 Nonetheless, even if he had 
been tight-lipped about his commander as acting governor, it is possible that later in 
his career he felt the need to put on record his version of events, especially if 
scurrilous detractors had defamed his conduct and reputation.84 That Roman 
politicians wrote memoirs requires no argument.85 Motivations for writing varied 
substantially, but it is obvious that authors could be every bit as concerned with self-
exculpation as they were with trumpeting military and political excellence.86 
Politicians constantly fought to defend their reputations, which often encouraged 
proactive self-promotion.87 Clearly, Cassius was entitled, and may have felt obliged, 
to write an account of the Parthian campaign, particularly as he was the only survivor 
of consequence and may have wished to pre-empt or rebut any accusations of 
dereliction of duty.88  
While this reconstruction is not impossible, there were several additional 
contemporaries who may just as easily have served as Plutarch’s source. Scholarly 
speculation has run rife, although the most promising candidates are as follows:89  
(i) P. Licinius Apollonius, freedman of P. Crassus 
(ii) Messala Corvinus  
 
80 Zadorojniy  (1997) 171. 
81 Cic. Att. 5.21.1, 6.1.14. 
82 Caesar provided reports to the senate about his campaigns in Gaul. So, too, L. Munatius Plancus 
(Fam. 10.8), and Cicero (Fam. 15.2).   
83 If Cassius had lambasted Crassus in a letter or letters to the Senate, his criticism may have been 
recorded in the acta: Suet. Iul. 20. Attacks Fröhlich, RE s.v. “Cassius” 3.1727: “C. dagegen schöpfte 
Argwohn, kehrte nach Carrhae zurück und entkam auf einem andern Wege nach Syrien.” 
84 Plut. Crass. 29.5, appears hostile. Cf. Cass. Dio 40.25.4-5; Joseph. BJ. 1.180. Sampson (2008) 147, 
goes so far as to argue that this evidence demonstrates Cassius “betrayed” Crassus. Smith (1916) 261, 
cites Ferrero, who believes Cassius had obtained permission to separate from the main army. Caelius 
mentions rumours that Cassius’ profiteering was so flagrant that he had to start a war with the Parthians 
as a means to cover it up.    
85 Sulla: Plut. Sull. 6.5. See especially Lewis (1991) 509-19; Tatum (2011) 161-88.    
86 Tatum (2011) 181-4, on Varro, Brutus, and Q. Dellius. 
87 Hall (2013) 215-29. 
88 For a rebuttal of the view that Cassius deserted Crassus after Carrhae, see Chapter 4, Section 8. 
89 Pelling (1979) 87. Contra Zadorojniy (1997) 171. Nicolaus of Damascus wrote on Crassus’ Parthian 
War (Athen. 6.252d), but on the balance of probabilities scholars need to look for a Latin source 
(Adcock below).   
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(iii) Q. Dellius      
(iv) Cremutius Cordus90 
A. Lintott argues that Apollonius, who may have been present at the Battle of 
Carrhae, escaped with Cassius into Syria, which (he implies) explains the favourable 
treatment of him in Plutarch’s Crassus.91 However, it is not entirely certain that 
Apollonius even wrote an account of Carrhae, although Lintott cites Plutarch’s 
fulsome treatment of P. Crassus as evidence of Apollonius’ hand.92 Yet Cassius’ 
criticism of M. Crassus surely detracts from the picture the freedman would have 
striven to create. Another source is more likely to have been favourable to Cassius. 
Rawson speculates that Messala may have discoursed on his earlier career.93 But 
perhaps the best candidate is Q. Dellius, although he has not found favour among 
scholars.94    
               Mockingly described as desultor bellorum civilium by Messala, Dellius had 
joined Cassius after he defeated Dolabella in 43.95 This was, in part, enough to 
suggest the Latin source to Adcock.96 But there is far more to him than that. He 
certainly appears to have written a history –Plutarch dubs him Δέλλιος ὁ ἱστορικός.97 
Moreover, he is widely regarded as a chief source of Plutarch’s narrative of the 
Parthian War in his Antonius.98 Since the scope of Dellius’ works is uncertain, it is 
strange that Pelling does not credit him as a source of Crassus.99 At times, in fact, 
commonalities between Plutarch’s accounts seem to suggest Dellius as the common 
thread, notably the motif of Crassus and Antonius donning black and purple cloaks 
 
90 Rawson (1986) [1991] 504.  
91 Lintott (1976) 368: “If Apollonius had been with Crassus’ army, he probably owed his escape to 
Cassius.”   
92 Lintott (1976) 368. Plutarch’s treatment of P. Crassus’ death: Crass. 25. Apollonius’ potential 
account: Cic. Fam. 13.16. See also Rawson (1985) 79, on Apollonius.       
93 Rawson (1991) [1974] 424. On Messala Corvinus, see Peter HRR ii. LXXVIII-LXXXIII 65-7.     
94 Rejected by Pelling (1979) 87; Hillard (1987) 21n.11; cf. Zadorojniy (1997) 171. However, Adcock 
(1966) 59, proposed Dellius.  
95 Sen. Mai. Suas. 1.7; Vell. 2.84.2. On his turbulent career, see Wissowa, RE (1903) IV.2,  2447-8; on 
Dellius’ treatment of Antony’s Parthian campaign, see Kelly (2008) 209-34.  
96 Adcock (1966) 59. Chlup (2013) 117, argues that Dellius is Plutarch’s source because the Parthian 
narrative in Crassus ends where it takes off in Antonius; cf. Rawson (1991) [1974] 424; Marshall 
(1976) 168.    
97 Plut. Ant. 59.6 with Pelling (1979) 88.  
98 Pelling (1979) 88, who notes the commonality between Plut. Ant. 49.4-5 and Dellius at FrGH 197.1.   
99 While Pelling accepts that Dellius may have written more than one work and that his accounts may 
have gone as far as Actium, he does not think a treatment of Crassus’ campaign plausible: Pelling 
(1979) 88, with n.101. Hillard (1987) 21n.11, notes Pelling is trying to have his cake and eat it too by 
rejecting Dellius as the source of the Crassus, while advocating his use in the Antonius. Moreover, later 
Pelling (1988) 210, credits Dellius with describing Ventidius’ campaign against the Parthians.       
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respectively.100 Both accounts are also littered with figures and casualty counts, a 
particular feature of Dellius.101 As he wrote his narrative after the battle of Actium, 
perhaps such a favourable treatment of Cassius should not be expected.  
Several other Latin sources cannot be overlooked. Asinius Pollio, though 
dismissed by Pelling, cannot be discounted.102 He fits Adcock’s criterion of a Latin 
source, and, as noted earlier, he is said to have extolled Cassius with praise in his 
works.103 However, did he treat Cassius’ service under Crassus? As has been seen, his 
account of the civil wars took as its starting point 60, so Carrhae may well have been 
a subject or flashpoint. Livy, too, may be behind the information about Cassius, as he 
spoke of Brutus and Cassius as insignes viri.104 Rawson does not discount the 
possibility that someone in Cassius’ household may also have written a memoir.105 
Nonetheless, Plutarch himself must not be overlooked either. The contrast between 
Cassius and Crassus is so stark that some would argue it is by literary design. For 
Rawson, Cassius “plays the role of adviser and Cassandra to the expedition”.106 Such 
a trope –that of the ‘Good Counsellor’– is a familiar theme in Plutarch and ancient 
historiography in general.107     
               Therefore, Cassius is one of many candidates who could have written about 
his role on the expedition.108 Given the details that Plutarch furnishes, Cassius or 
someone close to him (or with direct knowledge of his version of the campaign) has 
to have served as the source. Consider, too, the insightful details of his defence of 
Syria described in Frontinus,109 often overlooked by scholars. It is likely that 
Frontinus’ information came from the same writer who provided information for 
Plutarch’s Crassus. And given the interest in Cassius as a military commander and 
tactician, the most likely candidate who emerges is Dellius or Messala. Also 
noteworthy is the apologist at work in Dio’s account, who stresses that Cassius 
 
100 Plut. Crass. 23.1, Ant. 44.3 with Zadorojniy  (1997) 171. 
101 Pelling (1988) 221, on Dellius’ penchant for figures.  
102 Pelling (1979) 88. 
103 Tac. Ann. 4.34.  
104 Again this is according to Cremutius Cordus via Tacitus: Ann. 4.34. Yet Manuwald (1979) 191-2, 
notes that this Tacitean passage may indicate that Livy’s treatment of Brutus and Cassius may not have 
been as favourable as his treatment of Pompeius. Cf. Toher (2009) 232.  
105 Rawson (1982) 548n.52.  
106 Rawson (1991) [1974] 424.  
107 For Plutarch, Nestor was the paradigm of the wise counsellor: Plut. Mor. 788-90, 795. Since 
Herodotus, the wise advisor trope had flourished: Lattimore (1939) 24-35.      
108 Cassian Biographer: Rawson (1991) [1974] 424. 
109 Front. Str. 2.35. 
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modestly refused the supreme command when offered it by the troops, a clear act of 
pietas towards his senior commander.110 For the purposes of this discussion, it is 
important to note that there is no solid evidence that Cassius penned his own memoirs 
of those fateful years.     
 What conclusions can be drawn about the non-extant sources? Oppius likely 
lies behind elements of the anti-Cassian tradition. Messala is the likeliest candidate to 
have acted as a Cassian apologist, although Empylus and Bibulus may also have 
sought to defend his career in the process of trumpeting Brutus. Of these latter 
figures, however, it seems clear that their focus was chiefly on Brutus, and may have 
been so to the detriment of Cassius. Thus, there is no decisive evidence that Cassius 
wrote a memoir of the Parthian campaign.       
 
1.2 EXTANT PRIMARY SOURCES 
In 1986, E. Rawson provided a judicious analysis of the extant primary sources’ 
treatment of Cassius and Brutus, in which she argued that Cassius was a “figure of 
fully equal importance” to Brutus.111 She also outlined the various strands of 
favourable and unfavourable traditions that vied for currency after Philippi. This 
section, then, will offer an examination of the strengths and weaknesses of the key 
sources. Whilst some contemporary sources were favourable to the Republicans, this 
trend is inverted with the extant primary sources. Cicero is the most favourable 
source, Livy (via Florus) appears to have treated the Republicans with due respect; 
but many others did not, particularly Velleius Paterculus.112 History was rewritten: 
Cassius, as Cremutius Cordus was to observe, went from being the object of praise to 
the focus of disparagement.113         
VI. CICERO 
Cicero’s importance as a Late Republican source is undeniable. Though he is neither 
an impartial nor infallible observer, he provides an often-perceptive eyewitness view 
of the Republic’s final years. A close friendship –yet not as intimate as some would 
 
110 Cass. Dio 40.28. Batstone and Damon (2006) 37, on pietas as the quintessential Roman value.  
111 Rawson (1991) [1986] 488-507. 
112 Cf. Valerius Maximus, who mentions Cassius intermittently in his work, and goes further than most 
when he describes Cassius as a traitor to the state (1.8.8), as noted at the beginning of this chapter.  
113 Tac. Ann. 4.34. 
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imply114– with Cassius in his later years (and some connection with him even earlier) 
furnishes enlightening personal and political details about the tyrannicide, usually 
unrecorded elsewhere.115  For instance, at a key flashpoint in Cassius’ early career –
his defence of Syria against a Parthian invasion– Cicero was in the neighbouring 
province, keeping a close eye on his junior colleague.116 Later he would laud Cassius’ 
martial defence of Syria to the senate;117 at the time, however, his correspondence was 
far less glowing, although it is possible that his own political interests and triumphal 
aspirations may have led him to downplay Cassius’ accomplishments.118    
               Cicero also provides especially useful information about Cassius after the 
civil war, including his indecisiveness about seeking clemency from Caesar, while 
some of the die-hard Republicans (relatives even) continued their resistance.119 
During the bleak period when Cassius retired from politics, he corresponded with 
Cicero about philosophy and literature.120 As Cassius became more prominent in the 
affairs of state, Cicero’s opinion of him correspondingly becomes more positive. It 
would be incorrect, however, to suggest that Cicero enjoyed the same relationship 
with Cassius that he did with Brutus, a dedicatee of several of the consular’s treatises. 
For all that, Cicero still furnishes more insight into Cassius than any other source.121  
VII. AUGUSTUS 
Augustus wrote an autobiography in thirteen books commonly referred to as the Lost 
Memoirs of Augustus.122 Though no fragments survive, it is almost certain to have 
been hostile to Cassius and Brutus. A clue as to its contents may be gleaned from his 
formal and abridged Res Gestae, which dismisses the self-styled Liberators as 
murderers, justly convicted at a public trial. Partisan and polemical his writing 
 
114 Canfora (2007) 222-3.  
115 See, especially, Cic. Fam. 11.1-3, 12.1-12; 12.11-12 and 15.19: Cassius’ letters to Cicero.  
116 Cic. Fam. 2.10.2, cf. the letter of M. Caelius Rufus: Fam. 8.10.  
117 Cic. Phil. 11.35.  
118 Cic. Att. 5.21.2, 6.1.14, where he refers to the ineptas litteras of Cassius. But cf. Fam. 2.10.2. 
Chapter 4, Section 11 explores further Cicero’s motivations for describing Cassius’ achievements with 
understatement.    
119 Other useful information includes: petitioning in behalf of other elites not yet pardoned, his 
appointment as Caesar’s personal legate, his self-imposed political retirement on his return to Italy, and 
his adoption of Epicureanism; his disdain for Cn. Pompeius; and his desire to engage in rhetoric and 
philosophy with Cicero.    
120 Cic. Fam. 15.19. Cassius also visited Cicero’s estate and engaged in oratorical and literary pursuits: 
Cic. Fam. 7.33.2; 9.18.2. 
121 Caesar’s use as a source will be treated in Chapter Five.   
122 De vita sua: Suet. Aug. 85.1. On the Memoirs, see now generally Smith and Powell (2009). 
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certainly is: “I drove the men who slaughtered my father into exile with a legal order, 
punishing their crime, and afterwards, when they waged war on the state, I conquered 
them in two battles.”123 Distortions and mendacity litter this passage – Augustus did 
not drive Brutus and Cassius into exile and his forces were defeated in the first battle 
of Philippi. Even more tendentious, of course, is the statement that the Republicans 
made war on the res publica. Augustus, then, promotes the idea that Cassius and 
Brutus had stoked the flames of discontent and rekindled civil war, thus recasting the 
tyrannicides as base revolutionaries.124 Evidence of this line of attack is not hard to 
find elsewhere. The Augustan mouthpiece Nicolaus claims the Liberators offered to 
enfranchise the slaves, and M. Agrippa, Augustus’ alter-ego, spoke of them in the 
same breath as Sertorius.125  
               However, neither Cassius nor Brutus was the subject of damnatio memoriae 
(unlike Antonius).126 In fact, as events unfurled and his grip on power tightened, 
Augustus became more tolerant of the memory of Brutus and Cassius, not only 
because the Republicans could no longer trouble him but also because he wished to 
rehabilitate his own reputation, which had suffered as a result of his bloody early 
career.127 This forbearance dissipated, Tacitus claims, when Tiberius ascended to the 
purple; once more the tyrannicides were referred to as latrones.128 It was in this 
environment that Cremutius Cordus styled Cassius the “last of the Romans” (ultimus 
Romanorum), for which he was ostensibly brought to trial.129 Throughout the rest of 
imperial history, Brutus and Cassius would enjoy a mixed reception.      
VIII. VELLEIUS  
Velleius Paterculus’ uncle served as the subscriptor at Cassius’ trial for the murder of 
Caesar.130 Like his uncle Capito, the Tiberian historian is just as prosecutorial in his 
treatment of Cassius.  As mentioned earlier, Cassius is first described by Velleius as 
 
123 Aug. RG. 2.  See also Rawson (1991) [1986] 491-2. Cf. Babcock (1962) 30-2, on the damnatio 
memoriae.  
124 Rawson (1991) [1986] 492, citing Joseph. AJ 19.184; Suet. Oth. 10.1. 
125 Nic. Dam. 49; Cass. Dio 52.17.4. Nicolaus’ reliability is discussed in Chapter 6, Section 4.  
126 Tac. Ann. 4.35, on the imperial effigies of Brutus and Cassius.  
127 Plut. Comp. Dion. et Brut. 5; cf. Suet. Rhet. 6; esp. Tac. Ann. 4.34.  
128 Tac. Ann. 4.34. 
129 Tac. Ann. 4.34-5; cf. Cass. Dio 56.37. Quint. Inst. 10.1.104, indicates the passages Cremutius wrote 
about the Republicans were “expurgated”. On Cordus and his trial, see Rogers (1965) 351-359; 
McHugh (2004) 391-408.  
130 Vell. Pat. 2.69.5 with Sumner (1970) 264. Cf. Plut. Brut. 27; Aug. RG. 2. Rawson (1991) [1986] 
493, concluded that Velleius was “basically hostile” to Cassius.  
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the author of a “most terrible” deed (atrocissimi auctor facinoris), lest his readers 
should forget.131 This comment comes as Velleius describes the aftermath of the 
Battle of Carrhae. Other historians praise Cassius for saving the remnants of Crassus’ 
army and for repelling a Parthian invasion; Velleius refuses to credit Cassius with the 
impressive defence of Syria, which he instead puts down to a fortunate series of 
events (felici rerum eventu).132 Even here, then, Cassius is deprived of meritorious 
conduct.133 His personality comes under fire too. Unlike the man he slayed, Cassius 
despised clementia according to Velleius, which was repugnans naturae suae.134 And 
in a set-piece comparison of Cassius and Brutus, Velleius constructs an artificial 
antithesis between the two men, which allows him to damn by faint praise the 
former.135 Velleius, then, is a hostile source whose assessment of Cassius should be 
taken with a large pinch of salt.136 On occasion, however, he does give credit to 
Cassius, as when he captured the city of Rhodes, which he describes as a campaign of 
great difficulty.137 Although Velleius is predominantly a hostile source, at least his 
tendentiousness is readily apparent.     
IX. JOSEPHUS 
Cassius’ ruthlessness in the Jewish quarter of the Greek East naturally did not endear 
him to Josephus, who takes the tyrannicide to task for his many misdeeds: mass 
enslavements, extortionate tax-collecting, and menacing political interference.138 
Josephus’ Cassius is irritable, intimidating, and insatiably greedy, an assessment 
which no doubt reflects contemporary and oral reports, if not his own slant.139 Cassius 
is also a hypocrite: the self-proclaimed tyrannicide rules the port-city of Tyre in an 
 
131 Vell. Pat. 2.46.4.  
132 Vell. Pat. 2.46.4.  
133 Helpfully, the accounts of Cicero, Frontinus, and Josephus serve as a check to this misleading 
characterisation.  
134 Vell. Pat. 2.69.6. Contra Cic. Fam. 15.19.4. See Woodman (1983) 167, on the ancient belief that 
everyone, even the worst, contained minor elements of good. Yet as this thesis will endeavour to show, 
the reality was not so black and white. 
135 Vell. Pat. 2.72.2.  
136 For a summary of scholarly opinions on Velleius, see von Albrecht and Schmeling (1997) 1073-4, 
for thorough bibliography up to the close of the twentieth century. Cf. Sumner (1970) 257-97, who has 
tried to rehabilitate Velleius, arguing that he was no Tiberian apologist, yet this fails to convince. See 
also Cowan (2011). 
137 Vell. Pat. 2.69.6.  
138 Joseph. AJ. 14.119-22, 271-6, BJ. 1.180, 218-22, 238. 
139 Rawson (1991) [1986] 108-9.    
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authoritarian manner.140 Caesar’s assassination is described as a treacherous act and 
Cassius and Brutus are later accused, if through the Emperor Otho’s words, of 
rekindling civil war.141 However, Josephus does provide useful (if tantalizingly brief) 
information about Cassius’ activities in Syria and Judaea after the Battle of 
Carrhae.142 (One may suspect he exaggerates in claiming that Cassius enslaved 30,000 
Jews at Tarichaea.)143 But these events and Cassius’ role in them are treated in 
summary fashion. In fairness, a detailed, additional work of history is promised, 
though Josephus either did not get round to writing it or else it has been lost.144 He 
notes that other historians have dealt with the Carrhae campaign and its aftermath, 
though (as usual) no names are mentioned.145 In the end, Josephus is a limited though 
occasionally useful source, who must nevertheless be treated with caution as he is ill-
disposed towards Cassius.  
X. PLUTARCH 
Besides Cicero, Plutarch is our best source for the life and career of Cassius. He drew 
heavily on historical, biographical, and oral material, although often for didactic and 
moralistic purposes. Herein lies the danger for the historian. Though he utilises a vast 
array of historical evidence, Plutarch frequently tampers with the particulars to create 
his own edifying, literary biographies. True, he serves up invaluable information on 
Cassius, mainly in relation to Brutus; yet an editorial bent favouring Brutus regularly 
offsets his key insights. To be fair, Plutarch concedes that he is aware of his bias, as 
he outlines in the first chapter of his Brutus:  
ὥστε καὶ τοὺς ἀπεχθανομένους αὐτῷ διὰ τὴν ἐπὶ Καίσαρα συνωμοσίαν, εἰ μέν 
τι γενναῖον ἡ πρᾶξις ἤνεγκε, Βρούτῳ προςάπτειν, τὰ δυσχερέστερα δὲ τῶν 
γεγονότων τρέπειν εἰς Κάσσιον, οἰκεῖον μὲν ὄντα Βρούτου καὶ φίλον, ἁπλοῦν 
δὲ τῷ τρόπῳ καὶ καθαρὸν οὐχ ὁμοίως. 
As a consequence, even those who hated him on account of his conspiracy 
against Caesar ascribed whatever was noble in the undertaking to Brutus, but laid 
the more distressing features of what was done to the charge of Cassius, who was 
 
140 Joseph. AJ. 14.288.  
141 Treacherous assassination: Joseph. BJ. 1.218; rekindling civil war: AJ. 19.184.  
142 Joseph. AJ. 14.119-22, BJ. 1.180.  
143 Joseph. AJ. 14.119.  
144 Joseph. BJ. 1.180.  
145 Joseph. AJ. 14.122. Nicolaus of Damascus treated the campaign: Athen. 6.252d.   
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a kinsman of Brutus, indeed, and his friend, but not so simple and sincere in his 
character.146 
Even Plutarch, then, is suspicious of the one-sided tradition he has inherited about 
Cassius and Brutus. However, this tradition permits him to use Cassius as a foil in his 
Brutus.147 Indeed, Plutarch draws many parallels between the two men in his 
biography, often to the detriment of Cassius. Brutus serves as a model of a 
Philosopher-king,148 whose political actions are grounded in philosophical principles. 
Cassius, conversely, is depicted as an uncommitted Epicurean, who is often moved by 
his uncontrollable emotions.149 Overall, Plutarch’s slant in the Brutus is to sharply 
contrast the two men: Cassius’ flaws are designed to amplify Brutus’ virtues.  
 There are also episodes in the Brutus where Plutarch may magnify Brutus’ 
importance. After Pharsalus, for example, Plutarch claims that it was Brutus who 
softened Caesar towards Cassius, thus laying the groundwork to secure the 
tyrannicide a pardon.150 Yet Plutarch may also amplify Cassius’ historical influence 
too. As noted earlier in the chapter, Plutarch’s Crassus provides a very positive 
account of Cassius’ conduct under M. Crassus in Parthia.151 Cassius seems to play 
Cassandra to the expedition in a way that suggests a concerted effort at self-
exculpation.152 Here, again, it may be suspected that Cassius’ role and foresight on 
campaign are exaggerated.  
Plutarch also cites sources that are suspiciously hostile or apologetic in nature. 
In addition to the anecdote mentioned earlier about Caesar confiscating some lions 
belonging to Cassius, there is another story (teleological in nature) in which the young 
Cassius assaults Faustus Sulla, after he threatened to proscribe people as his father 
had done. Historians, therefore, must be alert to Plutarch’s literary and didactic aims 
when discussing Cassius, as well as the potential distortions in his source material.  
  
 
146 Plut. Brut. 1.4.  
147 FitzGibbon (2008) 459. 
148 See Plut. Brut. 1.3; cf. Dillon (2008) 364. 
149 Uncommitted Epicurean: Plut. Brut. 39.6. Anger: Brut. 9.1, 29.2.   
150 Plut. Brut. 6.5. Cf. Brut. 28.3, 6, where Brutus recalls Cassius from his campaign.  
151 See, for example, Plut. Crass. 20.2, 22.4, 23.3-4, 28.3-29.5.   
152 Rawson (1991) [1974] 424, notes Cassius “plays the role of adviser and Cassandra” in the Crassus.   
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XI. APPIAN 
Appian153 may ultimately censure Cassius for his leading role in Caesar’s assas-
sination, but, as F. Fröhlich long ago noted, he also preserves and regurgitates 
material favourable to the tyrannicide.154 His pro-Cassius source was perhaps 
Messala, who, as has already been seen, is said to have trumpeted the achievements of 
his imperator.155 Appian’s account is useful then, inasmuch as it can serve as a 
counterweight to Plutarch’s overly favourable assessment of Brutus.156 This is not to 
suggest that Appian is always to be preferred over other sources, however. He makes 
notable mistakes, especially in identifying the tyrannicide as the man who came 
across Caesar in the Hellespont after Pharsalus.157 The historian must also be wary of 
using speeches Appian reports. Indeed, he reports two of Cassius’ speeches; however, 
as this thesis will note, these are likely to be his own inventions.158  
Nevertheless, Appian does record useful details otherwise unrecorded.159 One 
such important detail is that Caesar had designated Cassius as governor of Syria for 
43, the ramifications of which are discussed in the final chapter of this thesis.160 
Appian is also useful on Cassius’ relationship with the island of Rhodes, where he had 
studied under the rhetorician Archelaus.161 Most importantly, however, Appian offers 
a notably different synkrisis of Brutus and Cassius. While Velleius and Plutarch 
dismiss Cassius, Appian’s portrait is far more favourable, noting he was a better, 
stricter commander, whose orders were followed without question.162 Cassius, Appian 
concludes, was wholly focused on the war against the triumvirs, like a gladiator 
facing his antagonist.163 The danger of using Appian then is all too obvious: unlike the 
other sources who diminish Cassius’ importance, the Alexandrian may give the 
tyrannicide too much credit.  
 
153 For a useful study of Appian, see Gowing (1992). Cf. also Welch (2015) 1-13. 
154 App. B Civ. 1.4, 2.111; Fröhlich, RE 3.1735. For a reevalution of Appian, see Welch (2015) 1-13.  
155 Appian may have supplemented the information of Asinius Pollio with Messala Corvinus (B. Civ. 
4.38). Cf. Tac. Ann. 4.34.     
156 He also provides alternative histories to Plutarch, for instance in the case of Theodotus, a man 
crucified by Cassius according to Appian (Brutus, according to Plutarch): App. B Civ. 290. 
157 App. B Civ. 2.88. On this episode, see Chapter 5, Section 3.  
158 For a discussion of these speeches, see Chapter 3, Section 10. Cf. Gowing (1990) 158-80, who also 
questions the historicity of Appian’s Cassian speeches; Gowing (1991) 135-41, (1992).  
159 App. B Civ. 2.122: Appian alone notes that Cassius stabbed Caesar in the face, and addressed the 
crowd on the Ides. 
160 App. B Civ. 4.57.  
161 App. B Civ. 4.65, 67-8.   
162 App. B Civ. 4.123. 
163 App. B Civ. 4.133. 
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XII. DIO  
Dio164 considers Cassius to have been politically misguided, and in assassinating 
Caesar, responsible for destabilising Rome.165 A Republican sympathiser Dio may not 
be, but he does offer several interesting details about the career of Cassius: he 
discusses Cassius’ ambush of Osaces in Syria;166 describes Cassius’ flight to Cato on 
learning of Pompey’s defeat; and records his subsequent pilgrimage to Caesar in 
search of clemency.167  Dio is also the only source to note Cassius’ public opposition 
to Caesar in early 44, an anecdote admittedly in which the historian stresses the 
dictator’s tolerance.168 He also provides important details about the lead-up to and the 
aftermath of the assassination.169  
 
1.3 CONCLUSION 
The source tradition concerning Cassius is far less favourable than that which treats 
Brutus. There is a strong tradition of sources that were critical of Cassius, particularly 
Oppius, Velleius, and Valerius Maximus. As is now clear, not only is evidence on 
Cassius far from plentiful, but it also must be analysed carefully. Appian, for instance, 
preserves a tradition that is favourable to Cassius, perhaps derived from Messala. This 
tradition is useful as a counter-example to the mainly effusive assessments of Brutus, 
but may be equally apologetic in nature and thus susceptible to the same bias and 
distortions. Augustus, Nicolaus, and Velleius provide accounts of Cassius that are 
highly suspect. Given that Augustus’ legitimacy was predicated on the discrediting of 
Cassius and Brutus this is not surprising. Moreover, whereas Brutus is often ascribed 
patriotic, statesmanlike, or philosophical reasons for his decision to assassinate 
Caesar, Cassius is (with one notable exception) generally characterised as a Caesar-
hater, a man who himself aspired to regal or tyrannical power.      
 
164 I refer to Cassius Dio as Dio throughout this thesis for the single reason that there is already a 
confusing number of Cassii in this story. Millar (1964) provides the standard study of Dio. See also 
Gowing (1992).     
165 Cass. Dio 44.1.5. He describes the assassination as illegal and impious. 
166 Cass. Dio 40.29.3. Cf. [Aur. Vict.] De vir. ill. 83. 
167 Cass. Dio 42.12.4.  
168 Cass. Dio 44.8.1-2. Nevertheless, Dio credits Brutus with forming the conspiracy, in contrast to 
Plutarch and Appian: 44.14.1-4. The question of who formed the conspiracy is the central focus of 
Chapter 6.  
169 Cass. Dio 44.15.4, 44.16.1, 44.34.6-7.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE CASSII LONGINI 
 
2.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will offer an account of the Cassii Longini, a decision that warrants 
justification. The Republican Cassii Longini have not been the subject of an extended 
study since the third volume of Paulys Realencyclopädie (1899).1 As will be apparent, 
scholarship (and the scholar’s methodological toolbox) has advanced tremendously 
since then. However, this progress has not trickled down and improved our 
understanding of the Cassii Longini; indeed, much that has been written about the 
prominent members of the family is questionable or demonstrably incorrect.2 Thus a 
new, concentrated investigation is now required.3 Accordingly, it is to be hoped that a 
better knowledge of the Cassii Longini will permit a more insightful assessment of 
their most famous member.  
               The first part of this chapter (2.1) will offer a short, general overview of the 
Cassii Longini’s place within the Roman nobility. The second part (2.2) will reassess 
the careers of the most prominent members of the gens Cassia, in an attempt to 
demonstrate how their achievements and failures may have influenced the 
tyrannicide. The third part (2.3) will sketch some basic information about Cassius’ 
parents and siblings. The final part (2.4) will make the case that Q. Cassius (tr. pl. 49) 
was Cassius’ brother. Ultimately, this chapter aims to illustrate the expectations 
placed upon Cassius as a member of an illustrious noble family which had attained 
the consulship through four consecutive generations.        
 
1 Before Paulys RE, Wilhelm Drumann had treated all the major members of the Republican Cassii 
Longini:  Drumann-Groebe (1964) [18992] 2.93-139. See RE (1899) s.v. “Cassius” 3.1678-1753. The 
appearance of BNP (2006) 2.1166-8, provided a welcome and useful update, but still very brief and 
rudimentary. This is also true of the OCD4 (2012) 288-9. An unpublished doctoral thesis on the Cassii 
treats only those members who were moneyers, focusing on numismatic concerns: Cody (1968).     
2 A few examples will suffice. C. Cassius Longinus (cos. 171) is termed a “plebeian extremist” by 
Scullard (1951) 194-8; L. Cassius Longinus Ravilla is regarded as a “popularis politician”: Alföldi 
(1956) 85, “severe popularis”; Paul (1984) 104; Katz (1988) 194-6 “severe popularis”; And Q. Cassius 
Longinus (tr. pl. 49) is still held to be the “cousin” of Cassius the assassin: Sumner (1973) 48-51; 
Shackleton Bailey (1968) 2.320; Harlan (1995) 143-4; Drumann-Groebe (1964) [18992] 2.129-130; 
Münzer, RE (1899) s.v. “Cassius” 3.1740: Syme (1939) 64n.2; Gruen (1974) 182; Linderski (1975) 37. 
See also, Cadoux and Seager, s.v. “Q. Cassius” OCD4 (2012) 289. Syme (1986) 98, argued that L. 
Cassius Longinus (tr. pl. 44) was also Cassius’ cousin rather than his brother.   
3 In a similar vein, Carlsen (2006) has charted the rise and fall of the Republican Domitii Ahenobarbi 
with some profitable results.  
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2.1 THE REPUBLICAN CASSII LONGINI 
The plebeian4 Cassii Longini5 were perhaps originally from Latium,6 although they 
had arrived at Rome during the First Punic War,7 if not earlier, and attained their first 
consulship in 171.8 Over the course of the next one hundred years they amassed an 
additional six consulships and two censorships, a tremendous feat, which, during a 
similar timeframe, was surpassed by only a handful of blue-blooded families such as 
the Licinii.9 This sustained consular success made the Longini one of the most 
eminent houses in the final two centuries of the Republic. Although they were neither 
the oldest nor the most prolific plebeian aristocrats, Tacitus could nevertheless aptly 
describe them as antiquum and honoratum.10 Since the Middle Republic, then, the 
Cassii had been a dependable consular family of some influence.  
               They cultivated friendships with leading aristocratic families, garnered both 
domestic and international clientele, and accumulated prodigious capital. By the first 
century, Cassius himself could comfortably take the hand of Junia Tertia, daughter of 
D. Iunius Silanus (cos. 62) and the redoubtable Servilia. The union brought into his 
orbit as kin M. Brutus, M. Cato, M. Lepidus, and P. Servilius Isauricus (among 
 
4 Plebeian nobiles: Tac. Ann. 6.15; Asc. Tog. Cand. 82C. It must be noted that some scholars have 
argued the Cassii Longini might have claimed patrician status (or, in fact, once been patrician): Brunt 
(1982) 5-6. This issue –and many other complicated historical debates– are addressed in more detail in 
the Appendices of this thesis: see Appendix A. A family tree is provided in Appendix H. 
5 Of all the branches of the gens Cassia, the redoubtable Longini were singularly illustrious. Unlike 
other clans, which could boast several distinct family offshoots (e.g., the Claudii, Cornelii, Fabii, 
Licinii), the Cassian gens does not appear to have experienced mitotic division. Thus, the Cassii 
Longini, a family that has itself been codified by Sumner (1973: 50-1) into major and minor branches, 
are the principal representatives of their clan. The historian L. Cassius Hemina may have been a 
relation or client of C. Cassius Longinus (cos. 171): Rawson (1975) 700-1; likewise Cassius Sabaco 
(see below). Etymologically, the word Cassius is of uncertain derivation, but may possibly be 
connected with the Latin word cassus, meaning “empty”, “hollow”, or, in some contexts, “vain”: 
Schulze (1966) 423; Macfarlane (1996) 257n.14, classes Cassius as a Latin gentilicium. The 
implications of the cognomen Longinus are discussed in Appendix I.  
6 Suolahti (1963) 153, 708, speculates that the Cassii Longini came from Latium, as did other families 
such as the Iunii and Servilii. See Appendix C: the tribe of the Cassii is unattested so it is difficult to fix 
their origins. 
7 Q. Cassius (mil. tr. 252 BC); cf. C. Cassius Longinus C.f.C.n (cos. 171).  
8 C. Cassius Longinus (cos. 171 BC) ennobled the clan. On this event, see Section 2 below.    
9 Hopkins (1983) 55-6, shows how surprisingly difficult it was for consular families to maintain the 
consulship successively over several generations. See also Brunt (1988) 424-5; Tatum (1999) 37; 
Millar (1998) 105; cf. Carlsen (2006) 11n.1, with supplementary bibliography. The Longini attained 
the consulship seven times, consecutively over four generations: 171, 164, 127, 124, 107, 96, 73. By 
comparison, the Licinii attained nine consulships during a similar timeframe, and the Postumii 
garnered eight consulships (although only one member of the gens entered the highest office in the first 
century). The Marcii furnished the state with eight men who won consular honours (two twice); the 
Fulvii, like the Cassii, won seven consulships, but they did not attain the office in the first century. The 
Calpurnii and Valerii achieved six consulships; the Manlii and Servilii five; and the Iunii four.      
10 Tac. Ann. 6.15; cf. [Q. Cic.] Comment. Pet. 7. Also, Cicero. Leg. Man. 68, on C. Cassius (cos. 73). 
Liv. 4.15.5, speaks of splendor familiae in reference to Sp. Cassius’ family. Cic. Leg. 3.35, on Ravilla.      
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others), key figures in the last days of the Republic.11 In addition to these impressive 
noble connections, the Longini also accumulated a throng of clients, from as far afield 
as Istria in the east to Gallia Narbonensis in the west.12 Supporting such a spread of 
clients demanded significant capital, which the family appear to have possessed; 
Cassius –one of at least three brothers– owned multiple estates and was not averse to 
amassing riches (and no doubt stocking his estates) from unsavoury practices such as 
slavery.13 This nexus of connections and copious wealth certainly help to explain their 
political success. 
 Their military record was not as impressive, however.  No family member 
ever seems to have celebrated a triumph or ovation.14 On the contrary, two of their 
number acquitted themselves poorly on the battlefield. L. Cassius Longinus (cos. 107) 
suffered a catastrophic defeat (insignis calamitas), to use Caesar’s words, against the 
Tigurine Helvetii in 107.15 He died in battle, which may have mitigated his disgrace, 
but his entire army was captured. His son, C. Cassius Longinus (cos. 73), the 
tyrannicide’s father,16 also experienced an embarrassing loss as proconsul at the hands 
of the slave army led by Spartacus in 72.17 That two successive generations of Cassii 
failed as commanders cannot have fostered confidence in their military ability. It is a 
fair assumption, then, that a primary concern for the young Cassius was to build a 
 
11 Tac. Ann. 3.76; Cass. Dio 44.14.4. Cassius’ brother Lucius may have wedded a Sulpicia, perhaps the 
granddaughter of Ser. Sulpicius Rufus (cos. 51), sister of the poetess: see Syme (1986) 206; cf. Table 
XXIV. Münzer, RE IVA2.878-9; ILS 3103: Sulpicia Ser. f. pro Paulla Cassia f. sua. Unfortunately, 
before Cassius himself all other wives of the Longini are ignotae. Erich Gruen has argued that the 
Longini were on excellent terms with the Domitii Ahenobarbi, which is logical enough, although the 
evidence for this hypothesis is slender: Gruen (1964) 107, (1968) 173. His theory is based on members 
of their families holding the same offices (tribunates in 104 and consulships in 96) at the same time. 
See too Marshall (1985) 129, on the links between the two tribunes; Lewis (2006) 221, dismisses these 
as “tenuous speculation”. However, such alliances were often transitory. See, for example, the 
mercurial relationship between the Pompeii and Longini over three generations: there were strained 
relations between Cn. Pompeius Strabo and C. Cassius Longinus (cos. 96): Gran. Licin. Fr. 35. 22F; 
but C. Cassius Longinus (cos. 73) supported Pompey’s Eastern command: Cic. Leg. Man. 68. Yet our 
subject and Cn. Pompeius iunior were not friends: Cic. Fam. 15.19.4. See also, Cass. Dio 42.5.6. On 
Cato’s connections, see Syme (1939) 44-5. Connections to the Popilii Laenae: Cic. Inv. 2.24.72; Rhet. 
Her. 1.15; a Popilius Laenus at the conspiracy: Plut. Brut. 14.4; App. B Civ. 2.115.   
12 The Cassii’s domestic and foreign clients are discussed in detail in Appendix E.  
13 Slavery: Joseph. BJ. 1.8.9: καὶ Ταριχέας μὲν ἑλὼν εἰς τρεῖς μυριάδας Ἰουδαίων ἀνδραποδίζεται. 
Cf. [Aur. Vict.]  De vir ill. 83.   
14 The restored text of Cic. Balb. 40, which implies the family achieved military greatness, is likely a 
MSS corruption. However, if the family claimed Sp. Cassius then they could claim to have celebrated 
two triumphs (Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 8.68.1-69.4), but these were hardly recent victories. See further the 
discussion on C. Cassius Longinus (cos. 124) below, who is wrongly attributed a triumph by Eutropius 
(4.22).                                  
15 Caes. B Gall.  1.12; cf. 1.7, 1.13; Liv. Per. 65.5; Oros. 5.15.23-4; cf. Peter, HRR 1.178.   
16 I argue below, based on filiation, that the consul of 73 was Cassius’ father.  
17 Liv. Per. 96; Plut. Crass. 9.7; Flor. 2.8.10.   
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reputation for martial valour, mending his family’s bruised military standing in the 
process.18 And to an extent he achieved military success. 
The Cassii do not appear to have been active or prominent in Roman state 
religion, despite the arguments of one scholar. J. Fischer long ago stated that they 
played “nicht unwichtige Rolle” in the history of the augural college.19 Yet the 
evidence he cites to prove his case does not stand up to close inspection.20 Indeed, the 
only confirmed member of the Cassii to have held the augurate is Cassius’s brother, 
Q. Cassius Longinus (tr. pl. 49),21 although it is possible that L. Cassius Longinus 
Ravilla (cos. 127) may also have been an augur.22 Some scholars have argued that 
Cassius himself was a member of the quindecimviri sacris faciundis, but, as will be 
seen, this proposal is based only on equivocal numismatic data.23 On the present state 
of evidence, there is nothing to suggest that they were active members of the Roman 
priesthoods, a trend which is in marked contrast to their political success in the last 
two centuries of the Republic.   
               Like the Manlii Torquati, the Cassii enjoyed an ambivalent reputation for 
severitas.24 Two members of the gens Cassia were responsible for this association. 
The first was the father of Sp. Cassius (cos. 502), who allegedly executed his son 
because he suspected him of aiming at a regnum.25 The second and more important 
figure was L. Cassius Longinus Ravilla (cos. 127), who was remembered as a 
proverbially severe judge.26 Famously, he condemned two vestal virgins in 113, both 
 
18 On military defeat, see generally Rosenstein (1990), who argues that military failures could be easily 
overcome and did not hinder electoral success; but cf. Tatum (1991). 
19 Fischer (1908) 123n.1.  
20 See Cody (1968) 114, for a refutation.  
21 Cic. Att. 9.9.4; Szemler (1972) 153, no.43, with references.  
22 Taylor (1966) 144n.32.   
23 Broughton, MRR 2.369, 3.51, lists Cassius as “XVvir s.f.”; Rüpke (2008) 128, 131; Armstrong (2011) 
112; Cadoux and Seager, OCD4 (2012) 289; but cf. Szemler (1972) 166, no.31, cf. 187, who is more 
cautious.  Chapter Three rebuts the modern assertion that Cassius held the Quindecimvirate.   
24 Feeney (2010) 206; Hölkeskamp (2010) 117, 120: Manlii Torquati. Cf. OLD s.v. “severitas” 1-4. 
When severitas is employed in connection with the Longini it often means something along the lines of 
old-fashioned sternness. Cicero often employs severitas (or its variants) in positive ways: Div. Caec. 
73; Verr. 1.1.40; Cat. 4.12; Att. 1.16, 5.11; however, in the Pro Murena (section 3) it is clear that 
severitas could sometimes be viewed in a negative light, in extreme contrast to humanitas. For a 
discussion on severitas and associated words connected to it (notably gravitas), see Hellegouarc’h 
(1963) 279-90.       
25 Cic. Rep. 2.60; Liv. 2.41.10-11; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 8.79-80. A classic example of patria potestas. 
See below on Sp. Cassius and this episode in more detail.   
26 Cic. Rosc. 84; Verr. 1.1.30, 2.3.137, 2.3.146; Cic. Brut. 97; Vell. Pat. 2.10.1; Val. Max. 3.7.9; Amm. 
Marc. 22.9.9, 30.8.15.  
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acquitted previously of unchastity by the College of Pontiffs.27 Perhaps it was as a 
result of this trial that Ravilla won notoriety as scopulus reorum (“Defendants’ 
rock”).28 But even if this were not so, both Asconius and Valerius Maximus agree that 
he acted with excessive severity in this case (nimia severitas).29 Clearly, Cassian 
severitas could be double-edged, but Cicero did not consider it inappropriate to laud 
their judicial and personal sternness. 30 The family reputation for severity continued to 
flourish well into imperial times.31 In this regard, the Longini were similar to other 
prominent families such as the Claudii, who were both praised and censured for their 
supposedly hereditary haughty character.32  
             Politically, the Cassii have been consistently linked to the cause of libertas 
populi.33 On many of their coins the goddess Libertas features prominently.34 Now 
while it is possible, as one school of thought contends, that Liber and Libertas were 
the Cassii’s “patron divinities”,35 it is, in fact, more likely that the goddess signals an 
attempt by the family to promote their past services to the people. What were these 
services and how were they connected to Libertas? For the Roman people generally 
three issues in which they had a vested interest were: land distribution; corn prices; 
and ballot laws.36 To different degrees, the Cassii had been instrumental in advancing 
these popular platforms. First, Sp. Cassius (cos. 502). According to our sources, he 
 
27 Liv. Per. 63; Cass. Dio 26. fr. 87. On the trial, see Alexander (1990) 21-2 nos.41-2. This is even 
more significant as Licinia had no less an orator than L. Licinius Crassus (cos. 95) as her advocate.   
28 Val. Max. 3.7.9. The Latin metaphor implies that Ravilla was as harmful to defendants as rocks and 
reefs were to ships.  
29 Asc. Mil. 45-6C; Val. Max. 3.7.9. Asconius admittedly records general opinion: ut existimatio est.     
30 Cic. Verr. 1.1.30, Phil. 2.26.  
31 See, for example, Tac. Ann. 13.48, 14.42-5, with Kajanto (1969) 43-60, who argues that Tacitus 
admired Cassius for his severe discipline; cf. SHA Avid. Cass. 5.3. Marcus Aurelius is said to have 
spoken of “Cassian strictness and rigour”: Hist. Aug. 5.3.     
32 The Claudii were notorious for their superbia: Tac. Ann. 1.4; Suet. Tib. 2; Sil. Ital. 17.88. See also 
Tatum (1999) 32. On this development of “family character” among the aristocracy, see the brief but 
useful comments of Wiseman (1979) 25. For the debate on whether the ancients regarded character 
traits as innate and immutable, see Gill (1983) 469-87, esp. 469n.2, with bibliography therein. Vasaly 
(1987) 203-26, has argued that often family members are stereotyped as behaving in a similar fashion 
to each other, especially the Appii Claudii. On this pattern in Livy, see Oakley (1998) 86-7.         
33 Based on numismatic evidence: Grueber (1910) 1.482: “The head of Libertas...may illustrate 
generally the efforts of the Cassia gens for the preservation of public liberties.” Cf. Cody (1968) 2: 
“[The] whole family with representatives spread over nearly a century continually employs portraits of 
this goddess [Libertas] and ancestral deeds connected with libertas.” Thus they were “well-known 
advocates of libertas populi”, as will be argued later: Cody (1968) 5, 28-9, 89-90, 116, 134-5. Marshall 
(1997) 66, speaks of the coins representing “the activities of the Cassian family to maintain popular 
sovereignty.” On the nature of libertas populi, see, for example, Syme (1939) 149-61; Wirszubski 
(1950) 44-52; Cowan (2008) 140-52.       
34 C. Cassius Longinus (cos. 96): Crawford, RRC 266/1,3 (3=Bes); L. Cassius Longinus (pr. 66): 
Crawford, RRC I.403, no.386/1.    
35 Babelon (1885-86) I.324; Grueber (1910) I.153n.1; esp. Mattingly (2004) 136.   
36 Wirszubski (1950) 40-52.   
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had been responsible for proposing the first agrarian land reform bill, and though he 
failed to implement this programme, he still appears to have become a totem around 
which later agitators rallied.37 Far more significantly, L. Cassius Longinus Ravilla 
(cos. 127) passed a landmark lex tabellaria in 137, which extended the secret ballot to 
judicial proceedings, except in cases of perduellio.38 This law reduced the power of 
the optimates by screening the people’s votes from them.39 Also significant in this 
regard is L. Cassius Longinus (tr. pl. 104). He carried plures leges that lessened the 
power of the nobility, including placing the decision to abrogate imperium in the 
hands of the comitia, a measure that may be alluded to on coins issued by a later 
Longinus.40 These examples demonstrate that the Cassii were not averse to serving 
the interests of the people, even when this conflicted with the interests of their own 
class.41 
The Cassii’s repeated support for the rights of the plebeians has led some 
scholars to conclude that they were populares.42 But though some members of the 
clan do exhibit popularis proclivities, such a sweeping assessment is problematic for 
two reasons. First, it must be stressed that a principled popularis stance on behalf of 
the people was well within the bounds of aristocratic ideology.43 And second, it is 
very unlikely that the Cassii consistently maintained a popularis posture; few 
individuals and even fewer family blocks could ever persist as populares for such a 
 
37 As Smith (2006b) 51 notes, Sp. Cassius becomes an important figure in Dionysius’s history because 
he represents a link in the chain to the Gracchan reformers: “Cassius is the first in a line of Romans 
whose actions on behalf of the people lead to their deaths.” On the historicity of Sp. Cassius’ supposed 
lex agraria, see, for example, Gagé (1979) 838-61.  
38 Cic. Amic. 41, Sest. 103. Marshall (1997) 54-73, argues that descendants of those politicians who 
passed secret ballot laws equated the secret ballot with freedom. The descendants of Cassius celebrated 
this law in a similar fashion to the descendants of the Porcii, who memorialized their passage of the 
leges Porciae de Provocatione: Crawford, RRC 1. no. 301/1. See also, Marshall (1997) 63. Hill (1909) 
69, argues that even the earliest coins minted by a Cassian moneyer (Crawford, RRC nos. 266/1-4) 
allude to the passage of the lex tabellaria of 137.       
39 Kaster (2006) 328.  
40 Asc. Corn. 78C: plures leges ad minuendam nobilitatis potentiam tulit. For discussion, see Bates 
(1986) 266; Gruen (1964) 107; Marshall (1977) 421; Drumann-Groebe (1964) [18992] 2.95; Lewis 
(2006) 285. Cf. also C. Cassius Longinus (cos. 73), who passed a lex frumentaria with his colleague: 
Cic. Verr. 2.3.16. L. Cassius Longinus (tr. pl. 44) issued a coin that may allude to the laws of the 
tribune of 104: Crawford, RRC no. 413/1. For discussion of this argument, see Cody (1968) 149-56.     
41 Harlan (1995) 42-3. Yet the Longini were not the only aristocrats who promoted themselves as 
champions of the people. So, too, did the venerable patrician Valerii: see, for example, Wiseman 
(1979) 25; Vasaly (1987) 203; Fantham (2005) 211, 215. 
42 See n.26 above. See generally, Kaplow (2012) 108-9, with n.52; Cody (1968); cf. Paul (1984) 104. 
Rawson (1991) [1976] 255n.52, describes the Cassii as populares to some extent. 
43 Tatum (1999) 10-11, 13-15.  
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long time.44 Often there were personal reasons for pursuing the popular route. To take 
the example of L. Cassius Longinus (tr. pl. 104), for instance, he passed a law that 
expelled from the senate anyone who had had his imperium abrogated by the people.45 
This popularis measure was chiefly directed at Q. Servilius Caepio (cos. 106) and 
intended to hurt the Metellan connection politically, as the people had nullified his 
command in 105.46 So in this case, at least, political gamesmanship rather than 
principle played the dominant role in Cassius’ popularis stance. Moreover, at times 
the Cassii were firmly in step with the optimates, for instance when in 100 family 
members joined the march to expel Saturninus.47 This is why it is unwise to insist that 
the Cassii were populares.  
 
2.2 PROMINENT FAMILY MEMBERS 
Like Brutus and several other nobles, Cassius could –if he wished48– trace his family 
(gens) back to the dawn of the Roman Republic. His earliest forebear, the semi-
legendary Sp. Cassius, had first been consul in 502.49 But whereas Brutus’ illustrious 
ancestor,50 L. Iunius Brutus, had expelled King Tarquin from Rome, Sp. Cassius had 
been condemned and executed in 485 for allegedly aiming at a regnum.51 There was a 
saving grace, however, according to one tradition.52 Spurius had been exposed and 
executed by his own father, thus turning an embarrassing and damaging story into one 
of family pride and distinction53 – as well as furnishing a classic example of patria 
 
44 Tatum (1999) 3-7; Dyck (2004) 531. See also Cic. Leg. 3.35, where in a fictionalised dialogue 
Cicero has his brother Quintus offer a pre-emptive apology to the Cassii for calling Ravilla a popularis. 
This shows that the current crop of Cassii were far from uniformly popularis in their political outlook. 
It is interesting to note that of all the figures who proposed leges tabellariae, Ravilla is censured the 
least by Cicero.   
45 Asc. Corn. 78C.  
46 Asc. Corn. 78: “Now he had carried it [the lex Cassia] chiefly on his quarrels with Q. Servilius…”. 
Drumann-Groebe (1964) [18992] 2.95; Bates (1986) 266: Gruen (1964) 107; Marshall (1977) 421; 
Lewis (2006) 285-6.     
47 Cic. Rab. Perd. 21. See also, Gelzer (1969) 32-3. 
48 Brunt (1982) 5-6. Cf. Fora (1999) 271.  
49 For bibliography on Sp. Cassius, see, for example, Mommsen (1871) 228-71; Drumann-Groebe 
(1964) [18992] 2.94; Münzer, RE (1899) “Cassius” [91] 3.1749-53; Sanctis (1960) 2.8-13; Ogilvie 
(1965) 337-45; Lintott (1970) 18-22; Broughton, MRR 3.52; Mustakallio (1994) 30-8; Cornell, OCD4 
(2012) 290; Eder, BNP 2.1168; Smith (2006b) 49-52. 
50 Cic. Brut. 53, and Brutus’ claimed descent from L. Iunius Brutus.  
51 He was charged with perduellio: Liv. 2.41.11; cf. Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 8.78-80. Lintott (1970) 19; 
Mustakallio (1994) 37. As one eminent scholar has noted, it is possible that Cassius was the victim of 
an oligarchic coup, orchestrated by the Fabii: Flower (2006) 45.  
52 Two traditions survive about Cassius’ demise: see Liv. 2.41.10; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 8.79-80. Cic. 
Rep. 2.60. See further, Sanctis (1960) 2.8-12; Lintott (1970) 18-22; Mastakallio (1994) 36-8; Smith 
(2006b) 49-51.   
53 Balsdon (1958) 88, notes that it was a source of “family pride” rather than disgrace.  
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potestas.54 In this way, his family could claim credit as the saviours of the state. 
Nonetheless, Spurius’ grisly end had the potential to stain the clan’s reputation.55 For 
the Cassii Longini, the figure of Spurius would have been potentially problematic; 
indeed, he was often invoked (along with Sp. Maelius and M. Manlius) as an arch-
traitor.56 It is no exaggeration, then, to suggest that Sp. Cassius’ reputation may 
certainly have contributed to Cassius’ decision to seek out M. Brutus to co-lead the 
conspiracy, for fear of being accused of monarchical ambitions.57   
Of all the members of the Cassii Longini, C. Cassius Longinus (cos. 171) was 
arguably the most pertinacious and distinguished. On paper, his career was 
exemplary. As the first member of his family to attain the consulship,58 he ennobled 
his clan and appears to have rescued them from around eighty years of obscurity.59 As 
a new man, this Cassius first surfaces as a military tribune in 178, before winning 
election as praetor urbanus in 175 or 174, a position unattested in the sources but 
deducible from ratiocination.60 In between the senior praetorship and his consulship, 
Cassius was assigned to a special commission in 173 (Xvir agr. dand. assig.).61 After 
the mandatory biennium, Cassius campaigned for the consulship of 171; he was duly 
 
54 Gaughan (2010) 29-30.  
55 Mustakallio (1994) 37-8; cf. Flower (2006) 45 
56 Flower (2006) 45, 47-8. Cf. Chassignet (2001) 83-96. Mommsen (1871) 228-71; Pina Polo (2006) 
87-8. Cf. Kaplow (2012); Panitschek (1989). 
57 Especially considering L. Cassius Longinus (pr. 66), a distant cousin perhaps, was a leading 
Catilinarian conspirator also. For a reconstruction of the Cassii Longini’s family tree, see Appendix H.    
58 Most scholars consider Cassius to have been a novus homo: see Drumann-Groebe (1964) [18992] 
2.97; Münzer, RE s.v. “Cassius” [55] 3.1726, (1999) [1920] 200-2; Billows (1989) 122n.22-3; Scullard 
(1945) 62, (1951) 195; Develin (1985) 288; but cf. Shatzman (1975) 440, who appears to list Cassius 
as a nobilis; and Brunt (1982) 5-6, who believes that Cassius claimed nobility from Sp. Cassius. On 
Brunt’s controversial theory of nobilitas, see, e.g., Shackleton Bailey (1986) 255-60 and Burckhardt 
(1990) 77-99; cf. Astin, CAH2 8.169. In a very technical sense, then, Cassius was not a novus homo, as 
the gens Cassia had produced the consular Sp. Cassius. Yet Cassius was certainly the first member of 
his familia (a subdivision of the clan) to reach the consulship.        
59 There is a Q. Cassius Longinus attested as a military tribune in 252, although this man may be the 
erroneous creation of the Byzantine epitomator Zonaras (8.14). On John Zonaras, see Banchich and 
Lane (2009) 1-20. One scholar who questions the account of Zonaras is Billows (1989) 123: “no earlier 
Cassius [sc. cos. 171] is known as magistrate or senator except the dubious military tribune Q. Cassius 
in 252.” See also, Ranouil (1975) 78: “le premier [sc. member of the Cassii Longini] est peut-être Q. 
Cassius (20)...mais seulement cité par Zonaras.” But see Develin (1985) 284; Sumner (1971) 50-1. For 
brief bibliography on Q. Cassius Longinus, see Drumann-Groebe (1964) [18992] 2.94; Münzer, RE s.v. 
“Cassius” [20] 3.1681; Broughton, MRR I.212; Ranouil (1975) 78; Develin (1985) 284. Smith (1844) 
789, listed Q. Cassius as the progenitor of the Cassii Longini.  
60 Military Tribune: Liv. 41.5.8; Broughton, MRR 1.396; Develin (1985) 284. Suolahti (1955) 113, 
states that Cassius laid the foundation for his “splendid” career as a successful military tribune (as did 
Cato), which is a likely though unproven inference. Praetor urbanus: Broughton, MRR 1.404, with n.1 
for caveats; cf. Münzer (1999) [1920] 200-1. It should be admitted that Cassius is missing from the 
praetorian lists; for discussion of the date of his praetorship, see Broughton, MRR 1.406 with n.1. 
61 Liv. 42.4.2-4. For further references, see Broughton, MRR 1.409-10. Ranouil (1975) 79, suggests a 
coin minted by L. Cassius Caecianus may allude to Cassius’ service distributing land.  
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elected alongside another plebeian, P. Licinius Crassus, and together they made up 
only the second pair of plebeian consuls in Roman history.62 Despite a controversial 
consulship in which he appears to have violated mos maiorum (if the tendentious Livy 
can be completely trusted), to cap his career off he also attained the censorship (154), 
Rome’s highest magistracy.63   
However, some scholars, following Livy, have traditionally described Cassius 
as a “plebeian extremist”, who bullied his way into the upper echelons of the ruling 
class.64 This thesis is untenable. Cassius’ election was not so much orchestrated by a 
powerful group of united plebeians looking to disrupt or supplant the patrician caste, 
but rather is proof that he convinced the ruling elite he could be assimilated into their 
order. His induction into the nobility was well within the limits of propriety.65 To 
enhance his political success, Cassius turned his hand to euergetism.66 He may have 
built the via Cassia,67 and certainly tried to build the first permanent stone theatre at 
Rome, an effort almost completed before Scipio Nasica moved that it should be 
pulled down.68 In an act of political showmanship, he petitioned to dedicate a statue 
of the goddess Concordia in the senate, an event that Cicero maintains demonstrates 
he was a censor of the highest morality.69 Cassius’ political feats certainly 
demonstrate his political nous. 
This political savoir-faire was also evident in his probable70 son, L. Cassius 
Longinus Ravilla (cos. 127), whose reputation for severitas has already been 
mentioned. Like the consul of 171, Ravilla also attained both the consulship (127) and 
 
62 On Cassius’ consulship, see Liv. 42.29.1; Oros. 4.20.36 with Broughton, MRR 1.416. That Cassius 
and Crassus were only the second all-plebeian college of consuls is discussed by Münzer (1999) [1920] 
200-2; Scullard (1951) 195; especially Ward (1977) 49-50. On the biennium, see CAH2 8.176. The lex 
Villia annalis (180) almost certainly made it a requirement to wait two years between curule 
magistracies.        
63 For references, Broughton, MRR 1.449; for discussion, Suolahti (1963) 388-90; cf. Scullard (1951) 
232-3. On the censorship as a magistracy, see first Suolahti (1963); Fantham (1977) 41-53; Astin 
(1990) 20-36, on censors’ economic responsibilities. Censors did not wield imperium and were not 
escorted by lictors. Epigraphic evidence indicates that it is likely they did not have the authority to 
build viae publicae. Nevertheless, the position was highly sought after because of the power and 
influence a censor wielded.  
64 Scullard (1951) 194-8. Cf. Swain (1944) 93n.94. Contra Harris (1979) 232; Develin (1985) 278-305; 
Rawson (1991) 256; cf. Astin CAH2 8.170-1, for a broad critique of Scullard’s methodology. 
65 Billows (1989) 122n.22; Develin (1979) 92-3, (1985) 287-8; Astin, CAH2 8.170. 
66 On euergetism, see generally Lomas (2003). As has been identified, there is often some uncertainty 
over whether public amenities were completed on private or state initiative by magistrates. See Pobjoy 
(2000) 89-92; Lomas (2003) 28-9.        
67 On the via Cassia and the debate over its builder, see Appendix G. 
68 Vell. Pat. 1.15.3-5; Val. Max. 2.4.2; App. B Civ. 1.28; Oros. 4.21.4; August. De civ. D. 2.5.  
69 Cic. Dom. 130: Ille [sc. Cassius] erat summa modestia et gravitate censor.  
70 As noted, on the family connections of the Cassii Longini, inclduing Ravilla, see Appendix H. 
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censorship (125).71 In a landmark (and controversial) tribunate in 137, he passed the 
lex Cassius tabellaria, the second of four leges tabellariae, which extended the secret 
ballot to judicial proceedings, except in cases of treason.72 The significance of this 
law is, as R. Kaster has observed, that it limited the auctoritas of the optimates, by 
screening the votes of the humiliores from them.73 As a result of Ravilla’s reformist 
policies, Cicero places him among the list of populares speakers in his Brutus.74 In 
the same oratorical treatise, he also provides a vivid description of Ravilla’s rhetorical 
appeal (Brut. 97): tum L. Cassius multum potuit non eloquentia, sed dicendo tamen; 
homo non liberalitate, ut alii, sed ipsa tristitia et severitate popularis. Thus, Cicero 
considers Ravilla’s lugubrious severitas to be the source of his popularity. As has 
been alluded to, this severitas was most famously on display when Cassius presided 
over the retrial of the sacrilegious Vestals in 113.  
The circumstances of Ravilla’s appointment to re-adjudicate the case merit 
exploration. Three Vestals had been charged with incestum the previous year, but 
only one had been convicted by the college of pontifices. Their decision was 
unpopular, and the tribune Sex. Peducaeus challenged it immediately. The issue was 
probably put before a plebiscite, and the result was that a special prosecutor was 
sought to retry the case.75 Ravilla (a consular –not a consul– as was customary in 
extraordinary quaestiones) received the special appointment (perhaps with 
imperium76) from the Roman people. He seems to have enjoyed sweeping powers, 
and ultimately he condemned the two previously exonerated Vestals, Licinia and 
Marcia, despite the former enjoying the counsel of L. Licinius Crassus (cos. 95), the 
greatest orator of the day. Ravilla’s achievements and actions demonstrate that he was 
 
71 In his censorship, Ravilla carried on the family’s euergetism by constructing Rome’s fourth aqeduct, 
the Aqua Tepula: Richardson, NTD (1992) 18. He may also have begun building the via Cassia: Kreiler 
(2012) 230-4.  On the via Cassia, see Appendix G. More importantly, along with his fellow censor Cn. 
Servilius Caepio, he branded C. Gracchus with the nota: Rowland (1969) 372. Gracchus was alleged to 
have prematurely abandoned his commander in Sardinia.    
72 Cic. Amic. 41; Sest. 103. 
73 Kaster (2006) 328. Yakobson (1995) 429, has argued that Ravilla’s election to the consulship and 
censorship does not mean that his bill had not deeply offended the aristocracy. 
74 Cic. Brut. 97. See Rawson (1971) 700, (1991) 256. However, Cicero is careful to only moderately 
criticise Ravilla (compared to other reformers), and has “Q. Cicero” offer a pre-emptive apology to 
Ravilla’s family for linking him to popularis politics: Leg. 3.35-6. The remarks would not have pleased 
the tyrannicide.    
75 Brennan (2000) 2.384-6, provides all the pertinent details and a useful reconstruction of the case. 
76 Brennan (2000) 2.385, suspects Cassius was empowered with praetorian imperium.  
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not a man to be trifled with, and later Longini repeatedly celebrated his most famous 
acts on coinage.77  
Ravilla’s brother, C. Cassius Longinus, was the consul of 124.78 Little is 
known about his career. Eutropius (4.22) inaccurately reports that he celebrated a 
triumph along with his fellow consul, C. Sextius Calvinus, for the defeat of the 
Sallues, a transalpine tribe.79 But the victory and the triumph belonged to Calvinus 
alone. Of more consequence was L. Cassius Longinus (cos. 107), probably Ravilla’s 
son, who has already been encountered above in relation to his disastrous military 
defeat by the Helvetii, for which he is chiefly remembered.80 As praetor, however, 
Cassius was sent as an emissary of the people to Jugurtha to bring the king back to 
provide testimony on the alleged offences of M. Aemilius Scaurus (cos. 115) and 
others.81 Sallust reports that, despite his fear and distrust, Jugurtha was persuaded by 
Cassius to return to Rome, based on the latter’s personal pledge of safety and his high 
standing within the Roman state; indeed, Cassius enjoyed considerable fame at that 
time: talis ea tempestate fama de Cassio erat (Iug. 32.5). As with Ravilla, the consul 
of 107 established his credentials as an influential and popular politician. Nonetheless, 
military defeat, which some scholars insist was not always an end (even a hindrance) 
to a politician’s prospects,82 certainly put a stop to Cassius’ hitherto successful career.         
Only some three years after Cassius’ defeat, L. Cassius Longinus (tr. pl. 104) 
passed a law targeting a personal rival, Q. Servilius Caepio (cos. 105), whose army 
had similarly been overcome in battle against the joint forces of the Cimbri and 
Teutones.83 Caepio’s command was abrogated, but this was not enough for Cassius, 
who moved that a man who had been stripped of command should be disbarred from 
 
77 Crawford, RRC 1.440, no.413, for one coin minted by a later family member, and commentary.  
78 Eutr. 4.22; Obseq. 31; Vell. Pat. 1.15.4. See Broughton, MRR 1.511, for references. Cf. Drumann-
Groebe (1964) [18992] 2.97, for brief biographical information. Drumann considered Cassius a son of 
the consul of 171, but Suolahti (1963) 389, disagrees. Cf. Appendix H.  
79 Vell. Pat. 1.15.4. 
80 Caes. B. Gall. 1.7.4; Liv. Per. 65; App. Celt. 13; Auct. ad Her. 1.15; Cic. Leg. 3.36; Oros. 5.15.23-4. 
For modern discussion, see for example, Drumann-Groebe (1964) [18992] 2.95; Russell (1935) 12; 
Swan (1967) 243; Billows (1989) 132n.35; Rosenstein (1986) 235. Appian relates that Cassius’ defeat 
was treated by a historian he refers to as Paulus Claudius (read Clodius?), who wrote after 107, but 
before the tyrannicide’s birth: Rose (1996) 118; See Cornell, FRmH (2013), s.v. “Paulus Clodius”.     
81 Sall. Iug. 32. 
82 Billows (1989) 132: “Indeed the system seems to have gone so far as to create what was practically 
an ideology of honor in defeat to shield the defeated generals from the political consequences of their 
own incompetence.” See also generally, Rosenstein (1986).     
83 Asc. Corn. 78C; Auct. ad Her. 1.14. See Drumann-Groebe (1964) [18992] 2.95, and the notes 
immediately below.  
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the senate.84 The tribune’s actions have led E. Gruen to speculate that the Cassii were 
enemies of the Metellan block (Caepio is posited to have been a connection of the 
Metelli85), a thesis that is based primarily on prosopographical inference.86 Whilst it is 
certainly possible, there is nothing convincing to suggest such sustained inter-family 
rivalry. The tribune of 104 could have been the brother87 of the C. Cassius Longinus 
who attained the consulship in 96, although this latter man was more likely to be 
related to the unfortunate consul of 107. He may be the man who Cicero remarks had 
been defeated in the tribunician elections.88 There is little information on his career, 
but, as will be seen, he is likely the man who relieved the ailing Pompeius Strabo of 
his command against Marius.89  
 
2.3 PARENTS AND SIBLINGS 
The world into which Cassius was born in October 86 –a time known to historians as 
the Cinnae dominatio90– was bloody and turbulent. At the start of the year, Marius 
had assumed the consulship for his seventh and final time, after triumphing at the 
Janiculum.91 Having wrested control of Rome from his enemies in the previous year, 
he engaged in a series of ruthless reprisals, in which many prominent senators lost 
their lives.92 Though the extent of his purge is greatly exaggerated by the ancient 
sources, there is no denying that bloodletting occurred and that Sullan loyalists were 
targeted en masse. Still, plenty of the nobility were able to escape this fate and some 
even found refuge with Sulla.93 The Cassii Longini were not, in all likelihood, among 
 
84 Asc. Corn. 78C; Lewis (2006) 285-6. Modern discussion: Bates (1986) 266; Gruen (1964) 107; 
Marshall (1977) 421   
85 Badian (1964) 35-43, on the Caepiones’ longstanding connections to the Metelli. Cf. Marshall 
(1977) 421.  
86 Gruen (1964) 107: “[The] family had been hostile to the Metelli in the second century.” Cf. Gruen 
(1966) 42.    
87 Gruen (1964) 107. Cf. Appendix H. 
88 Cic. Planc.  52.7, and Broughton (1991) 45. Cf. Shackleton Bailey (1992) 31.  
89 Drumann-Groebe (1964) [18992] 2.97; Carlsen (2006) 134; cf. Seager (2002) 23. 
90 On the term (and the period), however, see Lovano (2002) 534-78.  
91 He died on 13 January: Broughton, MRR 2.53, for references.    
92 Begun in 87 under the supervision of Cinna. M. Antonius (cos. 99): Cic. De orat. 3.1-10; Asc. 25C; 
Plut. Mar. 44; Flor. 2.21.14; Cass. Dio 45.47.2-3; Cn. Octavius (cos. 87): Cic. Tusc. 5.55; Liv. Per. 80; 
Vell. 2.22.1; L. Caesar (cos. 90): Cic. De orat. 310; Brut. 307. P. Crassus committed suicide: Cic. Sest. 
48. So, too, Q. Catulus (cos. 102): Cic. Brut. 307; Lovano (2002) 47-9.        
93 On the Sullani: Keaveney (1984) 114-50. Not all senators fled to Sulla, however. Some took refuge 
with their clients; for example, M. Licinius Crassus in Spain. Cf. Paterson (1985) 23-24. 
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the political refugees, as they appear to have enjoyed very influential Marian 
connections.94  
Who were these connections? Here prosopography (though an inexact tool) 
provides a tentative answer. It has been inferred that the Cassii enjoyed an association 
with Cinna on two grounds. First, L. Cassius Longinus Ravilla (cos. 127) and Cinna’s 
probable father had been consuls in the same year.95 This is hardly concrete evidence 
that a political friendship existed, however. A far more convincing connection is 
Cassius’ father (cos. 73), who was a monetalis in about 84.96 To enjoy a moneyership 
at this time strongly suggests he had the favour of the Cinnans, who were then still in 
control of Rome.97 Moreover, the imagery depicted on the coins he minted jointly 
with L. Salinator –who served later under Sertorius as a legate98– is patently Marian 
in its themes.99 But the associations go deeper. L. Cassius Longinus (cos. 107) held 
the consulship in the same year that Marius first attained the office. These men may 
have worked to thwart the political plans of Q. Metellus Numidicus and the Metelli in 
general.100 Moreover, Marius was also on friendly terms with a Cassius Sabaco, who 
was expelled from the senate in 115.101 This man, who may conceivably have been a 
Longinus, is more likely to have been one of their parvenu clients.102 Thus, there is a 
strong likelihood that the Cassii enjoyed key Marian connections, although it does not 
follow –nor should it be insisted– that they were ardent supporters of the camp.103   
 
94 Katz (1983) 361; Paul (1984) 104. However, Hill (1932) 175, argues that L. Cassius Longinus (pr. 
66) was among the Sullani.  See below.    
95 Broughton, MRR 1.507; argued by Katz (1983) 361n.10. On L. Cornelius Cinna (cos. 127), see 
Lovano (2002) 25, who is far from certain that this man was Cinna’s father.    
96 On 84 as the date Cassius was monetalis, see Sumner (1973) 50; Crawford RRC 1.370-1. Cf. Cody 
(1968) 53-4, who argues for “c. 83”. Luce (1968) 28, favours 84; Hamilton (1969) 198, argues for 83. 
97 Katz (1983) 361; cf. Spann (1987) 172 and 174, on Salinator. 
98 Plut. Sert. 7 with Konrad (1994) 99. Cf. Spann (1987) 172.   
99 Cody (1968) 53-73; Cf. Crawford, RRC 1.370, no.335. Even his moneyership is no guarantee that he 
was a diehard supporter of the Cinnans, of course. He may have been simply time-serving.    
100 Gruen (1964) 104; Paul (1984) 104. Gruen argues the Cassii were no friends of the Metellan block.    
101 Plut. Mar. 5.4-6: ὁ γὰρ Σαβάκων ἦν ἑταῖρος ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα Μαρίου; Paul (1984) 104; Katz 
(1988) 194-6. Rossi (1980) 4.463-5, argues Sabaco and the consul of 107 were the same man, but see 
Appendix H. See also Alexander (1990) 18, no. 36, on his trial for electoral bribery.       
102 Katz (1988) 194-6; Syme (1955) 59: Sabaco “is clearly not a person of class or consequence.” 
Contra Rossi (1980) 4.463-4, argues he was a Cassius Longinus, probably the consul of 107.  Rowland 
(1966) 413, suggests he was related to Cassius (cos. 73). Gruen (1968) 124n.97, proposes he was a 
client of the Longini; cf. Paul (1984) 104.     
103 Paterson (1985) 24: “Even those who stayed in Rome in the mid-80s did not necessarily support the 
regime in power there, nor were they likely to be classified as Sulla’s opponents.” The example of L. 
Marcius Philippus is telling: censor in 86, he nevertheless joined Sulla at an opportune moment. See 
also Badian (1962) 52, who notes even some consulars passively accepted the change of government. 
Several other prominent families collaborated with the Marians and Cinnans (e.g., the Ahenobarbi, 
Bruti, Cethegi, Philippi, and Scipiones): Badian (1958) 242; cf. Ridley (2000) 214.     
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In fact, some members of the Cassii were certainly not supporters of Marius or Cinna. 
Take, for instance, C. Cassius Longinus (cos. 96). While Pompeius Strabo lay dying 
in 87, having failed to press the advantage of an initial victory against Marius at the 
Janiculum (he was holding out for a second consulship), the senate sent out the 
consular Cassius to assume command of the ailing general’s army, as the fragments of 
the historian Licinianus attest.104 The senate would not have sent a man who was a 
Marian sympathiser to replace Strabo, which leads to the conclusion that instead 
Cassius’ loyalty was to the conservative senate. Here is a prominent member of the 
family –the son of Ravilla– who was certainly not, at this stage at least, an adherent of 
Marius or his acolytes.105 Nor, perhaps, was L. Cassius Longinus (pr. 66) later 
notorious as one of the Catilinarian conspirators. Like other young men who had yet 
to attain public office, he may have been forced into exile as a member of the 
Sullani.106 Evidently, members of the family appear on both sides of this struggle, one 
reason at least which could explain their continued good standing on the homecoming 
of the deadly reformer.107    
               Indeed, despite seemingly serving the cause of the Cinnans –albeit in a 
junior capacity as a triumvir monetalis– Cassius’ father was never the object of 
recrimination when Sulla returned to Rome in 82.108 This is somewhat surprising, but 
explanations are available. Whether the heroics of Cassius’ consular uncle merited his 
reprieve is difficult to assess, but it cannot be discounted. As in the notable case of 
Julius Caesar, family and friends may also have interceded on his behalf with Sulla.109 
Moreover, Cassius would certainly not be unique if he had transferred his allegiance 
 
104 Gran. Lic. Fr. Book 35, 22F[lemish]; 38-41C[ritini]. See Drumann-Groebe (1964) [18992] 2.97; 
Münzer, RE (1899) 3.1727; Carlsen (2006) 134; Seager (2002) 23; Broughton, MRR 2.48, is 
unnecessarily cautious in identifying Cassius as the consul of 96. On the transmission of Licinianus, an 
author who wrote after the time of Hadrian, see Reynolds (1983) 180. Ill health had also forced Marius 
to give up command of his army in 89: Plut. Mar. 33.6. Pompeius had been charged with defending 
Rome in 87: Liv. Per. 79; Vell. Pat. 2.21.2; Gran. Lic. 35.18; Obseq. 56; Oros. 5.19.10. Second 
consulship: Keaveney (1978) 240-1; Seager (2002) 22. Interestingly, as Cassius was consul in 96 he 
had a better claim to a second consulship than Strabo, as the decennium meant he could stand for office 
in 86. On the decennium, see briefly Sumner (1971a) 247. Hillard (1996) 135-45, on whether Strabo 
perished as a result of being struck by lightning.        
105 Nothing else is known of Cassius after he assumed command of Pompeius’ army.  
106 Such is the suggestion of Hill (1932) 175, with n.5.  
107 Hinard (1985) 558-60, has shown how divided families could be in the conflict between Sulla and 
the Marians. Cf. Bannon (1997) 149.   
108 The scale of Sulla’s purge is well known and no rehearsal of the facts is necessary here: see, for 
example, Keaveney (2005) 124-34. App. B Civ. 1.95, states he killed 40 senators and 1600 equites. 
Cassius’ father appears to have lacked Sullan connections: Gruen (1974) 126; Ward (1977) 24.    
109 Suet. Iul. 1.3. Cf. Plut. Caes. 1.3-5, which is more sensational and less plausible. Dowling (2000) 
305-40, has recently discussed the oft-neglected subject of Sulla’s clemency. See also Taylor (1957) 
12; Ridley (2000) 211-29, esp. 229.   
 46 
to the dictator when he realised the inevitability of a Sullan victory.110  Although 
some upright men had been unable to stomach or acquiesce in Cinna’s domination, 
many had done so; even a handful of consulars had accommodated themselves to the 
new regime.111 Cassius, then, could argue he had been time-serving. At any rate, 
whatever the explanation for his survival, it is important to understand that not only 
did he persevere, but he also later flourished.     
               Having survived the proscriptions unscathed, Cassius’ father fast assimilated 
himself into the new order at Rome. By 76 at the latest, he would have attained the 
praetorship, although there is no record of him holding this office.112 It was also 
around this year that he placed his son, the tyrannicide, now ten years of age, under 
the instruction of a grammaticus called L. Staberius Eros.113 Staberius was a former 
slave brought to Rome in the mid-80s, who received manumission because of his 
devotion to language.114 Described by Pliny as grammaticae conditor, Staberius’ 
pedagogical credentials were impeccable, although it is not his abilities as a teacher 
that occasion debate in this instance.115 Rather, Suetonius has it from some of his 
sources that Staberius taught children of the proscribed for free.116 This fact 
immediately attracts the attention of the political historian; T.W. Hillard has 
suggested that Staberius may have been “politically coloured”.117 Support for this 
theory is provided by the fact that Staberius also took under his wing M. Brutus, 
whose father (an implacable enemy of the Sullani) had been executed on Pompey’s 
 
110 Consider the example of L. Marcius Philippus, who wheedled his way into a censorship in 86 under 
Cinna but then joined Sulla before his inevitable victory: Cic. Prov. Con. 21. His career was certainly 
not adversely affected: Sall. Hist. 1.77. See also next note.  
111 Appius Claudius had been unable to acquiesce in the Cinnan domination: Tatum (1999) 33. So, too, 
Q. Caecilius  Metellus: App. B Civ. 1.80; Cass. Dio fr. 106.1. Consulars: Badian (1962) 52; Frier 
(1971) 588. See also, Badian (1964); Keaveney (1984) 138; Worthington (1992) 189, on the different 
groups that made up the kaleidoscopic Sullani.     
112 Broughton, MRR 2.93. This is rapid progress indeed given his moneyership in 84.  
113 Cassius would have received his praenomen on the ninth day after his birth. On the dies lustricus, 
see Rawson (2003) 110-13. Boys started their education under a grammaticus around the age of ten: 
see Cic. QFr. 2.12.2 and Clarke (1968) 18.   
114 Suet. Gram. 13.1-2. On Staberius’ career, see Funaioli, RE 3A2 1924-5; Bonner (1977) 60; esp. 
Kaster (1995) 165-70, with bibliography cited therein. Christes (1979) 53, places Staberius’ arrival at 
Rome in, or around, 83; cf. Kaster (1995) 165-6, who notes it is possible that he arrived earlier.  
115 Plin. HN. 35.189. His assessment is described as “ludicrous” by Baldwin (1983) 433. Staberius may 
have written the treatise De proportione: Baldwin (1983) 433; Kaster (1995) 167. For a detailed 
treatment of Cassius’ education, see Chapter 3, Section 3.  
116 Suet. Gram. 13.2: sunt qui tradant tanta eum honestate praeditum ut temporibus Sullanis 
proscriptorum liberos gratis et sine mercede ulla in disciplinam receperit. 
117 Hillard (1987) 35-6.  
 47 
orders.118 Considering the potential Marian sympathies of Cassius’ father, it is 
possible that he placed his son under Staberius because the man catered to parents of a 
particular stamp.119 And yet, other explanations are possible. Teaching the children of 
the proscribed may simply have been an act of courage rather than defiance.120 It must 
be remembered that almost all of Staberius’ pupils would traditionally hail from the 
senatorial and equestrian classes which were depleted after Sulla’s pogrom.121 Desire 
to secure the best teacher available –another form of aristocratic competition– may 
also explain why Staberius taught both Cassius and Brutus.122 Given their closeness in 
age, the tyrannicides may very well have belonged to the same coterie of aristocratic 
pupils taught by Staberius. If so, it would mean that they had known each other since 
boyhood.123  
               In 73, Cassius père attained the consulship, when the tyrannicide was around 
twelve years old.124 What effect this had on the young man can only be surmised, but 
it may not be too much of an exaggeration to suggest that the attendant rituals and 
pageantry of the office impressed him.125 In reaching the top of the political ladder, 
Cassius’ father had continued an unbroken chain of consulships, which had begun 
under his great-grandfather, C. Cassius Longinus (cos. 171). When he entered into 
office on 1 January, he may even have brought his son along with him when he 
convened the senate with his colleague, M. Terentius Varro Lucullus.126 Their tenure 
of office was not marked by dramatic events, although they did prudently pass a grain 
bill that restored a subsidy for impoverished urban plebs that had been abolished 
under Sulla.127  
 
118 Father murdered by Pompey: Plut. Brut. 4.1, Pomp. 16. Enemy of Sullans: Badian (1962) 54; Gruen 
(1974) 15; Hillard (1987) 36.      
119 So the hypothesis of Hillard (1987) 36; cf. also Clarke (1981) 12;  Katz (1983) 359-62, has argued 
that Cassius maintained his Marian sympathies and corrresponded with Sertorius, which is dismissed 
by Konrad (1994) 218.   
120 It may be for this reason, then, that Staberius is placed after Cornelius Epicadus, Sulla’s loyal 
Grammaticus, in Suetonius’ De Grammaticis. See Baldwin (1983) 433, who notes Epicadus is artfully 
contrasted “against a brave helper of the sons of the proscribed.” 
121 App. B Civ. 1.9.5; Flor. 2.9.25 with Kaster (1995) 169.    
122 M. Aemilius Scaurus had paid an enormous sum to hire an eminent grammarian, Daphnis, an 
indication of the value Roman aristocrats could place on excellent teachers: Plin. HN. 7.128. 
123 This issue is discussed also in Chapter 3, Section 1.  
124 Drumann-Groebe (1964) [18992] 2.98; Broughton, MRR 2.109.  
125 On the nature of the office, see Pina Polo (2011). The consulship was the pinnacle of the Roman 
cursus, the office every aristocrat strove to attain.   
126 Pina Polo (2011) 17-18, on the pageantry and rituals performed on taking office.  
127 Tatum (1999) 120. The subsidy was five modii per month.  
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However, though Cassius reached the top of the cursus honorum the remainder of his 
career was less smooth. As proconsul of Cisalpine Gaul in 72, he had suffered an 
embarrassing –though by no means the worst– defeat at the hands of Spartacus’ slave 
army, which triggered the appointment of M. Licinius Crassus.128 Orosius carelessly 
reports that Cassius died in the fighting, but no doubt the shame of defeat would have 
been almost as bad.129 As the tyrannicide was a teenager (around fourteen at the time), 
it is possible that his father had taken him on campaign to give him a taste of military 
life.130 If so, it would have been an inauspicious start to his martial orientation. 
Cassius survived the indignity of defeat and next emerges as a consular supporter of 
Pompey’s Eastern command.131 Scholars have debated the impact of his endorsement, 
though some go so far as to suggest it as the basis of the tyrannicide’s future service 
under Crassus.132 The elder Cassius’ throwing his weight behind Pompey may have 
been far more palatable than siding with Crassus, the man who, unlike him, had 
defeated Spartacus.133 Thereafter, Cassius falls out of the historical records. He is not 
the consular Varus, who, Drumann and Groebe incorrectly believe, fled from the 
proscriptions in 43.134 He enjoyed a chequered career.  
The identity of his wife –Cassius’ mother– is unknown. They contracted a 
marriage in or before 87. In the undelivered second actio of the Verrine orations, 
 
128 Defeat: Liv. Per. 96; Plut. Crass. 9.7; Flor. 2.8.10. See further, Ward (1977) 83. Cassius as trigger 
for Crassus’ appointment: Brennan (2000) 1.432-3.   
129 Oros. 5.24.4. On the shame attached to military defeat in Rome, Rosenstein (1990), is fundamental.  
130 Iuvenes between the age of the fourteen and seventeen often prepared for military training at Rome: 
Isayev (2007) 7; cf. Lammert, RE 6A2, 1448, on the normal age of tiro. But it is possible that Cassius’ 
father took his son on campaign. Pompey had been taken on campaign by his father in the Marsic War, 
at perhaps just sixteen years old. A young Crassus had been taken on campaign by his father whilst 
proconsul in Spain: Plut. Crass. 4.1. Moreover, Cicero had taken his son on campaign with him in 
Cilicia. Cicero junior would have been around the same age as Cassius had been:  Hazel (2001)  68, on 
Cicero junior.  
131 Cic. Leg. Man. 68, with a fulsome description of Cassius’ character and nobility.   
132 Ward (1977) 80; Dettenhofer (1992) 124. Cf. Brunt (1988) 473, 477, on the limited ramifications of 
his support. 
133 Drumann-Groebe (1964) [18992] 2.98, argues that Cassius’ father’s defeat by Spartacus in 72 
explains his support of the Manilian Law, against Crassus, who was successful against the slave army.    
134 App. B Civ. 4.28. Drumann-Groebe (1964) [18992] 2.98: “Er erreichte ein hohes Alter; der Consular 
Varus, welcher wahrend der Proskriptionen i. J. 43 von den Minturnensern ergriffen und dann von 
seinen Verfolgern getötet wurde, kann nur der unserige sein, denn seit dem Jahre 73 gab es keinen 
andern Consul mit diesem Beinamen.” However, see Münzer, RE (1899) 3.1727, in response: “Häufig 
legt man dem Cassius den zweiten Beinamen Varus bei und sieht in ihm den Consular Varus, der 43 
proscribiert und in Minturnae hingerichtet  wurde.  Aber die Inschrift einer Bleiröhre, auf welcher jenes 
Cognomen  vorkommt, ist zweifellos gefälscht und bei Appian liegt irgend ein Irrtum, etwa in Titel der 
Persönlichkeit, vor; sein Erzählung passt schlecht auf einem Greis von fast achtzig Jahren.” Willems 
(1878) 1.433, had wrongly attributed the agnomen Varus to Cassius due to confusion with his consular 
colleague Varro; cf. Heitland (1909) 3.12. On this confusion, see Tansey (2008) 206, with n.176. See 
also Rawson (1978) 195n.48. Broughton, MRR 3.216, shows Cassius was likely deceased by 43. As 
Münzer pointed out, he would have been in his eighties, if still alive.   
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Cicero describes her as femina primaria, yet since he seeks to cast the accused as a 
man who had preyed on defenceless and pure noble women it is difficult to know how 
much credence to grant his portrait.135 Women are often either saints or sinners in 
Cicero’s court speeches, and the phrase is employed as much as a marker of nobility 
as of character. Cassius’ mother inherited property at Leontini from her father.136 
Though in all probability her husband had predeceased her by 43 –and though she did 
not attend the famous family consilium of Brutus and Cassius in June 44– she was 
nevertheless still alive and active in March of 43 (Fam. 12.7.1): in contione quidem 
Pansa dixit matrem quoque tuam et fratrem illam a me sententiam noluisse dici.137 
Like Julia and Servilia, the mothers of Antonius and Brutus respectively, she appears 
to have exerted some influence in politics.138 If Pansa is accurately reported as saying 
that Cassius’ mother and brother did not support Cicero’s proposal to assign the 
tyrannicide an extended command against Dolabella it would be significant, although 
even Servilia did not back the mooting of this motion.139 Perhaps they believed it was 
doomed to failure and would only hurt Cassius. But it does not necessarily indicate a 
rift between mother and son.  Thus Cassius’ parents.  
               On the evidence of his cursus, the tyrannicide was the eldest son of 
the consul of 73. He had at least two brothers.140 The precise career paths of his two 
younger brothers, Lucius and Quintus, are not easily pinned down, despite their lively 
contributions to the history of the period. Even deducing which of the two brothers 
was older is a thorny issue. If one were to follow naming conventions alone, Gaius 
and Lucius are the most common praenomina for this branch of the Cassii.141 But, as 
Salomies has shown, it is dangerous to place too much stock in such rigid patterns of 
naming.142 Their respective careers are far more illuminating. Quintus was tribune of 
the plebs in 49, Lucius only in 44.143 The facts suggest Quintus was older.  
 
135 Cic. Verr. 2.3.97. At Verr. 2.2.24, Cicero also describes a Servilia as femina primaria. See Badian 
(1962) 53n.7. Shackleton Bailey (1977) 2.504, errs in stating that nothing is known of Cassius’ mother.   
136 Shatzman (1975) 46; Eck (1996) 111.  
137 Husband predeceased: Broughton, MRR 3.216; absent from consilium: Cic. Att. 15.11. For a modern 
discussion, see Dettenhofer (1992) 123. 
138 So too Dettenhofer (1992) 123. Julia: App. B Civ. 3.51; Servilia: Cic. Att. 15.11. On naming 
conventions in Cicero, see Mamoojee (2001) 5-15, esp. 13 on this reference specifically. On the ordo 
Matronum, see Welch (2011) 309-33, though the focus is mainly on the triumviral period.    
139 Cicero’s proposal: Phil. 11.29, cf. Ad. Brut. 4.2.  
140 See Section 4 below.   
141 If one accepts the reconstruction of Sumner (1973) 48-50. For further discussion, see Appendix H. 
142 Salomies (1987) 211-25, who provides an example of a son taking the praenomen of his mother’s 
father. Other variations also occurred, such as elder sons not taking their father’s praenomen. See also 
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Yet even here there are grounds for pause. Cicero notes in his defence of Plancius that 
Lucius, who was serving as subscriptor, made a speech worthy of an equestrian.144 
While some have viewed this remark as a clever swipe at young Lucius, Nicolet has 
argued that he may well have been a formal member of the equestrian order.145 Some 
men did indeed delay their careers to amass vast capital –or, as in the famous case of 
Atticus– shun political activity altogether.146 If Lucius were the youngest brother, then 
the odds were stacked against him as there are few known instances of three brothers 
all attaining the consulship, not that this should imply he would foreswear a political 
career as a result.147 Since the gap in age between Gaius and Quintus appears to have 
been small it is most likely that Lucius was the youngest of the three. At any rate, of 
more importance are their political careers. Unlike their elder brother Gaius, both 
Lucius and Quintus joined Caesar during the civil war, perhaps as a result of political 
marginalisation rather than a belief in his cause.148 Gaining the support of nobiles of 
their pedigree certainly did not harm Caesar’s platform. Their relationships will be 
elaborated on below. All three brothers had the same parents, which is not a trifling 
statement given the ‘blended’ nature of many Roman aristocratic families (consider 
Brutus and his half-sisters). However, not all scholars accept that Quintus was the 
brother of Cassius, so it is necessary to make the case for their fraternity.   
2.4  Q. CASSIUS AS FRATER 
In a letter to Atticus written in 50, Cicero identifies Q. Cassius as the frater of Cassius 
the assassin (pr. 44).149 Normally, one would take frater to mean “brother” but many 
eminent scholars (e.g., Gruen, Linderski, Münzer, Shackleton Bailey, and Sumner) 
contend that, in this instance, the word denotes “paternal cousin”,150 a usage that is 
 
Petersen (1962) 347-54, who notes how common was the praenomen Quintus; and Syme (1958) 172-
88, on “fancy” praenomina.  
143 Broughton, MRR 2.259, 2.324, respectively.   
144 Cic. Planc. 58: tua fuit perelegans et persubtilis oratio, digna equitis Romani vel studio vel pudore.   
145 Nicolet (1974) 2.829-30, and (1976) 22, with n.12. 
146 L. Gellius Publicola, brother of the consul of 76, remained a life-long equestrian: Tatum (1999) 115-
16.   
147 Tatum (1999) 98, quite rightly puts this down to demographic rather than political realities.  
148 Lucius: Caes. B Civ. 3.34.2; Quintus: Cic. Att. 6.8.2; Quintus was assigned sine sorte to Pompey in 
the 50s. 
149 Cic. Att. 5.21.2: Cassius, frater Q. Cassi familiaris tui. 
150 Sumner (1973) 48-51; Shackleton Bailey (1968) 2.320; Cf. Harlan (1995) 143-4; Generations of 
scholars have argued that Quintus and Cassius were likely cousins: Drumann-Groebe (1964) [1899] 
2.129-30; Münzer, RE (1899) s.v. “Cassius” [70] 3.1740: “frater, d.h. Wahrscheinlich Vetter.”; Syme 
(1939) 64n.2; Gruen (1974) 182, 526; Linderski (1975) 37 with n.11: “frater...clearly means frater 
patruelis”; see also, T.J. Cadoux and R.J. Seager, s.v. “Q. Cassius” OCD3 (2003) 301, OCD4 (2012) 
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not uncommon in Cicero.151 Whilst this postulation has gained wide acceptance, this 
section will examine the shaky grounds on which it is based, and argue that Q. 
Cassius was in fact the brother of the tyrannicide, as inscriptional evidence all but 
makes certain. Discussion will then turn to the ramifications of this reinterpretation. 
The argument that Q. Cassius was the cousin rather than the brother of Cassius 
was first advanced by Drumann in his classic Geschichte Roms, a work that is cited 
by one leading scholar as if it is sufficient authority in itself.152 Drumann’s rationale 
for wanting to make Quintus a cousin was based entirely on his faith in the regularity 
of the cursus honorum, as he outlines: 
Cicero nennt ihn [sc. Q. Cassius] den Bruder des C. Cassius [sc. pr. 44]; so 
hiessen auch solche, deren Väter Brüder waren, und an das letztere 
Verhältnis ist hier um so mehr zu denken, da er mit Gaius das Tribunat 
verwaltete.153 
The most compelling argument against the fraternity of Q. and C. Cassius, then, is 
that they both held the tribunate in the same year.154 This hypothesis is based on 
probability alone – one would not expect brothers to hold office concurrently. 
However, such an argument is far from unassailable. Whilst it is true that brothers 
very rarely held office at the same time, the turbulent Late Republic does indeed 
furnish historians with at least one notable exception: M. and C. Antonius, quaestors 
in 51. Gang violence and political obstructionism scuppered the elections in 53, 
preventing the future triumvir M. Antonius from winning the office of quaestor suo 
anno; as a result, he was confirmed at the polls a year later with his brother, who was 
clearly but a year younger than himself.155 Thus in certain circumstances brothers 
could indeed find themselves holding office simultaneously. 
The example of the Antonii is suggestive –in more ways than one. Like 
Antonius, Cassius’ career suffered a significant (and famous) delay: Carrhae, and its 
aftermath. As Crassus’ quaestor and deputy on the disastrous Parthian expedition, 
 
289, “probably cousin of the tyrannicide”. For Rawson (1986) 119 with n.94, Quintus is “perhaps a 
cousin.” Rüpke (2008) 600, no. 1103, with n.3, expresses reservations, but does not pursue the matter 
further. 
151Cic. Fam. 5.14.3; Att. 4.3.4. For discussion, see Bush (1972) 148-51, Bush (1986) 37n.4; Wilson 
(1988) 207. On frater meaning paternal cousin more generally, see the arguments of Shackleton Bailey 
(1977) 148-50, which were accepted by Wiseman (1985) 15-20; cf. Tatum (1999) 34-5. 
152 See Linderski (1975) 37n.11, who cites Drumann as proof that Q. Cassius was Cassius’ cousin.  
153 Drumann-Groebe (1964) [1899] 2.129-130. 
154 See note 151 above. Linderski (1975) 37 with n.11. 
155 Linderski and Kaminska-Linderski (1974) 213-23, esp. 222-3; Broughton, MRR 2.241, 3.19. Cicero 
implies that the three Antonii brothers were all born one year after the other: Cic. Fam. 2.18.2-3. 
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Cassius became by default the acting governor of Roman Syria after his commander’s 
death.156 His service was clearly prorogued by the senate until his tardy replacement, 
M. Bibulus, could arrive. Given that Cassius had been serving under the dynast since 
late 55/54 and was not relieved of duty until late in 51, he had been in the Roman East 
for around four years. This is exceptional as most quaestors did not usually serve 
more than two years –Caesar served less than a year, in fact.157  Cassius’ extended 
tour is thus notable. By the time he came to stand for the tribunate in 50, then, he was 
already in his mid-to-late thirties, an age at which he could conceivably have been 
preparing to stand for the aedileship.158 The significance of this delay has not hitherto 
been appreciated: Cassius’ belated tenure as tribune allows for him to have held office 
with a younger brother. Thus the principal objection against identifying C. and Q. 
Cassius as brothers is problematic, if not untenable. At the very least, the burden of 
proof should be on the prosecution. 
Positive evidence that Q. Cassius was the brother of the assassin comes in the 
form of two, strangely overlooked, inscriptions. The first, which can be dated to 49, 
discovered in Cordoba Spain, where Quintus was serving at the time, provides almost 
conclusive evidence of their consanguinity (CIL II2/5; AE 1986 369): Q. CASS. C.F. 
LONG. TR. PL. PRO. PR. Quintus’ filiation was C.f., which means he was most likely a 
son of C. Cassius Longinus (cos. 73), the only consular C. Cassius of the preceding 
generation, and the man generally considered to be the tyrannicide’s father. Yet some 
may still object that since no ancient writer identifies the tyrannicide’s father, doubt 
remains. Hence the importance of a second inscription. On an undated voussoir of the 
Porta Herculis at Pola (Pula, Croatia) an engraving reads: L. CASSIVS C.F. LONGIN(VS) 
L. CALPVNIVS L.F. PISO. IIVIR(I).159 This inscription is widely held to commemorate the 
founders of the Roman colony of Pola. There has been much debate over when the 
colony was established, although it is increasingly considered to be Late Republican 
rather than triumviral, c. 50. Whilst there has been much dispute over which member 
of the Calpurnii Pisones is referred to here, there has been no such wrangling over his 
fellow duumvir. Indeed, he is identified as the L. Cassius who was tribune of the 
plebs in 44, a man that Appian calls Λεύκιός τε ὁ Κασσίου [sc. Tyrannicide] 
 
156 On these events, see the detailed treatment in Chapter Four.  
157 Suet. Iul. 7-8, on Caesar’s early discharge.   
158 In Syria, it appears he was already making preparations to stand for the aedileship: see Chapter 4, 
Section 4.   
159 For the inscription, see Wiseman (1971) 40n.3, who cites ILLRP 639. 
 53 
ἀδελφὸς.160 Unlike his famous brother, Lucius fought for Caesar during the civil war 
and, though he appears not to have held prior office, was rewarded with proconsular 
imperium in 48.161As Lucius’ ancestor C. Cassius Longinus (cos. 171) had been 
active in Histria (where Pola is situated), it would not be surprising if he had clients 
there (as Wiseman suggests) in some numbers and thus he was a suitable Caesarian to 
found the colony.162 Evidently, another man long identified as the brother of Cassius 
appears also to have the filiation C.f. 
This conclusion has significant implications for our understanding of the 
relationship of these three brothers. In 59, for example, at least two Cassii appear to 
have offered their services to Q. Cicero, in the event that he should face prosecution 
(Cic. QFr. 1.2.13: note the plural Cassiis). D.R. Shackleton Bailey wished to identify 
both Cassius and Lucius as the men involved. But since Cassius and Quintus appear 
closer in age, their prospective aid is equally possible; Lucius’ forensic début may not 
have occurred until the mid-50s.163 Our discovery also helps to explain why Cassius 
carefully considered defending his brother Quintus when the latter faced the prospect 
of prosecution in 50, maybe at the hands of the consular L. Lucceius.164 Aiding a 
cousin would not be exceptional, but coming to the defence of a brother could be 
deemed a necessary act of fraternal pietas.165 Did Quintus ask Cassius to aid in his 
defence? The conclusion also possibly explains a curious gemstone referred to by 
J.M. Cody, which references an M. Cassius M. F. Longinus, from the early 
principate.166 Scholars have been baffled by the sudden appearance of an M. Cassius 
Longinus (especially with filiation dating back to the Republic), but as we know 
Cassius’ mother lived a prolific life (she was still alive in 43).167 Is it possible that she 
had at least four surviving sons, warranting the need for the Cassii’s unprecedented 
employment of the praenomen Marcus? In the case of Q. Cassius, then, when Cicero 
refers to him as the frater of Cassius he really did mean Bruder not Vetter. 
 
 
160 App. B Civ. 5.1.7.  
161 Broughton, MRR 2.275.  
162 On the Cassii’s clients in Histria, see Appendix E. 
163 Lucius’ first known forensic case in 54 was as a subscriptor in the prosecution of Plancius: Cic. 
Planc. 24.  
164 Cic. Fam. 15.14.4. Chapters 4 and 5 address this episode in more detail.  
165 On fraternal pietas, see Bannon (1997).  
166 On the Marcii Cassii Longini, see also Appendix D.  
167 See Chapter 2, Section 3 above. 
 54 
2.5 CONCLUSION 
The Republican Cassii Longini were politically prominent, well-connected, and well-
financed. Though they had not tasted military glory, they had established a 
conservative reputation for severitas. The modern impression that they consistently 
used populist policies to win the people’s favour is too simplistic. After a precarious 
existence during the time of Cinna, Cassius’ father attained the consulship and 
retained the family’s political triumphs. Cassius and his brothers were burdened with 
the same duty.      
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CHAPTER THREE 
CASSIUS’ EARLY LIFE 
 
3.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter treats Cassius’ early life and career through to his election as quaestor in 
56. Very little is known about his life and career prior to his service under Crassus, on 
the latter’s ill-fated Parthian campaign. As a result, reconstructing this period is 
difficult, especially as the few details that are recorded cannot necessarily be trusted. 
Indeed, it has already been observed that as a young man he is supposed to have been 
involved in a violent altercation with Faustus Sulla, son of the dictator.1 But as will be 
argued, the story is likely to be embellished, reworked by a source sympathetic to the 
Republican cause, in an effort to characterise Cassius as a man who had always 
despised tyranny.2 The consequence of this issue is that even the few scraps of 
information that do survive may be potentially misleading or biased, and, as a result, 
any attempt to illuminate the formative years of Cassius’ life has to rely on a healthy 
amount of ratiocination. 
 This chapter offers a broad sketch of Cassius’ life before he sets off on 
campaign with Crassus. It will treat many typical biographical issues, including (but 
not limited to) his birth, childhood, education, and marriage. It will also probe 
scholarly interpretations of his life during this period. Several scholars have proposed 
he held various offices, both public and religious: these claims need to be assessed 
carefully. Overall, it will be seen that –other than his alleged assault of Faustus Sulla– 
Cassius’ early life is remarkably conventional, as far as is known. Indeed, like many 
of his peers, he studied under a grammaticus; took a trip overseas to Rhodes, and 
perhaps visited the other Greek intellectual centres; contracted a respectable marriage; 
and seems to have been eager to  offer his assistance in legal cases, no doubt in an 
attempt to build a reputation in the courts. Disappointingly, however, there is no 
evidence to suggest Cassius served as a moneyer (or any comparable office), a 
position many of his family members enjoyed; nor is there a record of Cassius’ early 
military service, not that this is entirely unexpected. 
 
1 Plut. Brut. 9.1-4; Val. Max. 3.1.3. This issue will be discussed in Section 2 below.   
2 Thus Cassius was not motivated by personal hatred, as hostile sources alleged. On this tradition, refer 
again to Plutarch, as cited in the previous note. Cf. also, Chapter 1, Section 4.   
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How the reader interprets the tyrannicide’s early life will, in large part, be determined 
by the slenderest of anecdotal and Ciceronian testimony, neither of which can be 
accepted uncritically. But perhaps it is enough to say there are clear signs of Cassius’ 
conservatism, and even a hostility towards would-be oppressors like Faustus Sulla.     
        
3.1 BIRTH 
Uncertainty has long lingered over the exact year of Cassius’ birth, a question in no 
way trivial since its answer would provide a chronological peg from which to measure 
the tyrannicide’s political advancement. His natality is also important because there 
has been a tendency to view Cassius as notably older than M. Brutus, who the 
majority of scholars believe was born in 85.3 It is most probable, however, that they 
were in fact close in age. Based mainly on his problematic cursus, this section will 
endeavour to show that Cassius was very likely born around a year earlier than Brutus 
on 2/3 October 86. 
That the date of Cassius’ birth was the 2/3 October is most probable. Plutarch 
refers to Cassius’ confidant and apologist, M. Messala Corvinus, who was with the 
former on the eve of the battle of Philippi:  
ταῦτ' εἰπόντα φησὶν ὁ Μεσσάλας τελευταῖα πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀσπάσασθαι τὸν 
Κάσσιον· εἶναι δὲ κεκλημένος εἰς τὴν ὑστεραίαν ἐπὶ δεῖπνον ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, 
γενέθλιον οὖσαν.   
With these last words to him, Messala says, Cassius embraced him; and he had 
already invited him to supper on the following day, which was his birthday.4 
Thus Cassius was born on the same day as the first Battle of Philippi, 2/3 October,5 
which is also confirmed by Appian, who likewise notes that the tyrannicide died on 
his birthday.6 As D. Feeney has shown, the Romans observed birthdays with great 
 
3 Cic. Brut. 324. The view that Cassius was somewhat older derives from Plut. Brut. 29.1: ἡλικίᾳ τε 
προὔχοντα. Cf. Brut. 40.10; App. B Civ. 4.89. For Brutus’ age discrepancy in Vell. Pat. 2.72.2 see 
Woodman (1983) 173. See also, Porte (1994) 465-84, who argues for 78 as Brutus’ birth. However, 
Moles (1979) 57-9, convincingly refutes the testimony of Velleius. Far older than Brutus: Tyrrell and 
Purser (1933) 6.xcii, based on Velleius’ testimony. But the manuscript reading XXXVII should be 
emended to XXXXII. 
4 Plut. Brut. 40.4. 
5 The date of the first Battle of Philippi was either 2 or 3 October: Kilpatrick (1970) 135-41, argues for 
the former; Sheppard (2008) 15, for the latter. So, too, Dettenhofer (1992) 123. Cf. Moles (1979) 337. 
6 App. B Civ. 4.113:  Κασσίῳ μὲν δὴ τέλος ἦν τοῦ βίου κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ Κασσίου γενέθλιον ἡμέραν, 
ὧδε τῆς μάχης γενέσθαι συμπεσούσης. (“Thus Cassius ended his life on his birthday, on which, as it 
happened, the battle was fought.”) 
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attention, especially when they fell on even more famous anniversary days, as in this 
special case.7 Moreover, a passage in Juvenal’s fifth satire suggests that both Brutus 
and Cassius’ birthdays were still celebrated well into the Imperial period.8 It is 
therefore likely that the ancient sources were aware of the day and month of Cassius’ 
birth, and that the story was not an invention of Appian as F. Fröhlich insisted in his 
RE article.9   
However, no source provides any insight into the year of Cassius’ birth. The 
best the ancient sources can do is to relate that he was older than Brutus.10 Of course, 
this does furnish historians with a terminus ante quem: 86. But few scholars have 
explored this issue further, which is understandable.11 The challenge, then, is to 
reconstruct Cassius’ cursus –based on the assumption that he won election to public 
office at the earliest possible time, suo anno– in the hope that using the leges annales 
as our guide, his age can be ascertained. Yet here too there is a significant stumbling 
block: no fixed date has emerged for Cassius’ quaestorship, his first attested office, 
and the only election he may have won before political strife or Caesarian 
dispensation remove any semblance of regularity from the racecourse of honours.12 
Still, his quaestorship provides the best gauge of his age.13           
Traditionally, scholars followed the sources and fixed Cassius’ quaestorship in 
53.14 Both J. Linderski and G.V. Sumner demonstrated, however, that Cassius could 
not have been quaestor in this year, as no regular magistrates were chosen at the 
elections in 54 for the following year.15 Evidently, he had already been elected to 
office beforehand and thus was proquaestor in 53. Consequently, the question 
 
7 On the significance of birthdays that fell on anniversary days, see Feeney (2008) 148-9, 149 for 
Cassius; cf. Balsdon (1969) 121-2. D. Brutus was born on 21 April, the same day that M. Antonius was 
defeated by D. Brutus and Hirtius/Octavian at the battle of Mutina: Cic. Ad Brut. 1.15.8. The 21st  April 
is also Rome’s birthday, Parilia. 
8 Juv. 5.36-7: Thrasea Heluidiusque bibebant / Brutorum et Cassi natalibus. 
9 Fröhlich, RE (1899) 3.1734: “Man [The sources] erdichtete noch...Appian erzählt (IV 113), der Tag 
an dem er sein Leben geendet habe, sei sein Geburtstag gewesen.” 
10 Plut. Brut. 29, 40; App. B Civ. 4.89, 376. Drumann-Groebe (1964) [18992] 2.98-9.  
11 There is no discussion of the year of Cassius’ birth in Fröhlich, RE (1899) 3.1727-36; Elvers, BNP 
2.116; OCD4 (2012) 289; Dettenhofer (1992) 123-28. Manuwald (2007) 1.36, notes only that Cassius 
was born around 90. Münzer (1999) [1920] 323, hints that Cassius was born around 87/86.     
12 On the leges annales and age dispensations, see Sumner (1971a) 246-71, 363; on Cassius 
specifically, Sumner (1971b) 365; Linderski (1975) 35-7; Broughton, MRR 3.51. Even before Caesar, it 
was obviously possible to seek an exemption from the lex annalis: Katz (1977) 45-63. 
13 On the office of quaestor, see OCD3 (1996) 1287.   
14 Fröhlich, RE (1899) 3.1727; Broughton, MRR 2.229, with sources; Shackleton Bailey (1968) 3.221; 
cf. Richardson (1983) 463, who still argues for 53. 
15 Linderski (1975) 35-7; Sumner (1971b) 365. This had already been realised by Groebe: Drumann-
Groebe (1964) [18992] 2.99. This has been accepted by Ward (1977) 80n.78; Broughton, MRR 3.51.  
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becomes: was he quaestor in 55 or 54?16  As it is known he was older than Brutus, if 
Cassius were elected as quaestor for 5417 he had obviously not won election suo anno, 
as he would have been eligible to stand at least one year before –for 55. Based on 
when the late elections were held for 54 (most likely in early 54) he would also have 
had to join his commander M. Licinius Crassus after a marked delay, since the 
triumvir had set off for Syria in November of 55.18 If Cassius had not consciously 
delayed his election to the quaestorship, his failure to attain the lowest rung on the 
cursus honorum –for which there were 20 positions each year– when there were no 
electoral disturbances would have been quite remarkable for a nobilis of his stature.19  
In all likelihood, therefore, Cassius won election to the quaestorship in 56 for 
55, which would place his birth in 86,20 the year propounded by G.V. Sumner and 
accepted by J. Linderski.21 Clearly, he was much closer in age to Brutus than Plutarch 
would have his readers believe.22 (It serves Plutarch’s artistic designs to perpetuate 
this detail: Brutus is often deferential to Cassius because of his greater age and 
experience, which provides one explanation for the philosopher-statesman’s failure to 
accomplish his political goals.)23 In sum, Cassius was likely born on 2/3 October 86. 
This dating, if accepted, raises an interesting possibility: when Suetonius states the 
famous grammaticus L. Staberius Eros numbered Brutus and Cassius among his 
pupils, it is possible that they may well have been in the same coterie of his students, 
given that they were so close in age.24 Young aristocrats were, after all, educated in 
 
16 Linderski (1975) 36n.7: “It is impossible to decide whether he held his quaestorship in 55 or in 54.” 
17 The following scholars argue for 54: Babelon (1885) 332; Drumann-Groebe (1964) [18992] 2.99; 
Harlan (1995) 143; cf. OCD4 (2012) 289. Brutus was elected quaestor in 53 (Broughton, MRR 2.229), 
which was not suo anno, as a result of the election delays. He was entitled to stand for the election of 
54, which means Cassius could stand at least one year before this date, for 55.   
18 On Crassus’ departure, see Broughton, MRR 2.215, for ancient sources. Since the date of Cassius’ 
birth was in October before 85, it is clear by the time Crassus set off Cassius was already at least thirty.  
19 Broughton (1991) 1-64, notes in his famous article on defeated candidates for political office that 
only one certain nobilis suffered a repulsa when running for the quaestorship. This shows how rare it 
was to suffer a repulsa. M. Antonius (cos. 44), and M. Brutus (pr. 44), also failed to attain the 
quaestorship suo anno, but this was because of extenuating circumstances at Rome: Linderski and 
Kaminska-Linderski (1974) 222-3. See also Wiseman (1971) 106, on the ease of victory at the polls for 
a nobilis running for the quaestorship. On Cassius’ quaestorship, see Chapter 4, Section 1.  
20 Since a candidate for the quaestorship had to be thirty when he entered office, Cassius could 
campaign in 56, because his birthday on October 3 fell between the elections and his entry into office.  
21 Sumner (1971b) 365; Linderski (1975) 36, describes Sumner’s reconstruction as “ingenious” and 
“convincing”.  
22 At Plut. Brut. 29.1 and 40.1.  
23 On this artistic leitmotif, see Plut. Brut. 29.1; cf. 1.4. 
24 Suet. Gram. 13.1: Staberius Eros nomine, Thrax emptus de catasta et propter litterarum studium 
manumissus, docuit inter ceteros Brutum et Cassium. 
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their own homes or in the houses of family friends.25 There is a distinct possibility, 
then, that Brutus and Cassius studied side-by-side in childhood.  
 
3.2 CHILDHOOD 
Of Cassius’ childhood little is known other than a reported scuffle with Faustus 
Sulla.26 Cassius and his brothers would certainly have spent their early life at Rome, 
despite one scholar hypothesising that Cassius was removed to Rhodes for safety after 
Sulla’s return.27 The supporting evidence, a highly rhetorical passage in the fourth 
book of Appian’s Bellum Civile, is not credible, even though the practice of removing 
young sons from Rome at times of political crisis was not exceptional.28 Appian puts 
the following speech in the mouth of Archelaus, Cassius’ former teacher at Rhodes:  
πρὸς σὲ δέ, ὦ Κάσσιε, καὶ αἰδώς τις ἔστιν ἐξαίρετος ἔς τε τὴν πόλιν καὶ 
τὴν ἐν αὐτῇ τροφήν τέ σου καὶ παίδευσιν καὶ διατριβὴν καὶ ἑστίαν. 
As for you, Cassius, you owe a peculiar reverence to this city in which you 
were brought up and educated, lived, and had your homes, and where you 
attended my very school.29 
M. Dettenhofer takes Appian au pied de la lettre, glossing τροφή as reared from a 
young age. But, as has been interpreted elsewhere, the sense is more likely to be 
‘nurtured’ in his early adulthood.30 A pleader at the courts, Appian’s set-piece 
rhetorical speeches often display his own oratorical ability and persuasive skills rather 
than reflect what was really said.31 The use of τροφή, then, may deftly canvass the 
exaggerated argument of the speaker –Appian casts Archelaus as a sophist, whose 
arguments are sagely ignored by Cassius.32 There is, moreover, no credible evidence 
to suggest that Cassius was in imminent danger after Sulla’s return. As noted in the 
 
25 Meier (1997) 56-7. 
26 Anecdotes about the childhoods of prominent Romans are few and far between. Those that exist, like 
one concerning Cato the Younger, are often unrealistic: Cic. Fam. 16.22.1; cf. Plut. Cat. Min. 2. This 
lack of focus probably related to the Roman belief that children were weak: Cic. Senec. 23. On Roman 
childhood generally, see B. Rawson (1991), (2003); Dixon (2001); Tatum (1999) 43; Bradley (1991) 
183-96. On childhood education, see, for example, Clarke (1968) 18-22. On the alleged attack, see 
Section 3.2 below.  
27 Dettenhofer (1992) 124: “Sullas Gewaltherrschaft könnte auch Cassius’ frühen Aufenthalt auf 
Rhodos erklären. Möglicherweise war es dort einfach sicherer für ihn.”  
28 App. B Civ. 4.68. Magnino (1998) 220, does not discuss the veracity of Appian’s comment in his 
commentary. Also cf. B Civ. 4.65, less rhetorical.   
29  App. B Civ. 4.68. 
30 In his Penguin translation, Carter (1996) 243, translates τροφή as “nurtured”.  
31 Gowing (1991) 135-44, (1992) 171, 177, 245. 
32 Gowing (1992) 171.  
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last chapter, his father escaped recrimination and was soon elevated to the praetorship 
and consulship. Even Brutus, whose father was killed on Pompey’s instructions,33 was 
not evacuated overseas. Best, then, to imagine Cassius at Rome in these years.34 
One of the most fascinating stories from Cassius’ early life is the charge that 
he assaulted Faustus Sulla, son of the dictator.35 The attack is alleged to have occurred 
in a school setting (in schola), and, according to Plutarch, was serious enough that 
Faustus’ relatives wished to bring the matter to court. Supposedly Pompey intervened, 
although it is unclear in what capacity he did so.36 Rather than carry the matter to 
court, then, Pompey himself served as an arbiter between the young nobles, and held a 
private conference with them. However, if the meeting was designed to allow the 
boys to patch things up, Cassius did not play along. Instead of issuing an apology, he 
issued a threat: he would beat Faustus again if he had the courage to recount to 
Pompey the speech praising Sulla that had angered him. If this incident is historical, it 
would provide useful insights into Cassius’ character. But can it be believed? 
On the one hand, there is nothing in the anecdote that is demonstrably false. 
Cassius and Faustus Sulla, for example, were close enough in age that they could well 
have attended classes together.37 Indeed, one modern scholar argues that we know 
exactly where the assault occurred: in the school of Staberius Eros, a grammaticus 
who accepted children of the proscribed into his classes for free.38 Moreover, given 
the general paucity of ancient information about Cassius’ early life, we may be 
reluctant in principle to deny the validity of one of the few pieces of evidence that 
have come down to us.39 And yet there are problems. 
While there is nothing demonstrably incorrect in the anecdote, certain elements 
are suspicious. The ancient testimony is provided by Valerius Maximus and Plutarch. 
 
33 Sall. Hist. 1.70; Liv. Per. 90; Plut. Brut. 4.1-3, Pomp. 16.4-5; App. B Civ. 2.111; Oros. 5.22. 
34 As the following section shows, Cassius was taught (at some stage) by the famous grammaticus 
Staberius Eros, which means he was certainly at Rome for a period of time as a young man.    
35 Val. Max. 3.1.3; Plut. Brut. 9.1-4. 
36 Plutarch writes that the great general “forbade” (ἐκώλυσε) taking the matter to court, which implies 
some level of authority. If the incident occurred in 71/70, Pompey may well have been acting as 
consul. Even as a private citizen, however, Pompey’s influence was immense. Indeed, he perhaps 
considered himself Faustus Sulla’s true guardian: Plut. Lucull. 4.5 with Keaveney (1992) 378. 
37  The cursus of Faustus Sulla indicates that despite the ancient sources placing his birth in late 88, he 
was likely born in 86/85 (the same year as Cassius). On the date range of Faustus’ birth, see Sumner 
(1973) 88.  
38 Hillard (1987) 35-6; Suet. Gram. 13.1: Staberius Eros nomine, Thrax emptus de catasta et propter 
litterarum studium manumissus, docuit inter ceteros Brutum et Cassium. Cf. also Section 3 below on 
Staberius Eros.  
39 Moles (1979) 128, represents the general trend: “there is no reason to disbelieve this story”.  
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Though many of the details of theirs accounts overlap, there are also some notable 
differences. It is necessary to provide the full text of each account for close reading. 
Valerius’ account is the earlier (3.1.3):    
Cuius filium Faustum C. Cassius condiscipulum suum in schola 
proscriptionem paternam laudantem ipsumque, cum per aetatem 
potuisset, idem facturum minitantem colapho percussit. dignam 
manum, quae publico parricidio se non contaminaret! 
Sulla’s son Faustus at school was lauding his father’s proscriptions 
and threatening to do the same himself when he was old enough, at 
which a schoolfellow, C. Cassius, boxed his ears. Such a hand ought 
never to have defiled itself with a public parricide. 
Plutarch’s later version provides more details and a different emphasis (Brut. 9.1-4):   
ἐξ ἀρχῆς γὰρ <ἐν> ῆν τῇ φύσει τοῦ Κασσίου δυσμένειά τις καὶ 
χαλεπότης πρὸς τὸ γένος τῶν τυράννων, ὡς ἐδήλωσεν ἔτι παῖς ὢν 
βαδίζων εἰς ταὐτὸ τῷ τοῦ Σύλλα παιδὶ Φαύστῳ διδασκαλεῖον. ὁ 
μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς παισὶ μεγαληγορῶν τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς ἐπῄνει 
μοναρχίαν, ὁ δὲ Κάσσιος ἐπαναστὰς κονδύλους ἐνέτριβεν αὐτῷ. 
βουλομένων δὲ τῶν ἐπιτρόπων τοῦ Φαύστου καὶ οἰκείων 
ἐπεξιέναι καὶ δικάζεσθαι, Πομπήϊος ἐκώλυσε καὶ συναγαγὼν εἰς 
ταὐτὸ τοὺς παῖδας ἀμφοτέρους ἀνέκρινε περὶ τοῦ πράγματος. ἔνθα 
δὴ λέγεται τὸν Κάσσιον εἰπεῖν· “ἄγε δὴ ὦ Φαῦστε, τόλμησον 
ἐναντίον τούτου φθέγξασθαι τὸν λόγον ἐκεῖνον ἐφ' ᾧ 
παρωξύνθην, ἵνα σου πάλιν ἐγὼ συντρίψω τὸ στόμα. 
For from the outset there was in the nature of Cassius great hostility 
and bitterness towards the whole race of tyrants, as he showed when 
he was still a boy and went to the same school with Faustus the son 
of Sulla. For when Faustus blustered among the boys and bragged 
about his father’s absolute power, Cassius sprang up and gave him a 
thrashing. The guardians and relatives of Faustus wished to carry the 
matter into court, but Pompey forbade it, and after bringing the two 
boys together, questioned them both about the matter. Then, as the 
story goes, Cassius said: “Come now, Faustus, have the courage to 
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utter in this man’s presence that speech which angered me, and I will 
smash your face again.” 
The authors’ reasons for retelling this episode are very different. Valerius recounts 
this act under the rubric De Indole (“On Innate Character”), and the incident is 
designed to suggest that the same staunch character that led Cassius to assault Faustus 
Sulla as a youth also led him to assassinate Caesar in later years. (It is worth noting, 
however, that the final phrase is critical in aim –the man who as a boy rightly struck 
Faustus should not have stained his worthy hand with Caesar’s murder.)40 
 Perhaps there was an actual incident that generated this story; but if Cassius 
did indeed attend the classes of a teacher admired for educating free of charge the 
children of those proscribed by Sulla, the presence there of Faustus Sulla is odd.41 
Moreover, the parallelism between this assault and the assassination is so neat as to 
raise suspicions of contrivance. And yet, who would stand to gain from inventing 
such an anecdote? 
 One candidate perhaps is some unknown declaimer, who fabricated the detail 
in order to lend his set-speech regarding the assassination a piquant and innovative 
color.42 But the assault may be best viewed as the embellishment of a Cassian 
apologist, perhaps Empylus or Messala.43 In this case, the anecdote would have 
sought to repudiate the hostile charge that Cassius had assassinated Caesar as a result 
of personal hatred (μισοκαῖσαρ); that is, the story strove to show that Cassius had 
always hated tyrants and tyranny. If so, Faustus Sulla was simply a convenient vehicle 
for this teleological rebuttal;44 and Valerius seems then to have appropriated this 
anecdote for his own instructional purposes (as the last brief example in a series of 
three, illustrating the consistency of innate character).45 
 As is clear, Plutarch’s version of the event is embellished with greater detail. 
He is the sole authority for the additional details about Pompey’s intervention and 
 
40 Bloomer (1992) 208.  
41 Hillard (1987) 35-6, proposes that Faustus’ relatives deliberately placed him in the environment to 
build character.  
42 See Sen. Controv. passim on color. For a modern discussion, see Damon (2006) 439-50. 
43 Pace Hillard (1987) 35-6, who argues that the historicity of the story may be maintained.  
44 If the jests about Faustus preserved in Plutarch and Macrobius are any indication, he may have been 
an easy target: Plut. Mor. 205C; Macrob. Sat. 2.2.9. Ironically, Faustus Sulla would die –unlike 
Cassius– fighting for the Republicans at Thapsus: Liv. Per. 114; Suet. Iul. 75.3; BAfr. 95. [Aur. Vict.] 
De. vir. ill. 78.9. 
45 See also Val. Max. 5.3.4, where he reports as fact the spurious report that Cicero had been killed by 
C. Popillius Laenus, a man he had previously defended in court. 
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mediation, and this information immediately raises questions about the time frame of 
the supposed incident. Pompey was overseas for long periods during the 70s (the time 
in which both boys would have been studying), and only returned to Rome at the end 
of the decade, when he was elected consul. T.W. Hillard therefore suggests that the 
fight occurred in 71/70, when the boys would have been fifteen.46 But R. Kaster 
suggests that Plutarch places this episode during the Sullan dictatorship, a date that 
would belie its truth on chronological grounds alone.47 The reason for Pompey’s 
involvement in the scuffle is also unclear. It is possible that he may have considered 
himself (rather than his rival Lucullus) the rightful guardian of Faustus;48 
nevertheless, his appearance in the episode seems peculiar and does not inspire 
confidence in its veracity overall. 
 Despite these problems of detail, it seems clear enough that Plutarch uses the 
anecdote to demonstrate to his readers that Cassius had, since his earliest days, 
despised all tyrants on principle.49 To modern readers, one story from Cassius’ 
childhood may not seem like irrefutable proof of his anti-tyrant leanings, but the use 
of such vignettes conforms to Plutarch’s general historical practices.50 He amplifies 
the details to characterise Cassius as a man deeply committed to his principles, 
whatever the consequences. In addition, Plutarch uses the story to accentuate Cassius’ 
violent temper (note ἀνὴρ θυμοειδὴς), a characteristic that is emphasised throughout 
Brutus.51 The episode, then, is contrived to aid Plutarch’s literary depiction of 
Cassius’ character. 
 In sum, the anecdote presents an excellent example of the challenges regularly 
faced by modern historians of the Late Republic. We are presented with an episode 
that is curious, yet one that cannot be decisively rejected as a fabrication. If we accept 
that it contains a kernel of truth, there are implications for our perception of Cassius’ 
character and his reasons for planning Caesar’s assassination; but at the same time, it 
is wise to be aware that it was perhaps precisely this perception that these accounts 
were carefully designed to shape. 
 
46 Hillard (1987) 35. Pompey was consul in 70: Broughton, MRR 2.126.  
47 Kaster (1995) 168. The boys would have been around 4 or 5 years old.  
48 Pompey was unhappy that Lucullus had been designated Faustus’ guardian: see n.35 above. 
49 To a degree, this purpose runs counter to Plutarch’s earlier editorial comments that the tyrannicide 
hated Caesar on personal grounds (Brut. 8.5): ἀλλὰ Κάσσιος, ἀνὴρ θυμοειδὴς καὶ μᾶλλον ἰδίᾳ 
μισοκαῖσαρ ἢ κοινῇ μισοτύραννος, ἐξέκαυσε καὶ κατήπειξε.  
50 On vignettes to illustrate character, see the locus classicus: Plut. Alex. 1.2.  
51 Plut. Brut. 8.5.  
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Cassius’ aristocratic acculturation would have been a pressing concern for his family. 
Acting like a true aristocrat was of paramount importance; as Cicero notes, everything 
the young aristocrat said and did could –and probably would– be scrutinised (Off. 
2.44).52 Little escaped the attention of others. Even the way an aristocrat walked (or, 
preferably, strolled) was subject to censure.53 And failure to heed the rules of elite 
etiquette could be detrimental: Cicero at length defends the consul L. Murena in 62 
because Cato had accused him of being a dancer (saltator), evidently a serious breach 
of aristocratic decorum.54 Young men had to mature quickly in Rome.55  If Cassius’ 
alleged altercation with Faustus Sulla were historical, this would have been a serious 
breach of aristocratic comportment.  
The burden of expectation on young aristocrats was keenly felt. A son had to 
equal if not surpass the achievements of his father and ancestors.56 There was great 
pressure on young nobiles, whose ancestral imagines spurred or shamed them to 
excel.57 As four consecutive generations of his family had attained the consulship, this 
burden of expectation would have been keenly felt by Cassius. Fear of disgrace –
timor ignominiae– tormented many nobiles and there is no reason to doubt that this 
was not also the case with Cassius.58 This is further accentuated by the social ideology 
of pietas to one’s parents; it was not simply a burden or expectation but a duty to 
continue to glorify the family name.59  
 
 
 
 
52 Cf. Cic. Att. 1.18.1, on morning salutatio. See further, Wiseman (1982) 28-31; cf. Goldbeck (2010). 
On the public eye, see Flower (2004) 322-43; Hall (2014) 14-15.      
53 Spencer (2011) 63. Cic. Off. 1.131, cautions against walking too slowly, and instead recommends a 
leisurely pace. Suet. Claud. 4.5, demonstrates that Augustus fretted over the character of the young 
Claudius’ walk. For a full discussion on aristocratic walking, see Corbeill (2004) 107-23; and generally 
O’Sullivan (2011).  
54 Cic. Mur. 13. Cf. Sex. Titius’ flamboyant oratorical style after which a dance was named: Cic. Brut. 
225.  
55 Octavian delivered the funeral oration for his grandmother Julia (Caesar’s sister) when only a boy of 
twelve years old: Nic. Dam. 127.4; Suet. Aug. 8.1; Quint. Inst. 12.6.1. 
56 Cic. Rep. 1.1-12. See further, Taylor (1949) 25-8; Wiseman (1985) 3-8; Keaveney (1992) 32; Tatum 
(1999) 38, on the epitaph of Scipio Africanus; Richardson (2011) 155-60, with n.4 for additional 
references and scholarship.   
57 Flower (1996) 15, on “locus of shame”.  
58 Tatum (1999) 39, on timor ignominiae. Chapter 2 illustrated the burden of expectation on Cassius. 
59 Cic. Off. 1.160; Dixon (1988) 29: pietas to parents. Cf. Isayev (2007) 5; Cic. Fam. 5.17, 5.15.7-8, on 
sons who had brought honour and glory to their fathers. A desire to honour his father may explain 
Metellus Celer’s speed in hosting gladiatorial games within days of his father’s death: Plut. Rom. 10.3.   
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3.3 EDUCATION 
Cassius’ education was typical. Like Brutus, he was taught Latin grammar by a 
grammaticus, Staberius Eros.60 Staberius was an unusually prominent teacher, who 
merits discussion. His pedagogical credentials were impeccable. He was manumitted 
because of his devotion to literature and the elder Pliny describes him as the founder 
of Latin grammar.61 While Pliny’s assessment may be amplified, it is clear that 
Staberius was considered an enthusiastic and gifted scholar, the perfect candidate to 
teach young aristocrats. He was also highly regarded for his honestas, a notable trait 
to be ascribed to a former slave.62 There is no record of his teaching style, but he was 
perhaps closer in approach to the kind and nurturing M. Antonius Gnipho rather than 
the notorious Orbilius “the flogger”.63 Cassius would likely have begun his studies 
under Staberius at the age of ten or eleven (c. 76-75), and remained under his tutelage 
until about the age of fifteen. 
 But it is not Staberius’ teaching that has attracted the attention of some 
political historians. Rather, it is the fact that, as Suetonius recounts, Staberius 
admitted children of the proscribed into his classes without charge.64 This detail 
cannot be overlooked: how significant is it that Cassius studied under a teacher who 
(possibly, it must be stressed) had made a commitment and stand for the children of 
Sulla’s proscribed? Of course, despite the fact that Staberius admitted children of the 
proscribed into his classes, it cannot be inferred that he was in any way a “politicized” 
grammaticus.  Nor does it follow, as T.W. Hillard proposes, that Cassius’ assault of 
Faustus Sulla occurred at his school because of the presence of proscriptorum liberi.65  
 
60 Like other young nobiles of his day, Cassius would also have had a grammaticus Graecus (initially 
his paedagogus), who, if Cassius’ education followed the customary practices of the day, would have 
begun instructing him before Staberius: Clarke (1968) 19. The most detailed treatment of the 
paedogogus is a work in Dutch by Boulogne (1951). Whoever Cassius’ Greek grammaticus was, the 
tyrannicide would have been schooled in Greek poetry, particularly Homer, the cornerstone of a 
grammatical education: Cic. QFr. 3.5 and 6.4 with Clarke (1968) 19. Despite his Greek cognomen, 
Staberius taught Latin grammar, which encompassed basic literature. 
61 Suet. Gram. 13; Plin. HN 35.189, 199. On Staberius, see Funaioli, RE 3A2 1924-5; Bonner (1977) 
60; esp. Kaster (1995) 165-7, with bibliography cited therein.  
62 Suet. Gram. 13 with Kaster (1995) 168-9.    
63 Gnipho: Suet. Gramm. 7. Orbilius: Hor. Epist. 2.1.70; Suet. Gram. 9. 
64 Suet. Gram. 13.1-2: Staberius Eros nomine, †nametra† emptus de catasta et propter litterarum 
studium manumissus, docuit inter ceteros Brutum et Cassium. sunt qui tradant tanta eum honestate 
praeditum ut temporibus Sullanis proscriptorum liberos gratis et sine mercede ulla in disciplinam 
receperit. Based on their respective ages, it is possible that Brutus and Cassius were in the same coterie 
that received instruction from Staberius. Cf. Hillard (1987) 35-6, who suggests Staberius may have 
been politically coloured or simply a man of integrity, as Bonner (1977) 60.   
65 Hillard (1987) 34-6; contra Kaster (1995) 168.   
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A brief review of Cassius’ correspondence reveals that he could conduct epistolary 
exchanges with an appropriate degree of tact, which does not always appear to have 
been the case with Brutus.66 Only three of Cassius’ letters survive in Cicero’s corpus, 
although allusions to other epistles are known;67 but it has to be conceded that this is a 
woeful sample in view of G. Achard’s claim (bold though it may be) that on average 
the Roman aristocrat wrote ten letters a day.68 Nonetheless, even this small sample 
provides some useful insights into Cassius and his education. His letters indicate that 
he is comfortable writing in Greek,69 and that he will happily engage in light-hearted 
banter with Cicero: videor enim cum praesente loqui et iocari.70 But Cassius can also 
write provocatively in a self-assured and blunt fashion. He calls Cn. Pompeius junior 
a fool (fatuus), and ironically confesses he bore P. Sulla’s death with great fortitude.71 
It should be apparent, then, that Cassius could communicate with a significant degree 
of savoir-faire if required, or in a spirited and frank manner, entirely depending on his 
disposition.72    
In every respect, Cassius’ education was conventional. Like other Roman 
aristocrats, he enjoyed tuition from a grammaticus, albeit an extraordinary one of 
Staberius Eros’ calibre. And as will be seen, he also appears to have been politically 
acculturated in the normal Late Republican manner, placed in the care of eminent 
public figures (maybe Cicero) as part of the so-called ‘tirocinium fori’. He completed 
his education at Rhodes –if not Athens, too– where he studied under the leading 
rhetors and philosophers of the day. Yet although his educational circuit was 
conventional, Cassius displays a keen affinity for both the Greek language and 
philosophy (which cannot be considered common Roman aristocratic pursuits), 
interests he would nurture throughout his life.73 
 
66 Cassius’ extant letters to Cicero: Cic. Fam. 12.11; 12.12; 15.19. Cicero notes in one letter that Brutus 
had written to him in uncivil fashion; Cic. Att. 6.3.7. cf. however Plut. Brut. 2.8; also note the Suda 
(b561) records that he was admired for his stylish letters: θαυμάζεται δὲ εἰς τὴν τῶν ἐπιστολῶν ἰδέαν, 
ἤγουν χαρακτῆρα. For modern discussion of Cassius’ letters, see Cotton (1984) 422, (1986) 455; 
Deniaux (1993) 28, 97; Dettenhofer (1990) 256, argues that his correspondence with Cicero in 46-45 
should be read on different linguistic levels. 
67 For a complete catalogue of Cassius’ known non-extant letters, see Cugusi (1979) 2.191-6 [57]. This 
does not include two letters sent jointly by Cassius and Brutus to M. Antonius: Cic. Fam. 11.2-3.    
68 Achard (1991) 139.   
69 Cic. Fam. 15.19.2-3.  
70 Cic. Fam. 15.19.1. 
71 Cic. Fam. 15.19.1-3. 
72 He could be quite impassioned too: Cic. Att. 15.11, 12.1 with Hutchinson (1998) 131-7.  
73 On Cassius’ Epicureanism, see further Chapter 5, Section 10.   
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3.4 INTO THE FORUM 
At around the age of sixteen, Cassius would have donned the toga virilis and begun a 
process of political and forensic orientation, the so-called ‘tirocinium fori’.74 Paraded 
in the forum, Cassius and other young aristocrats his age were placed under the 
supervision of distinguished politicians, lawyers and orators, whom they would 
shadow as much as they were permitted.75 Naturally, this informal political 
apprenticeship was a vital way to make connections and learn the ropes. One orator 
Cassius may have enjoyed an association with was Cicero, who had established a 
reputation as one of the greatest speakers in Rome by 70.76 Two letters Cicero wrote 
to Cassius in later years may allude to this relationship. In the first, composed in 51, 
Cicero notes:  
tu puer me appetisti, ego autem semper ornamento te mihi fore duxi. 
As a boy you sought me out, and on my side I always believed that you 
would be a source of pride to me.77 
The second letter (Fam. 15.18.2) expresses much the same idea.78 In both letters, 
Cicero alludes to an intimate relationship a puero (“since boyhood”).79 How literally 
this phrase should be construed is, of course, open to interpretation.  But plainly 
Cassius had enjoyed some form of association with Cicero, who indicates he 
 
74 On ‘tirocinium fori’, see Stroup (2010) 141-50. Isayev (2007) 7, argues that tirocinium fori (which 
for her is “preparation for military training”) occurred between the ages of 14 and 17. For additional 
information on tirocinium fori, see Sen. Ep. 4.2; Plin. Ep.8.14; Barclay (1959) 158; Gwynn (1966) 132-
3; Bonner (1977) 84-5; Clarke (1971) 31; Eyben (1993) 128-45; cf. Gildenhard (2007) 74-5. On the 
ritual of donning the toga virilis, see Dolansky (2008) 47-70; cf. Dixon (1991) 101-2; Rawson (2003) 
142-4, 323-5; Wiedemann (1989) 113-42. The age at which an elite male donned the toga virilis 
varied, some were below sixteen (like Augustus) and others were older, like Caligula: Dolansky (2008) 
48-9. Contra Rousselle (1988) 59, who argues that a boy could not attain the toga of manhood until he 
reached sexual maturation. Traditionally, the ceremony would have taken place around the festival of 
the Liberalia, 17 March: Ov. Fast. 3.771-2. Commonality of ritual on Liberalia: Ridley (2000) 216. 
Plutarch notes that Cassius’ own son donned the toga virilis on the Ides (Brut. 14.4), which makes 
sense as it allowed the conspirators to assemble together at Cassius’ home without attracting attention. 
Plutarch is the sole authority for this detail: Moles (1979) 173.    
75 Cic. Lael. 1.1; Brut. 89; Cael. 9. Cf. Tac. Dial. 2 and see Berti (2009) 424-43, on his tirocinium fori.       
76 Indeed, with his successful prosecution of Verres in late 70, Cicero surpassed even Hortensius and 
cemented his place as Rome’s greatest orator, and won the moniker ‘king of the courts’: Cic. Verr. 
1.1.56; Brut. 319; Orat. 129; Off. 2.50; Plin. HN 34.6; Quint. Inst. 5.13.35; Plut. Cic. 7.1-8.2; Cass. Dio 
46.7.4; Stockton (1971) 43; Dyck (2008) 142-73.    
77 Cic. Fam. 15.14.6 with Shackleton Bailey (1977) 1.442. Cf. Cic. Fam. 15.18.2. See also Hall (2009) 
56-7, 60; White (2010) 159. Cicero is obviously using puer in the ‘loose’ sense, as Cassius would have 
been a young man by this stage. Cf. Fam. 2.1.2. LS s.v. “puer”.   
78 Cic. Fam. 15.18.2:  Valebis igitur meque, ut a puero fecisiti, amabis. 
79 See note above for indications of the intimacy Cicero implies (i.e., meque…amabis). 
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considered the younger man a credit to him.80 Cassius may have ‘sat at the feet’ of 
Cicero as the latter in turn had done with M. Antonius (cos. 99) and Q. Scaevola (cos. 
117).81 This is not all that remarkable: Cicero appears to have taken several young 
aristocrats under his chaperonage.82 (Law may have been one of the focal points of 
Cassius’ apprenticeship, as it had been with Cicero and Atticus.)83 It is also possible 
that Cassius attended Cicero’s morning salutationes.84 Perhaps, too, in 63 he had 
served in Cicero’s consular bodyguard, which was made up of young nobles.85 But it 
would be unwise to press these points too far –it is very uncertain what role Cicero 
played in Cassius’ acculturation, despite the former’s claims.  
Although Cicero implies that he has had an impact on Cassius’ political 
development (and one that he takes pride in), it does not follow that Cicero ever 
played a significant role in Cassius’ early entry into the political arena. There is every 
possibility that Cicero is indulging in polite exaggeration.86 Moreover, what 
impression he made on Cassius is also difficult to gauge, but Cassius unmistakably 
respected the orator enough to support (or pledge to support) him during (perhaps 
before) his exile.87  Thus Cassius would have been apprenticed to public life; Cicero 
may have played a role in this process, but it should not be presumed that he was 
constantly under the consular’s watchful gaze. It must be remembered that the extant 
evidence tends to be Cicero-centric in nature. As such, it is likely that Cassius enjoyed 
similar associations with a wide range of other aristocrats, given both the prominence 
of the Cassian gens and the extent of Cicero’s own known networks. Indeed, as will 
be seen below, Cassius enjoyed a connection to Brutus and Servilia through his 
marriage to Junia, and it may be inferred he was part of the “circle of Cato”.88    
 
80 Booth (1978) 123, points out that tirocinium fori was not a formal instructional relationship, but one 
more akin to informal, benevolent patronage.    
81 On Cicero’s political acculturation, see Amic. 1-2, Brut. 304-12, Leg. 1.13; Mitchell (1979) 6; Booth 
(1978) 123. Cf. Tacitus’ description: Dial. 2. For Cicero’s acculturation under L. Crassus, a leading 
member of the bar in the 90s who gave instruction to the sons of distinguished families, see Cic. De or. 
2.2. 
82 Curio: Fam. 11.1.2; M. Antonius: Phil. 2.3. Cf. Plancus: Jer. Chron. 188.4; Caelius: Cael. 9. For 
modern discussion of Cicero’s role in the informal education of the younger generation (including P. 
Crassus), see Van der Blom (2010) 311-15. See also Berti (2009) 424-3, on Tacitus’ tirocinium fori.  
83 Cic. Leg. 1.13, Amic. 1. 
84 See, for example, Att. 1.18.1, in which Cicero describes friends and admirers escorting him to the 
forum. On the morning salutatio, Goldbeck (2010) is essential.  
85 Cicero’s bodyguard of young nobles: Att. 2.19.4, 2.1.7; Red. Sen. 32; Phil. 2.16; Plut. Caes. 8.3-4.   
86 Cicero seeks to establish a relationship with Cassius in these letters, so he may politely exaggerate 
their relationship.  
87 See Section 11 below, on Cassius’ alleged support for Cicero during his exile.  
88 So Tatum (2008) 155. 
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3.5 CONTUBERNALIS            
When Cassius reached eighteen, in around 68, he most likely embarked on a year of 
military service as a contubernalis (“tent-companion”).89 His service is, unfortunately, 
unattested by the ancient sources. Although military service was no longer 
compulsory, it was still sensible for all aristocrats looking to pursue a career in 
politics to gain some experience of warfare.90 Success on the field of battle would 
often translate into success at the polls, as the careers of Scipio, Marius and Pompey 
aptly demonstrate.91  
Since no member of Cassius’ family had ever celebrated a triumph –Rome’s 
highest military honour– the quest for martial glory may have been particularly 
alluring, as it furnished the tyrannicide with one avenue by which to surpass the 
achievements of his ancestors.92 But more specifically, military service provided him 
with an opportunity to atone for the recent battlefield failures of his father and 
grandfather –as noted, around four years earlier his father had suffered an 
embarrassing defeat against Spartacus and his slave army.93 Indeed, as noted in the 
last chapter, it is possible, in fact, that Cassius had been party to this defeat, as fathers 
would often take their sons on campaigns in the provinces to give them a taste of 
military life. Cicero and others had taken their teenage sons on campaign with them.94 
 
89 On military service at –or around– eighteen see Harris (1979) 11-12; cf. Tatum (1999) 44.  But 
Suolahti (1955) 29, argues for sixteen or seventeen based on Gell. NA. 10.28.1. But cf. Liv. 35.5.8; 
37.11.15. On the role of contubernalis, see Rosenstein (2007) 139; cf. Gildenhard (2007) 29, who 
divides aristocratic education into two distinct phases (one being service as a contubernalis). OLD s.v. 
“contubernalis” 1b. Brunt (1971) 16n.7, perhaps errs in suggesting that military obligation began as 
late as nineteen years of age. C. Plancius, for example, served as a contubernalis immediately before 
68 with A. Manlius Torquatus in Africa: Cic. Planc. 27 with Earl (1966) 306. Also, Sall. Iug. 59.4; 
Front. Strat. 4.1.11-12. For the position of contubernalis, see OLD s.v. “contubernalis” 1b. Cf. also 
Cic. Cael. 73. For scholarly discussion, Rosenstein (2007) 139; Gildenhard (2007) 29. On the issue of 
when aristocrats began military service, see Harris (1979) 12n.6.         
90 The issue of whether military service was compulsory (and extended for a minimum of ten years) as 
suggested by Polybius (6.19.4-5) is fiercely debated. See Harris (1979) 11-12, esp. 12n.4; Suolahti 
(1955) 31; Keaveney (2005) 11. Even Cicero performed some military service, despite his dislike of 
soldiering: Cic. Div. 1.72, Phil. 12.27; Plut. Cic. 3.2. Dislike: Off. 1.74-80.  
91 Marius: Plut. Mar. 3.3-4.2. See especially, Harris (1979) 17, and the next note. Cf. Cic. Mur. 19-24.  
92 On the importance of military gloria, see Sall. Cat. 7.3; Harris (1971) 17-19; Earl (1967) 11-13. 
Increasing the dignitas of one’s family was a key task for every aristocrat: Cic. QFr. 1.1.2; Mitchell 
(1979) 2n.2; Badian (1970) 5; Cic. Off. 1.116: son’s duty to surpass achievements of his father. See 
also Tatum (1999) 38, with n. 30, on the epitaph of Cn. Cornelius Scipio. In Cic. Balb. 40, Cicero is 
supposed to praise the unsurpassed military glory of families such as the Cassii, but the manuscript 
tradition is dubious at this point in the text. Barber (2004) 72, appears to accept the reading. 
93 On this defeat, see further Chapter 2, Section 3.  
94 On sons joining their fathers on campaign, see Chapter 2, Section 3, n.129. 
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Like other ambitious aristocrats, Cassius would also have wanted to demonstrate his 
virtus.95  
As a contubernalis, the young Cassius would have been attached to a senior 
military officer in order to learn the art of military science.96 This was no sinecure; the 
Romans took military acculturation and competence seriously.97 Cassius had probably 
spent some (perhaps much) of his youth in training and drills, and he may even have 
pored over the available handbooks then accessible on warfare, military strategy, and 
discipline, works such as Cato the Elder’s de re militari.98 As will be seen in the next 
chapter, Cassius’ actions after Carrhae show that he was well schooled in military 
history and theory. Ultimately, it must be conceded that there is no trace of where the 
tyrannicide served overseas (or whom he served under). But there were certainly 
significant campaigns in Spain and Asia in the early sixties. As the importance of 
military service was paramount, Cassius would have been very unusual if he had 
altogether avoided this important part of Roman aristocratic life.   
 
3.6 OVERSEAS STUDY 
After military service, Cassius appears to have embarked on an educational ‘Grand 
Tour’, which entailed overseas study at the Greek intellectual centres under the great 
rhetors and philosophers.99 If Cicero is any guide, this could involve a visit to Athens, 
followed by Asia, and finally Rhodes.100 While it is unknown whether Cassius studied 
 
95 On virtus, see generally McDonnell (2006).  
96 For this relationship and its importance, see the example of Ti. Gracchus and Scipio Aemilianus 
during the Third Punic War: Plut. Ti. Gracch. 4.4. Cf. Sall. Iug. 64.4; Cic. Cael. 73, Planc. 27; Tac. 
Agr. 5.1.    
97 See generally Rosenstein (1990), on aristocrats not being affected by defeats; and the myth of 
“invincibility”. But see Tatum (1991) in response. Sheldon (2005) notes that the Romans were woeful 
intelligence gatherers.     
98 Cato’s work is cited in Vegetius, Epitoma rei militaris (I.8.11.13). See Rawson (1971) 17-18. 
Custom dictated that Cassius’ father, consul in 73, be responsible for his son’s earliest military 
training: McDonnell (2006) 181. Cf. Pompey and Pompeius Strabo: Vell. Pat. 2.29.3, Sall. Hist. 2.19. 
Cf. Nep. Att. 1.2, who instructed his son in all branches of education deemed worthy. Crassus’ father: 
Plut. Crass. 4.1 with Ward (1977) 49.  Such a practice would be analogous to those aristocrats such as 
his brother Lucius, who voraciously read and studied the speeches of Cicero to aid oratorical 
development: Cic. Planc. 66.     
99 Overseas study had become “almost obligatory” by the Late Republic: Rawson (1985) 9-12; cf. Daly 
(1950) 40-54; Harris (1979) 15. On this aristocratic, educational rite of passage, see Walden (1909) 54; 
Rawson (1985) 10. Famous Late Republican politicians who studied in Greece include Cicero: Plut. 
Cic. 3.5-4.3; Caesar: Suet. Iul. 4.1; Antonius: Plut. Ant. 2.4 with Pelling (1988) 119; Octavian: Nic. 
Dam. 130; Str. 13.265; Suet. Aug. 89.1; App. B Civ. 3.9. Walden believes this ritual of studying in 
Greece had become de rigueur by the Late Republic; see Daly (1950) 54-8; Marrou (1956) 246-7; 
Carney (1970) 10.   
100 Cic. Brut. 314-16.  
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in Athens, it is clear he studied in Rhodes, and perhaps, if a rhetorical passage in 
Appian is to be believed, for an extended period.101 The School at Rhodes was a 
fashionable Roman rhetorical finishing school;102 Caesar and Brutus also attended.103  
One skill Cassius would have sought to hone at Rhodes was his oratory. 
Public speaking was a fundamental feature of Late Republican political life, so an 
ability to communicate persuasively was highly desired by ambitious politicians.104 
Appian notes that one of Cassius’ teachers was Archelaus, whom he claims taught 
him Greek literature (Ἀρχέλαον, ὃς ἐν Ῥόδῳ τὰ Ἑλληνικὰ διδάσκαλος γεγένητο τῷ 
Κασσίῳ).105 Nothing else is known of this man, although he may be the rhetor referred 
to by Diogenes Laertius in connection with a handbook on rhetoric.106 Teachers of 
rhetoric also taught literature as well in order to develop their students’ appreciation 
of linguistic style and rhetorical tropes. Regardless of Archelaus’ precise role, Rhodes 
boasted many additional intellectual luminaries. The philosopher Posidonius edified 
visitors like Cicero until his death in 50; and Apollonius Molon had helped Caesar 
brush up his oratory.107  
With the services of teachers such as these, it would not be surprising if 
Cassius had spent an extended stint in Rhodes, as Appian reports. And if his later 
career is any indicator, it is evident that Cassius enjoyed philosophical discussion, and 
 
101 As attested by Cic. Fam. 15.14.6 and App. B Civ. 4.66-8 and Cass. Dio 47.33.4 specifically. As 
Rawson notes, Cicero expects his anonymous pupil will have studied in Athens in his Tusculum 
Disputations: Cic. Tusc. 2.26; Rawson (1985) 10.    
102 Even Pompey, while combating the pirates and other menaces in the East, stopped at Rhodes in 67 
to hear a lecture of Posidonius: Str. 11.492; Plut. Pomp. 42.5. 
103 Cic. Fam. 15.14.6; App. B Civ. 4.66-8. Cass. Dio 47.33.4.  
104 The example of the precocious noble Q. Hortensius, who had come to fame at the age of nineteen 
after a commanding performance in the courts, provided an example for others to emulate, if they so 
wished: Cic. de Orat. 3.229, Brut. 228-9, 324, 328. L. Sempronius Atratinus was only seventeen when 
he brought Caelius to trial: Austin (1960) 154-6. A cautionary example was also provided by Scipio 
Aemilianus, who was considered an aberration for not having appeared in court by the age of nineteen: 
Polyb. 31.23.11 with Harris (1979) 19. Cassius’ brother Lucius appears to have undertaken a 
prosecution in his early years: on Lucius’ role as subscriptor in the prosecution of Plancius, see Cic. 
Planc. 58.5, 62. On the importance of youthful prosecutions to gain laus, see Cic. Off. 2.47-9; Brut. 
159.  
105 App. B Civ. 4.66-8. See also Rawson (1985) 10.   
106 Diog. Laert. 2.17: τεχνογράφος ῥήτωρ.   
107 Cic. Planc. 84; Brut. 151; Val. Max. 2.2.3; Quint. Inst. 12.67; Plut. Cic. 4.4-5; Plut. Caes. 3.1-4; 
Suet. Iul. 2.4. [Aur. Vict.]  De vir. ill. 82.2. On Rhodes, see Marrou (1956) 214-15. Aristodemus of 
Nysa, who tutored Pompey’s sons, also had a school at Rhodes: Str. 14.650e. Jason of Nysa succeeded 
Posidonius as head of the school at Rhodes: Suda s.v. Jason of Nysa (I.52). Cicero studied under 
Molon: Cic. Planc. 84, Brut. 151; Quint. Inst. 12.6.7; Plut. Cic. 4.4-5.  
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preferred to speak in Greek when he wished to show affection to friends.108 This is 
significant and in need of explanation. Generally, aristocrats were expected to learn 
Greek, but paradoxically maintain a healthy prejudice against the language and its 
cultural treasures.109 But neither Cassius nor Brutus demonstrate anything but respect 
for the ancient world’s lingua franca. So while the evidence does not permit us to 
designate Cassius as a devoted philhellene like his compatriot Brutus, it is apparent 
that he was fond of Greek language, culture, and philosophy.110  
 
3.7 MONEYER 
Before he started his political career in earnest, Cassius may have sought election to 
one of the six boards of minor magistracies, known collectively as the 
vigintisexviri.111 These offices were a stepping-stone to the cursus honorum for the 
sons of senators.112 Of these six boards, the decimviri stlitibus iudicandis garnered the 
most prestige, but since the Sullan reforms, the number of aristocrats flocking to the 
college of tresviri monetales had ballooned, particularly because the mint offered 
them the chance to exploit the propagandistic –or, as some would prefer, 
monumentalizing– potential of coinage.113 Many moneyers used their position to 
commemorate the great deeds of their ancestors, which, in turn, they hoped would 
 
108 On his philosophical banter with Cicero, see Cic. Fam. 15.16-18. See also Plut. Brut. 40.2, for 
Cassius’ preference for speaking Greek to intimates. This testimony comes directly from his close 
friend Messala. Cf. Cic. Fam. 15.19.2-3, for evidence of his employment of Greek, and FRmH 1.547.   
109 Cicero, a philhellene like Cassius, was derided as Graeculus: Plut. Cic. 5.2, but with Lintott (2013) 
139, who misses Cassius Dio; Cass. Dio 46.18.1. That the word was derogatory, see Swain (1990) 
194n.5. On the need for aristocrats to learn Greek, see, for example, Rawson (1985) 1-18; Horsfall 
(1979) 85-95; and Crawford (1978) 193-207. Contempt for Greeks: Cic. de Orat. 1.47, 102; Juv. 3.78. 
110 Tröster (2008) has argued that “Greekness” may have aided a Roman’s self-image in the Late 
Republic, despite the traditionally negative view of Hellenism. He cites Lucullus as a key example. 
Zetzel (2003) 119-38, provocatively counters that even someone like Cicero was more guarded in his 
use of Greek learning than is traditionally held. Ultimately, Greek was the in-group language of 
sophistication.     
111 Soulahti (1955) 31, proposes junior aristocrats had to be twenty-five years of age to enter this office. 
112 For the vigintisexviri, see Purcell, OCD4 (2012) 1551; Crawford, RRC 2.616-19; Suolahti (1955) 29-
33, 54; Hamilton (1969). As military service waned, preliminary civil magistracies grew in importance. 
Administrative experience was important, if not as crucial as military service.       
113 Despite its status as a minor magistracy (Cic. Leg. 3.3.6), which had previously been deemed 
beneath the dignity of many blue-blooded nobles, the college of tresviri monetales gave young 
aristocrats a foretaste of the cursus honorum before they embarked on their career proper. From a 
logistical perspective, it gave grandees in their late twenties something to do while they awaited their 
chance to run for the quaestorship. On the propagandistic value of the office, see, for example, 
Hamilton (1969) 181-99, who also discusses how Sulla’s constitutional reforms may have made the 
mint a more desirable position for young grandees. Further, Cheung (1998) 53-61; and Meadows and 
Williams (2001) 27-49, who prefer the term “monumentalizing” to “propaganda”. Flower (2011) 129-
30, on Sulla’s reforms; contra Gruen (1974), who believes that Sulla restored the previous system.  
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serve to promote their own future canvass.114 There is no record that Cassius served as 
a moneyer. If he did not, it would be somewhat surprising given the increasing 
importance attached to the post in the first century, and his own family’s past 
connections with the mint.115 However, his apparent absence may simply be the result 
of insufficient evidence. There are gaps in the record of moneyers for the period of 
59-57, the most probable time that Cassius would have held this office.116 His brother 
Quintus was a monetalis in 55, and M. Brutus held the office in 54, immediately 
before a quaestorship.117 And yet, not everyone wished or got to be a monetalis; 
Caesar had performed the duties of curator viarum in his early career, which 
considering the Roman obsession with public works is understandable.118 If Cassius 
did serve in a capacity other than monetalis then his name, like those of most others, 
has been lost with the passage of time.119  While it would not have been exceptional 
for a nobilis to overstep this office if he considered it infra dignitatem,120 such a 
record of civic service was increasingly important in Cassius’ day. 
 G.V. Sumner mooted the possibility that Cassius may in fact have been a 
monetalis. He suggests the tyrannicide issued a coin that scholars had often attributed 
to his younger brother Lucius (tr. pl. 44).121 This hypothesis came about because the 
coin in question, which had been dated to the late 50s by Grueber and Sydenham, was 
re-dated by M. Crawford to 63, and then to 60 by Hersh and Walker, based on its 
 
114 See above note. Quintus Cassius (tr. pl. 49) commemorated the achievements of his great-great-
grandfather L. Cassius Longinus Ravilla as monetalis in 55: Crawford, RRC nos. 428/1-3.  
115 Sumner has mooted the possibility that Cassius served as monetalis and issued RRC no. 413/1, often 
attributed to his brother Lucius (tr. pl. 44). But see below. His younger brother Quintus (tr. pl. 49) 
certainly served as monetalis in 55. See Cody (1968) on the Cassii’s moneyerships.  
116 But see Cody (1968) 169: “Gaius Cassius was never a triumvir monetalis”. She makes this bold 
claim without qualification. Yet one notes that several moneyers for the period 59-7 go unattested, 
which opens the door for Cassius to have been a monetalis at these times. See Crawford, RRC 1.445-8. 
117 Peppe (1996) 47-64.  
118 Caesar as curator: Plut. Caes. 5. Caesar served as curator after election to the quaestorship. A 
certain Thermus (Cic. Att. 1.1.2) was a popular candidate for the consulship of 64, as a result, so Cicero 
tells us, of serving as curator viarum. See further, Laurence (1999) 41; van Tilburg (2007) 34-5; cf. 
Shackleton Bailey (1968) 1.292, on the problematic identity of Thermus. Burnett (1977) suggests that 
moneyers coined under the imperium of the consuls, and thus were often their family, friends or clients.   
119 Most of our information about the vigintisexviri relates to the tresviri monetales, who inscribed their 
names on their coins. M. Brutus served as a monetalis in 54: Crawford, RRC 1.455-456. Cf. Cerutti 
(1993/4) who argues for an earlier date than 54. Coin: Crawford, RRC no.433/1.   
120 Suolahti (1955) 32-3. But most nobles eyeing a senatorial career would presumably wish to hold the 
office for the exposure it offered.    
121 As noted in Badian (1971) 141n.37: “Professor Sumner points out to me that the moneyer [of RRC 
no. 413/1] may well be C. Cassius, the later tyrannicide.” Cf. Broughton, MRR 3.51-2. Hamilton 
(1969) 198, Crawford, RRC 1.440, argue for Lucius, as did scholars of previous generations. Grueber 
argued for Lucius’ eponymous son, who died at Philippi, and Gundel, BNP 1.1070, suggested, a priori, 
the son of the Catilinarian conspirator. On these proposals, see Cody (1968) 154.      
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presence in the Mesagne hoard.122 Consequently, if numismatists have correctly dated 
the coin to the late 60s, it throws into serious doubt Lucius’ eligibility to be the 
moneyer, as he would appear to have been too young to hold the minor office of 
monetalis at that time.123 Hence Sumner proposed Cassius the tyrannicide instead.124                
However, there are two problems with Sumner’s suggested emendation, 
especially the coin type itself, whose irregular control marks suggest the moneyer was 
indeed an “L.” Cassius Longinus (see Fig. 1 ).125 
 
Figure 1 
Another problem with Sumner’s hypothesis is the use of the cognomen LONGIN(VS) 
by the moneyer. Uniquely, this is the only coin minted by a member of the gens 
Cassia that does not have the family name inscribed upon it.126 Yet all of the 
tyrannicide’s known issues bear his praenomen and nomen, but not his cognomen.127 
As Cicero’s corpus demonstrates, Cassius evidently preferred not to be addressed by 
 
122 Crawford, RRC 1.440, no. 413/1, proposed 63; Grueber (1910) 1.413, suggested c. 52; so too 
Sydenham (1952) 156, no. 935; Pink (1952) 37-8, dated the coin to c. 70. Most recently, Harlan (1995) 
39, opts for 60, based on evidence from the Mesagne hoard. On the Mesagne hoard, see especially 
Hersh and Walker (1984) 103-34, who re-date the coin to 60. Cf. Hollstein (1993) 191-2, who notes 
Crawford’s dating is probably too early; cf. Mattingly (1982) 14, (2004) 232.             
123 Harlan (1995) xiii-xiv, argues monetales had to be in their very late twenties or early thirties. He 
presumes the office of monetalis immediately preceded the office of quaestor. See also Hamilton 
(1969) 182. Mattingly (1967) 29-31, reflects the standard view that moneyers had to be at least 27 
years of age, after the Sullan reforms. Lucius, the youngest of the three known Cassii brothers (see 
below, n.12), was perhaps born c. 83, not before. Thus even in 60 he would still have been too young to 
serve as master of the mint. This is why Sumner, and Harlan (1995) 39, rejected him as the moneyer of 
the coin.   
124 Cassius’ other younger brother, Quintus (tr. pl. 49), was a monetalis in 55: Crawford, RRC 1. 452;  
Hollstein (1993) 301. So Cassius appears to be the only possible candidate, unless the moneyer was an 
unknown, which is certainly possible. See below.    
125 Harlan (1995) 39: “Beside the obverse head are different letters, used as control marks, but the same 
letters C, A, S, a backwards S, I, and L, are used over and over…An earlier moneyer, Gaius Mamilius 
Limetanus, had used only the letters of his name as control marks.” See also Crawford, RRC 1.440. On 
control marks, see Crawford (1966). Mattingly (1982) 14n.26, believes the control marks could 
possibly equal C. CASSI L., given the date of the issue (which he placed between 59 and 58). But 
Hollstein (1993) 192, responds: “Doch der Buchstabe L steht eher für das praenomen, da das 
cognomen mit LONGIN ja nahezu vollständig auf der Rs.” See further, Hollstein (1993) 191, with full 
bibliography.             
126 Harlan (1995) 39. 
127 For coins, Crawford, RRC 1.513-16, nos. 498-500, 505. Hollstein (1993) 192, concurs: “In der 
schriftlichen Überlieferung wird das cognomen Longinus dem C. Cassius niemals beigefügt, es fehlt 
ebenfalls auf den von ihm später ausgegebenen Münztypen.” This includes coins minted by Cassius as 
proquaestor of Syria, after Carrhae: Bellinger (1944) 59-62, with pl. VII, no.2.   
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his cognomen (in contrast to Brutus, with whom Cicero was on more intimate 
terms).128 Taken together, these two factors make Sumner’s proposal unlikely.    
For the purpose of this brief discussion, it suffices to conclude, contrary to 
Sumner’s supposition, that Cassius is very unlikely to be the moneyer of RRC 413. 
The monetalis was possibly L. Cassius Longinus (mil. tr. 69),129 or even an otherwise 
unknown member of the family.130 It is also unlikely that the moneyer was Cassius’ 
youngest known brother, Lucius (tr. pl. 44), as M. Crawford maintains.131 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that Cassius was never a monetalis and given the 
usefulness of the post to aristocrats eyeing a political career he may well have served 
on the college of tresviri monetales. But unfortunately no record survives to confirm 
this speculation.  
 
3.8 QUINDECIMVIRATE 
Young nobles could also be co-opted into one of the four major Roman priesthoods: 
pontifices, augures, quindecimviri, or septimviri epulones.132 Election to one of these 
colleges was considered by some to be the first step in a successful career and utilised 
by junior nobiles as a “training ground” for political advancement and networking.133 
Unsurprisingly, competition to enter these priesthoods was fierce; P. Cornelius 
 
128 Adams (1978) 148, 152, 157; cf. Axtell (1915) 389, 403. Furthermore, Cassius’ brother Lucius was 
apparently the first member of the Cassii to use his cognomen regularly: Drumann-Groebe (1964) 
[18992] 2.129n.2; Mommsen (1860) [1956] 636n.498. And his other brother Quintus is also referred to 
by his cognomen in Bell. Alex. (e.g. 50.1). But the use of the cognomen LONGINUS may have been 
necessary in the late 60s given the disgrace that the Catilinarian conspirator had brought on the gens:  
Sall. Cat. 50.4, 52.36; 55.1. For this argument, see Harlan (1995) 39.    
129 Harlan (1995) 39-43. Hollstein (1996) 354-6, criticised Harlan’s work in his review in The 
Numismatic Chronicle, not without cause. But even he conceded that Harlan’s attribution of L. Cassius 
Longinus (mil. tr. 69) “seems possible.” (p. 356).  
130 The L. Cassius who came across Caesar at the Hellespont is another candidate. 
131 Crawford, RRC 1.440. So, too, Hollstein (1993) 192. Further, since Lucius was tribune in 44, his 
tenure as one of the mint masters in 60 would be strange as his seemingly elder brother Quintus 
(tribune before Lucius in 49) had secured the position of monetalis only in 55. Gaius, Quintus and 
Lucius were, despite the prevalent scholarly opinion, brothers: App. B Civ. 5.7; CIL II2/5 521; AE 1986 
369, with Amela Valverde (2002) 124.    
132 Co-optation of young nobles: Bardt (1871) 37; Taylor (1941) 117, (1942) 394, on the eulogium of 
M. Valerius Messalla (cos. 61); Shackleton Bailey (1977) I.430. Taylor (1957) 14-15, notes that Caesar 
was made a pontifex in 73, in his late twenties. Cf. Syme (1987) 193: “In favourable circumstances a 
young aristocrat qualified for a priesthood as soon as he donned the toga virilis.” Cic. Ad Brut. 1.5 and 
1.14,  highlight Cicero’s attempt to secure for his son a place among the pontifices (aged 22).   
133 Szemler (1972) 192. In 63, Titus Labienus passed the lex Labiena which revived the lex Domitia of 
104, placing the co-optation of priests in the hands of the people. Cass. Dio 37.37.1; Taylor (1942) 388.  
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Spinther even transferred out of his gens so that he might eligibly enter the augural 
college.134  
It has been repeatedly proposed that Cassius was a member of the 
quindecimviri sacris faciundis (XVvir s.f.), an exclusive Roman priesthood which was 
responsible for guarding and interpreting the Sibylline books.135 However, not all 
scholars are convinced of this; G.J. Szemler, for instance, only tentatively mooted the 
possibility in his The Priests of the Roman Republic.136 Much is at stake here. If 
Cassius were a priest, it furnishes the historian with a crucial detail about his role in 
Roman state religion. Therefore, it is crucial to assess the slim evidence on which 
scholars have argued that he held the quindecimvirate. It is suggested here that there 
is insufficient testimony to argue Cassius held the priesthood, and that scholars have 
very likely misinterpreted the numismatic evidence. The coins at issue (Crawford, 
RRC nos. 498-500) do not, it is argued, reference any quindecimvirate, but rather 
invoke Apollo who was the patron deity of the Liberators. 
               Unlike other prominent political actors of the Late Republic (Cato, Clodius 
and Dolabella) no written testimony verifies the alleged quindecimvirate of Cassius, 
which is somewhat surprising given his historical significance.137 Instead his 
priesthood has been inferred from numismatic evidence, which is not only far from 
conclusive but also open to different interpretations. Three coins are of particular 
interest, although the examination of just one of these will be sufficient for the present 
discussion.138 P. Cornelius Lentulus Spinther (son of the consul of 57) issued the coin 
below in 42, presumably after Cassius had captured Rhodes (hence IMP; see Fig. 2):139  
 
134 Cass. Dio 39.17.1-.2  
135 Broughton, MRR 2.369, 3.51, lists Cassius as “XVvir s.f.”; Rüpke (2008) 128, 131; Armstrong 
(2011) 112; Cadoux and Seager, OCD4 (2012) 289: “[H]e held a priesthood.” Previously, other 
prominent scholars accepted Cassius was a quindecimvir: Bardt (1871) 31, 33; Drumann-Groebe 
(1964) [18992] 2.103n.5; Hoffman-Lewis (1955) 48; Radke, RE (1963) 24:1145. On the quindecimviri 
sacris faciundis, see Linderski, BNP 12.345-7, with basic bibliography therein; cf. Beard, North and 
Price (2003) s.v. “quindecimviri sacris faciundis”; Szemler (1972) 21n.3; Lintott (1999) 183-4; Davies 
(2004) 64-71. On their duties of guarding and interpreting the Sibylline books, see Gell. NA 1.9.11; 
Cic. Div. 1.2.4. The quindecimviri were one of four major Roman priesthoods, behind the pontifices 
and augures: Cic. Har. resp. 18, Nat. D. 3.5, Leg. 2.20.        
136 Szemler (1972) 166. Several other scholars also consider it possible, but express hesitation: 
Borghesi (1862) 1.341; Babelon (1885) 334; Crawford, RRC 2.741n.6; Gosling (1986) 586-9. 
137 For the written testimony on the priesthoods of Cato, Clodius and Dolabella: Szemler (1972) 165-6. 
138 Crawford, RRC 1.513-14, nos. 498-500.  
139 On Cassius’ defeat of Rhodes, see Vell. Pat. 2.69.6; App. B Civ. 4.60-74; Cass. Dio 47.33.1-4. 
Crawford, RRC 1.514, no. 500/1. Lentulus was one of Cassius’ generals at Rhodes: App. B Civ. 4.72.   
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                                                              Figure 2 
It is noteworthy because the obverse clearly depicts a tripod on which rests a cortina, 
decked with fillets. Of these, it is the tripod that is particularly important, as it was 
famously the sacred symbol of Apollo.140 Now this is more significant because, as 
Livy mentions, the quindecimvirs were the overseers of the god’s cult (10.8.2): 
antistites eosdem Apollinaris sacri caerimoniarumque.141 Based on this evidence, it is 
hardly surprising that scholars such as G. Bloch connected Apollo’s tripod to the 
priesthood of the quindecimviri.142 Nor is it unexpected that historians have argued 
Cassius was a member of this religious order, especially as it is insisted that 
Republican initiates imprinted Apolline tripods on their coinage.143 However, as will 
be seen, neither of these claims  is certain. 
               Arguably, L. Manlius Torquatus (pr. 49) appears to be the first and only 
authenticated member of the priesthood to issue a coin depicting a tripod prior to 
Cassius.144 One Republican example is clearly insufficient to prove this was a 
common practice. Moreover, a M. Volteius issued a coin in 78 depicting a tripod that 
assuredly does not reference the quindecimviri.145 Thus it cannot be said with 
confidence that tripods always signify membership of this priesthood (not during the 
Late Republic at least). After all, it would be unwise to maintain that they enjoyed 
exclusive rights to Apolline iconography, particularly as many statesmen of the first 
century invoked the god for different reasons, some even staking a claim to Apollo as 
their family’s patron deity.146 But the most compelling evidence against the idea that 
 
140 On the mythological significance, see Boardman and Parke (1957) 276-82. 
141 Oakley (1997) 1.715, (2005) 3.109; Miller (2009) 241-2. See also, Plut. Cat. Min. 4.1: Ὁ δὲ Κάτων 
ἐπειδὴ τὴν ἱερωσύνην ἔλαβε τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος. 
142 Bloch, D-S s.v. “decimviri” 2.1, 442.  
143 Miller (2009) 242. Cf. his citations: Taylor (1931) 129; Radke, RE (1963) 24.1145; Gurval (1995) 
112-13. See Crawford, RRC no. 411/1b, on L. Manlius Torquatus.   
144 That he was the first attested member to issue such a coin: Linderski, BNP 12.347. Torquatus was 
made a quindecimvir in 69: Broughton, MRR 2.134; Szemler (1972) 165. He issued his coin in 65: 
Crawford, RRC no. 411/1b. The coin of M. Opimius, Crawford RRC no. 254, is uncertain.    
145 M. Volteius: Crawford, RRC 1.402, no. 385/5. The coin invokes the ludi Apollinares.  
146 Marius: Luce (1968) 25-39; Sulla: Crawford, RRC 1.388; L. Caesar (cos. 90): Crawford, RRC 
1.325, Gurval (1995) 111-12; C. Servilius: Crawford, RRC no. 370, Fears, ANRW II.17.2: 803; L. Piso 
Frugi: Hersh (1976) 7-63; L. Marcius Censorinus: Weinstock (1971) 13n.4; L. Pomponius Molo: 
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Cassius’ tripod type signifies his quindecimvirate comes from his compatriot Brutus. 
He also issued a coin portraying the sacred tripod of Apollo.147 Yet he was a member 
of the pontifical college. Since it was almost unprecedented to belong to two of the 
four major Roman priesthoods –Caesar being the only verified exception in the Late 
Republic– it is extremely unlikely that Brutus was both a pontiff and quindecimvir.148 
In this case, then, it is unlikely that the tripod coins of the Liberators reference this 
religious order. If we accept this argument, an important question immediately 
presents itself: what is the meaning of these tripods?  
               So far as offering explanations go, scholars can hardly be accused of falling 
into arrears. Grueber –a numismatist who did not shy away from designating the 
tripod as a sign of XVvir s.f.– believed that it perhaps referred to sacrifices which were 
offered to Apollo after Cassius’ naval victory over the Rhodians.149 During the 
Second Punic War, Apollo had become a god of victory, but there is debate among 
scholars as to whether or not he still remained so by the Late Republic.150 P. Zanker, 
by contrast, argued that the Apolline imagery on the coinage of the Liberators alluded 
to the promise of a brighter future.151 This analysis perhaps stemmed from the fact 
that, since his introduction to Rome, Apollo had been a god of purification and 
healing (Liv. 4.25.3). Other theories suggest reference to very specific events –for 
instance, Brutus’ defeat of C. Antonius at Apollonia– but these seem doubtful.152 
Thus none of these hypotheses is entirely satisfactory. Nevertheless, a workable thesis 
has emerged. Observing the coins of the Liberators as a whole (e.g., RRC 498-506), 
several scholars have emphasised the twin themes of victory and the restoration of 
libertas.153    
 
Buraselis (1976) 378-80; cf. Fears, ANRW II.17.2: 803; Caesar: Gagé (1955) 434-9; Weinstock (1971) 
12-14; cf. Gurval (1995) 112-13.   
147 Crawford, RRC no. 502/2, 4. 
148 Pontiff: Cic. Brut. 58, 212; Szemler (1972) 135-6; Crawford, RRC no.502/2,4: coin of Brutus 
depicting the tripod of Apollo. Miller (2009) 27n.37, has argued that Brutus’ coins may indicate that he 
was also a member of the quindecimviri, but Szemler (1974) 72-86, has convincingly shown that dual 
priesthoods were very rare (Caesar is the exception in the Late Republic), as they were regulated in a 
similar fashion to magistracies. It is thus very doubtful Brutus was both a pontifex and quindecimvir.  
149 Grueber (1910) 2.480-1n.2. Followed, for example, by Seaby (1952) 1.104.  
150 Apollo as the god of victory: Liv. 25.12.15; Gagé (1955) 111-13; Weinstock (1971) 12-13; cf. 
Miller (2009) 29n.52.  
151 Zanker (1988) 49; Miller (2009) 25.  
152 Hill (1975) 160, believes the Apolline imagery on Brutus’ coins references his defeat of C. Antonius 
at Apollonia. Cf. Babelon (1885) 334, on Delphi.  
153 Gosling (1986); Hollstein (1994); cf. Crawford, RRC 2.741. 
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 Following Caesar’s death, Apollo became a key deity in the propaganda war of the 
40s.154 Brutus had initially staked the Republican cause on the success of the ludi 
Apollinares in July 44.155 Yet the failure of his games to restore the Republican 
government did not dissuade him from his association with the god. On the contrary, 
Gosling notes Apollo became the guardian deity of the Republican cause and stood as 
an analogue for libertas.156 Indeed, Apollo’s connection to Brutus and Republicanism 
was very personal. As will be remembered, prior to the assassination Brutus had been 
goaded by graffiti to remember his illustrious ancestry (Plut. Brut. 9.5-8). He was well 
aware of the feats of L. Iunius Brutus (cos. 509) and even memorialised his ‘ancestor’ 
on coins.157  What is often forgotten about the first Brutus, however, is that before he 
expelled the Tarquins he had travelled to Delphi to seek Apollo’s sanction (Liv. 
1.56.9-12; Dion. Hal. 4.69).158 Apollo was thus intimately connected to the mythology 
of the Iunii Bruti and Republicanism.  
               Thus, the presence of Apollo’s tripod on the coinage of Brutus and Cassius 
may not reference either man’s quindecimvirate. Rather, it more probably signifies 
their political platform –the cause of libertas, which was upheld by the deity that, for 
the Republicans at least, had a unique association with Roman freedom. This does not 
make it impossible for Cassius to have been a member of the quindecimviri –nor 
would it be surprising if he were a priest as admittance was predominantly based on 
illustrious ancestry159– but the present state of the evidence far from suggests it as 
conclusive. In sum, modern scholars should put aside theories of Cassius’ supposed 
role as a quindecimvir and focus instead on his manipulation of Apolline imagery for 
political purposes.  
3.9 MARRIAGE 
The marriage of Cassius and Junia Tertia (sometimes called Tertulla)160 was a typical 
aristocratic match, which bound the fortunes and power of two equally prestigious 
 
154 Moles (1983) 250; Gosling (1986) 587; Barcaro (2008/9) 179-202; Millar (2009).    
155 Cic. Att. 15.10.1, 15.11.2, 16.2.3, Phil. 1.36, 2.31, 10.7-8; Plut. Brut. 21.3-6; App. B Civ. 3.23-4; 
Cass. Dio 47.20.2.    
156 Gosling (1986) 588; Lange (2009) 42-3; Crawford, RRC 2.741; but cf. Gurval (1995) 90, who is 
sceptical about the link between Apollo and libertas; and contra Clark (1981) 142n.15; Miller (2009) 
27-8. Hollstein (1994) 113-33, argues that Brutus and Cassius invoked Apollo as their divine protector 
who will lead them to victory against the triumvirs so they could restore libertas to Rome.   
157 Crawford, RRC no. 506/1.  
158 For brief commentary, see Ogilvie (1965) 217-18. First noticed by Gosling (1986) 588. 
159 Szemler (1972) 28-31. 
160 Tertulla: Suet. Iul. 50; Cic. Att. 15. 11.1, 15.20.2. See further, Chase (1897) 169.  
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families.161 By dint of birth, Junia enjoyed connections to some of the most prominent 
grandees of the Late Republic. She was the daughter of D. Junius Silanus (cos. 62) 
and the redoubtable Servilia; the niece to the dogmatic and intractable Cato 
Uticensis;162 and the half-sister of M. Brutus, with whom Cassius would become 
forever inseparable. As her name Tertia implies, she also had two elder sisters, who 
both enjoyed respectable marriages, to P. Servilius Isauricus (cos. 48) and M. Lepidus 
(cos. 46) respectively.163 Junia was perhaps a cousin of C. Marcellus (cos. 50).164 
Obviously, these connections would be useful even to someone with Cassius’ 
ancestral pedigree. But if these connections were not useful enough, Junia also 
promised a lucrative dowry, although this is not to suggest that Cassius (or his family 
elders) engineered the match for financial advantage.165  
               When did Cassius marry Junia? The ancient evidence demonstrates that they 
were wedded sometime in 60/59. It is clear that the marriage could not have occurred 
before 61, when Pompey was considering offering himself and his eldest son to two 
Juniae –the elder sisters of Junia Tertia– in a forlorn bid to secure an alliance with 
their uncle Cato (Plut. Cat. Min. 30.2-3):  
τοῦτο τὸν Πομπήϊον οὐχ ἡσυχῇ διετάραξε, καὶ νομίζων οὐ μικρὰ 
προσπταίσειν τῷ Κάτωνι μὴ φίλῳ γενομένῳ, μετεπέμψατο Μουνάτιον 
ἑταῖρον αὐτοῦ, καὶ δύο τοῦ Κάτωνος ἀδελφιδᾶς ἐπιγάμους ἔχοντος, ᾔτει τὴν 
μὲν πρεσβυτέραν ἑαυτῷ γυναῖκα, τὴν δὲ νεωτέραν τῷ υἱῷ· 
This troubled Pompey considerably; thinking that Cato would be a great 
stumbling-block unless he became a friend, he sent for Munatius, Cato’s 
companion. Cato had two nieces of marriageable age: Pompey asked for the hand 
of the elder one, and, as a wife for his son, the younger one.  
 
161 For fundamental bibliography on Junia, see Drumann-Groebe (1964) [18992] 4:54; Münzer, RE 
(1919) s.v. “Iunius” 10.1114 [206]; PIR2 4.361, no. 865; Münzer (1999) [1920] 322-3; Strothmann, 
BNP 6.1090. Cassius would have been in his late twenties at the time, a normal age for a male 
aristocrat. Cf. Münzer (1999) 162, who argues it was common for elite males to marry shortly after 
assuming the toga virilis. Cited approvingly by Ridley (2000) 217.  
162 Tac. Ann. 3.76: Catone avunculo genita. 
163 Syme (1980b) 425; Syme (1987a) 326; Weigel (1992) 24.  
164 Cic. Fam. 12.2, with Shackleton Bailey (1977) 2.482. These are only the connections that can be 
reconstructed confidently.  
165 On Cassius’ wealth, see Appendix F. Cf. Cicero’s marriage to Publilia:  Cic. Att. 16.2.1.   
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According to Plutarch, Servilia’s elder daughters were of marriageable (ἐπίγαμος) 
age. This implies, perhaps, that her youngest daughter, Junia Tertia, was not of age.166 
But if Junia were not eligible or ready to marry in 61, Cassius had nevertheless 
secured her hand by 59. This is calculated based on the age of their son, Gaius, who 
reputedly donned the toga virilis on the Ides of March 44.167 Given that the earliest 
age at which Gaius could be invested with the toga of manhood was fourteen, the 
marriage of his parents must have transpired by 59 at the latest.168 Junia’s age at this 
time cannot be fixed with precision, but can be approximated. Both F. Münzer and R. 
Syme placed Junia’s birth around 72, based on the year her parents contracted their 
marriage (76/75); it was further adduced that she was the third daughter born in quick 
succession.169 It follows, then, that Junia married and became a mother in her early 
adolescence, which was a far from uncommon experience for an aristocratic 
female.170  
 Cassius remained married to Junia until his death. This fidelity to his wife is 
note-worthy in an era –and amongst a class– in which divorce was not infrequent. 
Antonius and Caesar, for instance, had divorced several wives during their careers. 
Brutus, too, famously divorced his wife, Claudia, to marry Porcia, the daughter of his 
uncle Cato.171 Still, Cassius had spent much time overseas in the course of his career, 
and divorces were often motivated by the same reasons as the initial marriage: 
finances, politics, and family alliances.172 For Cassius, Junia’s family connections 
would be hard to trump. Thus Cassius’ steadfast commitment to Junia does not 
conclusively prove the marriage was a happy one; conversely, there is no evidence to 
suggest a loveless or unhappy match either.       
 
166 Münzer (1999) [1920] 323. The minimum age at which a girl could marry was twelve: Treggiari 
(1991) 39-43; Treggiari (2007) 20 with n.38.    
167 Plut. Brut. 14.4 with Affortunati (2004) 66-7.     
168 Münzer, RE (1919) s.v. “Iunius” 10.1114 [206]; Syme (1987a) 326; Münzer (1999) [1920] 323; 
Gaius must have been born by 58: Affortunati (2004) 66-7. On the toga virilis, see Hunziker, D-S 
5.352-3.    
169 Münzer (1999) [1920] 323; Syme (1939) 492; Syme (1987a) 326. 
170 On the age at marriage for aristocratic girls, see, for example, Hopkins (1965) 309-27; Shaw (1987) 
30-46; Treggiari (1991) 399-402. 
171 Q. Cicero was locked in an unhappy marriage: Cic. Att. 13.42; Nep. Att.5.3-4. On his marital 
problems, see esp. Att. 5.1.3-4. M. Antonius and Cn. (or possibly Q.) Gellius Publicola are alleged (by 
Cicero) to have spurned elite woman and married a first-generation free woman (ingenua) and a 
freedwoman respectively. Tatum (1999) 70. But M. Piso divorced his wife Annia to curry Sulla’s 
favour: Vell. Pat. 2.41.2. The example of Brutus’ marriage to Porcia is a classic case of family alliances 
predicating marriages: Cic. Att. 13.16. 
172 The example of Brutus’ marriage to Porcia is a classic case in point: Cic. Att. 13.16. For Balsdon, 
childlessness was the prime cause of divorce: (1962b) 209-11.  
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Nevertheless, the ancient sources do report that Junia was accused of adultery. 
Suetonius and Macrobius record an allegation that she had engaged in an affair with 
Caesar (or, more twistedly, had been cajoled into the liaison by Servilia).173 Citing 
Cicero as their source, they note that the infamous gossipmonger and joker used the 
sordid tale to execute one of his classic puns (Suet. Iul. 50.2):174  
sed ante alias dilexit Marci Bruti matrem Seruiliam, cui et proximo suo 
consulatu sexagiens sestertium margaritam mercatus est et bello ciuili super 
alias donationes amplissima praedia ex auctionibus hastae minimo addixit; cum 
quidem plerisque uilitatem mirantibus facetissime Cicero: 'quo melius,' inquit, 
'emptum sciatis, tertia deducta'; existimabatur enim Seruilia etiam filiam suam 
Tertiam Caesari conciliare. 
But beyond all others Caesar loved Servilia, the mother of Marcus Brutus, for 
whom in his first consulship he bought a pearl costing six million sesterces. 
During the civil war, too, besides other presents, he knocked down some fine 
estates to her in a public auction at a nominal price, and when some expressed 
their surprise at the low figure, Cicero wittily remarked: ‘It’s a better bargain 
than you think, for a third has been deducted.’ And in fact it was thought that 
Servilia was prostituting her own daughter Tertia to Caesar.175 
The clever pun is on deducta, which can mean “to deduct” or, in a marital context, “to 
escort a bride to her husband”.176 Here it is used as a double entendre, implying, as 
both Suetonius and Macrobius explain, that Junia has been made Caesar’s mistress in 
exchange for estates.177 If true, the allegation may have had profound ramifications; 
but its historicity is far from proven.178 That Cicero was the author of the joke may 
seem unlikely, given that he had an established friendship with Cassius. But he also 
had a reputation for pushing his jokes too far.179 And even so this alone does not belie 
the joke’s authenticity, as many jests were falsely attributed to the famous wit.180 But 
although Caesar was a notorious adulterer –and although he was the paramour of 
 
173 Suet. Iul. 50.2; Macrob. Sat. 2.2.5. See Epstein (1987a) 567. 
174 Cicero was a notorious wit, whose jokes sometimes exceeded propriety: Quint. Inst. 6.3.47; Plut. 
Cic. 5.5, 27, 38. Macrobius seems to cite Symmachus, who also credits Cicero with the joke.      
175 For commentary, see Butler and Cary (1927) 110. 
176  OLD s.v. “deduco” 10b.  
177 Macrob. Sat. 2.2.5:  “The point being that Junia Tertia [‘The Third’] was Servilia’s daughter and the 
wife of Gaius Cassius, and that the dictator was carrying on with both the mother and the daughter.”  
178 Münzer, RE (1919) s.v. “Iunius” 10.1114 [206], dismissed the charge as a “boshaften Witze”.   
179 Cic. Fam. 16.22.1, indicates he had invited Junia to a dinner party in 46.  
180 Cic. Fam. 7.32.1. Tiro collected an anthology of Cicero’s jokes: Quint. Inst. 6.3.5. Caesar himself 
was apparently able to distinguish between a true Ciceronian quip and a false one: Suet. Iul. 56.7; Cic. 
Fam. 9.16.        
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Servilia– the accusation that Junia had an extramarital relationship with him is 
nothing more than unsubstantiated rumour.181  
While affairs were not uncommon at this time, traducing a woman’s chastity 
was a standard rhetorical practice.182 Junia appears to have been a victim of this 
culture. It is even possible that the story was invented ex eventu, as a piece of 
Caesarian propaganda that explained Cassius’ actions on the Ides as part of his 
personal vendetta against Caesar, for which parallels exist elsewhere.183 It was also 
alleged that Postumia, wife of the conspirator Servius Sulpicius Galba, had been 
seduced by Caesar.184 Caesar was infamous for his rampant sexual escapades – affairs 
are alleged with the wives of many if not most of his political rivals (for example, 
Crassus and Pompey), but such claims are probably baseless.  Ultimately, it may be 
telling that Cassius did not divorce his wife, unlike Pompey, who sent notice to Mucia 
Tertia supposedly because she was having an affair.185 Similarly, Lucullus had 
banished his wife, a Servilia, from his house for lasciviousness.186 Cato, too, had 
divorced his wife Atilia for behaving likewise.187 Adultery was a serious charge 
against a woman, which gave grounds for divorce.188 This is not to argue, however, 
that Roman men invariably divorced an adultera coniunx, simply that the testimonium 
of Junia’s alleged infidelity is suspicious, and likely to be Caesarian invective. 
               Other than this dubious accusation, Junia appears to have been an exemplary 
wife. She fulfilled the major function expected of all Roman matrons by providing 
Cassius with a son, Gaius, who was born by 58.189 More children were expected from 
her, however, despite the perilous risks involved in childbearing for both mother and 
baby. Tragically Junia was not immune from these risks; Cicero reports on 11 May 44 
 
181 On Caesar and Servilia, see, for example, Cic. Att. 2.24.3; Plut. Cat. Min. 24.1; Brut. 5.1; Suet. Iul. 
50; cf. Cass. Dio 42.34, Caesar erotikotatos.    
182 Richlin (1992) 87: “Where men were accused of effeminacy, women were accused of unchastity.”  
See further discussion on pages 96-104. Adultery as a trope: Cic. Cluent. 11-13, on adultery of Sassia. 
Richlin (1992) 87. 
183 Caesar’s confiscation of Cassius’ lions: Plut. Brut. 8.6-7. Perhaps this slander was even promoted by 
Oppius in his pamphlet attacking Cassius. The issue of Caesar’s confiscation of these lions is discussed 
in Chapter 6.  
184 Suet. Iul. 50.1. Cf. Iul. 9.2-3, 49.1, for Curio the Elder’s sexual slurs on Caesar, including: Curio 
pater quadam eum [sc. Caesar] oratione mulierum virum et omnium virorum mulierem appellat (52.3). 
The trope of the wanton adulter is likely rhetorical exaggeration. On this reputation, see Catull. 57.   
185 Cic. Att. 1.12.3 with Shackleton Bailey (1968) 1.299; Suet. Iul. 50.1; Plut. Pomp. 42.15; Cass. Dio 
37.49.3; Zon. 10.5.  
186 Plut. Luc. 38.1, Cat. Min. 24.3. 
187 Plut. Cat. Min. 24.3. 
188 Treggiari (1991) 262-319, 264-75.   
189 Plut. Brut. 14.4 with Affortunati (2004) 66-7. Expectation of children: Treggiari (1991) 84.    
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that she had recently suffered a miscarriage.190 There is no further evidence 
referencing any other children of Cassius and Junia, although this only demonstrates 
the state of our sources. It may be suspected that she had lost children previously, 
either prematurely or in early childhood, which was an all too common experience, 
even for aristocratic women.191  
                Her loyalty is also evident. After the civil war broke out, for instance, it is a 
fair assumption that she left Rome with her husband as did other distinguished wives 
(even Terentia eventually joined Cicero in Formiae).192 If Junia and Terentia had not 
been acquainted prior to this, they may have become friends now, as their husbands 
discussed the looming conflict.193 Indeed, their friendship has been inferred by 
Shackleton Bailey from an elliptical reference in one of Cicero’s letters. In a time 
after Cicero had divorced Terentia, Junia boldly refused to attend one of his dinner 
parties if he invited Publilius (a relation of his new wife, Publilia).194 As a result, 
Shackelton Bailey believes this suggests that Junia spurned Cicero’s soiree as a loyal 
show of support for Terentia. If true, it would be a touching display of sisterhood. 
However, it is equally possible that Junia simply disliked Cicero’s new wife and/or 
relatives.   
One further reference to Tertia merits consideration. Brutus mentions her in a 
letter written to Cicero at a crucial moment for the Liberators –Cassius’ capture of 
Syria in 43. This triumph was a timely victory for the Republicans, and Brutus 
describes the success using the superlatives optime and felicissime (Cic. Ad Brut. 2.3). 
Intriguingly, he also notes that he has written to his sister and mother instructing them 
not to make Cassius’ achievement public:  
ego scripsi ad Tertiam sororem et matrem ne prius ederent hoc quod optime ac 
felicissime gessit Cassius quam tuum consilium cognovissent tibique visum esse. 
 
190  Cic. Att. 14.20.2-5. 
191 On the rates of infant mortality and the perils of childbirth, see Parkin (1992) 92-3; Balsdon (1962) 
195-6; Treggiari (1991) 427-9. The lack of other known children may also be explained by Cassius’ 
long absences from Rome. Furthermore, Junia may have struggled to conceive after her first 
pregnancy. It is also possible that other children were born but that they simply were not mentioned in 
the sources, which would not be surprising.  
192 Cic. Att. 7.14.3, 7.18.1, with Treggiari (2007) 106. Cicero speaks of distinguished ladies leaving 
Rome.  
193 Cic. Fam. 15.15.1, demonstrates both Cassius and Cicero met, presumably with their wives in train. 
194 Cic. Fam. 16.22.1: Tertia aderit. On this interpretation, see Shackleton Bailey (1977) 2.323. 
Alternatively, it is possible that Tertia disliked Cicero’s new wife alone, and was not showing 
solidarity to Terentia.      
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I have written to my sister Tertia and my mother to tell them not to make this 
splendid success of Cassius’ public before consulting with you and before you 
think proper.195      
It is difficult to know how to interpret this brief gobbet, but perhaps it is best to read 
nothing more into the statement than that Brutus wished to withhold news of Cassius’ 
success until the right moment at Rome, and that the most likely people to reveal 
these pleasing details were the tyrannicide’s wife and his mother-in-law. It may be 
inferred from Brutus’ instructions, however, that Junia was championing Cassius on 
the home front, and thus it was necessary to take steps to prevent her from promoting 
her husband’s success. The legitimacy of the Republicans’ legal position was far from 
assured at the time, so Brutus’ caution is understandable. However, it is also possible 
that Brutus is simply being polite here. He seeks to assure Cicero that he still respects 
his importance, and makes it clear that the women of his family should consult the 
consular orator first before making an announcement.   
On her death in AD 22, after enduring the suicides of her husband and half-
brother, as well as the loss of her son, Junia left gifts in her will to every leading 
citizen except –in a calculated act of political dissidence– the Emperor Tiberius.196 
Overall, the skimpy evidence that exists for Junia paints her as a robust and loyal 
woman, who was clearly strong in the face of adversity and tragedy.        
 
3.10 FORENSIC EXPERIENCE (ORATORY) 
In 59, Cassius offered his assistance to Quintus Cicero, who feared he would face 
prosecution for provincial malfeasance.197 A letter from Cicero to his brother late in 
the year198 indicates that at least two of the Cassii (probably Cassius and his brother 
Quintus) had offered their assistance to the younger Cicero should he be 
prosecuted.199 Three other fledgling nobiles had made similar overtures: M. Antonius 
 
195 Cic. Ad Brut. 2.3.3. 
196 Tac. Ann. 3.76. On Cassius’ wealth, see Appendix F.   
197 Cic. QFr. 1.2.13: De Censorino, Antonio, Cassiis, Scaevola, te ab iis diligi, ut scribis, vehementer 
gaudeo. Brunt (1988) 362 and Shackleton Bailey (1980) 163, suggest Q. Cicero would possibly face 
charges of repetundae as governor of Asia. 
198 On the dating of the letter, see Marinone (2004) 103.  
199 Note the plural Cassiis, on which see Shackleton-Bailey (1980) 165. However, Shackleton-Bailey 
probably errs in identifying the second Cassius as “Lucius”, who was the youngest of the three Cassii 
and whose career, based on his cursus, began slightly after his elder brothers. He was subscriptor 
against Plancius in 54 (Cic. Planc. 58) and perhaps the prosecutor of M. Saufeius in 52: Asc. Mil. 54-
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(cos. 44); Q. Mucius Scaevola (tr. pl. 54); and L. Marcius Censorinus (cos. 29). 
Münzer assumed these men were part of Q. Cicero’s cohors amicorum, but no such 
ties of friendship need necessarily explain their enthusiasm.200 Rather, it is completely 
reasonable to assume that they were all merely scampering to participate in a 
prospective trial that afforded them the chance to win personal fama.201 Undertaking 
legal cases, whether prosecutions or defences, was a conventional method by which 
young aristocrats sought to secure political advancement.202 For these five young 
nobles, then, Q. Cicero’s predicament presented them with an opportunity to gain 
forensic experience, if not oratorical glory. Cicero was pleased that his brother had 
received these friendly overtures from Cassius and several young nobles, but he 
nevertheless suggested that his brother sound out Crassus, an experienced orator. This 
is not surprising as Cassius was at the beginning of his oratorical career.  
Since Cassius could not yet stand for the quaestorship (he was twenty-seven, 
and the minimum age for the post was thirty), the Roman law courts offered the most 
convenient stage from which to build a canvass for his first election.203 The law courts 
also offered Cassius a means by which to further cement his influence and social 
obligations that would be crucial come election time. In any event, Cassius was to be 
disappointed; Q. Cicero was never brought to trial.204 Nevertheless, this brief allusion 
clearly indicates that young Cassius was striving to develop his forensic prowess. The 
career of Brutus parallels that of Cassius in this regard, as he too began to appear at 
the bar in the 50s.205 This episode provides a suitable opportunity to survey Cassius’ 
skill as an orator.   
The careers of Cicero and Hortensius had confirmed the importance of oratory 
as a vehicle for achieving judicial and political success.206 After one’s family name 
 
5C. Quintus, close in age to Cassius, fits better in this context. Brothers pleading cases –or considering 
doing so– together was not unique: Asc. Corn. 59-60, on the Cominii.  
200 Münzer, cited in Shackleton-Bailey (1980) 163.  
201 The Roman law courts provided ample opportunity for the elite to win fame: Cic. Brut. 312; Off. 
2.51.  
202 The classic example is Caesar: Plut. Caes. 4 with Taylor (1957) 13. Cf. the novus Cicero: Plut. Cic. 
3.5-6. And L. Lucullus: Plut. Luc.1.1-2. Further, Cic. Flac. 77. See also Harris (1979) 19, on the 
beginnings of this development.  
203 On the minimum age requirement for the quaestorship, see Ryan (1996) 37-43.  
204 Alexander (1990) 128, no. 263. Q. Cicero had been advised by his brother to seek out Crassus, an 
experienced advocate: QFr. 1.3.7. It has been suggested by Marshall (1985) 172 that Ap. Claudius 
Pulcher (cos. 38) was behind the threat of prosecution. Clodius’ brother would preside over the 
hearing: see Cic. Att. 3.17.1.    
205 Cic. Brut. 190, 324. Tac. Dial. 34.7, shows C. Asinius Pollio pleaded his first case aged twenty-two.  
206 On the importance of oratory, see the recent discussion of David (2006) 421-38. 
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and military accomplishments, oratorical ability may be counted amongst the most 
important assets of a Roman aristocrat (along with money and patronage). For a 
budding politician such as Cassius, then, the pursuit of oratorical excellence would 
have been a chief concern. To a degree, this supposition is supported by his extended 
overseas study at Rhodes, as noted above.207 But despite this fact, there is little 
evidence detailing his oratorical career in general, and this hinders any attempt to 
comment at length about his talent as a speaker.208 Indeed, the information that is 
extant must be analysed carefully, so as not to give a false impression. Overall, it does 
not appear that Cassius was a prolific orator, but, as will be noted, this perhaps 
reflects the scarce opportunities his career and the turbulent Late Republic afforded 
him, rather than a lack of ability or inclination.  
Indeed, it is clear that even by 51 Cicero did not consider Cassius to be an 
experienced orator. At this time, Cassius was contemplating defending his own 
brother, Quintus (tr. pl. 49), who appears to have faced the threat of prosecution from 
L. Lucceius (cos. 60) as a result of his questionable conduct as Pompey’s quaestor in 
Spain.209 In this instance, it is evident that Cassius was motivated primarily out of 
family loyalty rather than by a desire to flex his oratorical muscles. Writing in 51, 
Cicero seizes the opportunity to offer Cassius unsolicited counsel:       
 sed si quae sunt onera tuorum, si tanta sunt ut ea sustinere possis, propera; 
nihil tibi erit lautius, nihil gloriosius. sin maiora, considera ne in 
alienissimum tempus cadat adventus tuus. huius rei totum consilium tuum est; 
tu enim scis quid sustinere possis. si potes, laudabile atque populare est; sin 
plane non potes, absens hominum sermones facilius sustinebis. 
But if those near to you are under fire we must pause.  Should it be such as 
you can cope with, then make haste –it will be the brightest feather in your 
cap. But if it’s too powerful for that, you must consider. It would be a pity to 
arrive just at the least favourable moment. The matter is entirely for you to 
judge. You know your own strength. If you can, there is credit and popular 
approval to be had. But if you really cannot, you will find the talk less 
annoying elsewhere.210 
 
207 App. B Civ. 4.66-8 and Cass. Dio 47.33.4. See further Section 3 above, on Cassius’ education. 
208 Malcovati, ORF2 lists no fragments of Cassius’ oratory in the second edition of her seminal study. 
On the so-called speeches of Cassius preserved in Appian (B Civ. 4.69-70, 90-100), see below. 
209 Cic. Att. 5.20.1 with Shackleton Bailey (1968) 3.230, (1977) 1.442. 
210 Cic. Fam. 15.14.4. 
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Cicero politely prods Cassius to carefully consider whether or not he is in a position 
to undertake a defence, given his oratorical strength (si…sustinere possis) and –as is 
obliquely implied– the circumstances of the case.211 From this information it is 
evident that Cassius was not an orator of proven excellence, since, if he were, Cicero 
would not have needed to offer him this polite warning. It follows, then, that Cassius 
had limited experience at court, and faced the intimidating prospect of a consular 
prosecutor primed with plenty of incriminating evidence. There is no record of 
whether or not Quintus was ever prosecuted, but he was estranged from Pompey, and 
later famously joined Caesar shortly before the civil war.212  
The tyrannicide’s situation does not seem to have changed much after the civil 
war. By mid-July 46, Cassius and others took the opportunity to join Cicero at his 
Tusculan estate for rhetorical training.213 This oratorical conclave should not 
necessarily be viewed as a remedial declamation workshop, even though Cicero quips 
that he had set himself up as a schoolmaster.214 Rather, it was a leisurely retreat for 
men of a similar stamp whose involvement in public affairs had been put on hold 
temporarily; oratorical and philosophical pursuits offered respectable distraction.215 
D.R. Shackleton Bailey has argued that the focus of Cicero’s gathering was on literary 
and philosophical study, not oratory.216 But the fact the great orator was delivering 
model declamations to both Cassius and Dolabella belies this argument, although it is 
likely that the party engaged in other pursuits besides declamations, for variety if 
nothing else:  
nam et Cassius tuus et Dolabella noster, vel potius uterque noster, studiis 
iisdem tenentur et meis aequissimis utuntur auribus.  
Your friend Cassius and our friend Dolabella (I should rather say ‘our’ in both 
cases) are devoted to the same pursuits and find in me a very well-disposed 
audience.217      
 
211 If accounts of Q. Cassius’ conduct are correct, his excessive behaviour in the provinces provided his 
enemies back at Rome with plenty of incriminating evidence: BAlex. 48.1, 50-68; BHisp. 42. 
212 The threat of prosecution to Quintus, and the ramifications, is further discussed in Chapters 4 and 5.  
213 Cic. Fam. 9.18.3 with Dyer (1990) 17. Cicero also gave declamation classes to Hirtius and Pansa in 
44: Sen. Contr. 1 pr. 11; Suet. Rhet. 23.3 with Kaster (1995) 276-7. There is debate over whether 
Cicero was in Tusculum or Rome in this period: Shackleton Bailey (1977) 2.342.     
214 Cic. Fam. 9.18.2: amisso regno forensi ludum quasi habere coeperim. See further Shackleton Bailey 
(1977) 2.340.   
215 Cic. Fam. 7.33.2; 9.18.2.  
216 Shackleton Bailey (1977) 2.342-3.  
217 Cic. Fam. 7.33.2.  
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Nothing suggests that Cassius’ oratory needed fine-tuning; his attendance may signify 
only a desire to pass his time in recreation and company. 
        Cassius the orator finally appears fully-fledged after the assassination of Caesar. 
On 17 March, at the famous senate meeting in which Cicero proposed a motion for a 
blanket amnesty of Caesar’s assassins, the issue of whether or not the dictator should 
receive a public funeral was mooted. Naturally, Cassius spoke forcefully against this 
motion.218 Plutarch alone mentions this information (Brut. 20.1):  
Κάσσιος μὲν ἰσχυρῶς ἀντέλεγεν, εἶξε δὲ Βροῦτος καὶ συνεχώρησε, 
δεύτερον ἁμαρτεῖν τοῦτο δόξας.  
Cassius, indeed, vehemently opposed these measures, but Brutus yielded and 
agreed to them, thus making a second mistake, as was thought.219    
Plutarch may use this issue to effect a synkrisis between Brutus and Cassius: Cassius 
is ἰσχυρος, strong and intractable; Brutus is acquiescent (συνεχώρησε).220 Indeed, 
while it is likely that Cassius did address the senate, Plutarch’s account may simply 
reflect his artistic concerns rather than the reality of the senate debate. In the other 
accounts, Cassius finds himself marginalised after the Ides, and Brutus is credited 
with championing the cause of the Liberators in public contiones.221 Only Appian 
suggests that both men proffered speeches (B Civ. 2.122-3). This may betray a 
lopsided source tradition, but could equally evince a rhetorical reality: Brutus was an 
experienced orator; Cassius (perhaps) inexperienced.222 It may also reflect the fact 
that Brutus was the senior urban praetor, and enjoyed an unsurpassed reputation at the 
time of the assassination (according to Nicolaus). Cassius may have had several 
reasons, then, to defer speaking at the public contiones.    
        Appian far from clarifies matters regarding Cassius’ oratorical efforts. He 
preserves two so-called ‘speeches’ of Cassius, but these are highly suspect and almost 
certainly the invention of the author himself, a successful advocate at the court of 
 
218 However, Fröhlich, RE (1899) 3.1731, errs in citing Lact. Inst. 1.15.30 and Cass. Dio 47.35 as 
evidence of Cassius’ address to the senate: “Am Tage nach der Amnestieerklärung am 18. Marz, hat er 
allerdings im Senat gegen die Bestattung Caesars gesprochen (Lact. inst. I 15, 30 und Dio XLVII 35).”   
219 For commentary, see Affortunati (2004) 75; Moles (1979) 256-7. 
220 Affortunati (2004) 75. On synkrisis in Plutarch, see, for example, Duff (2000) 141-61.  
221 Nic. Dam. 21.101; Plut. Brut. 18.9-14, Caes. 67.4-7, Ant. 14.1; Cass. Dio 44.21.3-22.2.    
222 On Brutus as an orator, see Malcovati, ORF2 460-8 (no. 158). 
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more than one emperor.223 A brief discussion will suffice to show why they are 
inadmissible as proof of Cassian oratory. The first ‘speech’ occurs as Cassius 
contemplates the sack of Rhodes in 42. In a desperate attempt to dissuade him from 
his assault, the Rhodians sent forth his former teacher, Archelaus, who is ironically 
required to argue before his one-time pupil.224 This scene serves several functions for 
Appian: a poignant peripeteia between student and mentor dramatizes the tragedy of 
Rhodes; 225 their speeches permit the author to digress on the moral and legal 
prerogatives of Cassius; and a debate laced with irony unfolds about libertas.226 Based 
on these considerations, it is clear that the speech Cassius proffers to his old teacher is 
the invention of the author and, as A. Gowing has cogently argued, ultimately reflects 
the political and rhetorical concerns of Appian’s era.227 The second speech Appian 
attributes to Cassius is delivered before the Battle of Philippi. In this case, too, the 
speech that is made by Cassius has been artfully modified by Appian for his own 
literary, rhetorical and didactic purposes.228 Both speeches fall outside the period of 
this study, but serve to neatly illustrate the challenges of reconstructing Cassius’ 
oratorical skill and style.  
                Thus far the sources suggest Cassius had gained minimal oratorical 
experience and pleaded few cases. While the near silence of the sources may be 
deceptive, there are reasons that may explain Cassius’ situation. An all-too-easy 
assumption to make is that perhaps Cassius was not a very good orator. Not all 
Roman aristocrats had silver tongues like Cicero and could be king of the courts. No 
less a personality than M. Calpurnius Bibulus (cos. 59) was allegedly a poor speaker –
non esset orator.229 But there is nothing to support this view. A more probable answer 
lies in the course of his career. Specifically, the unusual nature of his early career 
 
223 App. praef. 15.62: σαφέστερον δ' εἰπεῖν, Ἀππιανὸς Ἀλεξανδρεύς, ἐς τὰ πρῶτα ἥκων ἐν τῇ 
πατρίδι καὶ δίκαις ἐν Ῥώμῃ συναγορεύσας ἐπὶ τῶν βασιλέων, μέχρι με σφῶν ἐπιτροπεύειν 
ἠξίωσαν. On this, see Gowing (1992) 10.  
224 App. B Civ. 4.69-70.  
225 Compare the famous account of Cicero’s death in which Popilius, a man Cicero had successfully 
defended in the courts, served as one of his executioners: Plut. Cic. 47.1-48.4, and again App. B Civ. 
4.20 (Laena). Gowing (1991) 138, notes that the speech was designed to elicit an emotional response 
from Appian’s Greek reader. On the peripeteia as a vehicle for tragic history, see Moles (1983a) 287.        
226 Gowing (1991) 135-44; (1992) 171. Cf. Gabba (1956) 182-4, who argues that Appian is playing a 
‘pro-Liberator’ source off against Augustan propaganda, which, he believed, accused the self-styled 
Liberators of imposing ‘slavery’ on Rhodes. Gowing refutes this argument: (1991) 144. On Cassius at 
Rhodes, see Section 2 above.   
227 Gowing (1991) 135-44, esp. 140. 
228 Gowing (1990) 158-81.  
229 Cic. Brut. 267.  
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(disordered by the disaster at Carrhae and then the turmoil of civil war) could account 
for Cassius’ apparent lack of oratorical performances; for long periods of time he had 
been absent from Rome.230 This perhaps explains why it is Brutus, a successful orator, 
who is credited with spearheading the difficult task of addressing the people in 
contiones immediately after Caesar’s assassination. But the evidence –or the lack 
thereof– cannot be pushed too far.   
What conclusions, then, can be drawn from this scant evidence? Like Brutus’ 
career, perhaps, Cassius’ oratorical career was cut short by the civil war and the 
consequent loss of libertas loquendi.231 Moreover, Cassius had been absent from 
Rome for long periods at the beginning of his career, which will have made it more 
difficult to establish a reputation for eloquence in the courts. Brutus, for instance, had 
made a reputation for himself in the courts mainly after his return from Cilicia in 52, 
where he defended his father-in-law Appius Claudius, among others. In a brief period 
he gained a reputation as a speaker.232 Cassius, by contrast, did not return to Rome 
until just before the outbreak of civil war. After Caesar’s victory, he retired from 
public life. He only returned to public life in a significant way in 44. Opportunities to 
amass fame as an orator had been too few. If nothing else, this may help to elucidate 
the plight of the nobles looking to make a name for themselves, frustrated in their 
ambitions by an unfortunate series of events –and by one man, Caesar. 
A brief coda is necessary. M. Dettenhofer has argued that by the Late 
Republic many aristocrats engaged in career specialization, either in the courts or in 
the military.233 In her view, men like M. Antonius, D. Brutus, and Cassius gravitated 
towards military service, whereas men like Brutus and M. Caelius Rufus preferred 
civil politics. This creates a false dichotomy, however. Antonius, for one, was every 
bit as comfortable in the Forum as he was on the battlefield,234 and well knew that a 
successful politician enjoyed a reputation in both spheres. He served as the 
 
230 Cf. Caesar, whose absence in Gaul meant he did not deliver a speech in Rome for almost ten years: 
van der Blom (2016) 176. Cf. Cic. Brut. 249, which notes Brutus was unfamiliar with Caesar as an 
orator.  
231 Cic. Brut. 22. 
232 Cic. Brut. 22, 192, 324. For a list of Brutus’ eight known speeches, see Malcovati, ORF2 561. 
Brutus also achieved a high degree of attention for writing up forensic speeches and eulogies –a 
defence of Milo was known to Quintilian, and eulogies of Appius Claudius and his uncle Cato, too: 
Quint. Inst. 3.6.93; Claudius: Keil (1855) 1.367; Cato: Cic. Orat. 35. As noted in Chapter One, similar 
speeches are not known for Cassius.       
233 Dettenhofer (1992) 34; cf. Suolahti (1955), who argues the trend gravitated away from military 
service towards more domestic service.  
234 Rossi (1959).  
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subscriptor in the landmark prosecution of Milo in 52.235 Cassius came to prominence 
in a military capacity, but that may simply be because he unexpectedly found himself 
in a position to win laus in Syria. His career is proof that a Late Republican 
aristocrat’s career was not linear and predetermined.  
  
3.11 SUPPORTING CICERO 
Cassius’ political conservatism is hinted at in his support for Cicero, who had been 
forced into voluntary exile in March 58.236 Outmanoeuvred by his political nemesis P. 
Clodius, Cicero had capitulated to the man who had nursed a bitter grievance against 
him since the Bona Dea scandal.237 Escorted out of Rome by a cadre of faithful 
supporters, among whom it is possible that Cassius numbered, Cicero languished in 
Thessalonica and Epirus.238 Despairing of his fate, he contemplated suicide at this 
time, a period that was without question the nadir of his career.239 Many of his fair-
weather friends (including Pompey) had abandoned him, but he did receive support 
from less promising quarters, notably Cassius.240 Indeed, in a letter to Cassius written 
years after the events in late 51, Cicero briefly alludes to the tyrannicide’s past 
assistance: 
Extremum illud est de iis quae proposueram, confirmatio nostrae amicitiae; de qua 
pluribus verbis nihil opus est. tu puer me appetisti, ego autem semper ornamento te 
mihi fore duxi; fuisti etiam praesidio tristissimis meis temporibus. 
The last of the points I mentioned was the strengthening of our friendship. On that 
little need be said. As a boy you drew towards me, and on my side I always 
believed that I should be proud of you. You also defended me in my darkest 
days.241  
Cicero’s unhappiest days (tristissimis meis temporibus) obliquely but obviously refer 
to his exile, though this elliptical phrase may also include the period running up to his 
 
235 Cic. Mil. 40; Asc. Mil. 36C.  
236 On Cicero’s exile, see Cic. QFr. 1.4.4, Fam. 1.9.13, Dom. 96, Sest. 35-50. Further, see Mitchell 
(1991) 127-44, esp. 138n.118, for ancient references; Tatum (1999) 151-7; Kelly (2006) 110-25. Cf. 
generally Garcea (2005), on Cicero’s correspondence from this period. 
237 Plut. Cic. 30.1. See also Mitchell (1991) 138; cf. Tatum (1999) 151-2, who proposes additional 
motivations for Clodius’ actions as well as enmity. On the Bona Dea scandal, see generally Hillard 
(1982); cf. Tatum (1990), (1999) 151-7, in response to Epstein (1986) 229-35.    
238 Plut. Cic. 31.6. Mitchell (1991) 140. See also Smith (1896) 65-84.  
239 Cic. QFr. 1.4.4; Att. 3.3, 3.4 with Mitchell (1991) 118n.138. 
240 Pompey’s abandonment of Cicero: Cic. Att. 10.4.3; Plut. Cic. 30.2-3, Pomp. 46.5. See Mitchell 
(1991) 136. Pompey had a reputation for fickleness: Syme (1938) 123-4.  
241 Cic. Fam. 15.14.6. 
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exilium.242 His final words, therefore, raise significant questions: did Cassius really 
support him before or during his exile, and, if so, what form did this assistance take? 
Or is Cicero indulging in a polite exaggeration? It can reasonably be assumed that 
Cassius did not provide senatorial support, as he was not yet a senator and his 
opposition to Clodius would carry little weight. He could not, then, lead the charge on 
Cicero’s recall, which the orator himself credited to P. Cornelius Lentulus Spinther 
(cos. 57).243  
However, it is very possible that Cassius and other young conservatives 
participated in a public show of support for Cicero before his exile.244 Aided by Q. 
Hortensius and the elder Curio, Cicero mustered his supporters as Clodius pushed for 
his banishment.245 Donning sordes, Cicero’s adherents (some 20,000 strong, he later 
claimed) thronged the streets of Rome and petitioned the consul Aulus Gabinius.246 
Ultimately, this protest was unsuccessful. But Cicero would later note that he enjoyed 
the support of adolescentes nobilissimi, among whom it may be inferred Cassius 
numbered.247 Cassius’ assistance would hardly be surprising. If he did not support 
Cicero’s cause in principle (though he probably did),248 he may also have been 
compelled by aristocratic obligation; Cicero, as his letter reveals, had served in some 
capacity as a mentor to Cassius (tu puer me appetisti).249 Cassius was thus honour-
bound to repay the beneficium he had received from Cicero.250  
 
242 Robinson (1994) 475-80, has shown that Cicero never once referred to his exile explicitly as an 
exile (e.g., exsilium), except when refuting being called an exile by others (three times). 
243 Cic. Fam. 1.9.4-5. Cf. Cic. Sest. 144, on the help P. Sestius proffered; and Milo: Cic. Mil. 94; and 
Cispius: Cic. Planc. 76; cf. Red. sen. 21; and Rabirius Postumus: Rab. Post. 47. There is some reason 
to doubt the extent of help proffered by some of these men, for example Plancius. When prosecuted by 
M. Laterensis and Cassius’ brother, L. Cassius, the latter mocks Cicero’s suggestion that he owed the 
defendant his assistance for the aid he provided him while in exile: Cic. Planc. 68: nam quod ais, 
Cassi, non plus me Plancio debere quam bonis omnibus.      
244 Cic. Sest. 26; Red. pop. 8; Red. sen. 12, 31; Cass. Dio 38.16.4.  
245 Cass. Dio 38.16.2-3.  
246 Cic. Red. pop. 8; Plut. Cic. 31. On Gabinius’ role, see note 241 above for references. 
247 Cic. Red. sen. 12. Cf. Cic. Sest. 26, equites Romani et omnes boni. On support for Cicero among the 
equestrians, see Berry (2003). Presumably, a number of equites would have pledged their support and 
protection for Cicero at his salutationes, which fits in line with Cicero’s use of praesidio.   
248  If his later career is any indicator, it is likely that Cassius disapproved of Clodius’ politics and 
methods. Cicero’s reference to always having been proud of Cassius indicates he probably stood for 
staunch conservatism, in contrast to his younger brothers.    
249 Cic. Fam. 15.14.2, further indicates that Cassius and Cicero had faithfully reciprocated favours. 
Perhaps Cassius’ father had introduced his young son to Cicero at one of his morning salutationes and 
had placed him in his care for his political acculturation (tirocinium fori). Eyben (1993) 60, argues that 
many young nobiles idolised Cicero as an orator.  
250 On the importance of bonds of friendship, support and reciprocity, see Cic. Flac. 103, 106, Mil. 100.   
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But it is equally possible that Cassius offered only token gestures of support. Perhaps, 
as Cicero himself did in similar cases, he had sent letters of support to the exiled 
consular, which was a social duty between friends.251 Or he may have made visits to 
Terentia and the children, pledging his assistance as Rabirius Postumus is supposed to 
have done.252 This may allow Cicero to politely exaggerate the services Cassius had 
rendered. After all, it is important to remember that Cicero was eager to strengthen his 
ties with Cassius in the letter he sends (confirmatio amicitiae) and there are elements 
of conventionalised politeness here.253 When compared with other aristocrats, then, 
Cassius’ support may have been negligible, but he was relatively young at the time 
and thus did not have the authority to assist Cicero in ways other than polite pledges 
of support. Nevertheless, even if Cassius only offered nominal gestures of support, he 
evidently had the good sense to engage in these important aristocratic interactions. 
Politically, were Cicero to return from exile Cassius could expect him to aid his future 
canvasses for office or offer aid in the courts.254       
              Plainly, Cassius was not a member of Clodius’ intimates –described 
sneeringly by Cicero in shorthand fashion as barbatuli iuvenes– the fast-set of young 
nobles who had backed Clodius during the Bona Dea scandal and beyond.255 This 
needs stating in view of T. Rice-Holmes’ strange insistence that Cassius had, as 
tribune, supported Clodius in 56.256 It is true that many prominent members of the 
younger nobility appear to have been connected to Clodius’ barbatuli, at least for a 
while: the younger Curio is the classic example; M. Antonius another; and even the 
future conspirator D. Brutus allied himself to Clodius in the 50s.257 Clodius’ appeal 
among the younger generation, according to some scholars, stemmed from his 
 
251 Cicero sent letters of consolation and support to the exiled Fadius (Cic. Fam. 5.18), Nigidius 
Figulus (Fam. 4.13.6), Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus (Fam. 6.22.3), Q. Ligarius (Fam. 6.13.3), and 
Trebianus, Cic. Fam. 6.10B.1. See especially, Hall (2009) 38-41. Cf. Deniaux (1993) 333-43; Kelly 
(2006) 196-8.     
252 Cic. Rab post. 47. Cicero may also exaggerate Postumus’ support.  
253 Hall (2009) 52-60. 
254 Metellus aided Q. Calidius’ election to the praetorship because the latter had provided support for 
Metellus’ father in exile: Cic. Planc. 69; Val. Max. 5.2.7.      
255 On Clodius’ sodalitates, see Tatum (1999) 70-1; Cf. Dettenhofer (1992). For Cicero’s references to 
the barbatuli iuvenes, see Cic. Att. 1.14.5, 1.16.11. Further, Frank (1919) 397; Linderski (1961) 112; 
Shackleton Bailey (1968) 1.302; Lintott (1967) 160; Will (1991) 62-66; Hutchinson (1993) 441-51.       
256 Rice-Holmes (1923) 2.66. Based on Cic. QFr. 2.1.2, which mentions two tribunes, a Cassius and C. 
Cato, opposing Clodius’ prosecution. Of course, the Cassius in question could not have been the 
tyrannicide, and Shackleton Bailey (1980) 172, suggests that “Cassius” is a corruption for L. Caninius 
Gallus, later connected to C. Cato. Cf. Shackleton Bailey (1976) 23. Contra Gruen (1974).   
257 On D. Brutus, see Tatum (1999) 70.  
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championing of anti-establishment politics, which put him at odds with the preceding 
generation.258 Whatever the merits of this argument, Cassius, in a departure from 
some prominent members of his own family, appears to have stood fervently for 
traditional and conservative values.259  
                 At times, in fact, Cassius could demonstrate great self-discipline and 
restraint, which were (as J.-M. David has demonstrated) key markers of elite 
comportment.260 In an age when debauchery, dandyism and dilettantism were 
allegedly rampant among Roman noble youths, it is perhaps telling that Seneca the 
younger records Cassius was a teetotaller: Cassius tota vita aquam bibit.261 One may 
not err too much, then, imagining Cassius as a man who reacted against the excesses 
of his peers. Though the likes of the younger Curio and M. Antonius may have curled 
their hair, trimmed their beards, hosted gluttonous banquets and engaged in excessive 
drinking and scandalous mésalliances, it would be unfair and unwise to assume this 
was the case for all young aristocrats.262 Cassius spurned drinking and perhaps other 
activities favoured by his young contemporaries. But there were plenty of other 
avenues of pursuit for a man of means. Philosophy and literature, for instance, served 
as potentially agreeable distractions, activities which Cassius certainly engaged in 
later in life.263 Much of his time must also have been spent tending to the oversight of 
 
258 Will (1991) 62-66; Vanderbroeck (1993) 423-5. Timmer (2005) 202-3, 206, has argued that the 
barbatuli were not frustrated with their fathers’ generations, but were simply politically marginal. He 
has further shown that they feature in the causes of both optimates and populares.     
259  See generally Isayev (2007) 1-13, who seeks to overturn the “generational conflict” thesis of (inter 
alia) Reinhold (1970) 362-3; cf. Eyben (1993) 7, 47-50. Cody (1968) notes that Cassius’ politics were 
markedly different from his brothers’ and forebears’.   
260 On the aristocratic ideology of self-control and restraint, see David (1980). Cf. David (1992) 553-6; 
Corbeill (2002). Self-discipline was a characteristic of the Cassii: Tac. Ann. 6.15.  
261 Sen. Ep. 83.12, with Costa (1988) 188. Cic. Sen. 23, speaks of ferocitas iuvenes. Cf. Plut. Brut. 6.9. 
It is possible that Cassius subscribed to the teaching of Zeno that the good man does not get drunk, 
which would indicate that his previous philosophical leanings before conversion to Epicureanism were 
Stoic. On drunkeness in the Roman world, see D’Arms (1995) 304-17.    
262 On youthful excess, see Eyben (1993) 98-107. Such youthful excess, however, may be exaggerated 
by Roman polemic or courtroom attacks: Cic. Verr. 2.1.32-3, on Verres’ allegedly dissolute youth; cf. 
Sall. Cat. 5.1-8, 16.1-3, on Catiline’s wayward youth. If Plutarch can be believed, Cato certainly acted 
with self-restraint and uprightness in youth: Cat. Min. 1.2-5, 2.6-7, Mor. 28B. Gellius, stepson of L. 
Philippus: Cic. Sest. 110.  
 263 Cic. Fam. 15.19, certainly indicates a fondness for philosophical contemplation. Other aristocrats 
enjoyed philosophy as a means of relaxation and contemplation: Plut. Luc. 1.4. Caesar had written 
poetry in his youth and a collection of maxims; juvenilia if Augustus’ actions are any indication: Suet. 
Iul. 56.7. So, too, Brutus: Tac. Dial. 21.6; Plin. Ep. 5.3.5. Cicero too wrote poetry in his youth: Plut. 
Cic.  2.3-4 with Lintott (2013) 133. 
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his numerous properties and estates.264 But his overall focus was clearly on climbing 
the cursus honorum –and the first step on the electoral ladder was the quaestorship.  
 
3.12 CONCLUSION 
Other than his alleged assault of Faustus Sulla –an incident that, if historical, does not 
appear to have affected his career– Cassius’ early life was remarkably conventional. 
Like other Late Republican aristocrats, he received a sound education in grammar and 
rhetoric. Though he may have spent more time overseas at the Greek intellectual 
centres than was customary, he nevertheless returned to Rome and contracted a very 
respectable marriage to Junia Tertia, a woman who enjoyed extensive family 
connections. After marriage, Cassius looked to build a reputation in the courts, and, in 
one case, offered his skills (ultimately unnecessary) to Q. Cicero. He also offered 
some form of support to Cicero at the time of his exile. In sum, Cassius had prepared 
himself very well for an oratorical career: he had trained at Rhodes; was seeking 
experience in court; and his declamation practice with Cicero all indicate his desire to 
hone his oratory. As will be seen, the political circumstances conspired to prevent him 
from gaining much actual experience in this crucial sphere of activity.   
In other areas of his early career, the record is much patchier. There is no 
evidence that he served as a moneyer (or other comparable office), although the 
register of moneyers is incomplete for the years 59-57, the most likely time at which 
he would have held office. There is also no record of his early military service, not 
that this is entirely unexpected.  
 While it is difficult to draw firm conclusions about his political outlook 
(which may not have been static; his philosophical beliefs changed over time), it does 
seem that Cassius had conservative tendencies, and was prepared to make a stand for 
the principles he believed in, as in his support of Cicero. Ultimately, as Cassius 
prepared to stand for the quaestorship, he was on the cusp of a promising career that 
he hoped would one day lead to the consulship. However, the trajectory of his career 
would begin to take an unexpected turn during his service in the East under Crassus.  
 
 
264 See Appendix F, on Cassius’ financial interests.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
CASSIUS AND THE PARTHIAN CAMPAIGN 
 
4.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter treats Cassius’ career down to the end of 51. It looks in detail at his 
service under Crassus before the battle of Carrhae, and his activities as acting 
governor of Syria thereafter. In particular, this chapter seeks to examine and, on 
occasion, dispute several interpretations of Cassius’ career. A few examples will 
suffice. Whilst this chapter reaffirms the view that Cassius was quaestor in 55, the 
manner in which he found himself on Crassus’ staff is examined because some 
scholars imply he was selected preferentially rather than by sortition. But there hardly 
seems sufficient evidence either way. Moreover, it has also been repeatedly claimed 
by moderns that Cassius deserted Crassus after Carrhae, a very serious allegation if 
true. And yet, as will be argued, the ancient evidence is far from conclusive. Another 
charge levelled against Cassius is that, as acting governor, he engaged in shameless 
provincial profiteering. Though this was certainly not an uncommon aristocratic 
activity in the Late Republic, the ancient testimony must be considered carefully. 
There is likely an element of truth to this last allegation, but the details are perhaps 
exaggerated by hostile sources. However, throughout this period there is also 
compelling evidence of a pro-Cassius source, especially in the Parthian narrative of 
Plutarch’s Crassus; analysis of his conduct, then, must be carried out with this borne 
in mind.  Overall, by the end of this period Cassius had established a notable military 
reputation, amassed foreign clients, and no doubt profited handsomely at the expense 
of his province. At the same time, however, the disaster of Carrhae meant that his 
career had been notably delayed as a result of his extended service in the East.   
 
4.1 QUAESTORSHIP 
 
In October 56, Cassius reached the age of thirty and could finally embark on a 
political career.1 The first rung of the cursus honorum was the quaestorship, for which 
twenty positions were available each year.2  For a nobilis of Cassius’ distinction, 
 
1 This conclusion is based on the fact that, as noted in the previous chapter, Cassius was born in 86 at 
the latest. He was thus first eligible to stand for the quaestorship in 56 for 55. Syme (1980b) 403, notes 
87 as a possible year of Cassius’ birth. On the issue of Cassius’ birth, see Chapter 3, Section 1. 
2 Tac. Ann. 11.22.6, indicates that Sulla set the number of quaestors elected anually at twenty.   
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securing election to this elementary office would have been straightforward. 3 
Nonetheless, several of our ancient accounts state unequivocally that Cassius was 
quaestor in 53, which gives the misleading impression that he failed to obtain office 
as soon as he was eligible. 4  But he was in fact, as is now generally accepted, 
proquaestor in that eventful year.5  (As R. Syme notes, the ancient sources often used 
the term “quaestor” for those who are actually proquaestor.)6 As a result, there is an 
even chance that his office began either in 55 or 54.7 Since Crassus set off on his 
campaign in November of 55 8  –and since he had been busily making campaign 
preparations beforehand9– it seems more likely that Cassius would have been elected 
quaestor for 55, suo anno, and thus was ready to serve Crassus when required.10  
From 54 to 51, therefore, Cassius was proquaestor.11 By securing election to the 
quaestorship, Cassius was admitted to the senate, which for centuries had been 
Rome’s central organ of government; increasingly, however, it was under assault 
from the dynasts.   
 
4.2 SELECTION 
 
The ancient sources do not record how Cassius came to serve under Crassus, although 
 
3 Broughton (1991) 1-64, shows how extraordinarily uncommon it was for nobiles to fail to win 
election to the quaestorship. Cf., especially, Wiseman (1971) 106. M. Antonius’ failure to win office 
suo anno was the result of disturbances at Rome; see Linderski and Kaminska-Linderski (1974) 222-3. 
Failure of a prominent politician to win office was occasionally commented upon by the ancient 
sources. For instance, Sulla failed to win the praetorship at the first attempt: Val. Max. 7.5.5; Plut. Sull. 
5.1-3. Cassius could expect to draw on family, supporters, and retainers. Consider the aid M. Favonius 
received when canvassing for the aedileship: Plut. Cat. Min. 46.1-3.       
4 Vell. Pat. 2.46.4; Liv. Per. 108; App. B Civ. 4.59; Plut. Crass. 18; Cass. Dio 40.25.4; [Aur. Vict.] De 
vir. ill. 83; Eutr. 6.18; Fest. Brev. 17. Modern scholars accepted this date without hesitation: Fröhlich, 
RE (1899) 3.1727; Broughton, MRR 2.229, with sources; Shackleton Bailey (1968) 3.221; cf. 
Richardson (1983) 463, who still plumps for 53. Quaestor can be used to mean pro quaestor: Sumner 
(1971b) 365. Cf. Linderski (1975) 37, who is more cautious on this issue.  
5 Broughton, MRR 3.51. Cf. Chapter 3, Section 1. 
6 Syme (1980b) 404. 
7 Linderski (1975) 35-8; Sumner (1971b) 365. Cf. Marshall (1976) 151n.63; Rawson (1991) [1974] 
423; Broughton, MRR 3.51. See, too, Earl (1966) 306, on Sallust’s cursus, for comparison. However, 
Syme (1980) 404, argues that a “nobilis did not need to worry” about attaining office suo anno.     
8 Cic. Att. 4.13.2 with Marinone (2004) 129. Dates for this letter range between 14 and 17 November. It 
seems relatively certain, then, that Crassus left in the first half of November. For further ancient 
references, see Broughton, MRR 2.215. Syme (1980) 404-5, argues that Cassius left in November with 
Crassus.  
9 Plut. Crass.16.3.  
10 Chamoux (1986) 40, notes that Crassus arrived in Syria with a full retinue of staff. The elections for 
54 and 53 were significantly delayed: Broughton, MRR 3.51.  
11 Cic. Fam. 15.14, designates him pro quaestor in 51. By comparison, Brutus was most likely quaestor 
in 54 and served as proquaestor from 53 to 51: Broughton, MRR 3.112.  
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traditionally it would have been as a result of a public sortition. 12  Soon (if not 
straight) after his election, he would have assembled with the other nineteen quaestors 
at a templum, historically the temple of Jupiter Optimus Maximus, and drawn lots 
before the Roman people.13 The ancient historians do not describe this political ritual 
in detail, but several sources (of varying degrees of trustworthiness) fill in some of the 
gaps. On the day of the allotment, the quaestors gather outside the temple of Jupiter. 
The temple doors, which are normally closed, are opened, and the lots are brought 
forth, though it is unclear exactly who was responsible for conveying the lots 
outside.14 Each wooden lot was inscribed with the magistrate’s name, under whom the 
selector would serve.15 In full view, the lots are deposited inside an urn (sitella), and 
then mixed or shaken.16 The quaestors proceed to draw lots and finally display them 
to the people. 17  Considering the competitive nature of Roman politics, it is not 
surprising that the aristocracy developed this impartial and transparent method to 
allocate provinces. Thus, ordinarily public sortition –that is, sheer good fortune– 
would explain how Cassius found himself serving under Crassus in such a promising 
provincial sphere. However, other explanations have also been put forward.   
               By 55, the dynasts (Caesar, Crassus, and Pompey) were firmly in control of 
Roman politics. It would not be implausible, therefore, if Crassus had manoeuvred to 
secure the quaestor he desired. This does not mean he rigged the sortition, although 
there were often accusations that such procedures were fixed; 18  merely that he 
 
12 On sortition, see especially Rosenstein (1995) 43-75; Stewart (1998) 23-35. Cic. Mur. 18, Div. Caec. 
46, QFr.1.1.11, Att. 6.6.4. This assumes Cassius served as Crassus’ quaestor rather than joining his 
staff in 54 as a proquaestor, which is also possible, though unlikely. See below.  
13 Timeframe: Cic. Verr. 1.17 with Stewart (1998) 28. Cic. Cat. 4.15, indicates the lots were drawn on 
the day the quaestors entered office (i.e. 5 December). See Vervaet (2006), on lex de provinciis 
consularibus. Temple of Jupiter: Stewart (1998) 30, with n.50 for evidence. Rosenstein (1995) 57, 
notes that any templum would suffice, but argues that the presence of augurs was required. Denniston 
(1926) 129, argues that quaestors drew lots at the temple of Saturn, the aerarium.     
14 Temple doors: App. B Civ. 1.15. Scholars have argued over the religious significance of this ritual: 
Stewart (1998) 30: “the temple gave the ceremonies a godly imprimatur by invoking Jupiter’s role as 
patron of the Republican political system and his sanction for the business at hand.” For a different 
perspective, see Rosenstein (1995) 58: “Sortition under these circumstances did not make the gods 
responsible for the outcome; it simply implicated them in the decision and sought thus to impel their 
support.” See also Johnston (2003) 146-56, on the idea that the sortition result was believed to reflect 
the gods’ will. On divination and sortition, see Liv. 41.18.10; Fest. 380, L.       
15 Wooden lot: Pl. Cas. 385; Inscription and service: Cic. Sest. 8, with Kaster (2006) 129; Stewart 
(1998) 30. 
16 Sitella: Pl. Cas. 385.; Mixed and/or shaken: Pl. Cas. 387; Hor. Serm. 1.9.29-30.  
17 Plaut. Cas. 15.  
18 A classic example is M. Antonius in 44: Cic. Phil. 3.24-7. See also Balsdon (1962a) 135; Rosenstein 
(1995) 70-2.  
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selected his quaestor without going through the process of sortition (sine sorte).19 For 
a quaestor to secure a province without allotment –extra sortem ex senatus consulto– 
a concession from the senate was required, which, although perhaps a rare occurrence, 
was not unprecedented.20 Indeed, a few years later, Pompey selected Cassius’ younger 
brother Quintus without sortition; and the same was true of Caesar, who selected M. 
Antonius sine sorte.21 So it is conceivable that Cassius was selected preferentially and 
without sortition. But if Crassus did indeed act in a fashion similar to Caesar and 
Pompey, and that seems to be the assumption of some scholars (see below), this raises 
a crucial question: why Cassius?  
               The only explanation offered so far involves pre-existing links between 
Cassius’ family and the dynasts, or, to put it differently, prosopographical inference. 
When Pompey pushed to secure the eastern command in 66, Cassius’ father, then a 
consular, had provided his support. 22  Based on this evidence alone, one scholar 
suggests that it made sense for Crassus to attach Cassius to his staff, either to prevent 
him aligning with Pompey, or as a favour to his rival.23 Frankly, although Roman 
politicians certainly operated with a quid pro quo mentality, this hypothesis seems 
quite tenuous; Cassius’ father’s support had been offered over a decade earlier, and 
there is debate as to its significance.24 It is more than likely that such support alone 
would not have moved Pompey to go to great lengths to assist the Cassii.25 That said, 
Pompey later selected Q. Cassius, the tyrannicide’s brother, sine sorte, which may yet 
suggest the Cassii enjoyed some sway with the general –or the dynasts in general. Of 
 
19 By an agreement known as comparatio, on which see Balsdon (1962) 135 and note below.   
20 Rare: Mommsen (1887) 21.532-4; Willems (1885) 2.607-8; Thompson (1962a) 17-25; Shackleton 
Bailey (1968) 2.372; Linderski (1975) 37n.9. Contra Denniston (1926) 129, who argues choosing a 
quaestor without sortition was not rare, citing Cic. QFr. 1.1.11. See further Ramsey (2003) 234. 
Ramsey cites Liv. 30.33.2 to argue that allotment without sortition was perfectly acceptable. See also 
Cic. Mur. 18. OCD3 (1996) 1287: extra sortem for personal reasons.   
21 Cic. Att. 6.6.4, Fam. 2.15.4; Cic. Phil. 2.50 with Ramsey (2003) 234. See also Denniston (1926) 129; 
Lacey (1986) 194; Broughton, MRR 2.236; Shackleton Bailey (1968) 3.272; Linderski and Kaminska-
Linderski (1974) 221. Badian (1970) 6-8, notes that Marius may have appointed Sulla as his quaestor 
without sortition.  And M. Brutus is supposed to have received an invitation (or perhaps was allotted) 
to serve under Caesar in Gaul, which he turned down: [Aur. Vict.] De vir. ill. 82.3.    
22 Gruen (1969) 74; Ward (1977) 24; Leach (1978) 75; Seager (2002) 49-50; Tan (2008) 185n.86. 
Drumann-Groebe (1964) [18992] 2.98, argue that the defeat of Cassius’ father against Spartacus in 72 
explains his support of the Manilian Law, against Crassus, who was successful against the slave army.    
23 Ward (1977) 80: “Politically, Cassius’ father may have favoured Pompey, so that it would make 
sense for Crassus to attach the younger Cassius to his staff, possibly at the request of his triumviral 
partner.” Also, Cic. Fam. 2.15.4, on the dynasts’ attracting young aristocratic support.  
24 See Brunt (1988) 473, 477, on  the limited ramifications of his support. Cicero had spoken in favour 
of the Manilian Law also, and this did not bring him any closer to Pompey at the time: Lintott (2013) 
145.  
25 Cass. Dio 42.5.6, records a peculiar anecdote that Pompey was suspicious of all citizens named 
Cassius.  
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course, it does not necessarily follow that because Pompey chose Quintus that this 
means similar strings were pulled for Cassius. But this is the only posited connection 
between these key grandees. However, rather than look to Pompey for answers, it 
may be more productive to examine the links between the Cassii and Licinii.    
               If anything, the scant historical record does not suggest a close relationship 
between the two families. Other than the interesting fact that the first consular Cassius 
had shared the highest office with a Licinius Crassus (in 171), there is little evidence 
that indicates a close working relationship or family alliance. In fact, in many cases 
the two families seem to have been on opposing sides of the political fence. As will be 
recalled, L. Cassius Longinus Ravilla had famously presided over a special court in 
which the vestal virgin Licinia was condemned for unchastity, despite an impressive 
defence by the greatest orator of the age, L. Licinius Crassus (cos. 95).26 The Licinii 
and Cassii also appear to have been on opposing sides of the conflict between Marius 
and Sulla, with the majority of the Cassii connected to Marius, and Crassus closer to 
Sulla.27 For these reasons, one Italian scholar surmised that Cassius was a political 
opponent of Crassus, a hypothesis supported allegedly by Cassius’ disloyalty to 
Crassus on campaign.28 Overall, there is no compelling evidence to suggest that these 
men were especially close during the 50s. 
One common thread that does link Cassius and Crassus is their strong 
connections to the equestrian order.29 C. Nicolet has noted that several members of 
the Cassii Longini may have delayed their senatorial careers to pursue their equestrian 
financial interests.30 Since the Cassii definitely had clients in the East, it would not be 
unlikely if they had business interests there also.31  Shortly before Cassius returned to 
Rome from the East, he sent a letter of recommendation to Cicero in behalf of his 
equestrian friend M. Fabius.32 Perhaps, then, it was business that connected these 
men. Given the scale of Cassius’ profiteering in the aftermath of Carrhae, there is a 
 
26 Liv. Per. 63; Cass. Dio 26.fr. 87. On the trial, see Alexander (1990) 21,-2 nos.41-2. It is unclear how 
this Licinia was connected to Crassus (cos. 95). For further discussion, see Chapter 2, Section 2.      
27 On the Cassii’s Marian connections, see Chapter 2, Section 2. Cf. Cadoux (1956) 154, on Crassus.  
28 Garzetti (1944/45) 43. 
29 Ward (1977) 80-1, shows that Crassus’ support derived from the municipal aristocracy as well as the 
equestrian order. Cic. Planc. 58.5, for L. Cassius Longinus (tr. pl. 44). See also, below.   
30 Nicolet (1974) 2.828-30; Nicolet (1976) 22 with n.12. Cf. Shatzman (1975) 189n.58. 
31 On the business interests of the Cassii, see Appendix F; [Aur. Vict.] De vir. ill. 83.3, shows that 
Cassius engaged in commerce and trading while in the Roman East. Badian (1958) 168: by the Late 
Republic, “all families of any importance...had such connexions abroad, particularly in the East.”      
32 Cic. Fam. 15.14.1-2. See Shatzman (1975) 189n.58; Deniaux (1993) 28. For the date of this letter, 
see Marinone (2004) 153-4.   
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strong case to be made that he was motivated primarily by money. If one were to 
compare his contemporaries, the main reason C. Trebatius served in Gaul was 
because he viewed the venture as a means to wealth.33 Whatever Cassius’ connections 
to Crassus were, he is clearly an anomaly: a first-rank aristocrat from a consular 
family amongst a retinue of undistinguished men. 34  In view of this observation, 
perhaps he really was assigned to Crassus’ staff by public sortition. 
               And yet, another possibility has been mooted. Cassius may initially have 
served his quaestorship under a different magistrate before proceeding to join Crassus 
as proquaestor in 54/53.35 Thus, perhaps Cassius was not assigned by lot (or because 
of favouritism) at all, but only joined Crassus’ campaign later. This, so the argument 
from silence goes, explains his absence from the ancient narratives before 53; perhaps 
Cassius reached Crassus only around the same time as Publius, Crassus’ son, who had 
been serving under Caesar.36 But this reconstruction is weak on two grounds. First, 
the failure of specific ancient narratives –Velleius Paterculus and Cassius Dio– to 
mention Cassius before 53 may only prove nothing beyond their elliptical nature.37 
These same sources also omit to mention that Crassus sacked the Temple of 
Jerusalem, and they generally provide only a patchy account either side of Carrhae.38 
Second, Crassus had carefully organised his retinue during his consulship and there 
was no obvious reason to add Cassius to this entourage later in 54.39 Ultimately, it 
seems most likely that Cassius was assigned as a quaestor –either by sortition or 
preferentially– to Crassus before the latter set out for Syria. If there were existing 
connections between Cassius and the triumvir they are not obviously apparent, and it 
is noteworthy that the young aristocrat is the only known member of the entourage 
with a consular family. Thus, although Cassius cannot be detected in Crassus’ service 
before 53, he was, in all probability, on the proconsul’s staff before that time and 
there seems no good reason to doubt he left Rome for Syria in late 55.  
Although Cassius would have eagerly awaited the Parthian campaign (an 
exotic theatre of war), many were not so enthusiastic. 40  Opposition to Crassus’ 
 
33 Cic. Fam. 7.9.2. 
34 Plut. Crass. 25.3 with Marshall (1976) 167; Ward (1977) 80-1; Rawson (1991) [1982] 423. As Ward 
observes, almost all known members of his staff were from second- and third-rank families.  
35 Marshall (1976) 167n.63; Ward (1977) 80; cf. Adcock (1966) 50. Thus appointed by Crassus.   
36 Plut. Crass. 17.7 with Marshall (1976) 167n.63.  
37 Vell. Pat. 2.46.4; Cass. Dio 40.13.4. Cited by Marshall (1976) 167n.63, to make his case.  
38 Joseph. BJ. 8.8, Ant. 7.1 with Sampson (2008) 103. See also the note above.  
39 Plut. Crass. 16.3 
40 For a full bibliography of early work on the Parthian campaign, see Debevoise (1968) 78n.36. 
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proconsular command reached a crescendo in 55 and continued thereafter, long after 
the dynast departed Italy.41 Hostility was especially great from the tribune C. Ateius 
Capito, who, in a last-ditch effort to prevent the campaign, noted unfavourable omens 
(dirarum obnuntiatio) at the very moment that Crassus was performing the customary 
vows at the Capitol in preparation for his departure that day, on 15 November.42 That 
the declaration of bad omens was politically motivated is likely. In earlier times, the 
sighting of ominous auspices (dirae) might have delayed Crassus’ departure, but by 
the Late Republic far too many magistrates looked to the heavens as a means of 
obstructing their political rivals.43  
Unsurprisingly, Crassus ignored the announcement of bad auspices, no doubt 
shaking it off as a desperate attempt by his enemies to scupper his command.44 It has 
also been suggested that Pompey, who later employed his augural privilege for 
political purposes, was present at Crassus’ auspication and ruled invalid the 
announcement of dirae by Ateius, on both technical and legal grounds.45 At any rate, 
Ateius was frustrated. Yet later historians, with the benefit of hindsight, dramatized 
and embellished this episode, suggesting that Ateius tried to arrest Crassus, and, when 
his attempt failed, finally called down curses on Crassus and his army.46 As has long 
been noted, however, these stories do not tally with the contemporary account of 
Cicero.47 But the consular wryly observed to Atticus that Crassus’ parade out of the 
 
41 Opposition to Crassus in 54: Marshall (1976) 143; Malitz (1984) 26. On the nature of Crassus’ 
imperium, see Sherwin-White (1984) 279; Marshall (1976) 139-41; Sampson (2008) 56-7.  
42 Cass. Dio 39.39.6 with Wardle (2006) 182. Cic. Att. 4.13.2, Fam. 1.9.20, Div. 1.29-30 with Wardle 
(2006) 181-3. Simpson (1938) 532-3; Marshall (1976) 150; Ward (1977) 287-8; Sampson (2008) 97. 
Since the Aelio-Fufian Law (c. 158), plebeian tribunes had the right to take auspices, even though they 
lacked imperium: Cic. Vat. 7, 18, Pis. 4, Red. Sen. 5, 11. How the Clodian law of 58 (Cic. Sest. 15, 33) 
affected the Aelio-Fufian law is not entirely evident, but it is clear that Ateius could take auspices and 
declare them unfavourable. On Clodius’ law, see Tatum (1999) 126-32. However, Ateius was later 
prosecuted for ‘incorrectly’ observing, or falsifying, the auspices by the censor of 50, Appius Claudius 
Pulcher: Cic. Div. 1.29-30. 
43 The classic example of a magistrate noting bad omens is M. Bibulus: Suet. Iul. 20.1. On the abuse of 
religio in Roman politics, see briefly Szemler (1972) 45-6. In 58, Clodius modified the rules governing 
obnuntiatio: Cic. Red. Sen. 11, Har. Resp. 58, Sest. 33, 56, Vat. 18, Pis. 9-10; Cass. Dio 38.13.3-6. In 
57, the tribune P. Sestius tried to announce that he had observed bad auspices, but he was attacked by a 
Clodian gang: Cic. Red. Sen. 6-7, Red. Pop. 17, Sest. 79-83.  
44 Rosenstein (1990) 71-2.  
45  Plut. Cat. Min. 42; argues for Pompey’s assistance; cf. Linderski ANRW (1986) II. 16.3:2213; 
Wardle (2006) 183.  
46 Plut. Crass. 16. Cf. Cic. Div. 1.29. See note below.    
47 Vell. Pat. 2.46.2-3; Plut. Crass. 16.3-6; cf. Eutrop. 6.18. Cic. Att. 4.13.2, Fam. 1.9.20, Div. 1.29-30; 
Caes. BGall. 6.1.2; Vell. Pat. 2.46.3; Plin. HN 15.83; Plut. Cic. 26.1, Crass. 16.3-6; Pomp. 52.5; Flor. 
1.46.1-3; App. B Civ. 2.18; Cass. Dio 39.39.1-7. For modern discussion, see Tarn, CAH1 9.605; 
Simpson (1938) 532-41; Adcock (1966) 50; Debevoise (1968) 80; Marshall (1976) 150; Ward (1977) 
287-8; Mattern-Parkes (2003) 389; Sampson (2008) 97. According to Plutarch, Ateius invoked terrible 
curses upon Crassus and his army as they left Rome, but Cicero notes only that ill omens were 
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city was not greeted with the same enthusiasm as that which had attended L. Aemilius 
Paullus when he set out to battle King Perseus of Macedonia.48 What Cassius made of 
the unpopularity of Crassus’ command and his sputtering departure is not recorded; 
his focus, at any rate, would have been elsewhere: all that concerned him was the 
chance to win military glory and amass a fortune. Caesar’s recent success in Gaul had 
led to an unprecedented supplicatio, including fifteen days of thanksgiving;49 honours 
such as these must have fired every eager aristocrat to military glory. And even 
quaestors occasionally received military honours while on campaign.50 There would 
have been high expectation that Cassius could win laus, or, better still, gloria.51 
 
4.3 QUAESTORIAL DUTIES 
There is little information about Cassius’ service as quaestor –the record only really 
begins in 54/53 in the lead-up to Carrhae, when he was proquaestor. But like other 
quaestors serving at this time, his responsibilities would have been varied. He may 
have been pressed into service to assist with Crassus’ troop recruitment. The tribunes 
had supposedly hampered enlistment, and Caesar and Pompey had already picked 
over the traditional areas from which men were conscripted.52 On campaign, Cassius 
also held the purse strings. Receipts and payments passed through his hands and he 
was in charge of the military stores.53 He was also responsible for the supervision of 
the chests of silver and bronze coins that each magistrate received when they went to 
the provinces, and more generally the supervision of the army’s train.54 He was not 
simply paymaster but also bookkeeper of the campaign; he was expected to make a 
record of all spoils seized from a defeated enemy. 55  Cassius was also chiefly 
responsible for overseeing the issuing of all coins on behalf of Crassus. A coin he 
 
observed in the sky, and ignored: Plut. Crass. 16.5-6; Cic. Div. 1.29. However, Wardle (2006) 183, has 
recently argued for the historicity of these curses, noting the failure of Cicero to mention them is 
because they do not relate to a discussion of auspices.       
48 Cic. Att. 4.13.2.  
49 Caes. BGall. 2.35.4; Plut. Caes. 21.1-2; Cass. Dio 39.5.1. Twenty-day supplication: Caes. BGall. 
4.1-19; 20-38; Broughton, MRR 2.219. 
50 Badian (1983) 158: honours were rarer than those for promagistrates, but attested occasionally.   
51 On the distinction between laus and gloria, see Harris (1979) 17-20. Syria: Butcher (2003) 36.     
52 Tribunes: Cass. Dio 39.39.3, with Wardle (2006) 182; Caesar and Pompey: Marshall (1976) 149-50; 
Sampson (2008) 95-6. See also Cass. Dio 39.39.1, on the levies of both Pompey and Crassus. Crassus 
appears to have sourced men from Lucania rather than Cisalpine Gaul, which was more common: Plin. 
HN 2.147; Hor. Carm. 3.5.8-9 with Marshall (1976) 149-50. Cisalpine Gaul was the most important 
stamping ground for troop recruitment: Chilver (1941) 8, 112. Plutarch, however, presents a rather 
different picture. He does not believe that Crassus had trouble attracting men for the campaign: Plut. 
Crass. 21.2; Sampson (2008) 95-6.         
53 Polyb. 6.31. Suolahti (1955) 46; Harris (1976) 96-7; Badian (1983) 161.   
54 Cic. Att. 2.6.2, 2.16.4 with Lintott (1993) 48-9. Train: Polyb. 6.32.8. 
55 Polyb. 10.19.1; Sall. Iug. 29.5-6. On a scriba quaestorius, see Jones (1949) 38-55.  
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minted on behalf of Crassus is extant, and this is discussed below.56 Lastly, he may 
also have had judicial duties.57As a result of his various responsibilities he would 
have been granted his own personal scribe.58 All of this highlights the importance of 
his position.     
It was crucial that Cassius note expenditure carefully; any impropriety or 
failure to balance the accounts ledger could be used against a quaestor, as it was 
against M. Fonteius and many others (perhaps even his brother).59 So far as can be 
ascertained, Cassius appears to have performed his quaestorial duties diligently. This 
needs stating because not all aristocrats performed their quaestorial tasks so 
assiduously.60 Some young nobles, in fact, used the position as a means to serve their 
interests. Networking, sightseeing, and education often served as welcome 
distractions for a quaestor. Some of Cassius’ peers, then, may have found the position 
of quaestor somewhat tedious or hard if they did not enjoy military life.61 Some may 
have shunned their duties altogether and pursued their own interests.62 Of course, it is 
likely that Cassius too used this role to increase his personal influence, especially in 
the area of foreign clients.     
 
4.4 FOREIGN CLIENTS 
Accumulating foreign clientelae must also have been on Cassius’ agenda, as it was 
for other young nobiles in similar situations.63 Establishing connections with the key 
provincial operators had numerous benefits. Not only would it increase Cassius’ own 
influence and prestige, but foreign dependents could also safeguard and assist in the 
 
56 On Cassius’ coin issues, see Section 16 below.  
57 See Wesner, s.v. “Quaestor”, RE 24 (1963) 801-15, 826-7. Cf. Lintott (1993) 50-2, Braund (1988) 
12, on judicial duties.  
58 Cic. div. Caec. 29, Plin. Ep. 4.12 with Lintott (1993) 51. Scribes, however, would often conduct their 
own personal business at the expense of the state, so much so that both Cato and Clodius passed 
legislation to rein in their activities, a bold move considering the clout of the scribal order: Suet. Dom. 
9.3; Plut. Cat. Min. 17.3 with Gruen (1974) 255; Tatum (1999) 249. Clout: Badian (1989) 582-603.     
59 Cic. Font. 3, 5. P. Cornelius Lentulus Sura: Plut. Cic. 17.2; M. Lucullus: Plut. Luc. 37.1. Vatinius: 
Cic. Vat. 12. As will be noted, Cassius’ own brother appears to have faced the threat of prosecution 
likely as a result of quaestorial impropriety: see the discussion at the end of this chapter.  
60 Cic. Acad. 2.2, 2.4, on L. Lucullus, who had not been involved in any fighting and reputedly spent 
his time instead studying philosophy under Antiochus of Ascalon.   
61  Reading behind Cicero’s gloss, Plancius may have found his role as quaestor in Macedonia 
frustrating, especially if he did not get on with his commander, L. Apuleius: Cic. Red. Sen. 35, Planc. 
28, 61, 71, 98-101. But Piso too forewent his quaestorial province to assist Cicero: Red. Sen. 38. C. 
Gracchus returned from Sardinia after one year, causing problems as he did not have permission.  
62 On Julius Caesar’s extended networking with King Nicomedes, see Osgood (2008) 687-91.  
63 Young Caesar: Osgood (2008) 687-91, (2010) 319-36.  
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advancement of his career.64 For instance, were Cassius to face charges of extortion 
on his return to Rome –and such prosecutions were common enough at this time– if 
necessary he could expect his clients to serve as witnesses in his defence.65 He might 
also call upon his clients for special favours.  
Patrons asked their clients for help sourcing animals and works of art for 
aedilician games. 66 Just such a situation is likely to have occurred with Cassius. 
When he began preparing well in advance to host public games as aedile (before the 
civil war put a stop to this ambition) he appears to have sourced lions. 67  In all 
probability these lions came from Syria and it has been inferred by one scholar quite 
reasonably that clients Cassius had acquired there during his long stint as 
“proquaestor pro praetore” gave the beasts to him.68 Irrespective of the veracity of 
this hypothesis, however, it makes sense that Cassius sought and procured Syrian 
clients, especially as he was credited with saving the province from the Parthians.69 
Indeed, when Cassius returned to Syria in 43 he drew on old connections to assist in 
winning over the legions stationed in the area.70 Cassius Dio reports the people were 
“friendly” towards him. 71  Cicero also reports in his eleventh Philippic that the 
Phoenicians were devoted to Cassius. Cicero’s testimony, and the fact that Cassius 
commanded a Syrian naval fleet during the civil war, indicates he made useful 
connections whilst serving in the East.72          
 
 
 
64 Badian (1958) 163. Tröster (2008) 142, points out that such connections aided politicians’ influence 
at home too, especially as prominent generals became increasingly independent in the Late Republic.  
65 Badian (1958) 161. Austin and Rankov (1995) 102, also note the use of clients in intelligence 
gathering of unsettled provinces or provinces bordering foreign foes. Gabinius appears to have lined up 
clients or Egyptian friends to aid his defence, to no avail: Cic. Rab. Post. 31-3. 
66 Badian (1958) 154-67, especially 166 (Caesar and Pompey); Osgood (2008) 690, with n.19, for full 
bilbiography.  
67 Plut. Brut. 8.6-7. 
68 Ryan (1999) 148: “Bedenkt man aber, daß Cassius selbst in der Vergangenheit als Statthalter in 
Syrien und damit in einem Verbreitungsgebiet des Löwen gedient hatte, liegt der Schluß nahe, daß 
auswärtige Klientelen in seiner ehemaligen Provinz –seien sie Individuen oder aber Gemeinden– ihm 
diesen Dienst erwiesen haben.” Cf. Jennison (1937) 53; Bleicken (1964) 186. Badian (1958) 167, 
posits that many of Caesar’s and Pompey’s animals would have been sourced from foreign clients.  
69 Ryan (1999) 148. Bleicken (1964) 186, has observed that Cassius would have built up a larger client 
base than usual. Popularity in Syria: Cic. Phil. 11.35; cf. Plut. Brut. 7.3; Cass. Dio 47.28. 
70 Cass. Dio 47.21.2. Butcher (2003) 37. 
71 Cass. Dio 47.21.2. Cf. Tac. Ann. 12.12, which suggests that Cassius’ name was not forgotten in Syria 
even in AD 49, when a descendant governed the province (see below).  
72 However, there is no epigraphic evidence to suggest that Cassius was honoured by any Eastern cities 
at this time; but even officials who committed extortion managed on occasion to secure such honours 
from their client states, so how much stock one can put in them is debatable. For discussion, see 
Tröster (2008) 133-6. On Asian honours for Romans, see Magie (1950) 162, 1050, n.1, 4, 174, 1064. 
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4.5 RELATIONSHIP WITH CRASSUS 
Though Cassius sought connections with important foreign clients, his relationship 
with his own commander appears to have been uneasy.  The relationship between a 
commander and his quaestor (and between Crassus and Cassius specifically) merits 
examination, not least because Plutarch indicates it was a tumultuous one:73  
οἱ δὲ περὶ Κάσσιον αὖθις ἠγανάκτουν, καὶ Κράσσον μὲν ἀχθόμενον αὐτοῖς 
ἐπαύσαντο νουθετοῦντες, ἰδίᾳ δὲ τὸν Ἄβγαρον ἐλοιδόρουν· 
But Cassius was once more greatly displeased, and though he stopped advising 
Crassus, who was angry with him, he did privately abuse the barbarian [sc. 
Abgarus].74    
Ideally, a quaestor was bound to his commander in fides for life.75 More specifically, 
he was in loco filii to his commander and as such expected to show him loyalty, 
respect, and attentiveness.76 Anything less would open the quaestor up to the charge 
of being impius.77 But if loyalty to a commander was the ideal, the reality could be 
quite different.78 Marius returned from his service as quaestor to slam his less able 
senior; and Cn. Pompeius Strabo notoriously went further by attempting to prosecute 
his commander, T. Albucius.79 M. Piso, moreover, refused even to serve under L. 
Scipio after being assigned to him by lot.80 Despite the ideal, then, it was certainly not 
unheard of for a quaestor to criticise or snub his commander. Such criticism opened 
the door to accusations of impiety; and some Late Republican quaestors did find 
 
73 Plut. Crass. 18.4, 20.2, 22.4. Garzetti (1944/45) 43, argued that Cassius was not entirely loyal to his 
commander.  
74  Plut. Crass. 22.4. Plutarch employs plural verbs in this passage (e.g., ἐλοιδόρουν), though the 
subsequent text makes it clear he is refering to Cassius alone.   
75 Badian (1964) 46-7, (1983) 156, (1984), on C. Norbanus and M. Antonius (cos. 99). 
76 Cic. Red. Sen. 35, on the filial relationship between quaestor and commander, albeit hypothetical. 
See further below. Antonius trumpeted the traditional bond between a commander and his quaestor in 
his defence of Norbanus: May (2001) 128.  
77 Welch (2012) 28 with n.101. In another context, Morgan (2006) 283, has noted that it also would be 
considered ungentlemanly to criticise one’s superior officer.    
78 Roth (1999) 258: The “quaestor was ultimately responsible to the state, and not the commander in 
the field. Inevitably, therefore, conflicts between commander and quaestor arose.”    
79 Plut. Mar. 7 with Braund (1988) 12; Cic. div. Caec. 63, Off. 2.50. Broughton, MRR 1.560; cf. 
Thompson (1962b) 341. However, Plutarch also includes a similar story about Cato. As quaestor he is 
alleged to have returned to Rome and criticised his commander, Scipio Africanus: Plut. Cat. Mai. 3.5. 
Yet Astin (1978) 14, has argued the story is “fictitious”. The relationship between the proconsul L. 
Valerius Flaccus and his legate C. Flavius Fimbria was notoriously disputatious, especially as the 
former (unlike the latter) was reportedly inexperienced in war and unpopular with the men: Diod. Sic. 
38.8.1-2; App. Mith. 51-2; Cass. Dio fr. 104.3-5.  
80 Cic. Verr. 2.1.37. M. Brutus may also have refused to serve under Caesar, although it is unclear 
whether he had been allotted to serve under him or received an invitation to do so: [Aur. Vict.] De vir. 
ill. 82.3.  
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themselves accused of being impius.81 Cassius clearly took issue with the way Crassus 
handled certain aspects of his campaign; yet, though he opened himself up to serious 
charges of disloyalty, he was not the first quaestor in Roman history to vent his 
frustration about a senior commander. If he thought his own career and reputation 
were at stake, it may have been necessary for him to cast himself as an aggressive 
critic of Crassus’ plans. It would be no surprise, then, if the relationship between 
Crassus and Cassius was none too cordial.  
The arrival of P. Crassus, the dynast’s son, probably did little to improve 
relations. Cassius, who in all probability was older than the dynast’s son and now a 
senator, may have felt jealous of Publius who, despite serving in a subordinate 
position as legate, would undoubtedly have enjoyed a privileged place under his 
powerful father.82 The sources do not comment on the relationship between the two 
young men and there is no way of knowing whether they knew each other well.83 
Publius’ reputation proceeded him, however, and this definitely threatened Cassius’ 
chance to win military fama.84 In Gaul under Caesar, Publius had won praise for 
securing the surrender of the Veneti and several other Gallic maritime states.85 He 
also conquered nearly all of Aquitania, an achievement that Caesar himself praised in 
his commentaries.86 Cicero’s inconspicuous quaestorship had demonstrated to him 
that military glory was the best way to stay in the public eye, so Cassius may have felt 
especially threatened.87 Balancing the account sheets and acting with diligence and 
fairness (as Cicero reports he had done) would not see Cassius propelled to new 
heights of popularity and fame.88 There was every danger, then, that Publius’ military 
deeds would overshadow Cassius’ efforts. Moreover, Crassus will have preferentially 
 
81 Cic. div. in. Caec. 61, describes Caecilius as an alleged impius ex-quaestor of Verres. See further, 
Thompson (1962b) 339-40, 349, with n.5, for additional ancient references from other examples.    
82 Rawson (1991) 425, argues that “jealousy” between Cassius and P. Crassus was very likely, based 
on the fact that Publius would be favoured in the campaign despite the fact that Cassius was both older 
and (definitely) a senator.   
83 Both had attached themselves to Cicero in youth: Cic. Fam. 15.14.6, Brut. 282. P. Crassus may have 
won election to the quaestorship in the same year as Cassius (55): Broughton, MRR 2.217, 3.119, but 
the evidence for this is problematic; see Rawson (1991) 422. Both may have come into contact with 
each other on numerous occasions. It seems that they may have been attached to Cicero in youth; and it 
is clear that Crassus (and perhaps) Cassius donned mourning clothes on Cicero’s behalf in 58: Plut. 
Crass. 13.4; donned mourning clothes: Plut. Crass. 13.4, which reveals he encouraged other young 
men to do the same.    
84 Plut. Crass. 17.4, mentions Publius’ deeds of honour. Cf. Val. Max. 1.6.11.   
85 Caes. BGall. 2.34. 
86 Caes. BGall. 3.20-7; Cass. Dio 39.46.1-4; Oros. 6.8.19-22. 
87 Cic. Planc. 64-66; Plut. Cic. 6.2-5; Schol. Bob. 163. 
88 Cic. QFr. 1.1.22-4; cf. Plut. Cic. 36.1-2. On Cicero’s uncommon integrity, see Mitchell (1991) 325.    
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favoured his son.   
Another source of tension was Crassus’ failure to heed the advice of Cassius. 
Plutarch makes clear that Cassius was of the opinion that Crassus was bungling the 
campaign; as the battle loomed, the tyrannicide despaired of advising the dynast, who 
had been consistently ignoring the cautionary counsel of his military officers. All of 
which indicates a serious breakdown in the normal communication lines. Nonetheless, 
though Cassius was repeatedly critical of the dynast’s strategy, Plutarch never 
suggests that he was disrespectful or insubordinate. In fact, Dio preserves material 
that strives to characterise Cassius as unshakably loyal to his commander, even in the 
face of overwhelming defeat. After the catastrophic battle, by which point Crassus 
had fallen into a lugubrious, incapacitated state, the remaining soldiers unilaterally 
offered the command of the campaign to Cassius:   
οὗτος γὰρ ἐν μὲν ταῖς Κάρραις τῶν τε στρατιωτῶν τὴν αὐτοκράτορα 
αὐτῶν ἡγεμονίαν μίσει τοῦ Κράσσου διδόντων, καὶ προσέτι καὶ αὐτοῦ 
ἐκείνου ἐθελοντὶ διὰ τὸ τῆς συμφορᾶς μέγεθος ἐπιτρέποντος, οὐκ 
ἐδέξατο... 
For when at Carrhae the soldiers through hatred of Crassus had offered 
him [sc. Cassius] the supreme command over themselves, and Crassus 
himself on account of the greatness of the disaster had voluntarily allowed 
it, he had not accepted the command.89 
Since Cassius repeatedly questioned Crassus’ handling of the campaign, his refusal to 
take the reins is a little unexpected, although he may have viewed the command as a 
poisoned chalice after Carrhae. But in modestly refusing the command, Cassius acts 
with pietas and complete deference to his commander. Though the soldiers’ offer 
constituted mutiny, Crassus himself was evidently prepared to acquiesce in their 
request. The sentiments of both men, therefore, indicate a not insignificant level of 
respect for each other, despite disagreeing on the direction of the campaign.  
 
4.6 CASSIUS AS ROMAN CASSANDRA 
Cassius is scarcely mentioned in the ancient sources before Carrhae. He does, 
however, have an important role in Plutarch’s Crassus –before and after the battle. At 
several points in the campaign narrative, Cassius serves as the voice of caution, 
 
89 Cass. Dio 40.28.2. There is perhaps an element of special pleading here. One should allow for the 
possibility that the source behind Dio’s information is perhaps seeking to cast Cassius as loyal to 
Crassus until his demise.        
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predicting disaster if Crassus does not adopt a more careful military strategy:90  
ὅμως δ' οἱ περὶ Κάσσιον αὖθις διελέγοντο τῷ Κράσσῳ, καὶ παρῄνουν μάλιστα 
μὲν ἐν πόλει τινὶ τῶν φρουρουμένων ἀναλαβεῖν τὴν δύναμιν, ἄχρι οὗ τι 
πύθηται περὶ τῶν πολεμίων βέβαιον· εἰ δὲ μή, χωρεῖν ἐπὶ Σελευκείας παρὰ 
τὸν ποταμόν· εὐπορίαν γὰρ τὰ σιτηγὰ τῆς ἀγορᾶς παρέξειν, ἅμα 
συγκαταίροντα πρὸς τὸ στρατόπεδον, καὶ φύλακα τοῦ μὴ κυκλωθῆναι τὸν 
ποταμὸν ἔχοντας, ἀπ' ἴσης ἀεὶ πρὸς ἐναντίους μαχεῖσθαι τοὺς πολεμίους.     
But, nevertheless, Cassius once more had a conference with Crassus, and advised 
him above all things to recuperate his forces in one of the garrisoned cities, until 
he should get some sure information about the enemy; but if not this, then to 
advance to Seleucia along the river. For in this way the transports would keep 
them abundantly supplied with provisions by putting in at their successive 
encampments, and, by having the river to prevent their being surrounded, they 
would always fight their enemies on even terms and face to face. 
At this council of war, Cassius and several other officers tried to convince Crassus to 
alter his plans.91 Councils of war could often be heated affairs.92 Malitz has pointed 
out that Cassius focuses on Crassus’ need to gain intelligence first before proceeding 
against the enemy;93 Roman intelligence-gathering could be quite haphazard.94 But 
Crassus had been proactive in sending out intelligence gatherers; his prodromoi had 
reported many horse tracks.95  Crassus failed to appreciate the significance of his 
intelligence, preferring to believe that his army would be too strong for the Parthians. 
More cautiously, Cassius (on behalf of the other officers) had suggested they encamp 
until actionable intelligence was available, or, if they did proceed, to follow alongside 
the Euphrates River, so as to prevent themselves from being surrounded.96 Crassus 
rejected this plan, preferring instead to seek out Suren and his army.97 Later, it is said 
that Cassius and some other officers tried to convince Crassus to call off the whole 
campaign.98    
As noted in Chapter One, some scholars have argued Plutarch must have used 
a pro-Cassius source, as this description of his foresight is highly favourable. But is it 
 
90 Sherwin-White (1984) 281.  
91 Plut. Crass. 20.2. For the other officers, cf. Crass. 18.4. 
92 See, for example, Caes. BGall. 5.38-40. Most officers, including military tribunes, would be present 
at the councils: Suolahti (1955) 50.   
93 Malitz (1984) 55-6, with n.188.  
94 Sheldon (2005) 91-3, discusses the apparent failure in Crassus’ intelligence gathering, or a failure to 
heed what had been discovered by his scouts.  
95 Plut. Crass. 20.1 with Austin and Rankov (1998) 40.  
96 Marshall (1976) 154-5.  
97 Sheldon (2005) 92. Austin and Rankov (1998) 32, speak of Roman commanders believing the 
reports they want to believe rather than the most reliable ones gathered.    
98 Marshall (1976) 154-5. 
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possible that Cassius really did urge Crassus to proceed more vigilantly against the 
Parthians? At first glance, it may appear that Cassius was a cautious critic of Crassus’ 
strategy, and repeatedly asked him to amend or abandon his plans. However, 
Plutarch’s narrative should be examined carefully. It is important to consider Cassius’ 
position as proquaestor and second in command. Cassius is likely to have been the 
mouthpiece of the senior military officers. The merits of various strategies will have 
been discussed, and it is certainly possible that at a military council heated exchanges 
occurred. Plutarch’s narrative, therefore, may not exaggerate the nature of Cassius’ 
criticisms. Thus, his repeated cross-examination of Crassus’ decision-making may be 
historical. But Plutarch could also employ Cassius as a “wise counsellor” figure (or a 
Cassandra),99 tragically ignored by Crassus, whom Plutarch characterises as a paragon 
of greed.100 Of course, if Plutarch has finessed the details to serve his own dramatic 
and moral purposes, this is potentially no more accurate than the account of an 
effusive pro-Cassius source. Plutarch may have magnified Cassius’ influence, 
foresight, and criticisms to accentuate Crassus’ foolishness and character flaws.       
Undoubtedly, Cassius appears to have repeatedly raised concerns with Crassus 
about the course of the campaign (and the decisions made). Given the nature of 
Plutarch’s Crassus, it is important to consider whether Plutarch may be magnifying 
Cassius’ role. At key moments in the campaign, for instance, Cassius appears to offer 
cautious, pragmatic counsel –counsel that Crassus invariably disregards. It may well 
be that Cassius’ cautious warnings are the embellishment of a source eager to trumpet 
his military ability –or to defend his reputation by engaging in exculpation. 
Cassius’ career demonstrates he had a first-rate military mind. As will be seen 
below, his efforts after Carrhae confirm he was well aware of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the Parthians. The advice he offers Crassus –the strategy of hugging to 
the Euphrates– is eminently sensible. On balance, then, Cassius’ counsel is likely to 
have been historical (rather than the post eventum ‘spin’ of an apologist), although 
there may well be an element of exaggeration in the frequency and forcefulness with 
which Cassius offered his military opinion. As noted in the first chapter, there is 
likely to be a degree of exculpation in the description of Cassius’ counsel, but 
Plutarch’s didactic intent could also explain this prominence.       
 
99 Rawson (1991) [1974] 424, notes Cassius “plays the role of adviser and Cassandra” in Plutarch’s 
Crassus.   
100  Scholars have noted the tragic and epic elements of Plutarch’s Lives, including in Crassus: 
Zadorojniy (1997); Braund (1993); Hartmann (2008) 431n.30, with additional bibliography therein.    
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4.7 CARRHAE 
Cassius may not have been well informed about the Parthian Empire. However, until 
recently, even classicists have often underappreciated its importance.101 Accordingly, 
some background is necessary, which hopefully will better inform the following 
narrative. For far too long, Roman historians have underestimated and misunderstood 
Parthia, an empire that endured for almost half a millennium. 102  The Parthians, 
originally from the steppes of central Asia, were predominantly a race of warrior 
horsemen, a reality confirmed increasingly by a greater appreciation of their art and 
epic poems.103 While Rome would certainly have been on the radar of the Arsacid 
royal house, it is no exaggeration to say that their primary focus always remained the 
eastern front.104 Their most successful king, Mithradates II (r. circa 121-88), even 
established cordial relations with the Han Chinese.105 However, when he extended the 
olive branch to the Romans, Sulla snubbed him and mockingly offered to make the 
Parthians a vassal state.106 Relations soured between the two powers thereafter and 
though treaties were drawn up to demarcate the boundaries of each other’s empire, 
Pompey may have reflected the common Roman attitude when he reportedly said that 
the border would be a “just one”, that is one chosen by the Romans.107        
Parthia excited the Roman imagination as a fabulously wealthy but militarily 
weak empire.108 Like the centre of a spider’s web, Parthia was situated in the middle 
of important trade routes stretching as far afield as India and China.109 It may be this 
 
101  Kim (2013) 9-13; Ball (2000) is a notable exception; cf. Sampson (2008). 
102 On the tendency to overestimate Roman power in the ancient Mediterranean at the expense of the 
East, see Ball (2000) 12-13, on Parthia specifically. On the Parthian empire, see generally Kim (2013) 
9-14; Dąbrowa (2012) 164-86; Ellerbrock and Winklemann (2012) 46-76, for history; to a degree, the 
appearance of Sampson (2008) has improved our knowledge of  Parthia. So, too, Sheldon (2010), and 
Butcher (2003) 33-5. Cf. Curtis and Stewart (2007).  
103 Sampson (2008) 32; Ball (2000) 12-13; Bivar (2007); Invernizzi (2007) 163-77.    
104 Ball (2000) 13; Kim (2013) 9-14. On Rome’s awareness of Parthia, see Sampson (2008) 84.   
105 Sampson (2008) 32; Ball (2000) 13. 
106 Plut. Sull. 5.4-6; Liv. Per. 70; Vell. Pat. 2.24.3; Flor. 3.12; Fest. Brev. 15.2, is erroneous. For 
modern discussion, see Ball (2000) 13.  
107Treaties: Keaveney (1981) 195-212, (1982) 412-28, in which he suggests Parthia only became 
aggressive towards Rome after the Romans reacted aggressively to Crassus’ defeat. Boundary: Plut. 
Pomp. 33.6 with Edwell (2013); Debevoise (1968) 74; Sampson (2008) 89. Whether he made a 
genuine treaty with Phraates III in 67 is debatable: Liv. Per. 100; Cass. Dio 36.45.2-5; Just. 32.4.6; 
Oros. 6.13.2. Even if he had done so, there was nothing to stop him reneging on his agreement, which 
he seems to have done in 65: Plut. Pomp. 33.6; Cass. Dio 37.5.2-6.3; Oros. 6.4.9. 
108 Fabled wealth: Rice-Holmes (1923) 3.320; esp. Sanford (1939) 84; Dalby (2000) 188-9. For sources 
of Parthian revenue, see Raschke, ANRW 824 with n.747. Plin. HN 13.18, 34.145, gives some 
indication of the wealth of resources the Parthians possessed. Weakness stereotype: Kuhrt (1998) 529.   
109 Charlesworth (1924) 36, 58. Parthia controlled the overland trade routes between central Asia and 
the Mediterranean. It has already been noted that Mithradates II established cordial relations with the 
Han Chinese. Carrhae itself was on one such caravan trading route. See especially Traina (2010b) 209.  
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fact that reveals the sentiment behind Plutarch’s claim that Crassus envisaged 
conquering Bactria, India, and beyond.110 Whatever Crassus’ true ambitions, Rome 
appears to have underestimated Parthia’s military strength. 
In fairness, as the Romans progressed to Syria, Parthia was in the grips of 
dynastic power struggle. The Romans were certainly aware of this turmoil, and 
perhaps had even fanned it further.111 Mithradates III, who had been supplanted as 
king by his younger brother Orodes II, had fled in 55 to the Roman proconsul then in 
Judaea, A. Gabinius.112 He asked the governor to assist in his restoration.113  Initially, 
Gabinius –who had previously made a brief incursion into Parthia in 65114– pledged to 
aid the deposed monarch, perhaps on the instructions of the dynasts, who naturally 
viewed a weak and divided Parthia as in their interests. Mithradates could thus be 
used as a stalking horse.115 But it is possible too that Gabinius acted in his own 
interest and simply viewed Mithradates’ ousting as a chance to win glory.116  
However, even though Gabinius had initially marched his army to the 
Euphrates with a view to restoring the king, at the very last moment he switched his 
attention to Egypt, which had also just overthrown its unpopular king, Ptolemy XII 
Auletes (father of Cleopatra).117  Undeterred by the loss of Gabinius, Mithradates 
pressed on with the campaign to repatriate and reinstate himself, mustering all the 
forces he could gather. To begin with, he made successful inroads, capturing Babylon 
and Seleucia in 55.118 Towards the end of 54, however, the Suren, arguably one of the 
greatest generals of his age and the most powerful satrap of Parthia (as well as the 
 
110 Plut. Crass. 16.2, further states that Crassus wished to make the campaigns of Pompey and Lucullus 
look like “child’s play” (παιδιὰν ἀποφανῶν). The parallel to Alexander’s deeds cannot be dismissed 
either: Pelling (1988) 220, 223. Cf. Ant. 37.4. Since the Parthian Empire encompassed much of this 
territory it is not much of an exaggeration at any rate.  
111 Cass. Dio 39.56.2. Phraates III had been murdered by his two sons, who then fought for his crown. 
See Debevoise (1968) 75-6; Sherwin-White (1984) 147.      
112 Just. 43.4.1 with Debevoise (1968) 75-6 with n.23. 
113 Cass. Dio 39.56.2-3.  
114 Cass. Dio 37.5.2; Debevoise (1968) 73-4.  
115 Sampson (2008) 95: “It is tempting to speculate that Mithridates was sent back into Parthia to 
rekindle civil war and thus destabilise the Parthian Empire...prior to the arrival of Roman forces.” 
116 Debevoise (1968) 76-7 and Keaveney (1982) 417, suggests Parthia was part of Gabinius’ provinical 
allotment.   
117 Cicero accused Gabinius of receiving a bribe of 10,000 talents from the Egyptian king to effect his 
restoration: Rab. Post. 21. Cf. Plut. Ant. 3.2, Pomp. 49.5; App. Syr. 51; Cass. Dio 37.12.1-3. See 
further, Siani-Davies (1997) 318-22; Shatzman (1971) 364-5; Williams (1985) 31. Some scholars 
conclude that Egypt was simply the easier and richer conquest: Debevois (1968) 77. Williams (1985) 
32, believes that the new consort of Egypt, Archelaus, truly forced Gabinius’ hand, as his Egyptian 
fleet posed a serious threat to the grain supply of Rome. As Tatum (1999) 195, observes, Ptolemy 
“owed such huge sums of money to Pompey and to Roman capitalists like Rabirius Postumus that his 
return to power...clearly constituted an economic incentive of the highest magnitude.”     
118 Debevoise (1968) 77; Bivar (1983) 49.   
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probable inspiration for the Persian epic hero Rustam), besieged the fortified 
Seleucia. 119  Eventually, Mithradates capitulated. 120  Obviously, these developments 
loom too large to be ignored when considering Crassus’ campaign; in fact, the gap 
between Mithradates’ defeat in Seleucia and the Battle of Carrhae may only have 
been a matter of weeks.121 No matter whether he had been an ally of the Romans or 
not, Mithradates allowed Crassus to invade Mesopotamia in 54 and capture its key 
cities almost unopposed.122  It was clearly an opportune time to invade Parthia.  
The initial engagements with the Parthians went to plan. Cassius (and the 
Romans’) first military encounter was against a Parthian satrap named Silaces, whom 
they fought near Ichnae.123 The Romans routed their relatively small opposition and 
Silaces himself was wounded in the engagement. 124  There followed another 
successful campaign against a tyrant named Apollonius, which may have lulled the 
Romans into a false sense of security.125 But so far the campaign was proceeding 
exactly as the Romans would have expected.126 Unfortunately, there is no record of 
Cassius’ performance in these encounters. All that might be inferred is that his 
conduct was satisfactory but not exceptional.  
 Crassus had not proceeded immediately against the Parthians after his inital 
successes, but retired back across the Euphrates. He was waiting for his son to arrive 
from Gaul with a squadron of cavalry. He also used the time to plunder the Great 
Temple of Jerusalem.127 Officially it was Cassius’ job to record the amount of booty 
Crassus seized, and there seems no reason to doubt he did so. If so, it needs to be 
asked what effect this role had on Cassius, especially as he was accused later in his 
career of provincial rapacity.128 He would not be the first Roman to be corrupted by 
the wealth of the East, and his later career certainly would indicate that he was not 
 
119 On the Suren as the inspiration for Rustam, see Shahbazi (1993) 155-63; Bivar (2007) 26-36; Ball 
(2000) 13. See also below.   
120 Just. 42.4.1, notes Mithridates was summarily executed.   
121 Le Rider (1965) 404, apud Bivar (1983) 3.1: 48.  
122 Sampson (2008) 101-2.  
123 Cass. Dio 40.12.2. Marshall (1976) 151.  
124 Cass. Dio. 40.12.2.  
125 Plut. Crass. 17.2-4. Appian thought Crassus took the Parthians too lightly: B Civ. 2.18. See further 
Sampson (2008) 88. 
126 Cic. Leg. Man. 23; Plut. Luc. 29.3-5; Butcher (2003) 36; Sampson (2008) 88. 
127 Joseph. BJ. 1.179, Ant. 14.105-9. For commentary, see Barclay (2011) 214. 
128  [Aur. Vict.] De vir. ill. 83. Greed was common enough among Cassius’ peers: Cic. Font. 3. A 
proquaestor named Oppius was dismissed from office because of usury: Sall. Hist. 3.41-2; Quint. Inst. 
5.10.690; Cass. Dio 36.40.3.   
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squeamish about exacting payments.129 As quaestor he certainly had the means and 
the machinery to engage in such activities –and later reports certainly accuse him of 
so doing.130 Crassus, of course, seized the temple money to help fund his campaign. 
Yet money alone would not be sufficient.     
 Crassus has often been accused of military incompetence. As has been seen, 
Cassius repeatedly urged Crassus to adopt a more cautious military strategy. But some 
credit must also be given to the nameless Parthian general who defeated the Romans 
in battle, known to historians as the Suren, satrap of Seistan.131 This man belonged to 
one of the most outstanding families of the Parthian Empire, a family that had been 
recently instrumental in installing Orodes II and eradicating his rival claimant, 
Mithradates III.  It is clear that the Suren was the most powerful Parthian after the 
king.132 Though Orodes owed his crown to the Suren in more ways than one, the 
latter’s success at Carrhae –which the king may not have expected; the Suren and his 
cavalry of 10,000 may well have been intended as canon-fodder133– compelled a 
vulnerable Orodes to have Suren murdered.134 Plutarch offers an effusive assessment 
of Suren, which certainly contains exaggerations and probably embellishments, but 
that nevertheless may capture the general qualities of the elusive man.135  This is not 
to say that Crassus did not make mistakes, and Cassius and other members of the 
dynast’s entourage had repeatedly counselled him to alter or even abandon his 
plans.136 But the Parthians were under the command of a talented general and in 
familiar terrain.     
Carrhae is located in south-eastern Turkey. In the first century, it appears to 
have been an important trading centre of northern Mesopotamia, which linked two 
important caravan roads.137 Before it came under Parthian control in the 120s, Carrhae 
 
129 Cic. Verr. 2.1.41, 2.1.95-102, 3.177-78, on Verres’ extortionate behaviour as proquaestor. 
130 Cass. Dio 36.41.1, notes some senators refused provincial assignments because of the systemic 
corruption associated with the job.  
131 Ball (2000) 13. Seistan was located in an area of modern-day eastern Iran.     
132 Plut. Crass. 21.5-6; Mattern-Parkes (2003) 387. The Suren was so powerful that Tarn (1938) 344-5, 
was led to speculate that perhaps Parthia was ruled jointly by both the Arsacid and Suren families.  
133 Sampson (2008) 105.  
134  The Suren had presided at Orodes’ coronation: Plut. Crass. 21.7; Sampson (2008) 104. As 
mentioned, he also defeated Mithridates III at Seleucia. His murder on Orodes’ order: Plut. Crass. 33.5; 
Debevoise (1968) 92.   
135 Exaggeration: that the Suren was the first over the wall at Seleucia is a favourite trope of the 
Chaeronean (Plut. Crass. 21.6-7). Cf. Plut. Ant. 3.1, Ti. Gracch. 4.5 with Pelling (1988) 120-1. As the 
Suren was the leader of the cataphracts, it is unlikely that he would be responsible for mounting and 
climbing the walls at Seleucia.  
136 Sheldon (2005) 86-8, on his woeful intelligence gathering.  
137 On the Battle of Carrhae, see Traina (2010a). 
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had been in the hands of the Seleucids. 138  The battlefield itself has aptly been 
described as cavalry country, which obviously put Crassus at an immediate 
disadvantage.139 He commanded a thousand horsemen, whereas Suren’s entire army 
(around 10,000) comprised cavalry.140 Even though Crassus had some experience as a 
cavalry officer (he had played a crucial role at the battle of the Colline Gate) he was 
unprepared for mobile, steppe-style warfare.141 As the Roman infantry, who fought in 
the oppressive heat of June, were most effective in close combat, fighting mobile 
cavalry rendered them ineffective.142 
Crassus also seems to have underestimated Parthian weaponry, especially the 
compound bow, which fired arrows that could penetrate Roman armour.143 Worse, 
combating the Parthian horse-archers was particularly difficult for two reasons. First, 
the heavily chain-mailed cataphracts managed to box in the Roman infantry and 
cavalry.144 Second, the Suren had ingeniously established a camel train that furnished 
the horse-archers with replacement arrows, meaning they could pepper the Romans 
continuously without fear of exhausting their supplies.145 Failure to counteract the 
Suren’s cataphracts prevented the Romans from neutralising the threat of the horse-
archers, who exploited the close formation of the infantry from a safe distance, 
unleashing a hail of arrows, often while retreating (performing the so-called ‘Parthian 
Shot’, whereby they would shoot backwards).146  All of this helps to explain the 
Roman loss at Carrhae.       
Realising the superiority of the Parthian strategy (and having witnessed the 
death of his son), Crassus descended into utter despair: ἀπηγορεύκει παντάπασιν.147 
It is at this point that Cassius took charge of the Roman forces. Both Cassius and 
Octavius (a legate) tried in vain to rouse Crassus from this psychological nadir. 
Failing to do so, they called together the centurions and captains on their own 
 
138 Traina (2010b) 209. Plin. HN 5.86, notes that Carrhae is only famous because of Crassus’ defeat.    
139 Cavalry country: Ball (2000) 14.   
140 The Suren’s cavalry numbered some 10,000: Plut. Crass. 21.6; Ball (2000) 6. On the Parthian army 
generally, see Ellerbrock and Winklemann (2012) 185-94 (p. 188 on the cataphracts).   
141  Bivar (1983) 3.50, 52. Crassus’ performance on the right wing at the Colline Gate had been 
decisive: Gruen (1974) 69; Sampson (2008).     
142 Bivar (1983) 3.52. 
143 Bivar (1983) 52; Cf. Fields (2010) 118-19; Colledge (1967) 40; Marshall (1976) 158.  
144 Sherwin-White (1984) 289; Mattern-Parkes (2003) 387; Fields (2010) 118.  
145 Camel train: Bivar (1983) 3.52. Tarn (1966) 160-1, even speculates that the camels employed were  
one-humped Arabian camels, which are faster than their Bactrian counterparts. Trajan later used 
Arabian camels:  Roth (1999) 207. Arrows: Wheeler (2011) 260.   
146 Marshall (1976) 158. On the ‘Parthian Shot’, see Rostovtzeff (1943) 174-87.  
147 Plut. Crass. 27.5.   
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authority, and, after holding a military council, voted to begin a retreat in silence 
(without the customary trumpet call). As Crassus was, in effect, unfit for command, 
Cassius probably became the acting general as the next most senior officer. Though 
the withdrawal was confused148 (and 4,000 wounded soldiers were left to the enemy), 
the Roman army managed to make it back to the fortress during the night, aided by 
the garrison commander, Coponius. It was an escape, but the damage had already 
been done. Cassius and Crassus appear to have negotiated with Parthian envoys the 
next day. The talks were probably designed to stall for time. Under the cover of night, 
Crassus and his army began the tough march back to Roman territory. Cassius, 
however, did not trust one of Crassus’ guides, and instead appears to have left his 
commander and returned with 500 men to the fortress at Carrhae.  
 
                                                      4.8 DESERTION 
There are some who suggest Cassius deserted Crassus after Carrhae. Is there any truth 
to this accusation?149 Plutarch, who does not accuse Cassius of desertion explicitly, 
supplies the most detailed ancient evidence: 
 
ἀλλὰ Κάσσιος μὲν ἐπανῆλθεν εἰς Κάρρας πάλιν, καὶ τῶν ὁδηγῶν (Ἄραβες δ' 
ἦσαν) ἀναμεῖναι κελευόντων, ἄχρι ἂν ἡ σελήνη παραλλάξῃ τὸν σκορπίον, 
“ἀλλ' ἔγωγε” εἰπών “μᾶλλον φοβοῦμαι τὸν τοξότην”, ἀπήλαυνεν εἰς 
Συρίαν μεθ' ἱππέων πεντακοσίων· 
Cassius indeed, went back again to Carrhae, and when his guides, who were 
Arabs, urged him to wait there until the moon had passed the Scorpion, he said 
“Personally, I fear the Archer even more than the Scorpion,” and rode off into 
Syria with five hundred horsemen.150 
The key question here is whether or not Cassius had received permission to return to 
Carrhae.151 Upon initial inspection, such a scenario may seem unlikely. What possible 
reason would Crassus have for sending away his quaestor and five hundred vital 
 
148 Four cohorts got lost during the night and were surrounded and killed (bar 20 valiant soldiers) the 
next morning  by the Suren’s forces.   
149 Marshall (1976) 177, with n.13: “The account of Cassius is very favourable in view of the fact that 
he deserted in the end”; cf. Fröhlich, “Cassius” [59] RE (1899) 3.1727: “C. dagegen schöpfte Argwohn,  
kehrte nach Carrae zurück und entkam auf einem andern Wege nach Syrien.” Smith (1916) 261: “The 
quaestor Cassius Longinus fled with 500 cavalry and, focused only on his own safety, hurried by the 
shortest route to Syria.” Sampson (2008) 147: “Of the two officers who are known to have survived, 
both could be, and indeed were, accused of desertion...Whilst Cassius betrayed Crassus and reached 
Syria safely, Octavius died fighting to defend his general.”  Tatum (1999) 49, argues Clodius’ potential 
desertion from Lucullus’ army (Cass. Dio 36.17.2) was “irrelevant”, but this was in the context of a 
change in command.     
150 Plut. Crass. 29.4.  
151 Ferrero (1908) 2.119, argued, a priori, that Cassius had received Crassus’ permission.    
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cavalry? But explanations are possible. Perhaps by splitting his army and escaping in 
separate directions Crassus hoped to confuse or lose the Parthians, or at least divert 
and divide their forces. It was not exceptional for a commander to disband or divide 
his troops when trying to extricate himself from a setback.152 Another of Crassus’ 
officers, Octavius, also detached himself from the main army, heading for the higher 
ground of Sinnaca with five thousand men.153 Plutarch attributes these separations to 
their distrust of Crassus’ guide, Andromachus, noting simply that those who did not 
trust the guide οὐκ ἠκολούθησαν.154 
There is no indication that Cassius abandoned or deserted Crassus, which is in 
itself significant as Plutarch unequivocally condemns Egnatius in a similar situation in 
the immediate aftermath of Carrhae: καὶ διέσωσε μὲν τοὺς σὺν αὑτῷ, κακῶς δ' ἤκουσε 
καταλιπὼν τὸν στρατηγόν.155 That he made no attempt to reunite with Crassus –unlike 
Octavius– may indicate that he truly did desert his commander. Indeed, one scholar 
maintains that Cassius’ cowardice and desertion is contrasted with Octavius, who 
rushed to defend the life of his commander, perishing in the process.156 But if Plutarch 
implies criticism of Cassius by contrasting him to Octavius this is subtle indeed 
(returning to Carrhae was very dangerous also).157  
Cassius certainly had cause to desert. Apart from distrusting Andromachus, he 
also had reason to fear the Parthians. Plutarch reports that they were baying for 
Cassius’ blood, and had asked the remaining soldiers to hand him over in chains.158 
Now this could be an example of Plutarchan magnification, but if true Cassius may 
have chosen desertion over an ignominious death. He had already witnessed the 
Parthians mockingly parade Publius Crassus’ severed head on a pike before the 
troops. It seems this gory episode was to have a lasting impact on Cassius, who ever 
after had about his person a slave (later manumitted) called Pindarus to ensure that the 
 
152 Front. Str. 2.13.3-4; cf. Plut. Pomp. 19.4. Frontinus notes that dividing and scattering one’s force in 
a retreat was not an exceptional practice, although reassembling was expected.  
153 Plut. Crass. 29.5-6.   
154 Plut. Crass. 29.4. For discussion, see Tyrrell and Purser (1933) 6.xcii; Debevoise (1968) 90. None 
of these scholars indicate that they believe Cassius deserted.  
155 Plut. Crass. 27.7. Egnatius’ name and reputation was forever diminished. Yet Plutarch does not 
mention that this was the case with Cassius. Nevertheless, it has been repeatedly observed that Cassius 
comes off rather favourably in Plutarch’s Crassus, potentially as a result of special pleading on the part 
of a contemporary who wished to laud his career. On this matter, see Chapter 1, Section 5.  
156 Sampson (2008) 147-8. 
157 As mentioned earlier, whilst Plutarch notes Egnatius got a bad reputation for abandoning Crassus in 
battle, Plutarch is silent on Cassius. Of course, this may reflect the pro-Cassius source Plutarch seems 
to be using rather than the reality.  
158 Plut. Crass. 29.1; cf. Crass. 28.3, on Parthian awareness of Cassius.  
 
 
119 
enemy never captured him alive.159 However, distrust of the Romans’ guides, and fear 
of Parthian bloodthirstiness, are not the only factors that may have induced Cassius to 
desert. Crassus’ mental state appears to have deteriorated after his son’s death, and the 
subsequent heavy losses sustained in battle. The dynast appears to have suffered what 
in modern parlance would be described as a breakdown. With morale dwindling and 
the Roman retreat in a state of confusion, discipline too diminished. The command 
chain seemed to be in tatters, as Egnatius’ example attests. There is no doubt that 
capture by the enemy would have led to an insurmountable disgrace, a frightening 
scenario that may have forced Cassius to swallow the bitter pill of desertion.  
In the end, even if Cassius did desert, he had only deserted as far as Syria, 
where he shored up the Roman position and rebuffed Parthian retaliatory aggression. 
These deeds –and even extracting the Roman forces under his command from Parthia 
was no mean feat– garnered great praise.160 If he had not won and ended the war 
against the Parthians, as he is said to have claimed in a letter to the senate,161 he 
nevertheless stopped the bleeding, restored some Roman pride and ensured that the 
Parthians would not reclaim Roman Syria. Ultimately, Cassius’ actions were likely 
highly improvised at a time of great chaos.     
 
4.9 RETREAT TO SYRIA 
After initially setting out with Crassus, Cassius returned with a small force to the 
redoubt at Carrhae. For those under his command it must have felt like returning to 
the lion’s den. But it is understandable if he feared Crassus’ guides were perfidiously 
leading the army astray.162 Nevertheless, depending on the time constraints, returning 
to the fort involved considerable risks. How he managed to return is unknown, as is 
how he managed to extricate his forces from Parthia. Why he returned is just as 
confusing but the safety of the fort may have been preferable to the exposed plains 
along which Crassus was plodding. Moreover, the Parthians were notorious for their 
inability to mount sieges, for which the Suren’s forces may not have had the 
necessary equipment –their outfit was mobile and entirely of cavalry, which makes it 
unlikely that they had vast siege engines in tow. Psychological comfort the fort walls 
may have offered, but Cassius was under no illusions about relief. Unless Crassus 
 
159 Pindarus performed his grim duty at Philippi: Plut Brut. 43.7.  
160 Plut. Brut. 7.3. 
161 Cic. Att. 5.21.2, 6.1.14. 
162 Plut. Crass. 29.4, on Cassius’ distrust of the guide Andromachus.   
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pulled off an improbable victory, no Roman force could effect a junction with him, 
and his cavalry unit would not be able to hold out indefinitely.    
Unwilling to risk being stranded deep in enemy territory, Cassius decided 
(presumably after the Parthians had set off in pursuit of Crassus) to open the fort gates 
and to ride out, almost certainly for the cover of the hills where the Parthian cavalry 
would find it difficult to pursue. His guides, a group of Nabataean Arabs163 who may 
have been supplied by the friendly King Maliku (Malichus) I of Nabataea (r. 54?-30), 
advised against riding forth too hastily, as the moon had not yet passed the 
constellation Scorpion. Their advice, if authentic, would be well in line with their 
cultural and religious beliefs, which centred around the zodiac.164 Ill at ease already, 
Cassius chose not to heed his guides’ counsel and is reported to have responded, 
decisively and (one might add) wittily, “Personally I am more frightened of the 
Archer than the Scorpion.”165 This curt reply not only dismissed what for Cassius 
would be the superstitious astrology of the Nabataen Arabs, but also indicated that he 
did not want to delay until the Archer (a pun on both Sagittarius and the Suren’s horse 
archers) arrived. There was to be no delay of his retreat into Syria.166 A flight it will 
have been, but the route of the decamping is unknown and certainly not worth  
speculating on.167 As C. Pelling has observed, however, credit is due to Cassius for 
shepherding his remaining forces back to safety –the only Roman officer to do so bar 
Egnatius, who fled immediately after the fateful battle. 168  Steering clear of the 
Parthian cavalry would not have been easy, as they were faster and more familiar with 
 
163 On the Nabatean Arabs, see Plut. Crass. 29.4. For a modern discussion, see generally Retsö (2003). 
164 On Pompey’s history with the Nabataeans, see Bellemore (2000) 91-123. On the Nabataean Arabs 
generally, see Retsö (2003) 364-91. Ball (2000) 62, notes that since the time of Gabinius Nabatea 
appears to have been a client kingdom of Rome, though no ancient information states this explicitly. 
Pompey had brought some Nabataeans under the thumb of Rome during the wars against Mithridates 
VI of Pontus. 
165 Plut. Crass. 29.4. The verbal cleverness of Cassius’ response –the pun on Archer (=Sagittarius, 
which follows Scorpio)– may explain why it was remembered and celebrated. Cf. Plut. Brut. 11, for a 
pun of Ligarius. Cassius is known to have made several other mordant, witty, and incisive remarks in  
the course of his career. Plutarch notes he was inclined to ironic and sarcastic remarks (Plut. Brut. 
29.2). And Quintilian indicates that he liked to make puns in other situations. His humour could also 
get him into trouble, as Seneca shows (Suas. 1.5.5). See further comments in the Conclusion. 
166 Joseph. AJ 14.119, BJ 1.180. Sampson (2008) 147: “Of the two officers who are known to have 
survived, both could be, and indeed were, accused of desertion...Whilst Cassius betrayed Crassus and 
reached Syria safely, Octavius died fighting to defend his general.”   
167 Bivar (1983) 3.55, notes only that Cassius escaped by a different route into Syria.  
168 Pelling (2011) 462, describes Cassius’ achievement as an “enterprising getaway”.  
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the territory; Cassius thus engineered an impressive escape.169 During the retreat, he 
collected anyone who had managed to escape from Crassus’ forces.170  
 
4.10 ACTING GOVERNOR 
Crassus was killed during confusion at a parley with the Suren, probably on 12 
June.171  Reports of his demise would not have taken long to reach Cassius, nor 
perhaps the wild (and likely false) rumours that Crassus and his soldiers had been left 
unburied, without the funerary rites customarily afforded fallen Romans. 172  The 
burden of supreme command of Roman Syria now fell unenviably to Cassius, who as 
noted had once refused the position when Crassus (completely at his wits’ end) 
offered to step aside.173 As Crassus was now dead, Cassius had no choice but to 
assume command. Not quite 33, by default he became the acting governor of Roman 
Syria, or (strictly speaking) “proquaestor pro praetore”, a position probably 
formalised by a decree of the Senate at a later date.174 In normal circumstances, he 
would have been attended by five or six lictors, carrying the fasces, but Plutarch’s 
Crassus implies that the Suren had captured these symbols of Roman imperium, and it 
is unclear whether they were replaced.175 Thrust into a leadership role, Cassius’ first 
priority was to stem the damage done by the defeat at Carrhae.   
Once he had reached friendly territory with the remnants of Crassus’ army, his 
first task was to review the state of the troops. Around twenty thousand men had 
 
169 Pace Sampson (2008) 147, who argues that Cassius “put his own life first” and got to safety by 
stabbing Crassus in the back.  
170 Vell. Pat. 2.46.4; Joseph. BJ 1.180, AJ 14.119; Plut. Brut. 43.7-8, Crass. 29.4; App. B Civ. 4.59; 
Cass. Dio 40.28.2-4; Fest. Brev. 17.4; [Aur. Vict.] De vir. ill. 83.1; Eutrop. 6.18.2; Oros. 6.13.5.      
171 Caes. BGall. 3.31.3; Liv. Per. 106; Vell. Pat. 2.46.4; Str. 16.747; Plut. Pomp. 53.8-10, Crass. 29-
33.4; Flor. 1.46.9-10; Cass. Dio 40.26.1-37.4. 
172 Just. 41.3.5; Traina (2010b) 210-11. The Parthians adhered to Zoroastrian funerary prescriptions, 
which included burial of the dead. On the importance of a proper burial, see Flower (1996) 146n.77. 
173  Cass. Dio 40.28.2. It should be noted that this anecdote may have been inserted by a source 
favourable to Cassius who wished to canvass his procedural punctiliousness: Cassius operated within 
the bounds of the Republican constitution. The troops were displeased with the dynast: Plut. Crass. 27.  
174 Acting governor: Broughton, MRR 2.242; Balsdon (1962) 134; Marshall (1976) 87n.36; Jashemski 
(1950) 156. Senate: cf. the case of Cn. Calpurnius Piso in Spain: Broughton, MRR 2.159, with 
references. M. Aemilius Scaurus was also pro praetore in Syria in Pompey’s absence: ILS 8775 with 
Balsdon (1962) 134.  The position of quaestor (or proquaestor) pro praetor was not uncommon: e.g., 
Q. Pompeius Bithinicus, quaestor pro praetor: Ballesteros (2009) 127-33. See too the case of Cato, pro 
quaestor pro praetore in Cyprus: Badian (1965) 110-25. But these examples are evidence of 
subordinates filling in when senior promagistrates were not available, rather than having perished on 
the battlefield. However, see Brennan (2000) 2.587; Plut. Crass. 32.2. On lictors, see Mommsen, 
(1887) I. 355-6, 373-93; Kübler, RE s.v. “Lictor” 1926: XIII 507-18. 
175 Plut. Crass. 32.2. On lictors, see Mommsen (1887) I. 355-6, 373-93; Kübler, RE s.v. “Lictor” 1926: 
XIII 507-18. He would normally be attended by five or six lictors, carrying the fasces, but Plutarch’s 
Crassus implies that the Suren had captured (at least some of) these symbols of Roman imperium, and 
it is unclear whether they were replaced: Plut. Crass. 32.2.   
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perished in battle, and ten thousand men had been captured. This left a force smaller 
than two legions at Cassius’ disposal (c. 10,000 soldiers).176 With the prospect of 
Parthian retaliation against a vulnerable Roman Syria –land that the Arsacid dynasty 
had long coveted– Cassius would struggle to defend the province. It has to be 
imagined that he appealed for additional troops to commanders nearby (Cicero and 
Deiotarus) and to the senate. But he would have been well aware that it would take 
time to raise new men, and Cicero was later to grumble that he did not have sufficient 
troops of his own –the consul Sulpicius vetoed his proposal to raise fresh troops.177  
The geopolitical situation was grave. Most of the territories in the Roman East 
were client kingdoms, tied to Rome through obligations and treaties, which had been 
honoured mainly through fear of Roman military superiority. As a result of Carrhae, 
Cassius had to presume that many states might reconsider their affiliations.  Armenia, 
to take the most important example, wasted little time before switching its allegiance 
to Orodes II.178 So too the minor kingdom of Osroene. Commagene remained neutral, 
though their king leaned towards the Parthians. The new, young king of Cappadocia 
had only a fragile grip on power, so little help could be expected from him. Cassius 
would certainly not draw upon assistance from Judaea, a province which had 
repeatedly revolted against Roman rule. He may even have suspected that news of 
Carrhae would spark off a conflagration of uprisings in the deeply divided 
kingdom.179 Worst of all, inside Syria itself (which had been a Roman province for 
little more than a decade) Cassius no doubt feared imminent unrest.  
Cassius probably also anticipated a full-scale Parthian invasion of Roman 
Syria quick on the heels of Carrhae. However, he was to receive an unexpected 
reprieve. King Orodes engaged in no immediate retaliation. The king’s inaction has 
often been described as a missed opportunity, but there were good reasons for not 
 
176 Marshall (1976) 144. Meyer (1919) 171, suggests that Crassus had left one legion behind in Syria 
before marching into Mesopotamia. 
177 Cic. Fam. 3.3.1: appeal for help. Rome itself was plagued with domestic problems –elections and 
gang violence– which prevented it addressing this disastrous setback. If the senate did not fail to 
appreciate the situation, they certainly failed to address it. Other problems such as setbacks for Caesar 
in Gaul may have overshadowed Crassus’ defeat. The late 50s was a notorious period of political 
instability at Rome.      
178 Plut. Crass. 21.5, 22.2-3, 33.1-2. Under the leadership of Tigranes, Armenia had defeated Parthia 
after the death of Mithradates II and absorbed territory in Mesopotamia: Str. 11.532b, 16.745c; App. 
Syr. 48, 69, Mith. 106; Just. 40.1.1-4; Eutr. 6.14.2. However, it subsequently lost territory to Rome and 
Parthia: Str. 10.532; App. Syr. 70; Just. 40.1.4. Traditionally, Armenia had served as a buffer state 
between Rome and Parthia: Charlesworth (1924) 37; Sherwin-White (1984) 337. Cf. Luttwak (1976) 
24. Armenia’s loyalty had always been questionable: Debevoise (1968) 80; Marshall (1976) 153; 
Sullivan (1990) 288-9; Sampson (2008) 101.    
179 Joseph. BJ. 1.180.  
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launching a counter-offensive into Roman Syria. The nature of the Suren’s victory 
had taken many by surprise, even Orodes. Suddenly, the hero of Carrhae –a man who 
had played a key role in the defeat of Mithradates III– was a potential rival to the 
king’s throne. The Suren had to be removed.180 Though the ramifications of this 
action are not recorded, it has to be presumed that Orodes’ removal of the second 
most powerful satrap of the Parthian Empire sparked internal strife. And, as Dio 
notes, Orodes also had to devote time to reconquering the territory Crassus had 
captured in 54. 181  Moreover, he also sought to realign the allegiance of King 
Artavasdes of Armenia, formerly an ally of Rome. For these reasons, then, Orodes did 
not mount an immediate invasion into Syria.182 Nonetheless, as far as Cassius would 
have been concerned, the Roman East was dangerously exposed to the Parthians. 
 Cassius escaped from Parthia into Syria.183 The route he took is not mentioned 
by the ancient sources, although they do note it was different to the paths of Crassus 
and Octavius.184 Once Cassius reached Syria, it is likely that he headed for Antioch, 
the provincial capital.185 Syria was a potentially rebellious province, but despite some 
restiveness, Cassius managed to keep it in check.186 None of the sources indicate that 
Cassius had much trouble with the provincials on his return to Syria, although this 
would not be the case in Judaea. Orosius, a late source, credits Cassius’ success in 
quelling Syria to his moderatio.187 This tradition may derive from Livy, or the pro-
Cassius source perhaps used by Plutarch.  Whatever the truth may be, Cassius needed 
to act with extreme care, as a quiescent Syria would be essential if he was to mount a 
successful defence of the province.   
Cassius certainly got the cogs of provincial administration spinning again on 
his return to Syria. He continued to strike silver tetradrachms, the principal silver 
currency of Syria (certainly in the north of the province),188 as Aulus Gabinius and 
 
180 Plut. Crass. 33.5, details Orodes’ fear and jealousy of the Suren, and mentions that the king had him 
put to death.   
181 Cass. Dio 40.28.1: “The Parthians at this time did not advance beyond the Euphrates, but won back 
the whole country east of it.”  
182 Sampson (2008) 148-68, speaks of Orodes’ “ineptitude”, but this is not quite fair. Orodes had also 
invaded Armenia, to cleave King Artavasdes away from his Roman alliance: Bivar (1983) 3:1, 55. It is 
also possible the Parthians were not interested in expanding their territory westwards.          
183 Joseph. BJ. 1.180. 
184 Plut. Crass. 29.4; Bivar (1983) 3:1, 55.  
185 Cic. Att. 5.18: capital; Sherwin-White (1984) 290: Antioch.   
186 Vell. Pat. 2.46.4; Joseph. BJ. 1.180; Oros. 6.13.5, esp. on Syria’s restiveness.   
187 Oros. 6.13.5. 
188 Butcher (2003) 214-15, notes other coin types were equally prominent in the south.   
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Crassus had done in the years immediately beforehand.189 He is most likely to have 
overseen this coin production at Antioch, although other mints are possible –for 
instance, Damascus. 190  The coins he issued, which conform to the Antiochene 
tetradrachm revived by Gabinius in 57/56, depict Philip Philadelphus (r. 95-83), 
whom the Romans viewed as the last legitimate Seleucid king.191 This design was 
perhaps adopted because of its acceptability to the recently conquered populace.192 
Pressed for time, Cassius simply replaced Crassus’ monogram with his own. 193 
(Cassius would also have been chiefly responsible for issuing all coins on behalf of 
Crassus as quaestor.) The coins he oversaw for Crassus and himself are extant:194  
 
  Figure 3                               Figure 4 
As R. Bellinger noted long ago, in Fig. 3, which Cassius seems to have overseen as 
proquaestor, Crassus’ initials are printed on the obverse, and Cassius appears to have 
left his own unique signature –ΚΑΣ, perhaps– in the exergue.195 In Fig. 4, which 
Cassius issued as acting governor, the ligature in Greek, which combines the letters Γ 
and Κ, clearly signify Cassius’ praenomen and nomen. Given the similarity of these 
types to the coin minted by Gabinius, it is improbable that Cassius had to devote 
much time to the design and monograms. Still, after Carrhae it served an important 
function to remind the recently pacified Syrians that Cassius, as the head of Roman 
government, was in charge and that provincial rule would continue unchanged despite 
the disastrous military setback.  As acting governor, Cassius would have been largely 
 
189 Bruun (1999) 29.  
190 Bellinger (1952) 53-63, notes the mint may not have been at Antioch (p. 55). The issue of Cassius is 
part of a planned currency for Syria which lasted for nine years (57-48). 
191 Crawford (1985) 203 with n.14. No unified currency: Lintott (1993) 48. Gabinius had been Roman 
governor in Syria since 57: Bivar (1983) 3:1, 48. 
192 Butcher (2003) 215: “A political statement could also be construed: Philip, who ruled before the 
invasion of Tigranes, was the last Seleucid king whom the Romans viewed as legitimate.”  
193 See n.191 above. Cassius may simply have ordered this change, rather than been ‘hands-on’ in the 
modification.    
194 Photo: Bellinger (1944) Plt. VII, no. 5 (obverse).   
195 Bellinger (1944) 61. See below for the coins Cassius minted as propraetor. Mommsen (1956) [1860] 
374, long ago noted that often a quaestor’s initials would appear on provincial coinage.  
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responsible for the considerable amount of administrative and judicial work that arose 
in the provinces, and this may have yielded new clients.196  
He may also have used his new position to profit. Indeed, there are allegations 
that Cassius used his new influence to exploit the provincials, a practice that was 
rampant in the Late Republic. The testimony alleging Cassius’ provincial rapacity is 
not above reproach. Two sources offer details. The first is contemporary. In a letter to 
Cicero dated 17 November 51, M. Caelius Rufus (the subject of the orator’s masterful 
Pro Caelio), comments that Cassius’ plundering was reputedly so extensive that some 
had accused him of falsifying a war with the Parthians to cover up his misdeeds: 
te litterae non venerunt et, nisi Deiotari subsecutae essent, in eam opinionem 
Cassius veni<eb>at, quae diripuisset ipse ut viderentur ab hoste vastata, finxisse 
bellum et Arabas in provinciam immisisse eosque Parthos esse senatui renuntiasse. 
No dispatch has come in from you, and but for the subsequent arrival of Deiotarus’ 
letter people were beginning to believe that Cassius had invented the war so that 
his own plunderings would be attributed to hostile devastations –he was supposed 
to have let Arabs into the province and reported them to the Senate as Parthian 
invaders.197  
The tone of Caelius’ letter here is in part humorous. As a result of Cicero’s failure to 
send accurate reports to him, Caelius was reduced to listening to wild and humorous 
rumours that Cassius had invented the war to cover up his own misdeeds. Caelius 
does not expect anyone to take these rumours too seriously, and Deiotarus’ timely 
report serves as a welcome corrective. Caelius concedes here that the information he 
has is incorrect or slanted, and this is ostensibly the primary reason he is writing to 
Cicero: to request accurate information.  
Deiotarus’ letter substantiated Cassius’ report that the Parthians had invaded 
Roman Syria, revealing the falsity of the claims surrounding Cassius. Of course, it 
does not follow that because certain details of Caelius’ report are inaccurate that this 
means all the details (including the rumours of Cassius’ looting) are suspect. And yet, 
it should be borne in mind that Caelius’ testimony is not objective reportage, but 
rather an accusation based on an inflated rumour. There is potentially, then, an 
element of exaggeration involved in his reported claims.    
 
196 Marshall (1966) 231-46. Joseph. AJ. 14.119, notes Cassius was active across the Roman East. 
Cassius even visited Tyre, which had come under Roman control in 64.  
197 Cic. Fam. 8.10.3.  
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The second source is the anonymous and late author  of De viris illustribus. As noted 
in Chapter One, this concise source occasionally betrays a gossipy and hostile attitude 
towards Cassius, 198 and seems to draw on an anti-Cassius tradition that may have 
been initiated by Oppius.199 Even so, whilst this testimony is more problematic, it still 
merits examination as it supports (and expands upon) Caelius’ rumours. The author 
provides the following details:  
Dein eo quod coemptis Syriacis mercibus foedissime negotiaretur, Caryota 
cognominatus est. 
He was nicknamed Caryota [“the Date”], because of his shameful trafficking of 
Syrian goods.200 
It is said that Cassius’ allegedly usurious conduct (note the disparaging superlative 
foedissime) in trafficking Syrian goods earned him the nickname Caryota, “the date”: 
Caryota cognominatus est. 201  As dates were prolific in Judaea and Syria this 
accusation would have been credible in Italy, although it could just as easily be a 
hostile slur.202 Few aristocrats would wish to be remembered as a negotiator, a charge 
that obviously carried an unpalatable stigma.203 Thus the image of Cassius as a trader 
flogging dates and other goods in the East smacks of invective attack: hawking goods 
in Syria was conduct unbecoming of a Roman aristocrat. Still, there may be a kernel 
of truth behind this allegation.  
Crassus had not been afraid to dirty his hands in trading and there was often a 
discrepancy between the expressed Roman ethos of not engaging in commerce and 
the economic reality: aristocratic avarice no doubt regularly prevailed.204  Further, by 
the Late Republic, the stigma attached to senators who conducted commerce may 
have been mitigated by the discrete employment of freedmen and equestrians as their 
 
198 The De viris illustribus contains 86 mini-biographies, spanning the Alban kings through to Queen 
Cleopatra VII of Egypt. Sage (1980) 184, has argued that the work is laudatory to Augustus. Strauss 
(2014) 74, on the “gossipy” nature of DVI.     
199 On Oppius, see Chapter 1, Section 4. 
200 [Aur. Vict.] De vir. ill. 83. The text followed here is a revised Teubner edition by F. Pichlmayr and 
R. Gruendel (1966); see bibliography. The translation is my own. Keil (1850) 103-4, provides a dated 
but useful commentary on this work. However, more recent is Braccesi (1973).  
201 On Caryota, see TLL 1.506, s.v. “Caryota”.   
202 Oppius may well be behind the information: See Rawson (1991) [1974] 424 and see Chapter 1, 
Section 4. A quick glance at the late source Apicius and his work De re coquinaria will demonstrate 
how important dates were to the ancient diet. Eaten at Rome: Pet. Sat. 40.  
203 D’Arms (1980) 77-89.   
204 Finley (1973) famously argued Roman senators avoided trade because it was invariably deemed 
infra dignitatem; Rostovtzeff (1957), however, argues that senators did engage in capitalist commerce.   
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frontmen –consider Brutus’ use of M. Scaptius and Matinius.205 (It has already been 
noted that Cassius’ equestrian associate M. Fabius accompanied him overseas.)206 
This is not to connect the dots, but only to accentuate that Cassius had both the 
machinery and the manpower to engage in such a practice. 
The importance of dates should not be underestimated.  Dates were lucrative 
business and there is evidence that they were exported to Rome and Italy more 
widely, although most often they were sold at local markets.207 The caryota date (as 
Pliny called it) was particularly prized because the principal wines of the East were 
made from it.208 In addition, Alpicius’ culinary handbook indicates that dates were 
used in flavouring food, and Strabo relates that there were over three hundred uses for 
dates.209 In short, dates were in demand and versatile, and the best ones (caryota) 
originated in Syria. An indication of how valuable these dates were considered to be 
is provided by the historian Nicolaus of Damascus, who brought the finest specimens 
he could procure to Rome as a gift for Augustus.210 As most of Judaea and Syria was 
under the control of Rome, much of the profit from the date trade went straight to the 
Roman fiscus, collected diligently by the publicani.211  It is possible that Cassius 
simply creamed a disproportionate profit for himself. (There is some evidence that 
dates were occasionally used as tax in kind in Syria.)212 Whatever the exact truth of 
the accusation, it is not improbable that Cassius siphoned off some of the profit from 
the date trade.  
Perhaps Crassus’ example had had a bad influence on him, or maybe he 
simply took an opportunity to amass a fortune when unexpectedly placed in a position 
of sole authority. In the end, there is very likely an element of truth in the accusation 
that Cassius profited from the trading of Syrian goods. This would explain sufficiently 
how he came to receive the snidely ironic epithet Caryota. Cassius was not the only 
prominent Roman to suffer this fate as a result of his deeds: indignant Alexandrian 
 
205 D’Arms (1980); cf. Badian (1972), on senators as covert shareholders of the publicani. Brutus’ 
agents: Cic. Att. 6.1 with Clarke (1981) 18-19.  
206 Cic. Fam.15.14.1-2. See Shatzman (1975) 189n.58; Deniaux (1993) 28. For the date of this letter, 
see Marinone (2004) 153-4.   
207 Virg. Geog. 3.12; Sil. Ital. Pun. 3.600. See further West (1924) 163; Butcher (2003) 169. In imperial 
times, dates from Judaea were shipped to Palestine and Caesarea: Safrai (1994) 78-9. Plin. HN 15.116, 
demonstrates that dates were far more valuable than figs.     
208 Plin. HN 13.44. Other qualities of the dates included largeness and attractiveness. See further, 13.45, 
15.116. West (1924) 164n.11, Safrai (1994) 103, note honey could be made from pressed dates.  
209 On ancient dates, see Dalby (2003) 113, s.v. “Date”. 
210 Athen. 14.22.  
211 Safrai (1994) 80. Publicani: Badian (1972) 98-100. 
212 Butcher (2003) 189. 
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subjects called Vespasian Cybiosactes. 213  There is other evidence of Romans 
receiving names that may have been designed to criticise or mock them. 214 
Sometimes, then, provincial malcontents mocked their Roman masters’ greed. 
Branding Cassius as a date-dealer was an effective, embarrassing rebuke, irrespective 
of whether this originated in the provinces or at Rome. 
Some scholars imply that Cassius went much further than favourably profiting 
from Syrian commerce. These scholars believe that the tyrannicide sought to reap the 
huge financial benefit of selling some 30,000 Jews into slavery.215 This is a bold 
claim, but one that is supported by the problematic and oblique testimony of 
Josephus. As Chapter One noted, Josephus was critical of Cassius –as an assassin of 
Caesar, and because of his activities in the East before Philippi. 216  Accordingly, 
Josephus’ account needs careful examination.  
Josephus reports that Cassius enslaved 30,000 Jews after he captured the town 
of Tarichaeae.217 This figure seems extravagant, but the population of Judaea at this 
time was perhaps around 250,000, which would mean Cassius enslaved more than ten 
percent of the population.218 It is certainly possible that the rebels had amassed an 
army of 30,000 men, but some allowance must be made for potential exaggeration. 
The point of this information, however, is that it is possible that Cassius could have 
enslaved tens of thousands of Jewish rebels in late 53/52.  
However, Josephus does not explicitly state Cassius’ reasons for enslaving the 
Jews, and there is no indication that Cassius was acting avariciously. On the contrary, 
Josephus implies that Cassius punished the Jews for rebelling against Rome, a key 
theme throughout the Jewish Wars. Indeed, after the sack of Jerusalem in AD 70, 
 
213 Suet. Vesp. 19.2.  
214 M. Antonius, defeated by Lasthenes of Knossos at Crete in 71, somehow received Creticus as a  
cognomen (usually reserved for victorious generals, for instance Scipio Africanus). But see Linderski 
(1990b) 164, who argues the appellation was honorific. Greenhalgh (1980) 79-80, notes that the senate 
may very well have wished to cover up such an embarrassing defeat. 
215 Shatzman (1975) 317: “[He] surely made profits...at least from the sale of 30,000 Jews as slaves.”; 
cf. Dettenhofer (1992) 127n.35. cf. Strauss (2015) 74: “In the same period, Cassius invaded Judea and 
is said to have enslaved about thirty thousand Jews –and slaving was big and profitable business.” The 
implication, then, has sometimes been that Cassius enslaved the Jews with profit in mind.  
216 On Josephus, see Chapter 1, Section 9. 
217 Tarichaeae was a stronghold for Jewish rebels, who revolted against the Romans after Carrhae. See 
discussion below.  
218 Population: Aperghis (2011) 20, estimated the population of Judaea was around a quarter of a 
million people at the end of the Seleucid period. For a catalogue of scholarly assessments of the 
population of Palestine in the first century AD, see Byatt (1973) 51-60.   
On the significance of Josephus’ use of ἀνδράποδον, see Gibbs and Feldman (1986) 291-2. 
 
 
129 
Josephus notes that the Romans enslaved some 97,000 Jews. 219  Of course, these 
figures are suspect. But the point is that Cassius’ actions are well within the bounds of 
Roman military behaviour, and certainly may not have been inspired purely for his 
own financial benefit. This is not to say that Cassius did not benefit financially from 
the sale of these Jews. He may well have done. But it is important to establish that he 
had strong grounds for taking the action he did that are separate from the potential 
pecuniary benefits of the deed.220  
   Overall, it is likely that Cassius did engage in some profiteering, even if it is 
impossible to determine his culpability beyond doubt. Corruption –like wealth– was a 
relative term, however, and even if he did partake in such practices he would be little 
different from the majority of his contemporaries. Many if not most Romans in the 
provinces engaged in corrupt practices. Often, the only difference is the degree of 
their profiteering. Filling his coffers was no doubt a key objective for Cassius during 
his time in the East, especially as he had to think about funding future political 
campaigns, which were becoming increasingly expensive.221    
 
4.11 CASSIUS AND THE JUDAEAN REVOLT 
Though the Parthians did not immediately exploit the disaster at Carrhae to challenge 
Roman authority, the restive Jews were another matter. They rebelled in 52. The 
revolt appears to have been orchestrated by a general named Peitholaus. This man, a 
military commander and erstwhile Roman accomodationist, had assisted Gabinius 
during a revolt against Hyrcanus II in 57.222 However, Peitholaus’ loyalty to Rome 
was extremely questionable. When Aristobulus II returned to Judaea (after his 
‘escape’ from Roman prison),223  Peitholaus wasted no time in joining the king’s 
forlorn revolt.224 Perhaps as a result of his former service, Peitholaus was able to 
 
219 Joseph. BJ. 6.420:  Τῶν μὲν οὖν αἰχμαλώτων πάντων, ὅσα καθ᾽ ὅλον ἐλήφθη τὸν πόλεμον, 
ἀριθμὸς ἐννέα μυριάδες καὶ ἑπτακισχίλιοι συνήχθη. 
220 Even the reasonably enlightened Cicero was not above selling slaves whilst proconsul of Cilicia: 
Cic. Att. 5.20. 
221 In the 50s, political campaigns became more expensive: Shatzman (1975); Dettenhofer (1992).   
222 On Peitholaus, see Shatzman (1991) 132-3.  
223 On Aristobulus II and his imprisonment by Pompey: Plut. Pomp. 39.2; Pelling (1988) 120-1. For 
Alexander’s activities and the size of his forces: Joseph. AJ 14.83. Huzar (1978) 28, accepts Josephus’ 
figures. Aristobulus had escaped his Roman detention in suspicious circumstances, and sought to 
overthrow his brother, whom Pompey had left in charge. 
224 Joseph. BJ 1.171, AJ 14.93, indicates that Aristobulus was a charismatic and popular leader. As 
deputy governor of Jerusalem, Peitholaus provided around 1,000 elite troops to Aristobulus: Joseph. AJ 
14.93; BJ 1.172. 
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avoid punishment, and he remained in Judaea. However, on learning of Crassus’ 
defeat in Parthia in 53, Peitholaus seems to have rekindled the revolt of Aristobulus, 
apparently rallying many of the monarch’s old partisans to the cause.225 Though no 
figures are given for the number of rebels whom Cassius subdued in 53, if Josephus’ 
arithmetic about the number of enslaved Jews is correct –and it is a big if 226 – 
Peitholaus had managed to foment a very large revolt. 
The revolt seems to have come to a conclusion at Tarichaeae, a city that 
should probably be located southwest of Tiberias on the Sea of Galilee. 227  One 
scholar has suggested that Cassius dealt severely with Tarichaeae because “elements 
within the town had welcomed the Parthians.”228 Another argues that Cassius headed 
to Tarichaeae because it was more Romanised than other parts of Judaea, and offered 
a strong, more welcoming base of operations. 229  Regardless, Cassius attacked 
Tarichaeae and captured the city:    
αὖθις δὲ εἰς Τύρον ἀφικόμενος ἀνέβη καὶ εἰς τὴν Ἰουδαίαν. Ταριχαίας μὲν οὖν 
προσπεσὼν εὐθέως αἱρεῖ, καὶ περὶ τρισμυρίους ἀνθρώπους ἀνδραποδίζει, 
Later he came to Tyre, and then went up to Judaea. Here he fell upon Tarichaeae, 
which he quickly took, and made slaves of some thirty thousand men.230 
Josephus does not explicitly connect this event with the revolt of Peitholaus. Still it 
seems certain that the two were connected. Cassius did not grant Peitholaus a second 
reprieve: he was put to death. Josephus implies that Cassius acted on the advice of 
Antipater, father of Herod the Great. But Cassius is unlikely to have needed 
Antipater’s counsel to reach a decision to execute the ringleader of a provincial revolt 
that occurred during a Roman military emergency. 231  Josephus is magnifying 
Antipater’s influence over Cassius for his own purposes. Cassius also compelled King 
Alexander Maccabaeus, the eldest son of Aristobulus II, to come to peace terms.232 In 
this respect, then, Cassius dealt decisively and severely with the Jews, in a fashion 
 
225 Joseph. BJ 1.181.  
226 Shatzman (1991) 125, states the number “may be an exaggeration”.  
227 Kokkinos (2010) 7-23. 
228 Curran (2007) 33-53, p. 39. See further Section 12 below on the Parthians.  
229 Overman (2009) 289, argues based on archaeological evidence that Cassius retreated to Tarichaeae 
because the area of southern Galilee was Romanised, more so than the potentially unwelcoming, anti-
Roman Iturean region. As such, Cassius could expect a more sympathetic welcome at Tarichaeae. It 
was also heavily fortified.     
230 Joseph. AJ 14.119; cf. BJ 1.180.   
231 Shatzman (1991) 133, argues that Antipater turned Peitholaus into a scapegoat to get rid of a rival, 
although the evidence for this is not strong.    
232 Udoh (2005) 26.  
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that does not appear out of character. Judaea had been brought to heel, and deprived 
of any leaders that might rally against Rome.   
 
4.12 PARTHIAN INCURSION INTO SYRIA 
After pacifying Judaea, Cassius returned to the Euphrates in anticipation of a Parthian 
invasion.233 Josephus reports that shortly after Carrhae the Parthians attempted to take 
Syria, but Dio contradicts this version of events.234 These accounts can perhaps be 
reconciled by the fact that Cassius had to rebuff several small-scale Parthian raiding 
parties.235 The incursions date to 52, but earlier attacks are possible.236 Orodes may 
have sent an “expeditionary force” across the Euphrates to test the Roman 
defences.237 Cassius met these forces, and, in his first outing as sole commander, 
easily repelled them.238 By this stage, Cassius had organised the remnants of Crassus’ 
army into around two legions; he also commanded around 800 cavalry.239 However, 
in the following year, Orodes sent a much larger cavalry force to attack Syria.  
This force was nominally under the command of Pacorus I, Orodes’ eldest 
son, then around 12-15 years old; 240  but Orodes also entrusted the campaign to 
another man, Osaces, a respected and experienced general.241 By 51, Pacorus may 
already have been co-regent with his father, so Orodes’ absence does not necessarily 
diminish the seriousness of this campaign.242 And yet, scholars have often dismissed 
this force as a “raiding party”, or as a training exercise, and not a serious invasion that 
sought to capture Syrian territory.243 Such notions are perhaps wrongheaded. The 
absence of Orodes and the apparent lack of infantry do not necessarily mean that the 
 
233 Joseph. AJ 14.119-22, BJ 1.180-82.  
234 Joseph. AJ 14.119, BJ 1.180; Cass. Dio 40.28.1.  
235  Throughout the first century BC, the Parthians were frequently affected by internal, dynastic 
struggles:  Sellwood (1971) 33-35. 
236 Joseph. AJ 14.119-22, BJ 1.180-82.  
237 Gray-Fow (1990) 182-3. 
238 As Josephus makes clear, these events predate the capture of Tarichaeae (see n. 233 above for 
references). 
239 Sampson (2008) 153, for the numbers.  
240  Sellwood and Simonetta (1978) 12, suggest Pacorus was “around 14 or 15 years old” in 51. 
Pacorus’ nominal control of the campaign: Rawson (1986) 116. 
241 Cic. Att. 5.20.3; cf. Fam. 2.10.2, Phil. 11.35. This dual leadership model was a clever move by 
Orodes, ensuring his son would get the credit for a victory, but also providing Pacorus with an 
experienced commander to assist in the campaign: Sampson (2008) 154.    
242 The suggestion that Pacorus I was co-regent from 51 was mooted by Alberto Simonetta in 1953, 
based, in part, on coinage minted on behalf of Pacorus at Ecbatana: see Simonetta (1978) 10, with n.5; 
cf. Mørkholm (1980) 38n.19.   
243 Debevoise (1968) 100, criticised this army as a “raiding party” rather than invasion army based on 
the “preponderance of cavalry”.  
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king did not seriously contemplate capturing Roman Syria. Osaces’ presence probably 
belies the idea that this was a raiding party; and Parthian strategy may have been to 
defeat the Romans in open battle.244 If the Parthians could defeat the remainder of the 
Roman forces using the same tactics as the Suren, Syria would be there for the taking. 
For Cassius and Roman Syria, then, the Parthian army, heavy in cavalry though it 
may have been, constituted a clear and present danger in 51. 
The Parthian invasion of Syria began in August 51.245 The size of the Parthian 
army is unknown, though it is reported to have crossed the Euphrates in large 
numbers, especially heavy in cavalry.246 The absence of infantry and Orodes himself 
is surprising; and yet, the Suren had defeated a far larger force than Cassius 
commanded; if, then, the Parthians could engage the Romans in open battle, Pacorus 
and Osaces were no doubt confident they could secure a decisive defeat over the 
Romans. The Parthians, moreover, were not simply waging a military campaign.  
Cicero, reporting information he had received from one of Rome’s loyal allies, 
informed the senate that the Parthians sought to foment an uprising among the 
recently pacified Syrian population: magnumque tumultum esse in provincia Syria 
excitatum.247 When the Parthians reached Antioch in September, they had superior 
forces to Cassius and envisioned kindling an anti-Roman uprising. Cassius and his 
troops were the only barrier in the way of the province falling under Arsacid control.  
Cassius evidently learnt from Crassus’ mistakes. He understood that with two 
legions under his control he could not defeat the Parthians in open battle. Even with a 
superior force Crassus had not been able to overcome the Suren’s army. Nor could he 
engage the Parthians and suppress an uprising simultaneously. Instead, he opted for 
what has been described as an “inglorious” path:248 to hole up his army inside Antioch 
and refuse to give battle. This strategy, as G. Sampson observes, revived a Roman 
military approach that had not been employed since the Hannibalic War: namely the 
use of the Fabian strategy.249 Cassius did not engage the Parthians on their terms, and 
 
244 Sampson (2008) 156.  
245 Cic. Fam. 15.1, 15.3, 15.44, Att. 5.18, 5.20. In mid-June of that year, Cicero (then governor of 
Cilicia) had written to Atticus expressing his hope that the Parthians would remain quiet: Att. 5.9.1.  
246 Euphrates: Fam.15.13: Pacorum Orodi regis Parthorum filium cum permagno equitatu Parthico 
transisse Euphratem et castra posuisse Tybae. Details of the campaign: Fam. 15.1, 15.3, 15.44, Att. 
5.18, 5.20; cf. Cass. Dio 40.28. Some Parthian allies, probably from tributary Arab lands, appear to 
have been present also: Fam.15.3.1; Sampson (2008) 156.   
247 Fam. 15.1.2-3 with Shackleton Bailey (1977) 1.438-9. 
248 Eilers (2005) 93.  
249 Sampson (2008) 157.  
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caused them frustration as they lacked the engines required to lay siege to Antioch. 
Moreover, though Cassius’ strategy left the Syrian province undefended, the Parthians 
could only ravage the surrounding areas250 –something that may have harmed their 
attempts to stoke an anti-Roman uprising.251 His strategy also deprived them of the 
one thing they truly needed –a decisive victory. In retreating to the heavily fortified 
Antioch, Cassius frustrated the Parthians, as they could not force the battle they 
required to secure the province. His strategy also demonstrated a sound awareness of 
military history and theory.   
Cassius’ Romans outlasted the siege, no doubt aided by the Parthians’ lack of 
siege engines. Eventually, the Parthians despaired of capturing the city and made to 
leave. On 7 October, Cassius abandoned his Fabian policy and devised a trap for the 
Parthians, who were now desperate to engage the Romans in battle. Cassius’ 
devastating ambush receives special commendation in Frontinus’ military handbook,  
Strategemata (2.35):   
C. Cassius in Syria adversus Parthos ducemque Osacen equitem ostendit a 
fronte, cum a tergo peditem in confragoso loco occultasset. Dein cedente 
equitatu et per nota se recipiente, in praeparatas insidias perduxit 
exercitum Parthorum et cecidit. 
Gaius Cassius, when fighting in Syria against the Parthians and their leader 
Osaces, exhibited only cavalry in front, but had posted infantry in hiding 
on rough ground in the rear. Then, when his cavalry fell back and retreated 
over familiar roads, he drew the army of the Parthians into the ambush 
prepared for them and cut them to pieces.252 
Cassius’ ambush, which occurred near Antigonea, 253  was a masterstroke –Caesar 
himself would employ similar tactics at Pharsalus. By feigning a retreat, Cassius’ 
cavalry lured the Parthians into a pursuit that led to the death of their veteran general 
Osaces, who perished from a wound inflicted during the hasty retreat.254 Osaces was a 
big scalp for Cassius, and the victory a morale boaster for the Roman army. An 
experienced general and warrior, Osaces had been sent by King Orodes into Syria, 
with the young Prince Pacorus. According to Cicero, Osaces was a “highly respected 
 
250 Cicero and the report of Parthian raids on Cilicia: Cic. Fam. 15.14.7.  
251 Uprising less dramatic than Cicero feared: Sampson (2008) 158.  
252 Cf. Cass. Dio 40.29. 
253 Bivar (1983) 3.1.56. 
254 Goldsworthy (1996) 65.  
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Parthian general” (magna auctoritate Osaces dux Parthorum).255 Cassius, then, had 
inflicted a significant military defeat, which Cicero –seeking to amplify his own 
achievements– describes with calculated understatement: Cassius…rem bene gessit.256 
Cassius, himself, appears to have exaggerated the scale of his victory in his epistolary 
report to the senate, if Cicero’s correspondence can be believed.257 The Parthian army 
may not have been wholly defeated, as Cassius (and perhaps Livy)258 is alleged to 
have claimed, but it had suffered a notable setback. After their defeat, the Parthians 
withdrew to northern Syria. Cassius would still have to be alert, since Pacorus was (or 
so it seemed) simply wintering with his army. But there was no reinvasion the 
following summer. 
Cicero initially dismissed Cassius’ efforts. But there is an element of self-
interest in the orator’s writing as he was competing with Cassius for credit for having 
secured the Parthians’ departure.259 M. Wistrand describes Cicero’s assessment as a 
“barefaced” attempt to snatch all of the credit for Cassius’ triumphs.260 In fact, he had 
learnt with delight that Cassius had driven the Parthians away from Antioch –hardly 
evidence that he had expected as much or that his presence was the decisive factor.261 
Frontinus and Cassius Dio mention Cassius’ military achievements convincingly, and 
here there is no hint that Cicero was the pivotal factor in repelling the Parthian 
army. 262  Wistrand has further pointed out that Cicero seemed unaware of the 
Parthians’ presence in Syria just five days before his showdown at the Amanus.263 
Rather it is more likely that Cicero joined battle against the mountain tribes of the 
Amanus on learning of the Parthians’ retreat. He later claimed his army had killed 
some of those Parthians who had fled into Cilician territory.264 To Cato, Cicero did 
not claim he was responsible for the Parthian defeat, even though he did so 
 
255 Cic. Att. 5.20.3; cf. Fam. 2.10.2, Phil. 11.35.   
256 Cic. Att. 5.20.3. After Caesar’s death, however, he gives Cassius far more praise (Phil. 11.35).   
257 Cic. Att. 5.21.2, 6.1.14. 
258 Liv. Per. 108.  
259Wistrand (1979) 5; cf. Retsö (2003) 396. Cicero’s defeat of the inhabitants of Mount Amanus is 
described as the prerequisite for Cassius’ own successes against the Parthians: the presence of Cicero’s 
army had (in the consular’s view) given Cassius the courage necessary to take on the Parthians and put 
them to flight: Cic. Att. 5.20.3, with Wistrand (1979) 7.   
260 Wistrand (1979) 7.  
261 Cic. Fam. 2.10.2 with Gelzer (1969c) 230n.102; Stockton (1971) 237; Rawson (1975) 169: “it was 
the panic inspired by his [Cicero’s] approach”.  See also Wistrand (1979) 237.  
262 Front. Strat. 2.55.35; Cass. Dio 40.29, with Wistrand (1979) 8. 
263 Wistrand (1979) 8. Cicero’s ignorance is an all too common example of poor Roman military 
intelligence.  
264 Cic. Fam. 15.4.7. 
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elsewhere.265 Wistrand assumes this is because Cato’s son-in-law, Bibulus, would be 
providing his side of the story, and Cicero would be unwise to rob him of glory.266 
But it should not be forgotten that Cassius too was connected to Cato; he had married 
Cato’s niece. So Cassius’ feelings may also explain Cicero’s reasons for playing 
down his role.  And years later Cicero noted: 
Magnas ille res gessit ante Bibuli, summi viri, adventum, cum Parthorum 
nobilissimos duces maximas copias fudit Syriamque immani Parthorum impetu 
liberavit. 
He [sc. Cassius] won great victories before the arrival of Bibulus, routing 
celebrated Parthian commanders and a mighty force, delivering Syria from a 
massive Parthian invasion.267            
This glowing assessment of Cassius’ military accomplishments, it should be 
conceded, was proffered during Cicero’s eleventh Philippic, at a time when the 
consular was seeking to persuade the senate to grant the tyrannicide a military 
command against Dolabella. But even if his spin does exaggerate Cassius’ success to 
a degree, Cicero may not distort history grossly. 
Cassius’ ambush of the Parthians and the death of Osaces may have merited 
an ovation268 or at the very least a supplicatio from the senate in normal circum-
stances.269  However, no such honours appear to have been bestowed on Cassius. 
Plutarch remarks that Cassius won fame for his exploits in Syria, and yet this does not 
seem to have translated into official recognition.270 In this regard, Cassius may have 
felt discontented. Lesser commanders had been granted supplications. Cicero, for 
instance, whose task in Cilicia was far less daunting than that of Cassius’, celebrated a 
supplicatio.271 And Bibulus wasted little time before canvassing for a triumph; Cato 
responded by voting for a supplicatio.272 Bibulus did not see the kind of military 
action that Cassius did, nor could he claim the scalp of a senior Parthian general. 
 
265 Cic. Fam. 15.4.7; cf. 2.10.2, Att. 5.20.3, with Wistrand (1979) 11.  
266 Wistrand (1979) 11-12.  
267 Cic. Phil. 11.35.  
268 Ovations: Cic. Phil. 14.12; Plin. HN 15.125. Versnel (1970) 165-71. M. Aquillius celebrated an 
ovation for suppressing a slave revolt in Sicily: Cic. de Orat. 2. 195.   
269 An ovation was possible, but a triumph unlikely: Lintott (1993) 47: “A formal procedure before the 
lictors, who represented the obsolete comitia curiata, seems to have been in theory required for a 
magistrate who was not a consul or praetor in office, if he was to hold the auspices while in his 
province and thus have a right to claim a triumph on his return.” Some of the lictors had been captured 
by the Parthians, but perhaps not all: Plut. Crass. 32.2.    
270 There is no mention of the senate’s recognition of Cassius’ deeds in Cicero’s Eleventh Philippic, a 
perfect time to recall such praise. 
271  Cic. Fam. 2.15.1, 8.11.1-2, 15.5.1-3, 15.6.1-2. Cato opposed Cicero’s efforts.  
272 Cic. Att. 6.8.5, 7.2.6-7.  
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Cicero sardonically dismissed his efforts.273 Logically, then, if Bibulus’ deeds merited 
a supplication so too did those of Cassius. Why, then, were Cassius’ impressive 
efforts overlooked?   
 Several explanations are possible. Gabinius’ example may prove instructive. 
Though his exploits in Egypt certainly could have merited a triumph or ovation, his 
alienation of the publicani scuppered any chance of this much-desired honour.274 
Likewise, as was noted earlier in this chapter, Cassius had been accused of provincial 
rapacity, and may have irritated the publicani. He may also have faced prosecution for 
provincial maladministration, which would have clouded his call for senatorial 
recognition. Or perhaps Cassius simply lacked the clout to petition for this honour 
from Rome’s governing body. At this time, his brother, Quintus, appears to have run 
afoul of Pompey, and may also have been facing prosecution. Whatever the reasons, 
and the disaster at Carrhae cannot be discounted completely, Cassius probably felt 
hard done by. Nevertheless, he was still relatively young and he could console himself 
with the prospect of future glory.   
His reputation had spread far. Cassius had restored Rome’s borders and shored 
up her security. In this, he demonstrated exemplary military ability in perilous 
circumstances. However, the threat of the Parthians did not abate, even at the time of 
the civil war, perhaps even in 44 on the eve of Caesar’s proposed campaign.275 But in 
defeating the Parthians Cassius won a reputation among some of them. In 43/42, he 
sent Q. Labienus with a detachment of Parthian soldiers to solicit aid from their king. 
The reinforcements failed to arrive in time, perhaps at the design of the king. Yet an 
independent band of Parthians fought for Cassius at Philippi, partly (Appian notes) 
because of their respect for Cassius’ martial prowess. 276  Among the Syrian 
 
273 Cic. Att. 7.2.6-7. Bibulus stayed behind the walls of Antioch: Cic. Att. 6.8.5, Fam. 12.19.2; Caes. B 
Civ. 3.30.3; Liv. Per. 108; App. Syr. 51; Cass. Dio 40.30.2. Syme (1987b) 186, describes his efforts 
there in terms of a desire to win “cheap laurels.”  
274 Cic. Pis. 48. Consider also the obstructionism of Memmius against Lucullus’ triumph, which was 
not granted until 63: Plut. Luc. 37.2-3.    
275 Timpe (1962) 108-10; Weinstock (1971) 130. 
276 App. B Civ. 4.59. On Cassius’ later relations with the Parthians, see briefly Rawson (1991) 110; esp. 
Keaveney (2003) 232-4; cf. Parfënov (1983) 52-65, who attributes Cassius and Brutus’ defeat at 
Philippi in no small part to the heterogenous nature of their army. See also Magnino (1998) 212, 215, 
on Appian’s account. The triumvirs may have used Cassius’ connections with the Parthians to stir up 
the fear that Parthian troops would be used against the Romans: Rawson (1991) [1986] 492. Just. 42.4, 
indicates that when Ventidius defeated the Parthians, he seems to have employed a similar tactic to 
Cassius. After refusing to give battle for some time, he sent out an expeditionary force to chase the 
Parthians, then, when they sought to sack the Roman camp, Ventidius executed an ambush. 
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population, too, Cassius must have gained a bright reputation.277 Even as late as AD 
49, Cassius’ efforts appear still to have been remembered in Syria, when a relative 
governed the province.278     
 
4.13 BATTLE AGAINST ANTIOCHUS? 
Paulus Orosius, in his Historiae Adversus Paganos (composed c. AD 416/17), 
provides another account of Cassius’ conduct after Carrhae, in which the tyrannicide 
is said to have fought and killed a certain Antiochus in battle (6.13.5): 
cognita clade Romanorum multae orientis prouinciae a societate uel fide 
populi Romani defecissent, ni Cassius collectis ex fuga militibus paucis 
intumescentem Syriam egregia animi uirtute ac moderatione pressisset; 
qui et Antiochum copiasque eius ingentes proelio uicit et interfecit, 
Parthos quoque ab Horode in Syriam missos iamque ingressos Antiochiam 
bello expulit ducemque eorum Osagen interfecit. 
After the catastrophe that the Romans had suffered became known, many 
of her Eastern provinces would have reneged on their allegiance or pledges 
of loyalty to Rome had not Cassius rallied those few who had fled and with 
exceptional presence of mind and moderation secured a restive Syria. He 
defeated Antiochus and his huge army in a great battle and drove out the 
Parthians who had been despatched by Horodes to Syria and had already 
managed to enter Antioch, killing their leader, Osages.279   
 
This passage is important for two reasons. First, Orosius furnishes a very favourable 
assessment of Cassius’ military conduct. Second, and more importantly, the historian 
refers to a battle between Cassius and a certain, unidentified Antiochus, an event 
otherwise unattested in the ancient sources. As such, this passage is useful not only in  
assessing Cassius’ military ability, but also the historicity of an alleged military 
encounter not widely discussed by modern scholars.     
 Perhaps drawing on Livy, Orosius describes Cassius’ fortitude and character 
in the East after Carrhae in effusive terms: egregia animi uirtute ac moderatione. 280  
This positive assessment is similar to the favourable accounts found in Plutarch’s 
Crassus, Frontinus, and Cassius Dio, and perhaps derives from the same source.281 
The language Orosius uses is important. The courage (virtute) Cassius showed as a 
commander after assuming Crassus’ responsibilities is accepted by both ancients and 
 
277 Cic. Att. 5.20. Even Cicero claimed his name had become popular in Syria. Cassius, too, must have 
won similar adulation among much of the populace.  
278 Tac. Ann. 12.12: ita dignum maioribus suis et familia Cassia per illas quoque gentis celebrata.   
279 The translation is that of Fear (2010) 290-1. 
280 Rawson (1986) 117. In the Periochae, Cassius’ deeds are described in what Rawson aptly describes 
as “bald” terms: Per. 108: Cassius, quaestor M. Crassi, Parthos, qui in Syriam transcenderant, cecidit.  
281 Perhaps Messala Corvinus: see Chapter 1, Section 3.  
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moderns. However, Orosius and (or) his source also attributes moderatio to Cassius. 
This description is more debatable.  
The importance in Roman military affairs of adopting a policy of moderation 
is well documented from Polybius on.282 Moreover, moderatio was a virtue praised in 
figures like Cato the Elder.283 But is it an apt characterisation of Cassius during his 
time in the East? In one sense, Cassius certainly demonstrated more self-control in 
dealing with the Parthians than Crassus had done. He opted to risk besiegement and 
frustrate the Parthians rather than engage them in open territory. Cassius’ self-control 
and discipline is certainly on display in the strategy he employed against the Parthians 
during the siege of Antioch and thereafter. On the other hand, Josephus probably 
would not have considered Cassius’ actions in Judaea restrained, especially his 
alleged enslavement of tens of thousands of Jews. Moreover, the accusations (if true) 
in De viris illustribus that Cassius engaged in shameless profiteering from Syrian 
commerce hardly support the view of his moderation. To be sure, Cassius exercised 
moderation in his dealings with the Parthians. But in other matters in the East, the 
claim that Cassius acted with moderation is suspect, and certainly represents the 
favourable source that has provided much information for his career at this time. In 
this matter, then, Orosius’ account relays the favourable (perhaps overly favourable) 
assessment of Cassius’ military exploits that may have originated either from Messala 
Corvinus or Livy. 
 In other respects, however, Orosius’ version of events is more problematic. 
For one thing, the notion that the Parthian cavalry managed to penetrate into the city 
of Antioch itself is dubious, and an interpretation which runs counter to the account of 
Cassius Dio (40.29.1).284 The most remarkable detail, however, is that the late antique 
historian credits Cassius with defeating and killing an Antiochus, a story not 
substantiated by any other source. The only credible candidate that Orosius can be 
referring to here is Antiochus I of Commagene (r. 70-38), as proposed by E. 
Rawson.285 But though it is certainly possible that Cassius encountered Antiochus in 
battle –the king was one of a number of fair-weather Roman allies– this scenario 
seems unlikely. If Orosius is referring to the king of Commagene, then he is definitely 
incorrect to state Cassius’ army killed him in battle (Cassius…Antiochum…interfecit). 
 
282 Thornton (2013) 224. Cf. Front. Str. 4, pr.  
283 Plut. Cat. Min. 3.2.  
284 Downey (1961) 150n.4.   
285 Rawson (1986) [1991] 117.  
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Despite his Parthian sympathies, Antiochus had been sending useful intelligence to 
Cicero, though not everyone in the consular’s retinue trusted the king’s information, 
perhaps with some justification if his later career is any indicator.286 For Cicero, 
Antiochus’ loyalty to Rome was nothing more than a convenient façade. 287 
Confirmation of his self-serving and opportunistic approach may be seen in his 
decision to marry his daughter, Laodike, to Orodes II. 288  Given Antiochus’ 
unpredictability, then, Cassius may well have taken steps to threaten him into 
neutrality, as Rawson first suggested.289 But did a battle occur?  
As mentioned, only Orosius recounts that a battle between Cassius and 
Antiochus occurred. Is it possible (or likely) that Orosius records a historical battle 
that no other ancient source mentions? Of course, an argument from the silence of the 
other sources is not sufficient in itself.  A.T. Fear, however, has recently suggested 
that Orosius has in fact confused the town of Antigoneia, where Cassius ambushed 
and inflicted a significant defeat on the Parthians, with “a non-existent general, 
Antiochus.”290 A mistake of this magnitude would not be uncharacteristic of the late 
historian, often dismissed by modern scholars as a sloppy epitomator.291 Given the 
ambitious scope of his universal history, it would not be unsurprising if Orosius has 
made occasional errors. Thus the mistakes in this passage militate against the 
accuracy of his statement. As such, on the balance of probabilities, Cassius cannot 
receive credit for a military victory over Antiochus.      
At the end of his tenure as acting governor, Cassius received a letter from 
Cicero. The consular wanted to forge a political friendship (amicitia) with the future 
tyrannicide.292 In this letter, Cicero provides useful information. He reveals that up 
until this point he has had only a distant, intermittent relationship with Cassius; in 
addition, he lavishes praise on Cassius for his recent military achievements, despite 
 
286 Cic. Fam. 15.1.2, with Shackleton Bailey (1977) 1.437. Antiochus later aided the Parthians against 
Ventidius and Antonius (Cass. Dio 49.22.1; Plut. Ant. 34). See Rawson (1991) [1986] 505.  
287 Cic. Fam. 15.4.4. 
288 Cass. Dio 49.23.4. 
289 Rawson (1991) [1986] 505.  
290 Fear (2010) 291n.183: “Orosius has turned the town of Antigoneia, where Cassius defeated the 
Parthians, into a non-existent general, Antiochus.”  
291 Rohrbacher (2002) 138; cf. Van Nuffelen (2012) 1, who speaks of the “negative press” Orosius has 
received from historians. However, he was attempting to write a universal history, and appreciation of 
his rhetorical intent should perhaps improve our opinion of him.    
292 Cic. Fam. 15.14.  
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downplaying these to another correspondent; he also indicates that a relative of 
Cassius was in legal trouble; it is likely to have been his brother Quintus.293  
   
4.14 CONCLUSION 
Cassius’ career took a remarkable turn during the period between his election as 
quaestor in 56 (for 55) and his return to Rome in late 51/50. During that time, he went 
from serving as Crassus’ deputy to finding himself in the position of acting governor, 
a position he held for over two years. The responsibility placed upon his shoulders 
was immense: in command of a province on the Eastern frontier of the empire, facing 
the threat of the Parthians. Such a position would normally be reserved for an 
experienced Roman politician –it is no wonder there were even calls to have Pompey 
or the consuls sent out to replace the dead Crassus. But the relatively inexperienced 
Cassius proved himself in testing circumstances. Appian, for one, reports that Cassius 
proved himself to be a more capable soldier and commander than Crassus. 294  In 
normal circumstances, a quaestor could expect to serve for one or two years in the 
provinces. This service allowed the ambitious aristocrat to gain valuable military 
credentials, and also to amass wealth. At the start of the campaign, Cassius probably 
expected to make money and no doubt hoped to gain a reputation for martial valour; 
by the end, he had commanded Roman legions in a battle against the Parthians, 
inflicting a significant defeat on them, and at least in part avenged Carrhae.      
This chapter has also explored more technical matters, for instance how 
Cassius came to serve under Crassus on such a promising campaign. Was he 
appointed by lot or did he receive a dispensation to serve sine sorte? In truth, there is 
no hard evidence either way, although some scholars have taken for granted that he 
was preferentially selected. It also looked at Cassius’ prominence in Plutarch’s Life of 
Crassus. Cassius is not mentioned in the narratives of the Parthian campaign for the 
period 55/54. It is only in the lead-up to Carrhae that he begins to play a crucial role 
as critic of Crassus’ strategy. According to Plutarch, he pleaded with Crassus to 
abandon the campaign altogether, or else to adopt a more cautious approach. He also 
foresaw the treachery of Abgarus. How far this pre-Carrhae narrative accurately 
reflects Cassius’ counsel is difficult to assess, especially as Plutarch’s account seems 
 
293 Shackleton Bailey (1977) 1.442; cf. Gruen (1974) 526, who questions whether a prosecution was 
threatened.    
294 App. B Civ. 4.59. 
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very favourable to Cassius generally. Scholars have often suggested a pro-Cassius 
source is behind the perspicacious foresight (See Chapter One, Section 5).  
If Cassius’ wise counsel before Carrhae is exaggerated, his military conduct 
after is not. Cassius showed himself to be an excellent commander. He successfully 
escaped to Syria, where he collected the remains of the Roman army. Here he got the 
wheels of provincial government back in motion; he pacified Syria and Judaea, before 
heading back to the Euphrates to face the Parthians. In the following year, he 
resisted a Parthian siege of Antioch before luring these forces into a devastating 
ambush. As a commander and provincial governor, Cassius was exemplary.  
However, like many Late Republicans in the provinces, Cassius was also 
accused of extortionate practices. It was not uncommon for Romans to fleece the 
provinces, but there is also a strong degree of hostile exaggeration in these charges. 
The ramifications of Cassius’ service in the East were many. Most important 
of all, however, was that –despite the defeat at Carrhae, for which Crassus was 
principally responsible– Cassius had gained a reputation for military aptitude.295  He 
had not only managed to stave off a Parthian invasion of Syria but also executed a 
carefully planned ambush, which ultimately claimed the life of Osaces. This success 
cannot be understated. Military valour brought recognition,296 and Plutarch describes 
Cassius’ Parthian exploits as λαμπρά (Brut. 7.2).  
Despite his achievements, Cassius had been absent from Rome for around four 
years. And yet, the arc of his career would be further interrupted by the civil war and 
the emergence of a new political milieu.     
   
 
  
  
   
 
295 Plut. Brut. 7.3-4; Cic. Phil. 11.35.   
296  Plut. Cat. Min. 8.1-3, Ant. 3.5. Cato the Younger had been praised by the consul L. Gellius 
Publicola for his military courage as a volunteer in the fight against Spartacus; and M. Antonius had 
gained a sound reputation for his service as a praefectus equitum in the campaign to restore Ptolemy 
Auletes XII. Caesar, too, had gained a reputation for valour in his quaestorship: Vell. Pat. 2.43.4; Suet. 
Iul. 7-8. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CASSIUS AND THE CIVIL WAR 
 
5.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter treats Cassius’ career from his election as tribune in 50 down to 45, at 
the time Caesar emerged triumphant from Spain. Up until 50, Cassius’ career –whilst 
delayed by Carrhae and Bibulus’ tardy arrival in Syria– had progressed in the typical 
fashion of a Late Republican aristocrat. In this period, however, the advent of civil 
war and Cassius’ subsequent retirement from public life completely scuppered his 
career advancement. The opening sections of this chapter explore Cassius’ decision to 
join Pompey in the civil war, and to accept Caesar’s clementia after Pharsalus. This 
leads neatly on to a discussion about whether Caesar’s pardon led Cassius to adopt 
Epicureanism as a way to justify his subsequent retirement from public affairs. Close 
analysis of Cassius’ correspondence reveals that his conversion to Epicureanism was 
whole-hearted, and not simply a screen. There follows a discussion of Cassius’ 
appointment as Caesar’s legate. Whilst some scholars maintain he served on 
campaign with Caesar, it will be argued here that Cassius headed to Brundisium, and 
thus cannot have played a significant role in military operations. Scholars have 
speculated over Cassius’ activities during his extended stay at Brundisium. The 
hypothesis that Cassius remained there in case Cn. Pompeius triumphed in Spain has 
much to commend it. Cassius cannot be considered a diehard Republican in the mould 
of Cato: his actions belie this mantle. Though he was certainly conflicted about 
accepting Caesar’s pardon, he quips that Caesar rather than Cn. Pompeius is the 
preferable master. By the end of 45, however, Cassius showed signs of increasing 
disillusionment with Caesar.     
It is unclear exactly at what point in 50 Cassius arrived back in Rome, but his 
career options are likely to have been hindered by the circumstances of the time. As 
alluded to by Cicero, it is possible that Cassius arrived at a time when his brother, Q. 
Cassius, was under prosecution, having fallen foul of Pompey and his circle. Cassius 
may also have arrived at a fraught time of political tension, as a conflict between 
Caesar and Pompey seemed increasingly on the cards. Evidence from Plutarch 
indicates he may have been making arrangements to stand for the aedileship (see 
below), but in the end he settled on running for the tribunate, an office that had served 
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as a springboard for the career of his illustrious ancestor L. Cassius Longinus Ravilla. 
As will be seen, Cassius’ reasons for standing for the tribunate may have been 
dictated by the looming civil war.      
 
5.1 TRIBUNE  
On his return to Rome, Cassius quickly won election to the tribunate (in 50 for 49).1 
The historical significance of this office to the Cassii Longini needs stating, as not all 
plebeian nobiles sought the office. For the Cassii, however, the tribunate had provided 
a significant springboard for the career of one of the family’s most famous members: 
L. Cassius Longinus Ravilla. His landmark tribunate had been the source of his 
tremendous political popularity.2 On the other hand, a C. Cassius (cos. 96 or 73?) had 
tried but failed to win election to the office, despite then going on to win the 
consulship.3       
That Cassius was tribune at a critical juncture in Roman history requires no 
argument. In the latter half of 50, as Caesar and Pompey sought but failed to curtail 
each other’s extraordinary power, armed conflict seemed increasingly likely.4 
Diplomacy, if it was ever more than political posturing, had ground to a halt, despite 
the overwhelming support for a peaceful compromise.5 The day after Curio had 
floated a proposal that would envisage both grandees relinquish their imperium, the 
consul C. Claudius Marcellus together with the consuls-designate sought out 
Pompeius and charged him with the defence of Italy.6 This occurred on 2 December, 
just eight days before Cassius was set to enter office.  
If the political situation was not serious enough, matters were complicated 
further by family developments. Cassius’ younger brother Quintus, who had also won 
election to the tribunate in 49 (Cassius’ career had been delayed in Syria), now openly 
 
1 Broughton, MRR 2.259.  
2 On Ravilla, see Chapter 2, Section 2.   
3 Cic. Planc. 52.   
4 Attempts were made to terminate Caesar’s proconsular command: Cic. Att. 7.1.5; Fam. 8.11.3; Caes. 
BGall. 8.53.1-2; Suet. Iul. 28.2. Countermeasures were then levelled at Pompey to force him to lay 
aside his power: Liv. Per. 109; Plut. Caes. 30.1-2; App. B Civ. 2.27. 
5 Pompey offered to lay down his command if Caesar did so first: App. B Civ. 2.28; so, too, did Caesar: 
Plut. Caes. 30.1-2. Curio counter-proposed that both Caesar and Pompey relinquish power 
simultaneously: Caes. B Gall. 8.52.4-5; Plut. Cat. Min. 51.6-7; Caes. 30.4-6; Pomp. 58.4-10; Ant. 5.6-
7; App. B Civ. 2.30; Cass. Dio 40.62.3-4. In total, 370 senators were in favour of Curio’s proposal 
whereas 22 were against it, a strong indication of the desire to maintain peace. But cf. Cic. Att. 7.8.4. 
Diplomatic solutions would continue to be floated into the first months of 49. See below.          
 6 Plut. Pomp. 59.1-2; App. B Civ. 2.31; Cass. Dio 40.64.4. Marcellus was senior consul with 
imperium: Broughton, MRR 2.247.      
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joined the cause of Caesar.7 Like Curio, his reasons for this change in support may 
have had nothing to do with political principle, but rather a personal slight.8 As 
previously observed, Quintus had fallen out of favour with his erstwhile commander 
Pompey, whose friends had sought to bring him to trial for his unsavoury conduct as 
quaestor in Spain.9 It is not known what came of the movement to prosecute Quintus, 
but this conflict likely inspired his transfer of allegiance.10 By Roman standards at 
least, he had every right to band together with the Caesarians. Quite what Cassius 
made of this development is hard to know, but it merits exploration, especially since 
his other younger brother Lucius also sided with Caesar. Cassius stood at the other 
end of the political spectrum, as the hostile source behind de viris illustribus notes: 
Tribunus plebis Caesarem oppugnavit.11 The emotive verb may exaggerate the degree 
to which Cassius attempted to resist Caesar’s plans. One point to appreciate is that 
Cassius may have been anti-Caesar rather than pro-Pompey.12 In this case, it is well to 
bear in mind that Brutus, the hereditary enemy of Pompey, fought on his side during 
the civil war. The conflict would divide families, but choosing a side did not 
necessarily mean supporting its leader unreservedly. And though Cassius was at odds 
with his brothers over Caesar, they may still have worked for each other’s election to 
the tribunate.         
Ties of kinship were once thought to be the backbone of Roman politics.13 Yet 
while the theories of Münzer no longer hold sway, it is nevertheless interesting to 
survey cooperation and competition between brothers in the Late Republic. The 
evidence is, perhaps not surprisingly, mixed. Some siblings worked in tandem to 
safeguard each other’s careers, for instance the three Antonii.14 They were particularly 
close in age, and cooperation had decisive advantages. In this regard, the Cassii were 
not dissimilar. It has already been noted that the tyrannicide and Quintus joined forces 
 
7 Cic. Att. 6.8.2, 7.3.5, Fam. 16.11.  
8 On Curio’s switch to Caesar, see Lacey (1961) 318-29.  
9 Cic. Att. 5.20.1, Fam. 15.14. Quintus’ later activities as propraetor in Spain during the civil war were 
notorious: [Caes.] B Alex. 48-64; B Hisp. 42. 
10 Shackleton Bailey (1977) 1.442. 
11 [Aur. Vict.] De vir. ill. 83.4.  
12 Cf. Huß (1977) 115, who writes of Brutus and Cassius as pro-Optimate (or perhaps pro-Senatorial) 
rather than pro-Pompey.   
13 See generally Münzer (1999) [1921]; Syme (1939).  
14 Cic. Fam. 2.18.2 with Hayne (1978) 96-105, p.96: “[They] did indeed work in unison most of the 
time.” See also Cic. Phil. 3.10, 5.25, 7.16, 10.4-5, for Cicero’s characterisation of the brothers. See also 
Bannon (1997) 156. Two Roscii brothers served on campaign together with Cassius in Syria: Plut. 
Crass. 31.2; Cato had served as a volunteer with his brother Caepio, military tribune to the consul L. 
Gellius Publicola: Plut. Cat. Min. 8.1.   
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in 59 to offer aid to Q. Cicero.15 Later, after his stint as Pompey’s quaestor, Quintus 
himself faced the prospect of prosecution. Here too Cassius carefully considered 
coming to his brother’s aid –one expects fraternal pietas forced his hand; family 
members often rallied together to combat such threats. This was certainly the case 
with the Marcelli. M. Marcellus languished in exile after the civil war. To effect his 
restoration, then, his brother Gaius supplicated Caesar in the senate, an act that 
certainly compromised his dignitas.16 (M. Marcellus was recalled.) Brothers, then, 
could present united fronts and defend each other’s interests. Nonetheless, though 
fraternal pietas was a key component of Roman ideology, this by no means meant that 
brotherly solidarity always trumped politics; the gap between ideal and reality is often 
commodious. Consider, for instance, Lepidus the triumvir and L. Munatius Plancus 
(cos. 42). Both of these men proscribed their own brothers in 43.17 One of the most 
powerful themes of Lucan’s epic poem on the civil war is that brother fought against 
brother.18 Though none of the Cassii brothers ever faced each other on the field of 
battle, their political loyalties were split and their personal relationships perhaps 
strained. The Cassii were certainly not the only family that found themselves on 
opposite sides during the civil war.19 Ultimately, unlike the cases of the Cicerones or 
the Antonii, the evidence does not permit speculation on the fraternal solidarity of the 
Cassii, though as outlined there is some data that shows a conscious desire to work 
together and support one another in times of familial danger.20 In the end, holding 
differing political views did not preclude mutual support.  
The day before Cassius entered his magistracy, Curio had ferociously picked 
apart the career and record of Pompey, a tendentious and vituperative assault that, 
according to some sources, forced the stunned general to resume the practice of 
declamation, in order that he might better rebut his bitter critic.21 M. Antonius, who 
entered office on the same day as Cassius, continued where Curio left off; he 
lambasted Pompey at a contio and accused him of precipitating war (21 December).22 
 
15 See Chapter 3, Section 10.   
16 Cic. Fam. 4.4.3.  
17 Vell. Pat. 2.67; App. B Civ. 4.12. 
18 On the importance of brother fighting brother in Lucan, see Leigh (1997). 
19 Shackleton Bailey (1960) 267. The civil war also put great strain on Cicero’s relationship with his 
brother and nephew.   
20 As noted in the previous chapter, Cassius seems eager to come to the aid of his brother Quintus, who 
faced the prospect of prosecution.  
21 Suet. Rhet. 1. Cf. Liv. Per. 109.  
22 Cic. Att. 7.8.5. Antonius spoke of terror armorum. 
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Naturally these attacks did little to cool the tensions between the two camps. If 
Plutarch can be trusted, Pompey had told the senate he need only stamp the ground 
and soldiers would rise up and defend Italy against Caesar.23 Cooler heads did not 
prevail in the new year; on 1 January, Antonius forced the consuls to publish a letter 
from Caesar, which contained (so Caesar later claimed) the mildest of demands.24  
Cicero, who found the letter menacing, tried to effect a reconciliation, but to no 
avail.25  On 7 January, despite attempts to broker a compromise, the senate passed the 
so-called senatus consultum ultimum, the emergency decree with potentially wide-
ranging powers and vague parameters. Antonius and Cassius’ brother Quintus fled 
Rome, allegedly in the dress of slaves. The flight of the tribunes, Cicero later implied, 
provided the “pretext” for war.26 Only a month after Cassius entered office, Caesar 
crossed the Rubicon. 
When news of Caesar’s movements reached Rome its effect was to prompt a 
mass exodus of senators on 17 January.27 It is probable that Cassius numbered among 
the diaspora. As a tribune of the people, he was technically forbidden from leaving 
the city, a fact Cicero alludes to (but then so too were Antonius and Q. Cassius).28 
Pompey, whose decision to abandon the city had profound consequences, set up 
makeshift29 headquarters in Luceria at the end of January, and it seems clear that 
Cassius was in tow.30  
Cassius was soon asked by Pompey to deliver a message to the consuls. On 7 
February, Cassius arrived at Capua to instruct the chief magistrates that the general 
wished them to return to Rome and remove all the money from the treasury.31 No 
doubt afraid of Caesar’s surprising speed, the consuls requested that Pompey himself 
head to Picenum first. The request came to nothing; the treasury would remain in 
Caesarian hands. For some scholars, the failure of Pompey to retain the treasury hints 
 
23 Plut. Caes. 33.5, Pomp. 57.9; cf. App. B Civ. 2.37.  
24 Caes. B Civ. 1.5: lenissima postulata. However, cf. Cic. Fam. 16.11.2. 
25  Cic. Fam. 16.12.2, Att. 15.3.1; Phil. 2.24. Vell. Pat. 2.48.5; Plut. Cic. 37.1, Caes. 31.1-2, Pomp. 
59.5-6, Ant. 5.8. 
26 Cic. Fam. 6.6. 
27 Cic. Att. 7.11.3-4, 8.3.3, 9.10.2; Caes. B Civ. 1.14.1-5; Plut. Cat. Min. 52.1-53.1, Cic. 37.1-3, Caes. 
33.1-34.4, Pomp. 60.5-61.7; Suet. Iul. 75.1; App. B Civ. 2.36; Cass. Dio 41.6.1; Oros. 6.16.   
28 Tribunes could not leave Rome during their tenure: Mackay (2004) 36; Cic. Att. 9.1.4.  
29 I do not subscribe wholely to the view that Pompey had been carefully preparing for war with 
Caesar, pace Welch (2012) 43-57 .   
30 Cic. Att. 7.13a.3, 7.20.  
31 Cic. Att. 7.21.2.    
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that his war effort was in disarray.32 What effect this inauspicious start had on Cassius 
is difficult to know, but the sequel is interesting.  Once he had delivered Pompey’s 
message, he did not return immediately to the general. Instead, he lingered at 
Formiae, where he watched events unfold closely along with M. Lepidus, L. Manlius 
Torquatus and Cicero. On 10 February, Cassius and Cicero met. Ineluctably, the 
course of the war and the likeliest outcomes were discussed. The consular recollected 
later:  
etsi, ut saepe soleo mecum recordari, sermo familiaris meus tecum et item mecum 
tuus adduxit utrumque nostrum ad id consilium ut uno proelio putaremus, si non 
totam causam, at certe nostrum iudicium definiri convenire. 
And yet, I often recall how in talking familiarly to each other, you to me no less 
than I to you, we were both led to the persuasion that our verdict, if not the entire 
issue, might properly be decided by the result of a single battle.33        
Their assessment was prescient. Around two years later, Cicero remarked that Cassius 
had sent him a letter from Pompey’s headquarters at Luceria, which may be dated to 
around February 49, probably advising him to stay neutral in the civil war (Cic. Fam. 
15.15.4: “I only wish I had followed the advice in that first letter of yours from 
Luceria”).34 Cassius, however, rejoined Pompey and committed himself to his cause, 
though he may have had serious doubts about entrusting the carnifex iuvenis with the 
command against Caesar. Pompey was hardly a paragon of constitutionalism. After 
joining Pompey, Cassius was appointed as a fleet prefect.    
 
5.2 PRAEFECTUS CLASSIS 
Why did Pompey appoint Cassius, a relatively young noble who had so far only 
attained the quaestorship (and tribunate), as one of his prefects of the fleet? This is a 
question worthy of extended exploration, particularly as one scholar suggests that 
Pompey made his naval appointments without regard for “seafaring talent.”35 It is 
possible that Cassius had simply been appointed because of his nobility, although in 
this regard that would make Pompey little different from Caesar.36 Pompey’s 
appointment of Bibulus as a senior commander of the fleet supports this hypothesis, 
 
32 So Shackleton Bailey (1968) 1.451. 
33 Cic. Fam. 15.15.1.  
34 See the comments of Shackleton Bailey (1977) 2.310. 
35 Gray-Fow (1993) 141. 
36 The patrician Dolabella had been appointed a prefect of the fleet with dire consequences: Broughton, 
MRR 2.281. 
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as his military and naval capacity does not appear to have been first-rate.37 But it does 
not hold true entirely.38  
It is unlikely that there were no other candidates available to serve as prefect, 
even though the position would be far away from any eventual land conflict.39 As a 
perspicacious commander, Pompey may have realised that Cassius had genuine 
military aptitude, as his exploits against the Parthians had demonstrated. A tested 
commander, Cassius was not out of place in the company of other talented officers 
who found themselves in command of fleets, such as M. Octavius and L. Libo.40 It is 
important to remember that Pompey’s grand naval strategy, which involved the 
systematic encirclement of Italy, formed the backbone of his plan to defeat Caesar.41 
So Cassius was placed in a position of great importance. Cassius’ close proximity to 
Cato should not be overlooked either.42 Nor should the fact that he was placed in 
command of the Syrian fleet.43 Given his extended and successful service in Syria, 
Cassius had demonstrated considerable military acumen and resilience at an early age. 
Furthermore, as Cassius undoubtedly had clients in Syria, it would be natural that he 
lead the Syrian fleet, as Pompey had asked for the province to provide finance, 
recruits and ships.44 Bibulus, who was Cassius’ successor as proconsul of Syria, will 
have been aware of Cassius’ Syrian connections and military skills. Cassius was thus 
a blue-blooded loyalist, who had been tested as a military commander, and enjoyed 
connections with influential figures in Syria. His appointment made perfect sense.    
 An existing friendship with Pompey may also explain Cassius’ appointment. 
And yet, the evidence is hardly compelling. The proximity of Cassius to Pompey is 
difficult to judge, for a number of reasons. Notorious as a fickle friend, the great man 
has been accused of casting aside his allies when they failed to serve any further 
purpose. Cicero and Gabinius are notable examples.45 Even if there were concrete 
evidence of a friendship with Cassius, then, it would be hard to maintain that it was an 
 
37 Syme (1987) 186-7. 
38 See Welch (2012) 50-57.  
39 Suolahti (1955) 242: There “seems to have been a great number of exceptionally competent men of 
noble birth in the prefectship working for the good cause” during the civil war. 
40 Welch (2012) 62.  
41 Cic. Att. 9.6.3. Systematic encirclement: Vervaet (2006) 939; Cf. Welch (2012) 55, who notes 
Pompey had used the same strategy against Mithridates. On the grand strategy thesis, see especially 
Welch (2012).   
42 Tatum (2008) 155, speaks of Cassius and his connection with the “circle of Cato”, plausible enough, 
although not well attested in the sources.  
43 Caes. BCiv. 3.5.3. 
44 Butcher (2003) 36.  
45 Seager (2002) 102; cf. Syme (1938) 123-4.  
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enduring one, given how fluid Roman alliances were. More importantly, there is not a 
shred of contemporary evidence that firmly connects the two men. To be sure, later 
accounts have the young Cassius hauled before Pompey as a result of a feisty tête-à-
tête with Faustus Sulla.46 And he is reported to have invoked the statue of Pompey on 
the morning of the Ides.47 But these, even if true, in no way suggest an intimate 
friendship. A peculiar anecdote in Dio –which claims Pompey was forever suspicious 
of men named Cassius– is likely to be an exaggerated literary device.48 Nevertheless, 
Cassius’ father did support Pompey’s bid for the eastern command, not that his 
backing was necessarily sufficient to gain him political capital.49 One suggestive 
piece of evidence is that Pompey chose Q. Cassius as his quaestor sine sorte, an 
indication perhaps that there were at least some bonds between the two families.50 
The position of prefect of a fleet was one of high esteem, and could furnish 
Cassius’ career with further military glory, particularly if Pompey were to triumph 
over Caesar.51 When Cassius began commanding the Syrian fleet is unknown, though 
it may not have been until after Pompey’s son transferred Laelius and C. Triarius to 
Brundisium.52 This would have been a long delay before entering the war. Caesar 
seems to imply that Cassius’ fleet was separate at B Civ. 3.5, which would indicate 
that the whereabouts of Laelius and Triarius would be irrelevant.  
What was Cassius’ job? Pompey’s naval commanders were charged with 
patrolling and preventing further reinforcements reaching Caesar, either from Italy or 
Sicily.53 By throwing down a net across the seas Pompey would control the grain 
supply, which he hoped would force Caesar’s army to capitulate. In short, Pompey’s 
eminently sound strategy was to starve Caesar of supplies, forcing him to surrender 
without bloodshed. The importance of Cassius’ task, therefore, should not be 
underestimated. It is unclear when Pompey appointed Cassius as a prefect of the fleet, 
or when he began performing his duties.54 Cassius’ ships had been sourced from 
 
46 Plut. Brut. 9.1-4; cf. Val. Max. 3.1.3. On this episode, see the discussion in Chapter 3, Section 2.   
47 Plut. Brut. 17.  
48 Cass. Dio 42.5.6.  
49 On Cassius’ father, see Chapter 2, Section 3. 
50 Quintus’ selection sine sorte:  Cic. Att. 6.6.  
51 Esteem of prefect position: Suolahti (1955) 240.    
52 Carter (1993) 219.  
53 Peskett (1903) 155.  
54 The ancient testimony for Cassius’ conduct as a prefect of the fleet is: Caes. B Civ. 3.101.1-7; Front. 
Str. 4.17.4; [Aur. Vict.] De vir. ill. 83.4-5. Carter (1993) 219, proposes Cassius may not have held 
command of the Syrian fleet until after C. Pompey’s son transferred Laelius and Triarius to 
Brundisium. But Caesar seems to imply that Cassius’ fleet was separate at B Civ. 3.5. 
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Cilicia, Phoenicia and Syria,55 all areas where Cassius may have had clients and 
connections (particularly Syria).56 Cassius found himself stationed off the coast of 
Italy and Sicily. Though far from the main theatre of war, it was imperative that 
Cassius did not let any Caesarian vessels slip through the Pompeian net.  
 Cassius performed his duties with aplomb. (As will be seen, Frontinus yet 
again highlights his military skills in Strategemata.)57 Having reconnoitred the area of 
Sicily, Cassius observed that Caesar’s fleet was divided in two.58 One part was 
stationed at Vibo, under the command of P. Sulpicius Rufus (pr. 48); the other part 
was at Messana, under the command of M. Pomponius.59 Before he realised the 
tyrannicide was approaching, Cassius attacked Pomponius in the Straits of Messana. 
The attack must have taken place in around late August, as news of Pharsalus arrived 
shortly thereafter.60 
Evidently, Cassius planned his attack carefully. He had prepared fireships, 
which he sent against Pomponius’ fleet,61 which was hemmed in and stranded in the 
straits. All were destroyed. Frontinus reports: 
Cassius onerarias naves, non magni ad alia usus, accensas opportuno 
vento in classem hostium misit et incendio eam consumpsit. 
Cassius set fire to some transports which were of no great use for 
anything else, and sent them with a fair wind against the fleet of the 
enemy, thereby destroying it by fire.62 
As Caesar and more overtly Frontinus make clear, Cassius employed a clever naval 
strategy to attack the utterly unprepared Caesarians. This caused pandemonium 
amongst them, and the town of Messana almost fell to Cassius.   
However, one scholar has suggested that the praise Caesar lavishes on Cassius 
is designed as a public olive branch, to rekindle relations after the divisive civil war.63 
And yet, this is not the purpose of Caesar’s Bellum Civile.64 Caesar’s description of 
Cassius’ conduct remains mixed. For instance, Caesar lists several advantages Cassius 
 
55 Caes. BCiv. 3.101.1.   
56 See Chapter 4, Section 4. 
57 Front. Str. 4.17.4.  
58 Caes. BCiv. 3.101.1.  
59 M. Pomponius is otherwise unknown: Gray-Fow (1993) 167n.70, speculates that this man may have 
served with Pompey in the campaign against the pirates nearly 20 years earlier.     
60 Caes. BCiv. 3.101.3-4, on news of Pharsalus arriving opportunely.   
61 Caes. BCiv. 3.101.2-3. 
62 Front. Str. 4.7.17. 
63 Dettenhofer (1992) 123-8.  
64 For a discussion of the Caesar’s Bellum Civile, see Grillo (2012).  
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enjoyed in his naval encounters: his opponent’s divided fleet; a favourable wind; 
Pomponius’ disorganised forces; and no patrols.  Despite these advantages, Cassius 
failed to take Messana and Caesar’s forces rallied. In his second encounter, Cassius 
was again successful, although Caesar’s forces still again hold fast and counter-attack. 
Cassius narrowly escapes the dishonour of being captured. It seems clear that Caesar 
is trying to diminish the achievements of Cassius, rather than extol them. However, 
Caesar does appear to commend the celeritas with which Cassius attacked. Cassius 
demonstrates speed and imagination in his well thought-out strike against Pomponius. 
Caesar’s account furnishes very mixed (and small) praise for Cassius, which is 
unsurprising given the dictator’s ultimate goal of self-glorification in the Bellum 
Civile.            
Of course, Cassius’ sea battles at Messana and Vibo did not decide the fate of 
the civil war. But they were not an entirely unimportant sideshow either. If nothing 
else, they demonstrate the power of the Pompeian navy, and of the strength of 
Pompey’s strategy.65 Cassius again proved he was a force to be reckoned with. He 
completely destroyed Pomponius’ fleet, and he damaged several of Sulpicius’ ships. 
Like Frontinus, Gray-Fow notes Cassius’ “talent” and “imagination” in creating 
fireships to paralyse the enemy.66 Above all, the tyrannicide had yet again shown 
himself to be a more than capable military commander. Caesar took note.      
 
5.3 CAESAR AND THE HELLESPONT 
Cassius’ first appearance in Appian’s Bella Civilia (2.88) is notoriously incorrect. 
Appian wrongly places him in the Hellespont after Pharsalus, where he encounters an 
under-prepared Caesar, then in pursuit of Pompey. Though “Cassius” was –as his 
campaign near Sicily demonstrated– πολεμικώτατον, he nevertheless surrendered to 
Caesar, despite commanding a superior naval force.67 For Appian, this narrative 
digression permits him not only to muse on the capricious nature of τύχη, but also to 
identify and foreground Cassius as the leader of Caesar’s assassination.68 However, as 
scholars have long observed, Cassius could not have been in the Hellespont in the 
 
65 Gray-Fow (1993) 168-69.  
66 Gray-Fow (1993) 167.  
67 Suet. Iul. 63.1. Caesar was in a navicula and Cassius had ten armoured ships, rostratae naves. App. 
B Civ. 2.88, exaggerates in stating Cassius had seventy (ἑβδομήκοντα) triremes under his command.       
68 For discussion of the passage, see Gowing (1992) 165-6. See also Gabba (1956) 137-8, on the role of 
tyche in Appian’s narrative, which discusses this incident specifically. Cf. Bucher (2000) 441.   
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immediate aftermath of Pharsalus, as he was then in southern Italy, waiting to confirm 
the outcome of the civil war. Even by March 47, he had still only progressed as far as 
Rhodes.69 Hence it would have been physically impossible for Cassius to have 
encountered Caesar in the Hellespont. Appian’s error is grave, although it is possible 
that he may have purposely distorted his narrative for artistic convenience.70    
Both Suetonius and Cassius Dio serve as a corrective to Appian and identify 
the commander of the Pompeian ships as a Lucius Cassius.71 But this immediately 
raises a problem. The only prominent L. Cassius at this time was Cassius’ brother, yet 
he was a loyal Caesarian officer throughout the civil war, and stationed at Thessaly, 
far from the Dardanelles.72 And Suetonius clearly states that the L. Cassius who came 
upon Caesar in the Hellespont was partis adversae.73 As a result, scholars have 
concluded that this L. Cassius must be an unknown.74                  
          Though identifying L. Cassius may be beyond the limits of prosopographical 
data, there is room to refute the dubious scholarly argument that his capitulation in the 
Hellespont inspired Cicero’s anecdote at Phil. 2.26.75 (Cicero had written that Cassius 
would have killed Caesar at the Cydnus River, if the latter had not moored his ships 
on the opposite bank from the tyrannicide.) Yet these stories seem irreconcilable. It 
would be hard to confuse or conflate these episodes, given that their details are very 
different in all respects.76 The locations are specific: L. Cassius surrendered in the 
 
69 Rhodes: Cic. Att. 11.13.1; Cassius had initially headed to Cyrene after Pharsalus: Cass. Dio 42.13.1.  
Cassius in Sicily and southern Italy: Caes. BCiv. 3.5.3, 3.101. See also Rice-Holmes (1923) 3.482. 
70 But Gowing (1992) 165n.6, notes that Appian can be careless with praenomina, terming Catiline 
“Gaius” rather than Lucius, and mistaking Lucius and Gaius Cassius at Mith. 11. Cf. Gabba (1956) 
138, who argues that Appian reworked this event for his own ends. This perhaps explains why he has 
made such a “grossolano errore” (138n.3) in identifying Gaius Cassius as the naval commander.   
71 Suet. Iul. 63.1; Cass. Dio 42.6.2.  
72 Caes. BCiv. 3.34-6; Cass. Dio 41.51.2; ILS 39; Broughton, MRR 2.275.  
73 Suet. Iul. 63.1; Fröhlich, RE (1899) 3.1728, unwisely indentified this L. Cassius as the “Bruder des 
Mörders”. Corrected by Rice-Holmes (1923) 3.482. 
74 L. Cassius as otherwise unknown: Rice-Holmes (1923) 3.482; Butler and Cary (1927) 126-7; 
Broughton, MRR 2.283; Gelzer (1969b) 244, with n.1; Ramsey (2003) 202; Münzer, RE (1899) 3.1680, 
no. 14. Drumann-Groebe (1964) [18992] 2.102n.4: “Der Cassius, welcher im Hellespont die Schiffe 
übergab, scheint weder Gaius, der Caesarmörder, noch sein Bruder Lucius gewesen zu sein, sondern 
ein anderer L. Cassius.”  
75 Ramsey (2003) 202, argues that the story preserved about Lucius Cassius “may have inspired” 
Cicero’s anecdote. So, too, Wuilleumier (1959) apud Canfora (2007) 222, 227n.36. There is no 
obvious L. Cassius who could have served as a Pompeian naval officer. If L. Cassius Longinus (mil. tr. 
69) was still alive then he would be a possibility. The son of L. Cassius (tr. pl. 44), who died at 
Philippi, would have been too young. Some scholars have noted, based on Asc. Mil. 54-5, that an L. 
Cassius had prosecuted M. Saufeius. Most identify this man as Cassius’ brother, but not all: see 
Marshall (1985) 210. Lewis (2006) 258, proposes, a priori, that he may have been connected to the 
Catilinarian Cassius, but this cannot be proven. It is also noteworthy that an unidentified L. Cassius 
served as monetalis in 60 (See Chapter 3, Section 7).   
76 So argues Canfora (2007) 222, without further elaboration.  
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Hellespont, whereas Cassius planned to murder Caesar at the river Cydnus, near 
Tarsus; L. Cassius enjoyed a naval advantage and yet yielded to Caesar; Cassius’ 
forces are unknown, though his plan was foiled strangely because Caesar anchored on 
an opposite bank from the one that had been anticipated. Further, since Cicero was on 
intimate terms with Cassius, it is possible that the latter had privately boasted about 
such an attempt at Cydnus, which ultimately he did not make. What is clear, 
therefore, is that two separate events occurred involving two different Cassii. Both 
had fought for Pompey, and both asked Caesar for mercy after Pharsalus.    
 
5.4 DIEHARDS AND DEPRECATORES 
Cassius gave up the fight on learning of Pompey’s death. At Cyrenaica, as Dio relates, 
the Republican forces finally split. One group, the diehards (led by the irrepressible 
Cato) vowed to continue the fight, perhaps fearing that Caesar’s clemency would not 
be extended to them, but more probably genuinely finding the prospect of his victory 
offensive.77 These men now headed to Africa to continue the resistance. Another 
group of men, the deprecatores, decided they would risk their luck heading to Asia to 
seek out Caesar for a pardon, the victor’s policy of forgiveness now being widely 
known.78 A final indecisive group simply chose to flee in any direction they thought 
might offer them safe harbour.79 Most headed to Greece, which was under the control 
of Q. Fufius Calenus. These men wanted to wait and see how events unfolded. In 
tarrying at Rhodes, Cassius seems to have initially adopted this policy.80 Cicero’s 
correspondence hints that, just as the tyrannicide had committed himself to heading 
for Alexandria to seek out Caesar, he suddenly changed his mind, perhaps discovering 
that Caesar had suffered several setbacks in Egypt.81 This hesitation probably reflects 
Cassius’ desire not to overtly commit himself to a pardon. He waited as long as he 
could to see who would gain the upper hand in the Alexandrian skirmishes. Evidently, 
he left the door ajar should he wish to reunite with the Pompeians, if they gained 
ascendancy; but eventually, as the Pompeians’ chances of success diminished, he 
 
77 BAfr. 64.1; Vell. Pat. 2.54.2; Plut. Cat. Min. 56.1-2, Caes. 52.1; Flor. 2.13.64; App. B Civ. 2.87; 
Cass. Dio 42.9.3-13.5, 56.2. 
78 Cic. Att. 11.6.7, shows Cicero thought Q. Cicero travelled with a party of deprecatores to Asia prior 
to 27 November, but Cassius was not in his group. 
79 Cic. Att. 11.16.2; Cic. Att. 11.15.2.  
80 Rhodes: see n.69 above. 
81 Cic. Att. 11.13.1, 11.15.2. 
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made peace with Caesar.82 In the end, Cassius made what must have been the 
unpalatable decision to accept Caesar’s pardon.  
 
5.5 CAESAR’S PARDON 
The decision of Cassius to seek a pardon from Caesar was momentous for many 
reasons. For one thing, he would be forsaking the Republican cause and deserting 
many of his friends and allies –standing aloof from the res publica. In so doing, some 
of the die-hard Republicans may well have considered him legally a hostis, or so is 
the argument of K. Raaflaub.83 (However, Cicero had been allowed to abandon the 
Republican cause –perhaps his age was a factor.) Ultimately, as a connection of Cato, 
Cassius could be assured relative protection as the former had ensured all those who 
wished could leave the Republican camp unharmed.84 It is also clear that Cassius 
wavered in his decision to go and seek a pardon from Caesar, perhaps because of 
Caesar’s changing circumstances, or perhaps because he truly was conflicted as to 
what was the best course of action.85 Though Caesar promoted his policy of 
clementia, his pardoning of men was not always assured, especially those who had 
opposed him more than once. Nevertheless, Caesar pardoned Brutus, Libo, Lucceius 
and Varro, so it would be reasonable to assume that Cassius would secure forgiveness 
too. However, Cassius had inflicted significant blows against Caesar’s fleet in Sicily 
and the neighbouring areas, which may have made him enemies and irritated the 
dictator. J. Linderski suggests that both Cassius and Brutus embraced Caesar’s pardon 
with the “prospect of a new career”.86 And yet, Caesar’s clementia was offensive to 
proud nobiles, and this may explain why Cassius delayed so long in seeking out the 
victor of Pharsalus.  
 Plutarch writes that Brutus had been instrumental in securing Cassius’ 
pardon.87 Brutus had received his reprieve soon after Pharsalus, so it is possible he 
“softened” Caesar towards Cassius.88 Had Cassius also received assistance from his 
 
82 See Cic. Att. 11.20. On the timeframe and Cassius’ decision to make for Caesar, see Cic. Fam. 15.15. 
83 Raaflaub (1974) 237-8; However, cf. Welch (2012) 77-8. See also, Meier (1982) 7.  
84 Plut. Cat. Min. 55.3. See further Welch (2012) 78.   
85 Wavering: Cic. Att. 11.15.2. 
86 Linderski (1996b) 561.  
87 Plut. Brut. 7.1, 6.5, cf. Caes. 62.3. 
88 Huß (1977) 115: “Die Versöhnung des Cassius mit Caesar kam durch die Vermittlung des Brutus – 
seit einigen Jahren Schwager des Cassius – zustande.” This scholar argues that there is little evidence 
to suggest that these two figures were particularly close, despite a later historical tradition which sprang 
up to the contrary.  
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brother Lucius?89 Quintus could not serve as an intercessor as he had recently 
perished in a shipwreck.90 If Cassius received his pardon around the same time as Q. 
Cicero, it would have been in July 47, near Tarsus, Cilicia.91  
 As noted, since Cassius had not participated in the battle at Pharsalus itself, it 
could be argued that he had not troubled Caesar and was more likely to secure a 
pardon. But Cassius had damaged some of Caesar’s ships and taken an active part of 
Pompey’s policy of containment. He also delayed in heading to seek out Caesar, 
perhaps wracked with guilt about deserting the Republican cause, or perhaps because 
he thought (if only fleetingly) that there was a chance the remaining anti-Caesar 
forces might yet still triumph.  If Caesar did pardon Cassius in Syria, one topic of 
conversation may have been the Parthians, as Caesar was even then making plans for 
a campaign to avenge the defeat of Crassus.92 
 
5.6 CAESAR’S LEGATE  
After his pardon, Cassius was appointed as one of Caesar’s personal legates (Cassium 
sibi legavit).93 He served as a legate in 47 and perhaps 46.94 Cassius’ legateship can 
be viewed from a couple of perspectives. On the one hand, given that he found 
himself on the losing side of the civil war, Caesar’s appointment perhaps indicates 
that Cassius survived the political aftermath of the conflict remarkably well. Cicero, 
for example, puts a very positive gloss on Cassius’ legateship in a letter to his exiled 
friend, Caecina:    
at nos quem ad modum est complexus! Cassium sibi legavit, Brutum Galliae 
praefecit, Sulpicium Graeciae.  
And think how he [Caesar] has taken us into his favour: Cassius made his 
legate, Brutus appointed to Cisalpine Gaul, Sulpicius to Greece.95   
 
89 Consider the case of C. Marcellus on behalf of his brother (Fam. 4.4.3). 
90 Drowned: BAlex. 64.2-3; Cass. Dio 42.16.2. 
91 Cic. Att. 11.20.1. 
92 Plans: App. B Civ. 3.312, 4.250.  
93 Cic. Fam. 6.6.10. Cf. Cic. Fam. 15.15.3. For discussion, see Rice-Holmes (1923) 3.291.  
94 The year of Cassius’ legateship has occasioned debate. T.R.S. Broughton maintains that Cassius 
served in 47 and 46: Broughton, MRR 2.290, 2.300. But some scholars have argued for 46 alone: 
Rawson (1991) [1986] 507, argues Fam. 6.6.10 indicates Caesar only made Cassius a legate in 46, 
presumably because Cicero wrote the letter in September 46. Yet Cicero is seeking to cheer up a 
correspondent in exile; he deploys Cassius’ example to demonstrate the general mercy Caesar has 
shown to the losing side, not necessarily the most recent example of clementia. Cf. Ryan (1999) 154, 
who argues Cassius was curule aedile in 47, and thus perhaps Caesar’s legate in 46. 
95 Cic. Fam. 6.6.10. Cf. Cic. Fam. 15.15.3. For discussion, see Rice-Holmes (1923) 3.291.  
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Rather than suffer recrimination, Cassius had been rewarded with a prominent 
military commission. From this perspective, then, Cassius could count himself 
fortunate: Caesar’s clementia ensured that he could begin to rebuild his career.  
However, Caesar may have had less beneficent reasons for bestowing a 
legateship on Cassius. It has already been observed that Cassius demonstrated 
impressive military acuity during the civil war, and of this ability Caesar was well 
aware. It has also been seen that Cassius was hesitant to seek out Caesar after 
Pharsalus. When considering these points, Caesar likely concluded that Cassius’ 
loyalty was far from assured, and his military experience presented a potential threat. 
(Legati enjoyed propraetorian power and often exercised command with semi-
independence.)96 Thus, whereas Brutus was despatched to the lucrative and 
important province of Cisalpine Gaul,97 Cassius would remain directly under 
Caesar’s watchful eye.  
Whatever Caesar’s exact thinking, of more importance is Cassius’ response. 
Though some modern scholars have suggested he actively served on campaign with 
Caesar (and was present at the famously short Battle of Zela), it instead appears that 
he promptly returned to Italy.98 A letter from Cicero to Cassius confirms that he was 
already back at Brundisium in mid-to late August of 47. So if Cassius had reached 
Brundisium by the end of August, it is unlikely that he participated in Caesar’s 
campaign against Pharnaces of Bosporus –the quickness of his return to the Italian 
mainland would be even more impressive than the speed of Caesar’s victory. More 
importantly, Cassius remained in Italy (predominantly in Brundisium) until after 
Caesar’s victory at Munda. Whilst it is certainly not surprising that Cassius did not 
partake in the African and Spanish campaigns, in which he would be fighting against 
his former Republican comrades, it is interesting to consider the fact that after 
Cassius was appointed as Caesar’s legate, he appears to have withdrawn from public 
life entirely. Of course, it is possible that Cassius assisted Caesar in some unknown 
official capacity, and legates were not always assigned military duties. Indeed, some 
 
96 OCD4 (2012) 815-16.  
97 Plut. Brut. 6.10-12, on Brutus’ service in Cisalpine Gaul, as a result of Caesar’s appointment.   
98 Fought at Zela: Smith (1844) 2.800; Tyrrell and Purser (1933) 6.xciii: “He certainly took part in the 
campaign against Pharnaces.” Cf. Clarke (1981) 34; Stevenson (2015) 160. Letter to Cassius: Cic. 
Fam. 15.15. On the dating of this letter, see Marinone (2004) 188.   
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were assigned logistical or diplomatic duties, or whatever the general required.99 But 
perhaps it is telling that he did not return to politics until 45.  
Therefore, Cassius’ appointment as a legate may best be understood as a 
sinecure. The contrast between his and Brutus’ legateships is interesting. Favoured 
by Caesar, Brutus enjoyed service in an important province; distrusted by Caesar, 
Cassius, if he served at all, quickly withdrew from public life.100 Ultimately, it was 
yet another propaganda coup for Caesar, who could boast that one more former 
opponent was now flocking to his cause. For Cassius, the legateship provided a 
modicum of political dignity (his career was still progressing), although he would be 
aware that in reality accepting this commission was a face-saving gesture of 
submission. Cassius would have found it deeply troubling to accept Caesar’s 
legateship –it is little wonder that he returned to Italy as fast as he did. Perhaps 
accepting Caesar’s unpalatable legateship also helps to explain the existence of an 
exculpatory anecdote that Cassius tried to assassinate Caesar at Tarsus.101    
 
5.7 INTERCESSOR 
Though Plutarch creates the impression that Cassius owed his pardon from Caesar 
entirely to Brutus, other evidence calls this into question.102 Not least is a peculiar 
comment in Cicero, which smacks of exaggeration, but which nonetheless merits 
examination. When discussing the fate of those diehard Republicans in Africa who 
had refused to come to terms with Caesar, Cicero notes: 
quae si fuisset, eandem clementiam experta esset Africa quam cognovit 
Asia, quam etiam Achaia te, ut opinor, ipso legato ac deprecatore.   
          Had that been forthcoming, Africa would have experienced the clemency 
which Asia came to know, as did Achaia also, whose ambassador and 
intercessor was, I believe, none other than yourself.103  
Even if the precise details elude reconstruction, there can be no ambiguity over the 
meaning of deprecatore.104 Here Cicero claims for Cassius a role as an intercessor on 
behalf of the Pompeian-Republicans who had fled to Greece after their defeat at 
Pharsalus. If Cassius was instrumental in any such negotiations –and there seems little 
 
99 Varro, Ling. 5.87.  
100 See also Huß (1977) 115: “Während Brutus mit Caesars Zustimmung i.J. 46/45 die Provinz Gallia 
Cisalpina verwaltete, zog sich Cassius anscheinend völlig aus dem politischen Leben zurück.” 
101 See Section 8 below on this story.  
102 Plut. Brut. 6.5. Moles (1979) 86: “There is no reason to doubt that Brutus was instrumental in 
securing Cassius’ pardon.”   
103 Cic. Fam. 15.15.2 with Shackleton Bailey (1977) 2.310.  
104 Shackleton Bailey (1977) 2.310: “Nothing is known of the circumstances”.  
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reason to dismiss the evidence– it raises a number of questions. When and where had 
he served as intercessor? Had he been selected by other aristocrats to petition Caesar 
on their behalf? What were his credentials for acting as an ambassador? And why 
would Caesar listen to him specifically? Of course, one simple answer to these 
questions is that Cassius was simply the man on the spot at the right time.  
Cassius is likely to have secured his own pardon from Caesar in early 47 at 
Tarsus in Cilicia. (This is the place that Cicero alleges Cassius tried to assassinate 
Caesar.)105 Plutarch writes that Brutus, who had been pardoned already, softened 
(ἐπράϋνε) Caesar towards Cassius.106 The tyrannicide may also have received some 
form of support from his brother Lucius, who had served Caesar loyally during the 
civil war. The influence of Servilia with Caesar on behalf of her son-in-law cannot 
be dismissed either, considering her famous influence even after the dictator’s 
murder.107 Whatever factors led to Cassius’ pardon, it seems he felt in a strong 
enough position to argue on behalf of others also. Brutus likewise argued before 
Caesar on behalf of others, most famously (and unsuccessfully) for King Deiotarus 
of Galatia. Given the aristocrat’s many social and political obligations, it is not only 
possible but probable that Cassius went before Caesar and petitioned for the pardon 
of other aristocrats eager for the victor’s mercy. We need not imagine that Cassius 
was formally appointed, but simply that other aristocrats and connections asked him 
to put their case to Caesar on their behalf. Though a relatively junior politician 
(Cassius had still attained only the quaestorship), he hailed from a distinguished 
family and was clearly a man of determination. Caesar would have been unwise to 
easily dismiss a man like Cassius.        
  To a degree, however, the image of Cassius going cap in hand to Caesar on 
behalf of his Republican friends jars slightly with his otherwise imperious mien. But 
that is no reason to discount Cicero; in fact, it may indicate another side to Cassius 
hitherto unappreciated. On occasion, he was evidently prepared to compromise his 
beliefs (and willing to sacrifice his dignitas) for the sake of others. Put simply, his 
friends’ safety and careers were more important than his personal prestige. However, 
it should be remembered that not everyone, especially those men still fighting, would 
have been happy with him striking a deal with Caesar. Cassius himself must have felt 
 
105 Cic. Phil. 2.26. See also Moles (1979) 86.  
106 Plut. Brut. 6.5  
107 Meier (1982) 480, is unsure whether Servilia played a hand in Brutus’ reconciliation with and 
pardon by Caesar.   
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squeamish about the prospect of a pardon. As N. Rosenstein has written in another 
context (military defeat): “survival under the wrong circumstances led to disgrace 
and hence political vulnerability.”108    
If it is accepted that Cassius served as arbitrator and conciliator then the next 
question of particular interest is: how did he convince Caesar to grant his enemies 
clemency? Did he simply plead the cases of the defeated or did he go so far as to 
supplicate Caesar? Though the latter had been quick to promote his policy of 
clementia in the aftermath of Pharsalus, this did not mean necessarily that those who 
had crossed his path would be spared.109 Even at the start of 46, when he had firmly 
established himself as dictator, Caesar was not prepared to recall M. Marcellus from 
exile. It took a personal plea from his brother, Gaius Marcellus, who threw himself at 
Caesar’s feet in supplication, to finally convince the dictator to recall his old 
enemy.110 In the wake of Pharsalus, defeated senators also appealed for mercy from 
Caesar. With outstretched arms and tears in their eyes they prostrated themselves 
before their conqueror, and he forgave all, as he himself reports.111 That Gaius 
Marcellus, the brothers of Q. Ligarius and unnamed senators were prepared to engage 
in these demeaning practices highlights that, in trying circumstances, some senators 
were not above supplication.112 Suetonius reports that no less a man than Lucullus, a 
consular and triumphator, had supplicated Caesar in 59, fearing he would be 
prosecuted.113 Cicero, too, had engaged in a supplication of Pompey, which was 
rejected.114 It is impossible to know what tactics Cassius used to plead the cases of the 
other Republicans still in limbo after Pharsalus. But it should be clear that he might 
have engaged in supplication in addition to an oral entreaty.    
Cassius may also have been motivated by more than just social and political 
obligations. He may have served as an intercessor because he was worried about the 
charge that he had “sold out” the diehard Republicans, as well as his Republican 
ideals (libertas).115 As Cicero’s correspondence hints, he may have been uneasy about 
the civil war from the beginning, and wished to bring peace, stability and harmony 
 
108 Rosenstein (1990) 124.  
109 On Caesar’s policy of clementia, see Weinstock (1971) 237 with n.1.   
110 Cic. Fam. 4.4.3. Members of the senate also appealed to Caesar’s clementia along with Marcellus.  
111 Caes. BCiv. 3.98.1-3. 
112 Cicero had worked for the recall of Q. Ligarius:  Fam. 6.13.3, 6.14. 
113 Suet. Iul. 20.3.  
114 Cic. Att. 10.4.3. 
115 Cass. Dio 42.13.4-5, indicates the Republicans at Cyrene were in dispute as to how to proceed. Cato 
continued to fight, others fled, and Cassius and some others headed to Caesar.  
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back to Roman politics as quickly as possible. Cicero credits Cassius with 
encouraging people to abandon the war spirit and come to terms with the dictator, 
even though he himself was no fan of Caesar.116  
 
5.8 CYDNUS: THE FIRST ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT? 
quid C. Cassius? in ea familia natus quae non modo dominatum, sed ne 
potentiam quidem cuiusquam ferre potuit, me auctorem, credo, desideravit! qui 
etiam sine his clarissimis viris hanc rem in Cilicia ad ostium fluminis Cydni 
confecisset, si ille ad eam ripam quam constituerat, non ad contrariam navis 
appulisset. 
What of Gaius Cassius? Born in a family that could not tolerate any man’s 
superior power, to say nothing of despotism, he needed me, I suppose, to prompt 
him. Even without these most illustrious men, he would have finished the 
business in Cilicia, at the mouth of the Cydnus, if Caesar had moored his ships to 
the bank originally determined instead of the one opposite.117  
 
As noted earlier, Cicero’s claim that Cassius tried to assassinate Caesar near Tarsus, in 
July 47, has consistently split modern scholarly opinion. Some, like L. Canfora, accept 
without reservation the senior statesman’s account; others, notably J.P.V.D. Balsdon, 
dismiss the story as post-assassination braggadocio.118 As neither side of this debate 
has managed to offer convincing evidence for their position, it seems an appropriate 
time to re-examine the historicity of the issue.   
Following Caesar’s victory at Pharsalus, Cassius’ activities are unclear. 
Cassius Dio reports that he had joined his uncle-in-law, Cato, at Cyrene,119 although 
after Pompey’s death (c. 28 September 48) he left, apparently in search of Caesar.120 In 
the early months of 47, however, he had taken refuge at Rhodes; he had studied on the 
island in his youth and may even have owned properties there.121 Finding sanctuary at 
 
116 Cic. Fam. 15.15.1.  
117 Cic. Phil. 2.26.  
118 Prominent scholars who accept the story are: Boissier (1897) 330; TP V.xxix; Meyer (1922) 536; 
Denniston (1926) 114; Lord (1938) 29; Epstein (1987a) 567-8. See especially Canfora (2007) 222-3. 
“The facts are...this attempt was organized by Cassius”. However, several historians refute the story: 
Rice-Holmes (1923) 3.210; Balsdon (1958) 82; Moles (1979) 120; Ramsey (2003) 202. See also 
Drumann-Groebe (1964) [18992] 2.93, who call the account a “Fable”.  
119 Cass. Dio 42.13.1, 5. 
120 Pompey’s death: App. B Civ. 2.84-6; Cass. Dio 42.3.1-5. Caes. B Civ. 3.103-4; Cic. Tusc. 3.66. Cato 
assumed command in October 48, when news of Pompey’s death reached him: Luc. 9.51-293; Plut. 
Cat. Min. 56.3-4. Dio insists Cassius left immediately, but he tarried at Rhodes.    
121 Cic. Att. 11.13.1: Cassius at Rhodes. Studied at Rhodes (and properties): App. B Civ. 4.66-8; Cass. 
Dio 47.33.4; cf. Cic. Fam. 15.14.6.     
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Rhodes may be counted as good fortune; others had not been so lucky.122 Eventually, 
Cassius decided to head from Rhodes to Alexandria, presumably in order to sue for a 
pardon from Caesar, as Q. Cicero and many others had done.123 By then it may have 
become apparent that Caesar had mostly adopted a policy of clementia,124 although, as 
Cicero notes, Cassius appears to have wavered regarding this momentous decision: 
nam C. quidem Cassium aiunt consilium Alexandriam eundi mutavisse.125 This 
tarrying may have been the result of military developments; Caesar had suffered some 
eventful setbacks in Egypt –at one point he had been forced to flee for his life. 
Nevertheless, as was invariably the case, he recovered his position and managed to 
gain the upper hand. As he held victorious assizes across Asia Minor, he most likely 
came across Cassius at Tarsus in July 47.126  
The story of the assassination attempt is, in all probability, not true. So why 
was it promoted? First, Cassius may have wanted to set the record straight; he was the 
first to realise that Caesar must die and he was the architect of his assassination. That 
he would want credit and acknowledgment as Caesar’s tyrannicide is obvious when 
one considers how revered L. Brutus was in the Roman consciousness. He, like 
Cicero, was entitled to the mantle of father of his country. But many men had 
scrambled to join the Republican cause in the wake of Caesar’s death, some even 
reporting they had previously attempted to assassinate the dictator. Most notably, there 
was a story circulating that C. Trebonius had planned to kill Caesar in 45.127 As R.D. 
Murray observes, these “I-all-but-killed-him-myself” stories perhaps forced Cassius to 
reassert his claim to being the original conspirator and mastermind of the plot.128 Since 
 
122 P. Cornelius Lentulus Spinther (cos. 57), L. Cornelius Lentulus Crus (cos. 49), and Pompeius had 
all been refused asylum at Rhodes: Cic. Fam. 12.14.3. Cf. Caes. BCiv. 3.85, 102.7. They perished in 
Africa: [Aur. Vict.] De vir. ill. 78.9 (Spinther); Caes. BCiv. 3.85 (Pompey and Crus). At Cic. Fam. 
11.1.3, D. Brutus suggests heading to Rhodes in the aftermath of the assassination, so it was clearly a 
place of sanctuary.   
123 Cic. Att. 11.13.1 with Marinone (2004) 186, who notes that the letter may be dated to either 8 or 9  
March. Cf. Canfora (2007) 222. On Quintus’ pardon, see note below (Nepos). See also Shackleton 
Bailey (1977) 2.309.  
124 On Caesar’s clemency, see Caes. BCiv. 3.98.1-3; Cic. Phil. 2.5; Nepos, Att. 7.3 (Q. Cicero); Liv. 
Per. 111; Vell. Pat. 2.52.5-6; Plin. HN 7.94; Plut. Brut. 6.1-4, Caes. 46.4, 62.3; App. B Civ. 2.112; 
Cass. Dio 41.62.1-63.6; [Aur. Vict.] De vir. ill. 82.5.  
125 Cic. Att. 11.15.2. 
126 Boissier (1897) 337, argues that Cassius had already received his pardon at this stage, but this is by 
no means certain, especially given Cassius’ tarrying at Rhodes. 
127 Plut. Ant. 13.2; Cic. Phil. 2.34, 13.22. Several figures, including Dolabella and P. Cornelius 
Lentulus Spinther the younger, falsely claimed they had been involved in the conspiracy: App. B Civ. 
2.122; cf. Cass. Dio 44.22.1; Vell. Pat. 2.58.3 (Dolabella); App. B Civ. 2.119; cf. Plut. Caes. 67 
(Spinther et. al.).    
128 Murray (1959) 194; Balsdon (1958) 82: Cassius as “First Conspirator”.      
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Brutus had received much of the praise and was considered the leader of the 
conspiracy, perhaps jealousy too played a role in Cassius’ proactive promotion of the 
‘Tarsus Attempt’, hogwash though it was.    
The ‘Tarsus attempt’ may also have been an exercise in self-exculpation. 
Accepting a pardon from Caesar whilst other Republicans had continued to fight for 
the state may have haunted Cassius and provided fodder for his enemies.129 Cato and 
Cn. Pompeius could not stomach Caesar’s domination and had died valiant deaths 
rather than endure a life of compromised freedoms. By contrast, Cassius had 
humiliatingly begged for a pardon from Caesar and even (shamefully!) accepted a 
position as a legate under his authority.130 To a degree, then, the story of Cassius’ 
attempt on Caesar’s life at Tarsus serves to gloss over an inconvenient truth: Cassius 
had saved his own skin in the aftermath of the civil war. Moreover, as Cicero reveals, 
Cassius had even encouraged others to give up the fight against Caesar.131 Given that 
some of his enemies accused Cassius of murdering Caesar because of personal hatred 
rather than political principle, promoting the ‘Tarsus Attempt’ may have served to 
answer this criticism. He had every reason to encourage the story.132   
He may also have wanted to excuse his humiliating sycophancy in becoming 
Caesar’s legate (Cic. Fam. 6.6.10); he clearly equivocated over proceeding to Caesar 
to sue for a pardon in the first place (Cic. Att. 11.13.1; cf. 11.15.2).133 Even his 
conversion to Epicureanism has been interpreted as a “gesture of submission”,134 so 
he may have wished to promote a version of events wherein even immediately after 
Pharsalus, he was still trying to assassinate Caesar. Given that Cn. Pompeius and the 
die-hard Pompeians had not surrendered after Pharsalus maybe this also mitigated 
some of the guilt that Cassius felt about accepting a pardon, when others, including 
his uncle-in-law, Cato, refused. He was thus not a turncoat but a committed 
Republican. Though Cato and others had realised the danger of Caesar’s victory, 
Cassius sought a pardon. One reason to promote the Cydnus story was that, unlike 
Cato and other diehard Republicans, Cassius seems to have realised only in late 45 or 
early 44 that Caesar’s autocracy would be so suffocating and humiliating that it would 
be better to put one’s life on the line and conspire against him than to wither away 
 
129 Cass. Dio 42.13.5, states Cassius headed straight for Caesar on learning of Pompey’s death.  
130 Cic. Fam. 6.6.10. See also Moles (1979) 120.   
131 Cic. Fam. 15.15.1.  
132 MacMullen (1966) 16.   
133 Moles (1979) 120.  
134 Canfora (2007) 297. 
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under the tyrant. Some would think that Cassius’ sudden epiphany was all too 
convenient, especially as Caesar had snubbed him over the issue of the urban 
praetorship. It was vital, then, to promote a version of events in which Cassius had 
(for a long time) been contemplating assassination.    
 
5.9 CATO 
What effect did the death of Cato have on Cassius? This is an extremely difficult 
question to answer, but merits exploration. Cassius had sought refuge with Cato 
initially after learning of Pompey’s defeat at Pharsalus. They met at Cyrene but 
Cassius had left Cato’s camp on hearing of Pompey’s death.135 It was not until April 
46, however, that Cato committed suicide at Utica.136 He opted for a noble death over 
a life of compromised freedom.137 His final act of defiance snubbed Caesar and 
proved that not all Roman nobles would submit themselves obsequiously to his rule. 
For this act of bravery, Cato received the cognomen Uticensis, normally bestowed on 
a victorious general (e.g. Scipio Africanus).138 He became a martyr of the Republic. 
Cicero wrote an eponymous eulogy of him; Brutus, too, had written a eulogy and 
defence of his uncle, as much from a need to make “personal amends”, if one scholar 
is correct.139 Caesar, recognising the danger of Cato’s example, responded quickly by 
writing an attack piece: the Anti-Cato.140 Though Cassius had benefited from Caesar’s 
pardon, it is possible that he considered himself the inheritor of Cato’s legacy, at least 
by 44. They were closely related and shared similar personalities (especially a 
reputation for severitas),141 and, if the Pseudo-Corbulo bust is of Cassius, he may 
have modelled himself on the Stoic martyr.142 Indeed, Cato’s suicide may have 
 
135 Cassius and Cato at Cyrene: Cass. Dio 42.13.1, 5; Pompey’s death: App. B Civ. 2.84-6; Cass. Dio 
42.3.1-5. Caes. BCiv. 3.103-4; Cic. Tusc. 3.66. As noted, Cato assumed command in October 48: Luc. 
9.51-293; Plut. Cat. Min. 56.3-4.    
136 Cato’s suicide: BAfr. 87.1-88.7; Cic. Fam. 9.18.2, Tusc. 1.74, Off. 1.112. Liv. Per. 114; Plut. Cat. 
Min. 58.13-73.1; App. B Civ. 2.98-9; Cass. Dio 43.10-12.1. 
137 Gelzer (1969b) 301, who argues that, in commiting suicide, Cato branded Caesar a tyrant: Cic. Off. 
1.112; Plut. Cat. Min. 66.2.  
138 Cass. Dio 43.11.6.  
139 Meier (1982) 481; cf. Woolf (2006) 141: “Cato’s choice [to commit suicide] accused Caesar of 
tyranny. It also reproached those followers of Pompey who had elected to accept the dictator’s 
clemency, men like Cicero, Brutus and Cassius.”  
140 Cic. Att. 12.4.2, 12.5.2, 13.46.2, Fam. 16.22.1; Quint. Inst. 5.10.9; Plut. Caes. 54.5; Gell. NA 
13.20.3. For modern references, see Morgan (2000) 56n.29.  
141 Cato: Sall. Cat. 54. 
142 That the Pseudo-Corbulo bust should be identified as Cassius is argued in Appendix I.   
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shamed many Republicans, including Cassius, to stand up to Caesar.143 Nonetheless, 
in the short term the death of his uncle-in-law did not prompt Cassius into any 
noticeable opposition of Caesar. That was to come later.   
 
5.10 EPICUREANISM 
If Cicero’s calculations are correct, Cassius adopted Epicurean philosophy around 48, 
after securing a pardon from Caesar. The timing of his conversion has not gone 
unnoticed. J. Moles sees in Cassius’ actions an “excuse” to provide cover for his 
departure from political affairs.144 Strategic withdrawals from politics were not new, 
and Schofield notes philosophy allowed Cassius to retire to political quietism, at least 
for a while.145 The timeframe of Cassius’ decision is intriguing, but it does not follow 
that his adoption of Epicureanism was a screen –or that he was a philosophaster. 
Philosophy was an important part of his life. 
Cassius had not always been an Epicurean. Before the war he had belonged to 
another philosophical school, although scholars debate which one.146 A passage in 
Seneca –perhaps the best and only evidence– possibly suggests that he had previously 
belonged to the Stoic school, as he seems to have spurned alcohol and drunkenness, 
the latter of which had been advised against by the school’s founder, Zeno.147 
Moreover, the contemporary and popular Stoic philosopher Posidonius also insisted 
that the σοφός remain in control of his reason at all times; drunkenness was thus never 
permitted.148 Cassius certainly would have been familiar with Posidonius’ works and 
may even have been his pupil at Rhodes, reasons aplenty for following the strict 
moralism of the polymath.149  Cicero, whose Stoic tendencies are well documented, 
also pleads (perhaps in jest) with Cassius to return to virtue, which also may signal 
the Stoic creed.150 Stoicism, therefore, is the best candidate. 
 
143 Cato’s death shamed Brutus: Meier (1982) 481; cf. Syme (1939) 58. Writting about Cato was an 
attempt to make amends, but also to restore Brutus’ face and reputation.  
144 Moles (1979) 129.  
145 Schofield (2000) 454. 
146 Clarke (1981) 34: Cassius abandoned “Stoicism”; so too Mayer (1986) 58; TP 4.412; Shackleton 
Bailey (1977) 2.379, argues that he was an “Academic”, a follower of Antiochus of Ascalon. Griffin 
(1995) 343-4, notes it is folly to favour one school over another, as virtue was a common tenet of the 
Stoics, Academics and Peripatetics. Cf. Sedley (1997) 41: Cassius’ prior “allegiance [is] unknown”.      
147 Sen. Ep. 83.12. See §11 on Zeno’s prohibition and cf. n.150 below. 
148 Pos. fr. 186, 187 with Kidd (1999) 2.646.   
149 Cicero and Pompeius had studied under Posidonius: Kidd (1999) 1.10-12. Rhodes: Suda, s.v. 
Ποσειδώνιος.  
150 Cic. Fam. 15.16.1.  
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But Cassius’ Epicureanism151 demands attention, partly because it seems incongruous 
with his political and military career, both of which were reputedly forbidden pursuits 
for a true Epicurean;152 and partly because tremendous significance has been attached 
to his conversion, most famously by A. Momigliano, who controversially suggested a 
relationship between Cassius’ new-found philosophical beliefs and his decision to kill 
Caesar.153 His adherence to Epicureanism also demands attention because Cassius –
along with other prominent acolytes– has often been dismissed as a dilettante.154 
These views are in need of re-assessment. By examining Cassius’ famous response to 
Cicero’s jibes about Epicureanism (Fam. 15.19), it becomes clear that he was not 
merely dabbling in philosophy but fully conversant in the tenets of Epicurus. 
However, the evidence can only be pressed so far; there is no suggestion that Cassius 
was an Epicurean ‘fanatic’ or apologist.155 Ultimately, when considering the historical 
context of his conversion –in 48/47, at which time Cassius made a conscious choice to 
retire from public life– his close engagement with Epicurean philosophy may have 
provided one of the few palatable activities available to a man of his stamp and 
proclivities. 
A brief overview of the place of Epicureanism in Roman culture is in order. 
Of the four principal schools of philosophy in the Late Republic –Stoics, Peripatetics, 
Academics and Epicureans– it was the latter who appear to have flourished more than 
their rivals.156 Some scholars attribute the popularity of Epicureanism among the elite 
to its emphasis on personal safety and tranquillity, which, it is argued, must have 
appealed to the aristocracy in the deeply unsettled period of the Late Republic; others, 
notably M. Griffin, argue that Epicureanism flourished during this time because it was 
the first philosophic doctrine to present its views in Latin.157 One need think only of 
Lucretius: he took austere dogma and made it not only digestible but also 
 
151 For references to Cassius’ Epicureanism, see Castner (1988) 24-31.   
152 Diog. Laert. 10.119; Cic. Rep. 1.1-12, Pis. 53-63, Tusc. 5.108; Plut. Mor. 1124D-1127E. For 
discussion, see Fowler (1989) 122-3; cf. Schiesaro (2007) 49-50. Additionally, see further below. 
153 Momigliano (1941) 149-57. Contra Shackleton Bailey (1977) 2.378; Griffin (1995) 342; Sedley 
(1997) 41. Momigliano believed not only that many Epicureans were political, but also that they were 
adverse to Caesar. This issue is discussed further below.        
154 Taylor (1968) 473; Clarke (1981) 34; Castner (1988) 29; Brunt (1989) 197: Cassius as “light half-
believer”. Contra Fish (2011) 73n.5; Armstrong (2011) 110.  
155 Syme (1939) 57, notes that Cassius ‘was of the Epicurean persuasion and by no means a fanatic’. 
There is no mention that Cassius had rings or drinking cups bearing Epicurus’ likeness: Cic. Fin. 5.3. 
156 Cic. Cael. 17, 41; Tusc. 4.3.7; Fin. 1.13, 1.25; Momigliano (1941) 149-57; Hill (2004) 73; DeWitt 
(1964) 344. Stoicism was unpopular: Shackleton Bailey (1977) 2.381.  
157 Griffin (1989) 8-9; cf. Rawson (1985) 9, 284. Cicero of course put the success of Epicureanism 
down to a decline in mores: Cic. Cael. 40-1.    
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delectable.158 Griffin further notes the import of charismatic Epicurean evangelizers. 
Phaedrus, who eventually became the scholarch of the Epicurean school,159 is credited 
with converting Atticus, and the eloquent Philodemus, L. Calpurnius Piso’s 
philosopher-in-residence, won acclaim by modifying and thoroughly gentrifying 
Epicurean doctrine.160 As a combination, lucid Latin treatises and engaging teachers 
definitely help explain the success of Epicureanism among the elite.161 But it would 
be remiss not to mention too the ancillary importance of the ‘cult of Epicurus’; 
indeed, the founding father had become a messianic figure (for Lucretius at least he 
was godlike).162  
But did these factors prompt Cassius’ conversion? It must be stressed 
immediately that he had belonged to a different philosophical school prior to 48.163 
Which school this was has been the subject of frequent speculation –Stoicism and the 
Academy are often favoured– despite the lack of any positive evidence one way or the 
 
158 Lucret. 4.12-19. Cicero compliments the poem for its ingenium, despite his aversion to 
Epicureanism as a  philosophy: Cic. QFr. 2.10.3. Briefly, mention must be made of the vita Borgiana, 
a short biography of Lucretius, which was discovered in a manuscript that once belonged to Girolamo 
Borgia. In this work, it is claimed that Cassius (as well as other prominent Late Republicans such as 
Atticus and Cicero) and Lucretius were on intimate terms: cum T. Pomponio Attico, Cicerone, M. 
Bruto et C. Cassio coniunctissime vixit. J. Masson thought that the Borgiana was a garbled and 
truncated version of Suetonius’ ‘Life of Lucretius’ contained in the lost work De Poetis. However, 
most modern scholars consider the vita Borgiana a forgery. Since Lucretius probably died in the 50s 
and Cassius did not adopt Epicureanism until the early 40s, the proposition is weak on chronological 
grounds alone. Possibly, the forger has confused another Lucretius, a friend of Cassius mentioned by 
Cicero in 49, with the famous poet. All that need be said is that there is not a shred of ancient evidence 
that Cassius and Lucretius were intimate. On the vita Borgiana, see Luck (2000) 60n.3, with 
bibliography cited therein; Masson (1895) 223, provides the disputed Latin testimony; see also Masson 
(1895) 220-37, (1896) 323-4, for the argument that the Borgiana was a version of the Life of Lucretius; 
scholars who argue the work is a forgery include: Momigliano (1941) 157; Fabbri (1984) 348–66; 
Conte (1999) 156; Butler (2011) 38. Paratore (1947) 340-6, has rejected the alleged friendship of 
Cassius and Lucretius.        
159  For Phaedrus’ position as scholarch in Athens, see Phlegon of Tralleis, FGrH 257 F12.8. 
160 Cic. Fin.1.16: Phaedrus; Griffin (1989) 9. Philodemus of Gadara can no longer be considered a 
“pettifogger”, pace Grant and Fisk (1924) 3. For Atticus’ Epicureanism, see Castner (1988) 57-61.    
161 Cicero also notes that Epicureanism is a simple philosophical system to understand: Fin. 1.27. For 
the standard prosopography of Roman Epicureans, see Castner (1988). Hill (2004) 73, notes that 
Epicurean success may also stem from the fact that it was not so focused on “morality” as was the 
Stoic school. However, even the Epicurean school had bad teachers and terrible writers: Patro, one 
scholarch at Athens, was described as a pedant by Cicero: Griffin (1989) 16-17. And C. Amafinius and 
Catius Insuber were considered by Cicero and Cassius to be incompetent translators: Castner (1988) 
29-30.     
162 Epicurus’ image was depicted on rings and drinking cups: Cic. Fin. 5.3. On Epicurus’ status as a 
messianic figure, see Sedley (1989) 97-119; Fish and Sanders (2011) 2. Lucr. 5.8: deus ille fuit, deus.   
163 Cic. Fam. 15.16.3: si enim stomachabere et moleste feres, plura dicemus postulabimusque ex qua 
αἱρέσει 'vi hominibus armatis' deiectus sis in eam restituare. For discussion, see Shackleton Bailey 
(1977) 2.380-1.  
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other.164 Yet during the course of his rhetorical studies Cassius would likely have 
been exposed to all the major philosophical schools, so it is difficult to pinpoint 
precisely where his allegiance lay.165 It can only be concluded that he became 
disillusioned with his previous philosophical beliefs. Although any attempt to deduce 
Cassius’ former philosophical persuasion remains difficult, fixing the chronology of 
his conversion may illuminate his motivations. 
Momigliano famously argued that Cassius’ conversion occurred in 46, the date 
at which Cassius realised that Caesar had to be murdered.166 However, Shackleton 
Bailey pointed out that this theory does not hold water; Cicero remarks in January 45 
that Cassius’ conversion had transpired around two or three years earlier.167 This 
places his adoption of Epicureanism in 48 or 47. As D. Sedley has concluded, there 
appears to be a strong connection between Cassius’ emerging Epicureanism and his 
decision to “withdraw from the Republican struggle and to acquiesce in Caesar’s 
rule.”168 Cicero himself jokingly explained Cassius’ change as a result of the 
Pompeian defeat at Pharsalus: plura dicemus postulabimusque ex qua αἱρέσει 'vi 
hominibus armatis' deiectus sis in eam restituare (Fam. 15.16.3). Thus Cassius had, 
in Cicero’s opinion, turned Epicurean because of the ‘violence of armed men’. 
Though this may appear to be sportive teasing on Cicero’s part, it does not discredit 
the underlying remark. In his reply to this letter (Fam. 15.19), Cassius does not 
respond to Cicero’s jest, which makes it difficult to ascertain with certainty the reason 
for his conversion. It cannot be ruled out, however, that other factors contributed to 
his shift.169  
 
164 Clarke (1981) 34: Cassius abandoned “Stoicism”; so too Mayer (1986) 58; TP 4.412; Shackleton 
Bailey (1977) 2.379, argues that he was an “Academic”, a follower of Antiochus of Ascalon. Griffin 
(1995) 343-4, notes it is folly to favour one school over another as virtue was a common tenet of the 
Stoics, Academics, and Peripatetics. Cf. Sedley (1997) 41: Cassius’ prior “allegiance [is] unknown”.          
165 The Peripatetics debated both sides of an argument; the Academics specialized in rebuttal: Cic. Fin. 
5.10 with Griffin (1989) 9-10. Cicero was an Academic with Stoic fancies; Brutus a follower of 
Antiochus of Ascalon. Adherence to philosophical schools varied.  
166 Momigliano (1941) 151: “There is a conspicuous date in the history of Epicureanism: the date (46 
BC) at which Cassius turned Epicurean (Cic. Fam. xv.16; 19) not to enjoy the hortulus, but to reach 
quickly the conclusion that the tyrant had to be eliminated.” 
167 Cic. Fam. 15.16.3: si iam biennium aut triennium est cum virtuti nuntium remisisti; with Shackleton 
Bailey (1977) 2.378. Momigliano’s analysis is further discredited by Cassius himself, whose view of 
Caesar in Fam. 15.19 (written in 45, a year before the assassination) is favourable, remarkably.          
168 Sedley (1997) 41; Cf. Griffin (1989) 31, (1995) 342.    
169 Even a perfunctory glance at Cassius’ known intimates highlights the fact that many of them were 
Epicureans, some of them his acquaintances long before his conversion to Epicureanism. Of course, it 
is well known how slippery prosopographical connections can be. Some of his friends: M. Fabius 
Gallus: Cic. Fam. 15.14.1; Shackleton Bailey (1977) 1.417; Castner (1988) 34. There is a debate over 
whether this man’s nomen was Fabius or instead Fadius. C. Nicias of Cos: Shackleton Bailey (1977) 
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In the end, Cassius’ desire to seek pleasure and tranquillity during these turbulent 
times is understandable. Still, this notion may imply that his renewed interest in 
philosophy served as a welcome, frivolous distraction. After all, it could be argued 
that, having ‘retired’ from public life, philosophy provided one of the few pursuits 
available to a man of Cassius’ station. To some extent, this may have been true;170 but 
his commitment to Epicureanism appears to have transcended superficial interest. 
This is demonstrated best when he responds to Cicero’s waggish criticisms of his 
school. When the consular mocks the incompetent Epicurean Greek translator Catius 
Insuber, Cassius deftly parries by pointing out that he could easily assail Cicero with 
many clumsy Stoic writers: tot rusticos Stoicos regeram (Fam. 15.19.1).171 His 
rebuttal is far more substantive than arch repartee, however. Cicero had also noted in 
a previous letter to Cassius written in late 46 that C. Vibius Pansa, an Epicurean, had 
distinguished himself recently by choosing a virtuous course of action rather than the 
safe and voluptuous alternative.172 Cassius’ response to this view is significant for 
several reasons, but especially because he defends the Epicurean doctrine of Pleasure 
as the highest good (Fam. 15.19.2-3): 
difficile est enim persuadere hominibus τὸ καλὸν δι' αὑτὸ αἱρετὸν esse; ἡδονὴν 
vero et ἀτ<αρ>αξίαν virtute, iustitia, τῷ καλῷ parari et verum et probabile est. 
ipse enim Epicurus, a quo omnes Catii et Amafinii,  mali verborum interpretes, 
proficiscuntur, dicit ‘οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδέως ἄνευ τοῦ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως ζῆν’. itaque 
et Pansa, qui ἡδονὴν sequitur, virtutem retinet et ii qui a vobis φιλήδονοι 
vocantur sunt φιλόκαλοι et φιλοδίκαιοι omnisque virtutes et colunt et retinent. 
It is hard to persuade men that Right is to be chosen per se; but that Pleasure 
and Peace of Mind are won by virtue, justice and Right is both true and easily 
argued. Epicurus himself, from whom all these sorry translators of terms, 
Catius, Amafinius, etc. derive, says: ‘To live pleasurably is not possible without 
living rightly and justly.’ Thus it is that Pansa, whose goal is Pleasure, retains 
 
2.373; Baldwin (1983) 433. P. Volumnius Eutrapelus: Cic. Fam. 7.33.2; Castner (1988) 89-90, who 
suggests his allegiance to Epicureanism is uncertain.   
170 Cic. Fin. 1, demonstrates that philosophy was considered by some to be appropriate only as an 
inconsequential leisure activity. For a brief discussion of this attitude, see Griffin (1989) 13.   
171 On Amafinius and Catius, see Castner (1988) 7-12, 32 respectively. Griffin (1995) 344n.85, is 
perhaps right to question Shackleton Bailey’s assertion (1977: 2.381) that these Stoics are “Greek”. 
This passage may also provide the best evidence that Cassius was formerly a Stoic.   
172 Cic. Fam. 15.17.3 with Shackleton Bailey (1977) 2.377-8; Castner (1988) 24.  
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Virtue; and those whom you and your friends call Pleasure-Lovers are Right-
Lovers and Justice-Lovers, practising and retaining all the virtues.173 
In many ways Cassius’ reply to Cicero is predictably logical: virtuous behaviour is a 
necessary means of achieving the τέλος (Pleasure).174 To support his case, Cassius 
quotes Epicurus himself, who had argued in his Letter to Menoeceus that it is 
impossible to live pleasantly without also living prudently, nobly and justly.175 For 
Cassius, then, there is no incongruity between Epicurean hedonism and virtue.176 As 
D. Sedley has elegantly discerned, Cassius understood that the sage must sometimes 
yield to social obligations, but that this does not result in a rejection of hedonism.177 
In addition, Cassius implies that virtue itself can be a pleasure. Indeed, D. Armstrong 
has noted recently that Cassius’ view that one should do good to all men not simply to 
secure their “protective goodwill” but because their friendship and goodwill are 
pleasures in their own right highlights a “deeper note” to his Epicureanism.178 He also 
directly disputes Cicero’s understanding of καλῶς, which he argues should not be 
reduced merely to “Right” but “omnes virtutes”.179 Cassius’ point is that Epicureans 
are not amoral or self-centred, but that they continue to retain “omnes virtutes”, which 
are the means to hedonistic fulfilment.  It has also not gone unnoticed that his 
response is the same as tendered by ‘L. Manlius Torquatus’ in De Finibus.180 It is 
evident, therefore, that Cassius was thoroughly conversant in the tenets of Epicurus 
and was prepared to defend his school to critics such as Cicero.181        
However, Plutarch creates the impression that Cassius wavered in his beliefs, 
particularly prior to the Battle of Philippi.182 But his account should be pondered 
 
173 For analysis of this letter, see Shackleton Bailey (1977) 2.381-2. Cf. McConnell (2014) 19-22, 24-6. 
174 Shackleton Bailey (1977) 2.381; Griffin (1995) 346; Sedley (1997) 46; Armstrong (2011) 118.  
175 Ep. Men. 132 (Diog. Laert. 10.132: οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδέως ζῆν ἄνευ τοῦ φρονίμως τοῦ καλῶς καὶ 
δικαίως). Armstrong (2011) 124. Griffin (1995) 344-5, discusses the significance of Cassius’ failure to 
include φρονησις. She argues it was a deliberate misquotation.      
176 Deane (1918) 43; Waerdt (1987) 403n.4; Griffin (1995) 344-5; Sedley (1997) 46; Gill (1997) 11.  
177 Sedley (1997) 46.   
178 Armstrong (2011) 112-13, 119.  
179 Griffin (1995) 345.  
180 Cic. Fin. 1.42. On this, see Castner (1988) 29; Griffin (1995) 345. 
181 There are other indicators that Cassius was no Epicurean dilettante, including his possession of an 
estate in Naples (a popular residence for Epicureans) and horti in Rome. Naples: Cic. Att. 16.3.6 with 
D’Arms (1970) 58, 179; horti: Cic. Att. 12.21.2 with Grimal (1969) 120n.6. He also abstained from 
drinking alcohol: Sen. Ep. 83.2 with Armstrong (2011) 111-12. His suicide at Philippi was thoroughly 
acceptable in Epicurean terms: Hill (2004) 84-5.      
182 Plut. Brut. 37, 39.6: ὃν ἐξέκλεισαν οἱ μάντεις, ἀφοσιούμενοι τὴν δεισιδαιμονίαν, ἀτρέμα καὶ τὸν 
Κάσσιον αὐτὸν ὑπεκφέρουσαν τῶν Ἐπικούρου λόγων, τοὺς δὲ στρατιώτας παντάπασι 
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carefully, largely because he viewed Epicureanism with disdain.183 Indeed, P.M. 
FitzGibbon has recently gone so far as to suggest that Cassius’ Epicureanism 
accentuates his depiction as a flawed individual in the Brutus.184 Given these 
concerns, and being alert to the biases of Plutarch in general, it is perhaps best to 
discount his comments about Cassius’ doubts. Much the same can be said for Cassius’ 
response to Brutus following the famous appearance of the δαίμων κακός (Plut. Brut. 
36.7).185 If the historicity of this episode is questionable, Cassius’ reply to Brutus is 
more so.186 Though his answer is suffused with explanations consistent with some 
Epicurean theory, most scholars have detected a Platonic or Aristotelian flavour in his 
opinion.187 Overall, Plutarch provides little insight into Cassius the Epicurean; in fact, 
his information is misleading, if not polemical. 
Barring Plutarch, nothing suggests that Cassius vacillated in his Epicurean 
views. But many would rejoin that his continued involvement in politics –and his 
eventual decision to lead a conspiracy against Caesar– cannot easily be reconciled 
with the seemingly clear mantra of Epicurus: the wise man will not engage in a public 
career (οὐδὲ πολιτεύσεται).188 Naturally, this issue has fostered considerable debate. 
As has been seen, some scholars dismiss Cassius and other followers as superficial 
adherents of the creed;189 others have argued that, although ideally a true Epicurean 
would never engage in politics, in an emergency situation participation was 
permissible.190 Still others have questioned or sought to qualify the clipped 
prohibition of Epicurus.191 With such a wide spectrum of scholarly opinion it is 
necessary to evaluate how (or if) Cassius squared his Epicurean beliefs with his 
political career.  
 
δεδουλωμένην. Cf. Plut. Caes. 66.2-3 with Pelling (2011) 479. See too Plutarch’s comments before the 
assassination (Chapter Six, Section 10). 
183 Castner (1988) 29, notes Plutarch’s account may have been “polemically” motivated. 
184 FitzGibbon (2008) 445-60. Alfinito (1992) 227-36, had previously noted that Plutarch uses Cassius’ 
Epicureanism to engage in a subtle critique of a position with which he disagreed. Cf. Brenk (1988) 
109-18. 
185 For analysis, see Affortunati (2004) 102-3; Brenk (1988) 109-18; Sedley (1997) 41n.6.  
186 Moles (1979) 391-411, notes this story could be the product of Caesarian propaganda.  
187 Castner (1988) 30-1, with citations therein.  See also preceding note. Sedley (1997) 41n.6. 
188 Diog. Laert. 10.119; cf. Lucr. 5.1143-51. This may be even more true if Ryan (1999) is correct in 
arguing that Cassius was curule aedile in 47, perhaps months after becoming an adherent of Epicurus. 
A discussion of whether Cassius was aedile follows in Section 11 below.  
189 Taylor (1968) 473; Clarke (1981) 34; Castner (1988) 29; Brunt (1989) 197, on Cassius as “light 
half-believer”. Contra Fish (2011) 73n.5; Armstrong (2011) 110.  
190 Long (1986) 321-2: see ‘Discussion section’; Fowler (1989) 128; Hill (2004) 84-5; Schiesaro (2007) 
49-50; Fish (2011) 75, 92-4; Armstrong (2011) 110.      
191 Roskam (2007) 34-41: every maxim is subject to qualification and distinction.    
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Ιt has long been observed that there is a “striking polarity” between the beliefs and 
conduct of Epicureans, especially regarding public life.192 From antiquity onwards, 
Epicureans have been censured for professing adherence to Epicurus at the same time 
as engaging in political careers.193 Often scholars have explained this ‘hypocrisy’ in 
terms of the insouciant Roman attitude towards philosophy.194 Indeed, even the author 
of Prosopography of Roman Epicureans has argued that most elite Epicureans were 
“superficial” adherents of their creed.195 On Cassius specifically C.J. Castner notes:  
Clearly philosophical adherence was for Cassius, as for Trebatius Testa and 
most other Roman Epicureans of the upper classes, an aspect of culture and 
not politics. When political action is crucial, philosophical adherence is not 
seriously considered as an important guide to such activity.196    
This assessment flies in the face of Momigliano, who, as will be remembered, argued 
that Cassius rationalised his decision to murder Caesar on Epicurean grounds in 46.197 
More importantly, it is unlikely that Cassius regarded himself as a “superficial” or 
“cultural” Epicurean. To be sure, like many adherents of any creed or religion, he 
struggled with certain articles of faith. But to cite his failure to follow one of 
Epicurus’ supposedly fundamental tenets as proof of his superficiality smacks of 
unintelligent legalism, particularly as scholars now believe that there were exceptions 
to Epicurus’ famous ‘no politics’ rule.198 In an emergency, for example, activity in the 
political arena was justified if the pleasure and security of the community were put 
seriously at risk.199 One presumes that this directive trumped even the Epicurean 
adage that the cruelty of tyrants should be met with ἀταραξία.200  
Moreover, emergencies of state were not the only source of exemption. It has 
recently been restated that even Epicurus thought that men in love with fame and 
honour should indulge their natural appetite, on the basis that they are 
 
192 Griffin (1989) 12-13.  
193  Some examples of Roman Epicureans who were also politicians include: L. Manlius Torquatus (pr. 
49); L. Calpurnius Piso (cos. 58); P. Cornelius Dolabella (cos. suff. 44). See further, Castner (1988).    
194 One need only remember Cicero’s famous comments at the beginning of De Finibus (1), in which 
he notes that many Romans tolerate philosophy as long as it is pursued casually rather than seriously.   
195 Castner (1988) xv, cf. xix. 
196 Castner (1988) 31. Cf. Shackleton Bailey (1968) 1.8, who argues that Atticus became an Epicurean 
“partly to be in fashion.” 
197 Momigliano (1941) 151, 155. Cf. Griffin (1989) 28-30. Cassius’ motivations for instigating the plot 
to assassinate Caesar are discussed in the next chapter.  
198  Exceptions are attested by the ancient sources: Cic. Rep. 1.6; Sen. Otio 3.2. See further, Fowler 
(1989) 126-30; Hill (2004) 84; Schiesaro (2007) 49-50; Roskam (2007) 34-41.   
199 Cic. Rep. 1.10. Hill (2004) 84; Long (1986) 321-2; Fowler (1989) 127; Roskam (2007) 34-41; 
Schiesaro (2007) 49-50; Fish (2011) 75; Armstrong (2011) 110.      
200 Diog. Laert. 10.118; Cic. Tusc. 2.17-18.    
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“constitutionally more likely to be disturbed and corrupted by inactivity, if they do 
not obtain what they want.”201 Logically, if the τέλος of Epicureanism is ‘Pleasure’ 
then an acolyte must ultimately do whatever serves that end. Given this more elastic 
assessment of political engagement, it is clear that Cassius could reconcile his beliefs 
with his public career.   
Indeed, J. Fish has now argued compellingly that scholars should not be 
seduced by the misleading –and tendentious– accounts of Cicero and Plutarch.202 
These sources have peddled reductionist interpretations of Epicureanism, which do a 
disservice to a philosophy that, as studies on Philodemus demonstrate, constantly 
qualified, nuanced and even refashioned the dogma of Epicurus.203 Fish concludes 
that political grandees such as Cassius were thus able to find in Epicureanism strands 
of thinking that justified their political lives.204 However, this is not to suggest that 
Cassius’ Epicureanism occasioned his return to politics; such a claim seems “less 
likely” given that his adoption of that philosophy coincided with his retirement from 
public life.205 Other factors must also have been in play. But his involvement in 
political life can no longer be cited as evidence that he was a superficial or poor 
excuse for an Epicurean. And though Cicero questioned whether Cassius really had 
converted to Epicureanism in January 45, the latter’s own epistolary response (Fam. 
15.19) can leave no doubt.206 In fact, Griffin has concluded that Cassius gets the better 
of Cicero in their epistolary tête-à-tête, while for Armstrong his parsing of Pansa’s 
actions in Epicurean terms signals a “deeper note” to his beliefs than has generally 
been conceded.207          
 
201 Fish (2011) 92, with Plut. De tranq. anim. 465f-466a.  
202 Fish (2011) 94. DeWitt (1964) 346, exaggerates when he states Cicero “poured forth a steam of 
anti-Epicurean propaganda.”   
203 Roskam (2007) 34-41; and see generally, Fish and Sanders (2011). 
204 Fish (2011) 75: “I suggest that, with the help of Philodemus and others like him, Roman statesmen 
were able to connect two strands of Epicurean thought in order to justify their political life: one, that a 
person’s virtues are productive of the goodwill and love of others, actual pleasures in themselves; the 
other, that power can in fact lead to safety. Combining the two could result in the claim that the 
virtuous exercise of political power can sometimes provide safety as well as pleasure to a ruler. 
Epicurean statesmen in previous generations likely held a similar point of view.” Fish then cross-
references his arguments to Armstrong’s assessment of Cassius’ response to Cicero (Fam. 15.19). Cf. 
Sedley (1997) 53.  
205 Sedley (1997) 41. Griffin (1989) 28-31, also notes that there is limited invocation of philosophy 
regarding Cassius’ motivations for assassinating Caesar. See Plut. Caes. 66.2. See also, Brunt (2013) 
82n.102, who states it is “particularly implausible” that Cassius would find in Epicureanism a 
justification for assassinating Caesar because such actions would promote renewed civil strife.    
206 Cic. Fam. 15.16.3: in ista ipsa αἱρέσει metuo ne plus nervorum sit quam ego putaram si modo eam 
tu probas. 
207 Griffin (1995) 346; Armstrong (2011) 112-13, 119.  
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What conclusions can be drawn? Based on the present state of the evidence it is clear 
that Cassius was a wholehearted late-life convert to Epicureanism, despite the 
sometimes misleading accounts of both Cicero and Plutarch. Moreover, his response 
to Cicero (Fam. 15.19) defending the Epicurean doctrine of Pleasure as the highest 
good provides the most unambiguous evidence that he was fully conversant with and 
faithful to the tenets of Epicurus. The prevalent modern view that Epicureans could 
never engage in political careers seems dubious. Accordingly, Cassius’ statesmanship 
is easily reconciled with his philosophy, although this is not to make the case that he 
was primarily motivated by his Epicureanism in his public life (see further Chapter 
Six).  Hopefully, the spectre of Cassius as a superficial dilettante has also now been 
exorcised.  
One important question remains: did Cassius’ Epicureanism prompt him to 
conspire against Caesar? As mentioned earlier, for Momigliano, Cassius’ conversion 
to Epicureanism (which he wrongly dated to 46) indicates that he had “reached the 
conclusion that the tyrant had to be eliminated.”208 The pleasures of the Garden were 
irrelevant. But Cassius’ conversion came well before there was creditable evidence 
that he sought to assassinate Caesar. Indeed, for D. Sedley, Cassius’ participation in 
the conspiracy only suggests that, whatever one’s philosophical principles, “most 
courses of action can be justified given a little ingenuity”.209 Sedley implies that 
Cassius ‘found’ in Epicureanism justification for his actions, even though he was 
clearly flouting orthodox dogma. Cassius was thus able to reconcile his philosophy 
with a little elastic thinking. Indeed, J. Moles believes that Epicureanism offered 
Cassius enough latitude to engage in politics once more. Thus Castner’s view that 
Cassius was a dilettante should be deemed wrongheaded. When push came to shove, 
Cassius’ philosophy was probably not the leading factor in his decision to form the 
conspiracy. But there was also something in the riches of Epicurean philosophy to 
allow him to participate: if the commonwealth was at stake –and tranquillity in 
jeopardy–the Epicurean wise man could enter the political fray.  
 
5.11 AEDILESHIP 
The aedileship offered politicians an excellent vehicle by which to gain the people’s 
affection and support: public games. These games, which could include gladiatorial 
 
208 Momigliano (1941) 151. 
209 Sedley (1997) 53.  
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combat and the display of exotic animals never before seen at Rome, increasingly 
pitted aristocrats against one another as each attempted to outdo the games of their 
forerunners.210 Public expectation was very high and nothing less than a feast of 
magnificent entertainment would do.211 Members of the Crassi, Claudii and the 
Luculli had excelled in giving memorable games.212 Caesar, too, had put on splendid 
games, famously risking bankruptcy in the process. There are many other 
examples.213 Evidently, Roman aristocrats keenly felt the importance of winning the 
aedileship and putting on great games.214 Cassius may have been no different in this 
regard, and there is evidence to suggest he made preparations to host games. But was 
he ever elected to the office? It is necessary to parse Plutarch:  
ἄλλα τε κατ' αὐτοῦ ποιούμενος ἐγκλήματα καὶ λεόντων ἀφαίρεσιν, οὓς 
Κάσσιος μὲν ἀγορανομεῖν μέλλων παρεσκευάσατο, Καῖσαρ δὲ 
καταληφθέντας ἐν Μεγάροις, ὅθ' ἡ πόλις ἥλω διὰ Καλήνου, κατέσχε. 
and among other charges which he [sc. Cassius] brought against him [sc. 
Caesar] was that of taking away some lions which Cassius had provided 
when he was about to be aedile; the beasts had been left at Megara, and 
when the city was taken by Calenus, Caesar appropriated them.215  
Based on this passage, F.X. Ryan has argued that Cassius was elected curule aedile in 
47.216 He accepts the historicity of Plutarch’s account and proposes the following 
hypothesis, summarised here in necessary detail: (1) Cassius may have obtained the 
lions –for the purpose of giving aedilician games– from clients in Syria, where he had 
 
210 C. Claudius orchestrated an elephant fight in his games as aedile in 99: Cic. Verr. 2.4.6-7, Har. 
Resp. 26, Off. 2.57; Val. Max. 2.4.6; Plin. HN 8.19; Gran. Lic. 32. Caelius’ letter to Cicero regarding 
panthers (Fam. 8.2), is also instructive.    
211 Q. Gallius, who had failed to produce wild beasts during his games, later compensated by 
speciously providing gladiatorial games in his praetorship: Asc. 88C. Clearly a failure to deliver a 
spectacle was keenly felt by the Roman grandee, although, as Gallius’ own subsequent election 
indicates, not necessarily crippling.     
212 Cic. Off. 2.57.  
213 Plut. Caes. 5-6. C. Claudius celebrated magnificent games as aedile in 97; M. Livius Drusus also 
celebrated popular games in 93: [Aur. Vict.] De vir. ill. 66.1-2; L. and M. Lucullus had given 
magnificent games as aediles: Cic. Off. 2.57; Val. Max. 2.4.6; Plin. HN 8.19. In 58, M. Scaurus had 
given popular games: Cic. Sest. 116.     
214 Cic. Planc. 51, notes it was not unheard of to fail to win election to the aedileship. No less a figure 
than Ap. Claudius (cos. 79) failed in 93.   
215 Plut. Brut. 8.6-7. 
216 Ryan (1999) 145-54. However, scholars have had substantial doubts about Plutarch’s account, 
although admittedly this does not excuse their silence entirely. Cf. Affortunati (2004) 57: “Non c’è 
nessun ricordo di una edilità di Cassio.” Tyrrell and Purser (1933) 6.xci, accept that Cassius prepared 
for aedilician games. 
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been the acting governor for two years;217 (2) he was in the process of transporting 
these lions to Italy, although they were still at Megara before the outbreak of civil 
war; (3) sometime between 48/47 Cassius’ lions were seized by Caesar;218 
alternatively, Caesar could have asked Cassius to hand over the lions either during (or 
after) the meeting at which he granted the latter a pardon;219 (4) Cassius was disgusted 
(“ungehalten”) about losing his lions;220 (5) Caesar made Cassius a curule aedile in 
the autumn of 47, which meant he suffered the indignity of a truncated tenure and 
missed the opportunity to put on public games. The result of this reconstruction, then, 
is that Ryan concludes: “Der berühmte Cassius ist zu den Ädilen der Republik, nicht 
aber zu den ädilizischen Spielgebern zu rechnen.”221 
               However, it should be acknowledged that Ryan has avoided debating many 
important criticisms of Plutarch’s passage. Admittedly, some critiques flounder under 
close scrutiny. For instance, the story cannot be dismissed merely as a malicious 
Caesarian invention because of its perceived triviality.222 On the contrary, D. Epstein 
has argued that wronged aristocrats could nurse the smallest personal affronts with 
frenetic compulsion.223 This is to say nothing of the importance placed on the giving 
of public games by Late Republican aristocrats.224 Thus the confiscation of lions was 
no inconsequential matter.225 But there are far more substantive objections to 
Plutarch’s anecdote than its supposed nugacity. One such criticism is that there is no 
mention of this story in the corresponding account of Cassius Dio (42.14.3-4), who 
treated the capture of Megara. Why does Dio ignore the lions when they appear to 
have played such an important role in Plutarch’s version (Brut. 8.7)? Yet this 
 
217 See also Jennison (1937) 53: “It seems certain that the large number of lions belonging to C. 
Cassius, which were found at Megara in 48 B.C., had been held up by the civil war on their way to 
Italy from Syria, where Cassius had been first Crassus’ quaestor, and then, from 53 to 51, acting 
governor.”    
218 Jennison (1937) 56: “It appears that these lions were appropriated by Caesar for his own ludi.” 
Caesar would eventually show 400 lions in 46: Suet. Iul. 37; Plin. HN 8.53; Cass. Dio 43.22-3.   
219 Ryan (1999) 148: “So hat Caesar möglicherweise den Cassius, den er gleichzeitig begnadigte bzw. 
bereits begnadigt hatte, lediglich gebeten, ihm das Geschenk der Syrier zu überlassen.” 
220 Cassius had every reason to be angry: Moles (1979) 123-5; Epstein (1987a) 567-8.  
221 Ryan (1999) 153.   
222 Wilson (1950) 59, apud Moles (1979) 123. Procuring lions, if not donated, would have been a 
considerable expense for Cassius.    
223 Epstein (1987a) 566-70, 567-8 on Cassius specifically. See generally, Epstein (1987b).    
224 Moles (1979) 123.   
225 So Ryan (1999) 149 and again Moles (1979) 123; pace Dettenhofer (1992) 248: “Die Wegnahme 
der Löwen im Jahr 47 kann nicht so schwer gewogen haben.” 
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argument is far from conclusive, like any argumentum ex silentio. Dio may have 
simply considered the lions a relatively small sideshow in the capture of the city.226     
               Another critic of Plutarch has suggested that he has confused the tyrannicide 
with his brother Lucius. A. Garzetti noted that the Caesarian L. Cassius Longinus had 
been serving under Calenus in Achaea (Caes. BCiv. 3.56.1).227 Since it was Calenus 
who captured Megara (presumably with Lucius in tow), Garzetti has inferred this 
correction, as Lucius was in situ at the right time. After all, the brothers had also been 
famously muddled up by Appian in his account of the civil war, so such confusion 
may have appeared to be a common error.228 But as J. Moles has accentuated much 
depends on Plutarch’s source, which he clearly found outside the “main historical 
tradition”.229 Could this source have perpetuated this error? It seems unlikely, 
especially as L. Cassius does not have a clear claim to these lions.230 Ultimately, 
nothing disproves the anecdote of Plutarch and nothing conclusively shows that he 
has jumbled his Longini.      
           The final point at issue for objectors is that there is no record of Cassius’ 
aedileship. While this argument is not insurmountable it is troubling. Much depends 
on how one interprets the phrase ἀγορανομεῖν μέλλων. Naturally, Ryan suggests this 
wording to mean that Cassius’ lions were expropriated shortly before he was set to 
enter office: in short, that Cassius must have been aedile-elect.231 Logical though this 
interpretation is, there is scope to flesh out another reading. J. Moles suggests that 
Cassius may have been promised the aedileship before Pharsalus, a hypothesis based 
on Plut. Pomp. 67.5.232 Though this theory is improbable it is not unlikely that the 
blue-blooded Cassius would assume his election to the aedileship to be ineluctable. It 
was the next step on the cursus. After the Pompeian defeat, which –for all his military 
sobriety– Cassius may not have anticipated, this hope of enjoying an aedileship 
vanished. Up to that point, Cassius had been destined for the aedileship. Now he was 
 
226 Moles (1979) 125: “Dio’s account seems impressively detailed and circumstantial, but it is quite 
brief and his failure to mention the lion story cannot be taken as evidence that it is fictitious.”  
227 Garzetti (1954) 226 on Plut. Caes. 62.8: “Cause di questo odio non certo il fatto che a Megara nel 
48, C[aesar] gli fece portar via da Caleno i leoni preparati per giochi dell’edilità (PLUT. Brut. 8, 6) i 
quali in ogni caso sarebbo stati tolti non a lui, ma al fratello Lucio.” 
228 App. B Civ. 2.88. For discussion, see Gowing (1992) 165, with bibliography therein. Pelling (2011) 
464, does not dismiss Garzetti’s hypothesis.    
229 Moles (1979) 123-4.  
230 It is unlikely that Lucius (the youngest brother probably) was contemplating standing for the 
aedileship at this time.  
231 At B Civ. 2.112, Appian uses similar phrasing in connection with the praetorships of Brutus and 
Cassius.  
232 Moles (1979) 124.  Epstein (1987a) 567, speaks only of Cassius’ “prospective” aedileship.   
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forced to retire from public life. He adopted Epicurean philosophy and later took up 
oratorical and philosophical studies with Cicero.  
Though Cassius likely contemplated being elected aedile and hosting lavish 
public games, the civil war surely squashed this desire. Even if Plutarch’s account is 
accurate, it does not follow necessarily that Cassius was to be aedile after Pompey’s 
defeat in the civil war. In the normal course of events, Cassius would have secured the 
office of aedile. But the civil war changed everything. For Cassius –like so many 
aristocrats after Pompey’s defeat– there was only one person to blame for this failure: 
Caesar.233 This is what Cassius meant when he related the story of the lions. It can be 
concluded that Plutarch’s anecdote may be authentic, but he has surely misconstrued 
or modified it for structural purposes. Therefore, Cassius was probably not curule 
aedile in 47.     
 
5.12 BRUNDISIUM 
In January of 45, Cicero writes to Cassius noting that he was still at Brundisium, 
although how long he had been there is difficult to know: Tu quod adhuc Brundisii 
moratus es valde probo et gaudeo.234 As observed previously, after ‘serving’ Caesar 
briefly as his legate he had returned to Brundisium in August of 47. In mid-July of 46, 
he (along with Dolabella) had joined Cicero at his Tusculum estate, where they 
engaged in rhetorical and literary pursuits.235 Nothing else is known about his 
activities, but he may indeed have lingered in Brundisium, far away from both Rome 
and Spain.236 When he finally wrote back to Cicero in late January, Cassius describes 
his current activities thusly: Non mehercule in hac mea peregrinatione quicquam 
libentius facio quam scribo ad te.237 While it is possible that Cassius used this time to 
tour his estates in the area, peregrinatio can be interpreted a few ways. It is indeed a 
nice spin on what is (in effect) an enforced retirement. Perhaps sojourning put the best 
gloss possible on his unenviable position. However, given Cassius’ fondness for wry 
repartee it is also possible that this phrase is a humorous euphemism –far from being 
in self-imposed exile, he is in fact on holiday. Philosophy and otium were wonderful 
pursuits in themselves, but not so appealing at the expense of his dignitas. One 
 
233 Epstein (1987a) 567. 
234 Cic. Fam. 15.17.4.   
235 Cic. Fam. 9.18.3, 7.33.2 
236 Shatzman (1975) 317-18, places Cassius at Brundisium at the end of 46 and early 45. He assumes 
Cassius had an estate (or estates) in the area. Later imperial Cassii had estates in the area: Appendix F.  
237 Cic. Fam. 15.19.  
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commentator, however, argues that Caesar placed Cassius in charge of supervising the 
administration of Macedonia in 45.238 But there is no firm evidence for this thesis. 
Drumann is more likely to be correct to suggest that Cassius lingered at Brundisium 
to avoid antagonising Cn. Pompeius. Brundisium provided the psychological comfort 
of a quick potential exit across the Adriatic.   
 
5.13 P. SULLA AND CAESAR 
In Cassius’ epistle to Cicero dated late January of 45, he comments on the death and 
character of P. Sulla, which not only gives plentiful insight into his view of Sulla, but 
also of his opinion of Caesar’s dictatorship.239 Sulla (cos. des. 65), whom Cicero had 
defended in his earlier career, had died in late 46 or early 45, from overeating it was 
said.240 However, it was not gluttony that provoked Cassius to joke sarcastically that 
he had borne Sulla’s death with difficulty (cuius ego mortem forti mehercules animo 
tuli), but his unsavoury activity in the auction rooms, where he unabashedly 
participated in the sales of confiscated Pompeian property.241 In the midst of a 
philosophical discussion about virtue and good, Cassius wryly opines that instead of 
trying to find what was good, Sulla spent his time buying other people’s goods –non 
quaesiit quid bonum esset <s>ed omnia bona coemit, a pithy play on words. Based on 
Cassius’ letter, one scholar has hypothesised that Caesar may have rehabilitated Sulla, 
who had been convicted of electoral bribery in 66.242 Criticising Caesar’s restoration 
of the damnati, Cassius remarks: nam habet damnatos quos pro illo nobis restituat. 
Cassius may only have been thinking of those people who had been recalled from 
exile recently by Caesar in 46.243 Regardless, Cassius is clearly scathing about the 
conduct of both Sulla and Caesar.244 For Cassius, Caesar was recalling criminals, but 
then again as a dominus Caesar too was a criminal. The tyrannicide was not alone in 
his anger; Caesar aroused unpopularity by recalling criminals who had, in many 
 
238 Lange apud Drumann-Groebe (1964) [18992] 2.103n.4.   
239 Cic. Fam. 15.19.3.  
240 Overeating: Cic. Fam. 15.17.2. For bibliography on Sulla, see generally Berry (1996).  
241 Cic. Fam. 15.17.2 and Berry (1996) 13, with n. 74 for further references. On auctions and estate 
sales in the Late Republic, see generally Rauh (1989) 45-76. Political significance: Gelzer (1969b) 280.   
242 On Sulla’s conviction, see Alexander (1990) 101, no. 201. For Caesar’s rehabilitation of Sulla, see 
Berry (1996) 12n.71. Shackleton Bailey (1977) 2.382, notes that Cassius ironically alludes to this 
conviction de ambitu in his letter with the genitive phrase iudicium.   
243 Cass. Dio 43.27.2. See also Yavetz (1983) 64-6.  
244 Fröhlich, RE 3.1729: “Wenigstens sehen wir aus dem Briefwechsel des Cicero mit dem C. aus 
diesen Jahren, dass jener auf die verbissene Stimmung, an die dieser sich allmählich gewöhnt hatte, 
bereitwilligst einging und mit  zweideutigen Ausserungen über Caesars Regierung nicht zurückhielt.”  
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people’s eyes, been justly condemned (men like T. Munatius Plancus Bursa).245 This 
is another area in which Caesar was arrogating unreasonable authority and trampling 
over Republican customs.  
 
5.14 HORTI 
In March 45, Cicero reports that a Cassius was contemplating selling his suburban 
Roman gardens (horti): venales certe sunt Drusi, fortasse et Lamiani et Cassiani.246 
As Shackleton Bailey has observed, the Cassius here referred to cannot be ascertained 
with certainty, but most scholars have plumped for the tyrannicide.247 Possession of 
horti would be well in keeping with his stature as a prominent statesman as well as his 
Epicurean beliefs. There are few other family contenders.248 No record exists of when 
he acquired (or inherited) these gardens and Cicero does not report why Cassius 
considered selling. Fiscal considerations may have been a factor, and, as Rawson has 
noted, the frequent exchange of properties and landholdings was not an uncommon 
feature of Roman aristocratic life.249 At any rate, Cassius did not sell.250   
Like the gardens of Drusus and Lamia also mentioned in this Ciceronian 
epistle, the horti Cassiani were probably situated on the right bank of the Tiber, 
perhaps on the Janiculum, but certainly transtiberim.251 Greater precision in 
pinpointing the location is not possible, and speculation is fruitless. Indeed, whilst the 
infamous Clodia’s horti were probably opposite the campus Martius, Horace notes 
that Caesar’s gardens –left to the people in his will– were quite far from the city.252 
 
245 Cass. Dio 44.27.1-2. See also Rawson, CAH 1994: 460. There is uncertainty about the date of 
Bursa’s recall, though he had certainly returned to Rome by late 46: Kelly (2006) 200.   
246 Cic. Att. 12.21.2. This is the only reference to the horti Cassiani in any source. 
247 Shackleton Bailey (1968) 5.318; cf. Lugli (1938) 5-27; Grimal (1969) 110-11; Shatzman (1975) 
22n.43, 318. On Roman gardens in general, see Grimal (1969); Andreae (1996); Stackelberg (2009). 
On Cassius as the owner, see below. I accept that Cassius owned the gardens, based on a process of 
elimination. See note below.        
248 It is possible that the Cassius referred to is his one known surviving brother, Lucius Cassius, tr. pl. 
44. His own father (cos. 73) was, in all likelihood, deceased by this time.   
249 Rawson (1976) 85-9, (1991) 204-8.         
250 Grimal (1969) 118-25, 128, argues that Cassius’ horti may have been appropriated by Antonius 
after Philippi. After Actium, they may have passed to M. Agrippa. Cf. Platt (2009) 42-3n.4. 
251 Grimal (1969) 110-11; Richardson, NTD, s.v. “horti Cassiani”, 197. Platner and Ashby thought that 
the horti Cassiani were “probably” on the right bank of the Tiber. Janiculum: Taylor (2000) 247.  
Laurence and Newsome (2011) 25n.85, has recently placed the horti Lamiani on the Esquiline, but he 
has confused this with a different imperial garden; see Richardson NTD s.v. “horti Lamiani [2]” 199, 
for clarification; cf. Wallace-Hadrill (1998) 4n.17, with scholarship on the two gardens and the 
confusion over their owners.      
252 Horti Clodiae: Cic. Cael. 36; Richardson NTD s.v. “horti Clodiae” 197; Hejduk (2008) 8; Caesar’s 
gardens: Hor. Sat. 1.9.18; Suet. Iul. 83: populo hortos circa Tiberim publice...legauit. 
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Accordingly, it would be unwise to assume too much about the location of Cassius’ 
horti. 
Nor should one make assumptions about the nature of the gardens. As 
Wallace-Hadrill has also noted, not all of them were lavish and ornate pleasure parks, 
as were those belonging to Clodia. Some were little more than horticultural plots.253 
Cicero describes the gardens of a certain Cotta as squalid (sordida) and small 
(pusilla).254 Nevertheless, it is probable that Cassius’ horti were closer in style and 
function to those of Clodia and Lucullus.255 Replete with flowers, ornamental 
shrubberies, exotic trees, fountains, fishponds and sculpture, these suburban gardens 
were influenced by Near Eastern and Greek models.256 They were situated on private 
estates and maintained by one or more specialist landscapers (a topiarius).257  
There are many reasons Cassius may have owned horti. It would be tempting 
to connect his Epicureanism to the possession of suburban pleasure-gardens. But 
while Epicurus was, according to Pliny the Elder, the founding father of the horti 
Romani, a caveat must be offered:258 Epicureans were not the only owners of horti, 
nor were all Epicureans garden owners.259 This notwithstanding, A. Wallace-Hadrill 
cogently argues that some Epicureans may have maintained suburban gardens in order 
to flag their “philosophical detachment from and superiority to the hubbub of the 
forum”.260 Escaping the hustle and bustle of the Forum, even if only temporarily and 
for reasons of leisure, cannot be dismissed lightly.261  
It is also possible that Cassius was in possession of these horti prior to his 
change in philosophical allegiance. In this case, another explanation is required. The 
most likely reason is that horti promoted the culture of a Roman grandee, with his 
peristyle garden evoking the gymnasia of Greece.262 As Cicero’s works make clear, it 
was often here that the aristocrat would receive important guests and, on occasion, 
 
253 See the discussion of Wallace-Hadrill (1998) 3, in which he highlights that not all horti served the 
same purpose.   
254 Cic. Att. 12.23.3, 12.27.1. Richardson, NTD s.v. “horti Cottae” 198, for caveats about the nature of 
Cotta’s horti. See, too, Laurence and Newsome (2011) 26.         
255 On Lucullus’ maginificent gardens, see Tac. Ann. 11.1; Plut. Luc. 39.2-3, 41.5-6.  
256 For the influence of Greek and East Persian gardens on Roman horti, see Zarmakoupi (2010) 624. 
On fishponds, see Cic. QFr. 3.1.3 and generally Higginbotham (1997).    
257 For topiarius, see for example Cic. QFr. 3.1.5. 
258 Plin. HN 19.51. On the connections between Epicureanism and horti, see Wallace-Hadrill (1998) 4; 
cf. Grimal (1969) 75-6.    
259 Consider Nepos on the Epicurean-leaning T. Pomponius Atticus: Nep. Att. 14.3. He was considered 
somewhat unusual (and frugal) in that he apparently owned no grand gardens or lavish villas.   
260 Wallace-Hadrill (1998) 4, with examples.   
261 Higginbotham (1997) 59, echoes Wallace-Hadrill in speaking of escape from arduous city business.  
262 Fundamental is Mielsch (1987); cf. Zarmakoupi (2010).  
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engage in philosophical contemplation and debate.263 In addition, it would be unwise 
to dismiss aristocratic competition, which fuelled so much of what a noble did. And 
gardens definitely provided the fame-hungry elite with a powerful and physical means 
to generate renown –and this is precisely the reason why Cicero (in the 
aforementioned letter) was looking for land upon which to build a shrine to his 
beloved daughter Tullia.264 Some believe that owning gardens was part of a display 
culture of “conspicuous consumption”, which advertised the wealth and power of the 
elite.265 Thus horti were a mark of social distinction and part of an elite fad. If it were 
knowable when Cassius acquired (or inherited) his horti perhaps it would be easier to 
explain his ownership of them. At present, the acquistion of these gardens should be 
viewed as another example of Cassius engaging in the tradition arena of aristocratic 
competition.  
 
5.15 MUNDA AND CN. POMPEIUS 
Pompey’s sons, Attius Varus and T. Labienus carried on the resistance against Caesar 
in Spain. The senior Pompeians made solid progress against the Caesarians. The 
situation became so serious that Caesar himself headed in person to the Iberian theatre 
to finish off the irksome pocket of resistance.266 In January 45, Cassius sent a letter 
from Brundisium to Cicero in which he confessed that, after accepting a pardon from 
the dictator, he would prefer a Caesarian victory, especially as he was no friend of Cn. 
Pompeius:  
Nunc, ut ad rem publicam redeam, quid in Hispaniis geratur rescribe. 
peream nisi sollicitus sum; ac malo veterem et clementem dominum habere 
quam novum et crudelem experiri. scis Gnaeum quam sit fatuus, scis quo 
modo crudelitatem virtutem putet, scis quam se semper a nobis derisum 
putet; vereor ne nos rustice gladio velit ἀντιμυκτηρίσαι. 
Now to get back to public affairs, let me know in your reply how things are 
going in Spain. I’m devilish worried, and I’d rather have the old easy-
going master than try a cruel new one. You know what a fool Gnaeus is, 
how he takes cruelty for courage, how he thinks we always made fun of 
him. I’m afraid he may answer our persiflage with his sword hobbledehoy-
fashion.267    
 
263 Cic. De. orat. 2.19-20. 
264 Wallace-Hadrill (1998) 3.   
265 Higginbotham (1997) 67, on conspicuous consumption and piscinae specifically. But see Wallace-
Hadrill (1998) 5-6.   
266 See, e.g., Cic. Fam. 7.23.4, 13.16.3, 15.20.2; Suet. Caes. 56.5; App. B Civ. 2.103; Cass. Dio 
43.28.2.  
267 Cic. Fam. 15.19.4. See also Gelzer (1969b) 301.    
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This comment needs to be interpreted carefully. Cassius’ point is that he views Caesar 
as the lesser of two evils. At first glance, such a statement may seem surprising given 
his later actions. But Cassius perhaps had reason to fear for his safety (as a man who 
has turned his back on the diehard Republicans) should Cn. Pompeius triumph in 
Spain. Even as Cassius wrote this letter he remained in Brundisium, the best place to 
make a quick exit from Italy if necessary. In uncertain times, then, Caesar seemed like 
the safer bet. He had already granted Cassius a pardon, and had generally acted with 
clemency after Pharsalus. Cn. Pompeius, on the other hand, was an unknown quantity 
and someone whom the tyrannicide perceived to be cruel. But Cassius goes much 
further in his assessment.  Cassius jokes he prefers Caesar to Cn. Pompeius because 
he feared the latter’s retribution. There is an uncomfortable truth behind this humour. 
In Cn. Pompeius’ eyes, perhaps, Cassius had deserted the cause of his father and thus 
was a hostis, a stance far different from that of Cato.268 To a large degree, this 
explains his self-imposed exile in Brundisium, where he anxiously awaited the news 
from Spain. He may seriously have considered fleeing Italy if Cn. Pompeius were to 
triumph at Munda; in a rare glimpse into his mind he sums up his position to Cicero: 
“If Caesar has won, expect me back quickly.” (si Caesar vicit, celeriter me 
exspecta).269   
This letter also provides an important –and harsh– assessment of Cn. 
Pompeius, the de facto leader of the Republicans. Cassius describes him as fatuus 
(“foolish” or “silly”), as a man who takes crudelitas for virtue, and as thin-skinned. 
Cn. Pompeius views Cassius’ banter as derision, to the point that this ridicule is 
intolerable and will lead to a rustic (rustice) response with the sword. The general 
impression created by Cassius here is very unfavourable. This evident tension 
between Cassius and Cn. Pompeius may, in part, explain Cassius’ desire to retire from 
public life after Pharsalus and Cato’s suicide. Personal differences played a 
tremendous part in Roman politics, and Cassius probably did not wish to join forces 
with a man he considered foolish and cruel.          
 However, Cassius did not find Caesar an appealing alternative. His ironic use 
of the phrase “clement master” (clementem dominum) indicates he still feels the 
repressive nature of Caesar’s victory. That Caesar is termed dominus (“master”) 
 
268 Huß (1977) 115-16, who speaks of Cassius’ fear of Pompeius’ desire for Rache. As noted above, 
however, Cato had offered all participants the chance to seek Caesar’s pardon with impunity (which 
amounted to an informal immunity, which Cassius had reluctantly accepted).    
269 Cic. Fam. 15.19.  
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clearly indicates Cassius  feels he has been reduced to a servile state. He was under no 
illusions about the ramifications of Caesar’s victory. Ultimately, Cassius’ comments 
here indicate that, given the decisions he made after Pharsalus, it was preferable for 
Caesar to triumph in Spain; nonetheless, this was not an endorsement of Caesar 
himself, whom Cassius still viewed unfavourably. At least Caesar was old and lenient, 
Cassius remarks. But, as time went on, Caesar showed no signs of slowing down or of 
acting with moderation in the political sphere.  
5.16 THE DEATH OF MARCELLUS 
In late June or early July 45, Cassius informed Cicero of M. Marcellus’ death.270 The 
letter he wrote is not extant, and Cicero notes that another correspondent had to 
supply him with the unpleasant details. It is hard to tease further information out of 
this evidence, as there is no indication in Cicero’s letter of how Marcellus’ death 
affected Cassius. In fact, it is possible that Cassius was simply relaying the 
unexpected news matter-of-factly, as a man of his station ought to do. (Ideally, a 
noble had a duty to inform his familiars of developments in public affairs.) And yet, 
Cassius was also connected to the Marcelli through his wife Junia, whose aunt was 
the mother of C. Marcellus (cos. 50), the cousin of the deceased man.271 How intimate 
these connections made Cassius with the Marcelli is, of course, difficult to know. It is 
also unclear whether the tyrannicide had been present during the senatorial 
supplication of Caesar in October 46: many members of the senate had supplicated 
Caesar on behalf of Marcellus.272 His participation seems unlikely; at this time, he 
still appears to have been in the south of Italy. Furthermore, though Cassius had 
certainly worked for the restoration of some aristocrats, Marcellus had refused 
initially to take advantage of Caesar’s policy of clementia, and was in no hurry to take 
up Caesar’s pardon once granted.273 
 Rumours swirled that Caesar was behind Marcellus’ mysterious death. On the 
surface, Marcellus’ demise looked like an accident; he was wounded by his familiaris, 
P. Magius Cilo, who committed suicide shortly after the deed.274 Cicero believed 
 
270 Cic. Fam. 13.22.2. Cassius may have received the news at Brundisium, which may be the reason he 
was able to inform Cicero so quickly.  
271 Cic. Fam. 12.2.2 with Shackleton Bailey (1977) 2.482. 
272 Senate supplication of Caesar: Cic. Fam. 4.4.3. At Cic. Fam.15.17.4 (dated January of 45), Cicero 
speaks of Cassius’ extended stay at Brundisium. Cic. Phil. 13.18, indicates that certain opponents of 
Caesar still attended the senate despite finding his presence repugnant. 
273 Cic. Fam. 4.11, 4.10.1, cf. 4.4.3-4; Liv. Per. 115, on Marcellus’ recall.   
274 Cic. Fam. 4.12, for the details.   
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financial trouble lay behind Magius’ actions; Valerius Maximus reports jealous 
insecurity.275 One scholar even suggests that the death was over Marcellus’ 
acceptance of Caesar’s pardon.276 In this reconstruction, Magius is a fanatical 
Pompeian who cannot come to terms with Marcellus’ betrayal.277 But rumours 
persisted that Caesar had had a hand in the death. This gossip was significant enough 
for Brutus to proactively take up Caesar’s defence, at least in his correspondence.278 
Cicero writes that Brutus’ comments were unnecessary, as few right-thinking 
individuals suspected Caesar. Yet perhaps the orator has underestimated the 
pervasiveness of the chatter. (The rumours may also have been fanned by dissidents 
looking to cast odium on Caesar.) It is notable that Brutus rushed to Caesar’s defence 
in this matter (or mocked the accusation of Caesar’s involvement); it is unlikely that 
Cassius would have been as sympathetic about Caesar’s bad press. This again shows 
that Brutus is much closer to Caesar at this time than Cassius. It need not be assumed, 
then, that Cassius sent a lugubrious letter to Cicero, but rather passed on the news as a 
man of his station and responsibilities ought.279 While the correspondents were not as 
familiar as some maintain –L. Canfora argues Cicero was on friendlier terms with 
Cassius than Brutus, a dedicatee of several Ciceronian works!280– since 51 they had 
grown steadily closer to each other.281 
  
5.17 LEX CASSIA 
In late 45 or early 44, a Lex Cassia was passed which granted Caesar the authority to 
adlect plebeians into the patriciate, a power that he certainly exercised.282 Given the 
vagueness of the law’s passage date, both Cassius and his brother Lucius may be 
considered potential authors of the law.  Most scholars, however, argue Lucius passed 
the law as tribune, but many concede it is possible, though unlikely, that the 
 
275 Cic. Att. 13.10.3; Val. Max. 9.11.4.  
276 Caesar had granted Marcellus a pardon, although the latter had not yet accepted it: see n.276 above.  
277 Bauman (1985) 52. 
278 Cic. Att. 13.10.3; cf. Huß (1977) 115-16. 
279 Since he was at Brundisium it is likely that he was made aware of the news before those at Rome.  
280 Canfora (2007) 222-3; cf. Clarke (1981) 31, with n.33 lists the five works Cicero dedicated to 
Brutus.    
281 Clarke (1981) 31. There may still have been some social distance between the two men (as there 
was even between Brutus and Cicero). 
282 Tac. Ann. 11.25.2; Suet. Iul. 41.1 with Butler and Cary (1927) 97; Cass. Dio 43.47.3. For modern 
discussion, see Dettenhofer (1992) 179; Wardle (2014) 83.  
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tyrannicide pushed it through as a praetorian lex.283 On the balance of probabilities, 
however, the latter would seem unlikely.  
Unlike Cassius, Lucius was a loyal supporter of Caesar, had followed him in 
the civil war, and been designated proconsul of Greece in 48, in spite of the fact that 
he had not previously held any office.284 Swift career advancement and patronage 
explain his devotion to Caesar and his interests, which continued unabated after the 
assassination.285 Cassius, in sharp contrast, barely tolerated the dictator and had 
recently been snubbed over the office of the urban praetorship, which had been 
awarded to Brutus somewhat unfairly. Since then Cassius had been angry with 
Caesar.286 To assist Caesar with a bill that allowed him to fortify his position in Rome 
does not sit right with the disaffected Cassius. Lucius Cassius, therefore, should be 
considered the shepherd of this law. In passing this lex, Caesar hoped to replenish the 
patrician stock, which had been significantly depleted as a result of the civil war he 
had played a large part in stoking. Though Cassius was not likely responsible for the 
passage of this lex, he probably found it unpalatable that Caesar should be in charge 
of adlecting plebeians into the patrician order, as the dictator had already proved 
himself to be a far from impartial judge of men (see Chapter Six). For Cassius, the 
Lex Cassia served as one more example of Caesar’s excessive desire to control the 
ruling class.             
 
5.18 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, Cassius’ promising career took several adverse turns. First, he sided 
with (or bet on) Pompey in the civil war. This, it has been emphasised, should not be 
understood as proof that he was an ardent supporter of the man himself. Cassius may 
have been pro-senate rather than a committed Pompeian. Pompey might only have 
been a more palatable choice than Caesar. During the war itself, Cassius again 
demonstrated military adroitness as a praefectus classis. However, the notion that 
 
283 Butler and Cary (1927) 97, argue Lucius is probably the Cassius referred to; cf. Yavetz (1983) 126, 
who notes that it is not clear which Cassius passed this law, but concedes the tyrannicide may be 
considered a candidate. Conversely, Elvers, BNP 2.1167, considers it “doubtful” that Lucius passed the 
law. Niccolini (1932) 347, accepts Lucius; Scardigli (1983a) 114, too; cf. Mommsen (1864) 1.175, 
n.12, believes Lucius passed the law, but is prepared to concede that Cassius too may have passed the 
bill. Gelzer (1969b) 310, opts for Lucius.  So too Roddaz (1988) 328. Bunson (1995) 235, even 
disputes whether a Cassius passed the bill at all:  “The so-called lex Cassia”. Wardle (2014) 83, does 
not doubt that the Lex Cassia was a tribunician law passed in 45.         
284 Proconsul: ILLRP 400. For discussion, see Badian (1971) 141; Sumner (1971a) 251, with n.17. 
285 Cic. Phil. 3.23.  
286 On Cassius’ ‘loss’ of the urban praetorship, see Chapter 6, Section 8.   
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Caesar’s account of Cassius’ conduct (written after the war and after Cassius’ pardon) 
was designed as a public rapprochement between the two seems wrongheaded. 
Throughout Caesar’s account his commentary remains mixed. He goes to 
considerable lengths to establish the advantages Cassius enjoyed against Caesar’s 
fleet. It has also been seen that Cassius served as an intercessor for men still in limbo 
after Pharsalus, something heretofore insufficiently appreciated. Cassius sought 
clemency for men in a similar position to himself after Caesar’s victory. Nonetheless, 
it is unclear what form of support Cassius offered, and Cicero provides the only 
(perhaps exaggerated) testimony.  
This chapter has also argued that Cassius’ conversion to Epicureanism was 
whole-hearted and not a “gesture of submission”. It is incorrect to argue his 
Epicureanism compelled him to conspiracy; at the same time, there were tenets in his 
philosophy that (in some circumstances) permitted political action, especially when 
the state’s tranquillity was threatened. The views that Cassius was a philosophaster or 
that his philosophy was cultural in nature have little to commend them. Careful 
reading of his letter to Cicero defending his philosophy indicates someone committed 
to Epicurus. Ultimately, Cassius was an Epicurean conspirator; yet he was not 
primarily motivated to conspire by his Epicureanism (as will be seen in the next 
chapter). Although Cassius may have been slightly relieved that Caesar triumphed 
over Cn. Pompeius in Spain, that certainly does not mean he was happy about Cae-
sar’s victory. Quite the contrary. Cassius was increasingly troubled by Caesar.      
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CHAPTER SIX 
CASSIUS AND CAESAR’S ASSASSINATION 
 
6.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses Cassius’ leading role in Caesar’s assassination. It begins by 
arguing that he was the instigator of the conspiracy. While the ancient source tradition 
is contradictory (and modern opinion far from unanimous), it will be seen that the 
most compelling evidence attributes the deed to the tyrannicide. Furthermore, it notes 
that the hypothesis that Decimus Brutus was the real mastermind –based on Nicolaus’ 
account– is founded on a misreading of the author. The historian’s account of 
Cassius’ actions at the Lupercalia is also problematic. After arguing that Cassius was 
the architect of Caesar’s assassination, a discussion follows on his motives. Both 
personal and political reasons impelled Cassius, but ultimately Caesar’s repeated 
interference with his career advancement (both accidental and deliberate) affronted 
his dignitas. This meddling, above all, sealed Caesar’s fate.  
A caveat is required. Caesar’s assassination is arguably the most famous event 
in all of antiquity, and a watershed moment in European history. It is also one of the 
most complex and well-trodden historical issues in Roman studies. There is no 
attempt here to provide a doxography of scholarly opinion –such a project would need 
a book-length treatment in itself– or to parse every piece of ancient evidence in great 
detail. The focus of this chapter is to examine Cassius’ motives in conspiring against 
Caesar, as it is argued he is the key to understanding this landmark event.     
 
 
6.1 INSTIGATOR 
Three Romans are contenders for the crown of first conspirator: Brutus, D. Brutus, 
and Cassius. This triumvirate of candidates has emerged because the ancient evidence 
is contradictory: Dio credits Brutus with forming the conspiracy; Plutarch and Appian 
say that it was Cassius.1 Not to be outdone, some modern scholars have conjectured 
that D. Brutus headed the plot. This hypothesis is based, in large part, on one sentence 
in Nicolaus of Damascus’ Bios Kaisaros.2 Accordingly, each of these men has found 
 
1 Brutus: Cass. Dio 44.14.1-4; Cassius: Plut. Brut. 8.5, App. B Civ. 2.113.     
2 D. Brutus: Nic. Dam. 19.59. But cf. Cic. Phil. 2.26, and D. Brutus’ primacy in the catalogue of 
conspirators. On the Life of Augustus, see generally Bellemore (1984).    
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some share of scholarly support. Though modern scholars have debated which of the 
ancient traditions is to be preferred, there is still no consensus, and respectable cases 
have been put forward for each of the protagonists.3 It is the purpose of this section to 
make the case that: (i) Cassius was the originator of the plot; (ii) he had an established 
group of conspirators assembled before he reached out to Brutus; (iii) he co-led the 
assassins with Brutus and D. Brutus, whose influence with disaffected Caesarians 
(like C. Trebonius) would be crucial if they were to secure wider support for their 
enterprise; (iv) he needed Brutus’ name and unimpeachable reputation to give the 
assassination as much credibility as possible from those who would strive to discredit 
its legitimacy, and this is the reason he sought Brutus’ assistance as the figurehead of 
the conspiracy; (v) Plutarch’s account, rightly enshrined as the most important by 
modern scholars, still diminishes the true influence of Cassius.    
The only contemporary account of the assassination is provided by Nicolaus of 
Damascus. Some scholars conclude from his narrative that Decimus Brutus was the 
leading light of the conspiracy.4 This is because in his roll call of the conspiracy’s 
leadership, Nicolaus lists Decimus before both Cassius and Brutus, which has been 
interpreted to indicate the erstwhile Caesarian’s primacy (Nic. Dam. 19.59):5 
φασὶ γὰρ τοὺς μετασχο´ντας τοῦ λόγου γενέσθαι ὐπὲρ π ´,ἐν οἷς μέγιστον 
ὐδύνατο Δέκμος τε Βροῦτος, φίλος ἐσ τα μάλιστα ὢν Καίσαρι, και Γάιος 
Κάσσιος τε και Μάρκος Βροῦτος, οὐδενὸς ἧττον παρὰ Ρωμαίοις τότε 
έπαινούμενος;     
They say that over eighty took part in the plot, the most important of whom 
were Decimus Brutus, a special friend of Caesar, Gaius Cassius, and Marcus 
Brutus, whose standing amongst the Romans at that time was unsurpassed.6    
Nicolaus’ status as a contemporary has led some to argue that he was in a better 
position to understand the role of Decimus. While these arguments are not without 
merit –and while it is true that Decimus was despatched to escort Caesar to the curia 
on the Ides– Nicolaus’ aims and themes are not above suspicion.7 It is probable that 
 
3 D. Brutus: Bondurant (1907) 54; Tatum (2008) 154-5, who argues Decimus inducted Cassius into the 
conspiracy; cf. Strauss (2015) 81-2, who also argues for the centrality of Decimus throughout his work. 
Cassius: Syme (1939) 57; Balsdon (1958) 82; Canfora (2007) 306-10. Fröhlich, RE s.v. “Cassius” (59) 
3. 1730, disputed Cassius’ primacy in the conspiracy, questioning the accounts of Appian and Plutarch.   
4 Moles (1979) 119, suggests that Nicolaus “is neutral” on the conspiracy’s founding.  
5 Nic. Dam. 19.59, states: ἐν οἷς μέγιστον ἠδύνατο Δἑκμος τε Βροῦτος. 
6 Nic. Dam. 19.59. 
7 On Decimus’ role on the Ides, see for example App. B Civ. 2.115.  
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Nicolaus, whose account can best be described as “tragic history”,8 places Decimus at 
the head of the list because his betrayal of Caesar, as a friend whose career had been 
advanced by him and a secondary heir in his will, seemed the greatest of all.9 Indeed, 
Nicolaus foregrounds his special friendship with Caesar: φίλος ἐς τὰ μάλιστα ὢν 
Καὶσαρι.10 As in the case of the Lupercalia (see below), then, Nicolaus had artistic 
and moralistic reasons for putting Decimus at the head of the conspirators: he aims for 
poignancy in foregrounding the fact that Caesar was killed by a good friend. Thus the 
order of the conspirators’ names should not be interpreted as an indication of their 
corresponding responsibility in Caesar’ assassination. Moreover, Plutarch suggests 
that Decimus joined the conspirators rather late in the piece, when the plot had long 
been formed and a circle of disaffected senators had gathered around Cassius and 
Brutus.11 His influence with disillusioned Caesarians was important, but Decimus 
cannot be deemed to have begun the conspiracy based on Nicolaus’ account. His 
account of the Lupercalia (see below) is also highly suspicious, and illustrates the 
danger of relying on his version of events to reconstruct this complicated period. 
Dio lays the blame for Caesar’s illegal (ἀνόμωs)12 assassination squarely at 
Brutus’ feet. In the forty-fourth book of his vast history of Rome, he remarks:  
ἀκούσας δὲ ταῦτα ὁ Βροῦτος ἐθαύμασε, καὶ οὐδὲν ἔτ' αὐτὴν [sc. Porcia] 
ἀπεκρύψατο, ἀλλὰ αὐτός τε ἐπὶ μᾶλλον ἐρρώσθη καὶ ἐκείνῃ πάνταδιηγήσατο. 
καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο τὸν Κάσσιον τὸν Γάιον, σωθέντα μὲν καὶ αὐτὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ 
Καίσαρος καὶ προσέτι καὶ στρατηγίᾳ τιμηθέντα, τῆς δὲ ἀδελφῆς ἄνδρα ὄντα, 
προσέλαβε.  
Hearing this, Brutus marvelled; and he no longer hid anything from her [sc. 
Porcia], but felt strengthened himself and related to her the whole plot. After this 
he obtained as an associate Gaius Cassius, who had also been spared by Caesar and 
moreover had been honoured with the praetorship; and he was the husband of 
Brutus’s sister.13  
According to Dio, Porcia’s impressive speech (and self-mutilation) compelled Brutus 
to reveal his plot. Brutus then seeks out Cassius. Throughout Dio’s account, in fact, 
 
8 On Nicolaus’ narrative as an example of “tragic history”, see Rawson (1986) 110 (and below).  
9 Tragic history: see also Lintott (2009) 72-3; Hägg (2012) 198-9. Cf. Jacoby, FGrH 132, who shows 
Nicolaus wrote tragedies in his youth. On the strength of Decimus’ position with Caesar, see Bellemore 
(1984) 100. Fundamental, too, is Toher (1985), (1987), (1989), (2003b), and (2006).  
10 Nic. Dam. 19.59. Note, too, that he bookends his list with Brutus, whose reputation was unsurpassed.   
11 Plut. Brut. 12.5. 
12 Cass. Dio 44.1.1-2. 
13 Cass. Dio 44.14.1-2.   
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Brutus is identified as the ringleader of the conspiracy (e.g., 41.63.6, 46.2.3). In the 
first of these examples, Dio discusses Brutus’ culpability in the first person, which to 
A. Gowing indicates the historian’s own view.14       
However, Dio’s account is less plausible than the narratives of Plutarch and 
Appian for several reasons. Brutus was closely aligned to Caesar, and hopeful in 
August 45 that the dictator would reunite with the boni. Cassius, by contrast, had 
already recorded his opposition to Caesar by refusing to vote him new honours; these 
activities all predate graffiti that supposedly spurred Brutus to consider the 
assassination. The graffiti itself probably indicate that conspiracy was already afoot, 
and Cassius reveals in a speech that nobles seeking to bring Brutus into the fold had 
planted these comments.15  
Dio naturally gravitated to the compelling story of Porcia’s remarkable spirit, 
as the portrayal of politically active women is an important theme throughout his 
history. And yet, Plutarch and Appian contradict Dio’s account, as they state 
unequivocally that Cassius approached Brutus first.16 These versions, based in part on 
superior biographical source material, should be preferred over Dio, who seems to 
have muddled events in this instance. Dio is the only historian to make Brutus the 
originator of the conspiracy, even though earlier in his account he shows that Cassius’ 
resistance to Caesar predated Brutus’ (see below).       
 
6.2 THE CASE FOR CASSIUS 
There is strong evidence scattered throughout the source tradition that Cassius was 
the instigator of the conspiracy. Of this testimony, Plutarch provides the most 
compelling details. Throughout the early narrative of his Life of Brutus, Plutarch 
strongly hints that Cassius was the author of the conspiracy. As will be seen below, 
several accounts Plutarch had access to provide alleged reasons for why Cassius 
initiated the plot (ὑπάρξαι τῆς ἐπιβουλῆς).17 This phrase indicates that Cassius was 
initially responsible for making the first movements against Caesar, at least in the 
eyes of some observers. A close examination of Chapters 8 and 10 of the Life support 
 
14 Gowing (1992) 165-6.  
15 Graffiti: Plut. Brut. 9.5-7; App. B Civ. 2.113 (planting of graffiti). 
16 Plut. Brut. 7-8, recounts Cassius’ steps to conscript Brutus into the conspiracy. Cf. Plut. Brut. 13, 
which argues Brutus only revealed the plot to Porcia when the conspiracy was well advanced and his 
anxiety about it evidently had become apparent to his wife. App. B Civ. 2.112.  
17 Plut. Brut. 9.1.  
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this interpretation. In Chapter 8, Cassius is said by Plutarch to have “fired up” 
(κατήπειξε) Brutus against Caesar.18 The tyrannicide thus provokes the necessary 
reaction in the passive and morally upright Brutus –stoking the conspiracy into 
existence. It is Cassius who has realised Caesar’s true nature, and his anger (a 
leitmotif in Plutarch’s work) serves to inflame Brutus. According to Plutarch, then, it 
is Cassius who first sounds out Brutus about the conspiracy.  
In Chapter 10 of the Life, Plutarch continues to suggest that Cassius was the 
originator of the conspiracy.19 At this point, Cassius carefully attempts to entice 
some unnamed friends into the plot. These men appear receptive, although they do 
not commit to the cause unreservedly. According to Plutarch, they are only prepared 
to join if Brutus is enlisted too (see below, section Brutus): 
Κασσίῳ δὲ πειρῶντι τοὺς φίλους ἐπὶ Καίσαρα πάντες ὡμολόγουν, εἰ 
Βροῦτος ἡγοῖτο. 
Moreover, when Cassius sought to induce his friends to conspire against 
Caesar, they all agreed to do so if Brutus took the lead.20 
If this narrative is accepted, it is clear that Cassius was already conspiring against 
Caesar, and recruiting participants, before Brutus’ involvement. While Plutarch’s 
language here is slightly opaque, that may only convey the cautious manner in which 
Cassius broached the topic of conspiracy. 21  Indeed, Cassius attempts to stir up 
(πειρῶντι) his friends against Caesar (ἐπὶ Καίσαρα). The implication is that the 
tyrannicide is seeking to assemble a group of trustworthy friends against Caesar.    
 As Cassius’ friends were insistent on Brutus’ participation –because of his 
unimpeachable reputation (δόξα)– the tyrannicide visits his brother-in-law with the 
intention of incorporating him into the conspirators’ fold.22 Here Plutarch’s account 
of their meeting shares much common ground with that of Appian, who also concurs 
that Cassius first sought out Brutus.23 Some have questioned the historicity of their 
conversation, especially as Plutarch’s clipped summary appears slightly implausible. 
Indeed, according to this account, Cassius questions and presses Brutus about 
 
18 Plut. Brut. 8.5. Moles (1979) 119, notes that the implication is that Cassius was the “instigator” of 
the conspiracy. 
19 Cf. also Plut. Caes. 66.8.  
20 Plut. Brut. 10.1. 
21 Moles (1979) 134.  
22 Plut. Brut. 10.1. Nicolaus of Damascus also notes Brutus’ reputation was second to none at that time: 
Nic. Dam. 19.59.  
23 App. B Civ. 2.113. See further below.  
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Caesar, until Brutus suddenly realises that Caesar is a threat to their interests. Yet 
again, Cassius initiates the conversation and cleverly coaxes Brutus into the plot. 
And even if Brutus’ participation was not enlisted in exactly this way, the main point 
seems clear: throughout Plutarch’s Life of Brutus Cassius is characterised as the 
instigator of the conspiracy.     
However, Plutarch’s synkresis (Comp. 1.2-3) of Dion and Brutus undermines 
this narrative thrust. Here he notes that only “some” (ἔνιοι) attribute the origin (τὴν 
ἀρχήν) of the plot to Cassius.24 On the one hand, this is concrete evidence that 
certainly some ancient writers identified Cassius as the architect of the conspiracy. 
On the other hand, Plutarch is apparently aware of other accounts that contradict this 
claim. But the context is crucial. In the Comparison, Plutarch is looking to explain 
and lessen the contribution of Cassius, so as not to diminish the achievements of his 
subject. Indeed, Cassius’ contribution to the Republican cause sits uneasily with the 
themes and tenor of his Brutus.25 To be sure, Plutarch mentions the tyrannicide’s 
achievements, but in a way that serves to damn them with faint praise.26 Moreover, it 
is well known that several opportunistic politicians claimed credit for Caesar’s 
assassination. Some even falsely claimed to have participated on the Ides in the 
hopes of winning favour.27 It is possible, then, that there is more than one reason why 
Plutarch contradicts his own narrative. Moralistic intent likely forced Plutarch to 
weaken the strength with which he suggests Cassius was the originator of the plot, as 
he does in the Life when adhering closely to his source material.28  The overall 
emphasis of Plutarch’s account is that Cassius began the plot. 
Appian also singles out Cassius as the man responsible for instigating 
Caesar’s murder. In the second book of his history of the civil wars, he writes (2.88): 
 
24 This information is very important, however, since no other extant source explictly states Cassius 
was responsible (cf. Dio’s account of Brutus’ primacy). So the fact that Plutarch found accounts 
attributing the conspiracy to Cassius is very useful.    
25 Moles (1979) 119, notes that Cassius’ ambivalence fascinated Plutarch, and that his portrait of him is 
very complex. Cassius serves as a foil for Brutus in the Life, and Plutarch diminishes the Epicurean’s 
importance in favour of the Stoic’s, who for him embodied a real-life example of the philosopher-king. 
26 The conspiracy required not daring and bravery but reputation: Plut. Brut. 10.1. 
27 These false claims are also discussed in Chapter 5, Section 8.  
28 Appian also indicates that Cassius initiated the conversation with Brutus about the conspiracy (B Civ. 
2.113). In his version of events, Cassius coaxes his brother-in-law to commit himself to action, should 
Caesar attempt to make himself king. Appian, however, then notes that they began recruiting 
conspirators together, but this neglects the fact that Cassius had already assembled other men.   
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ὁ δ᾽ οὕτως ἑαυτὸν αἰσχρῶς ὑπὸ φόβου μόνου παραπλέοντι παραδοὺς ὕστερον 
ἐν Ῥώμῃ δυναστεύοντα ἤδη κατέκανεν: ᾧ καὶ αὐτῷ δῆλόν ἐστι τὸν ἕτερον τῷ 
Κασσίῳ φόβον ὑπὸ τύχης ἐγγενέσθαι τὸν Καίσαρα ἐπαιρούσης.  
And yet he [sc. Cassius] who thus, through fear alone, disgracefully surrendered 
to Caesar when he was crossing the straits, afterward murdered him in Rome 
when he was at the height of his power; by which fact it is evident that the panic 
which then seized Cassius was due to the fortune by which Caesar was uplifted.   
This passage has generated more attention for Appian’s notorious error: confusing 
the tyrannicide with another, unknown L. Cassius, who surrendered to Caesar at the 
Hellespont (“the straits”).29 Nevertheless, the important point is that Appian thinks he 
is writing about Cassius the tyrannicide. And, in the historian’s opinion, it was 
Cassius who “murdered” (κατέκανεν) Caesar when the latter was at the height of his 
power. For Appian, then, Cassius is the chief culprit in Caesar’s murder. As noted, 
Appian also concurs with Plutarch that Cassius brought Brutus into the conspiracy (B 
Civ. 2.113).   
 Additional ancient testimony supports the accounts of Plutarch and Appian. 
In his compendium of Roman history, the Tiberian historian Velleius Paterculus 
writes (2.46.1): C. Cassius, atrocissimi mox auctor facinoris. The phrase 
atrocissimi…facinoris clearly alludes to Caesar’s murder. But the crucial word here 
is auctor. The Oxford Latin Dictionary notes that auctor can mean “the person or 
thing responsible or principally responsible (for an action, situation).” 30  This 
meaning, above all others, is likely to be the sense that Velleius intended.31 Cassius 
was the originator (auctor, OLD 12) of the conspiracy to murder Caesar 
(atrocissimi…facinoris). In a different context, Velleius employs auctor with similar 
purpose when describing Lucullus’ culpability for the sybaritic extravagance that 
came to define the Roman aristocracy (2.33.4). As noted in the first chapter above, 
 
29 See further Chapter 5 for a discussion of this historical episode.  
30 OLD s.v. “auctor” 12, p.205.  
31  In his Loeb translation, Shipley (1961) 153, glosses auctor as “perpetrator”. However, this 
translation is slightly unsatisfactory, and perhaps fails to capture all of Velleius’ original meaning. 
After all, Cassius was one of many perpetrators who had stabbed Caesar on the Ides, so it would hardly 
be worth singling him out, and certainly not with the emotive force that Velleius does here. It is very 
likely, therefore, that the historian implies something more than perpetrator. In his Budé translation, 
Hellegouarc’h (1982) 2.56, glosses auctor as “l’auteur”: “Cassius, qui devait être bientôt l'auteur d'un 
crime particulièrement atroce.” The word auctor is often employed by Velleius in his history, and often 
to different effect, as befits a word with several meanings. Indeed, Velleius also uses the word auctor 
in a simpler sense to mean “author”, as in an author of a work or a piece of legislation (2.23: 
turpissimae legis auctor).  
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Velleius’ uncle had served as a subscriptor in the trial of Cassius and Brutus for 
Caesar’s murder. The historian was therefore in a special position to understand who 
was generally deemed to have been responsible for Caesar’s murder. Considering his 
personal and political connection to the case, it is very significant that he not only 
singles Cassius out for especial censure, but that the language he uses to do so 
strongly suggests he viewed the tyrannicide as the initiator of the conspiracy.32  
One ancient author has been overlooked repeatedly: Lucan. Cassius is only 
mentioned once in his Pharsalia, but it is in a very important context (7.447-51): 
Spectabit ab alto 
Aethere Thessalicas, teneat cum fulmina, caedes? 
Scilicet ipse petet Pholoen, petet ignibus Oeten, 
Immeritaeque nemus Rhodopes, pinusque Mimantis: 
Cassius hoc potius feriet caput?     
Shall Jupiter, though he grasps the thunderbolt, look on idly from the high 
heaven at the slaughter of Pharsalia? Shall he indeed aim his fire at Pholoe 
and Oeta, at the pines of Mimas and the innocent forest of Rhodope, and 
shall Cassius, rather than he strike Caesar down? 
When Lucan looks ahead to the assassination of Caesar, then, he considers Cassius to 
be responsible for Caesar’s demise, as Jupiter has forsaken mankind.  Lucan accuses 
Jupiter of passively watching the civil war taking place and not intervening. Cassius, 
then, will have to strike Caesar down –not Brutus, not Cimber, nor Casca. For the 
Stoic poet to attribute the deed to Cassius is significant, especially as it was widely 
known that Cassius was not the first to stab Caesar, so there could be no confusion as 
to his rôle.33 Thus the human agency of Cassius, as the first conspirator, is required to 
rectify the wrongs left unpunished by Jupiter.  
Valerius Maximus, too, notes that Cassius should not have defiled his hand 
with a public parricide, and censures him far more harshly than Brutus, a further sign 
perhaps of where responsibility for the deed was deemed to lie (3.1.3): dignam 
 
32 Cf. Vell. Pat. 2.56.3, which focuses on the joint leadership of the conspiracy rather than the issue of 
its origins.   
33 Casca had struck Caesar first: Plut. Caes. 66.7. From a metrical standpoint, it could be argued that 
since neither Casca nor Brutus scans as a dactyl (unlike Cassius), that Lucan’s hand has been forced in 
this line. However, Lucan was a gifted metrician and so it is unlikely that he either was unclear about 
Cassius’ role or forced to use his name for poetic convenience.       
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manum, quae publico parricidio se non contaminaret! 34  The hand of Cassius is 
responsible for Caesar’s murder in both Lucan and Valerius.  
Lurking in the ancient testimony, then, is credible evidence that Cassius was 
considered the instigator of the conspiracy. 
 
6.3 THE PARTY OF CASSIUS 
There is also compelling evidence that Cassius began the recruitment of conspirators 
prior to Brutus’ involvement.35 Plutarch supplies the salient details. In chapter seven 
of the Life of Brutus, he writes that Brutus could have enjoyed an unequalled share in 
Caesar’s power, had not the “party of Cassius” (ἡ περὶ Κάσσιον ἑταιρεία) diverted 
him from this path.36 The full importance of this passage has been unappreciated 
hitherto. At this point in early 44, Brutus was still attached to Caesar to some 
degree. 37  And he was also still at variance with Cassius for both personal and 
political reasons.38 In contrast, Cassius had already assembled a group of associates 
around him who were evidently disaffected with Caesar –hence their desire to drive a 
wedge between Brutus and the dictator.    
 Plutarch’s use of ἡ περὶ Κάσσιον ἑταιρεία is especially striking. Rather than 
use a word that merely indicates friendship, he chose ἑταιρεία, a word that has strong 
political connotations. 39  B. Perrin chose to translate the word as “party”, 40  but 
Plutarch may only have meant allies or associates.41 However one chooses to gloss 
ἑταιρεία, it is clear that Plutarch implies something more than ‘friends of Cassius’. 
These men are his political allies. Plutarch, then, strongly hints in this chapter that 
Cassius has already inducted a group of likeminded associates into the conspiracy 
(cf. Chapter 10 of the Life, see above).  
 
34 Val. Max. 3.1.3. Cassius needed wide support for the conspiracy so as to avoid the accusation of 
killing Caesar as a personal vendetta. This is the reason the conspirators seek broad support for their 
deed.  
35 Canfora (2007) 306-10, has already examined Cassius’ role in the recruitment of key conspirators. 
This section seeks to add further to that discussion.   
36 Plut. Brut. 7.4. The translation is from Perrin’s Loeb edition.  
37 Brutus’ marriage to Porcia has often been credited with too much political significance: Plut. Brut. 
13.3-4, on the romantic reasons for the union. It is far from certain that Brutus’ divorce of Claudia and 
marriage to Porcia signalled a profound shift in his political outlook. That observers like Atticus and 
Cicero approved of the match (e.g., Cic. Att. 13.9) does not prove that it was motivated by politics.  
38 See below on the contest for the urban praetorship. 
39 LSJ s.v. “ἑταιρια” I.1 (1968) 700. Its semantic range spans “association” to “brotherhood”.   
40 Perrin (1918) 141.  
41 In more than one case, Plutarch uses this word to mean “party” or “faction”: see, e.g., Plut. Per. 
14.2.  
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There is also a strong tradition of a party of Cassius lurking in the wider ancient 
source material. The anonymous author of Livy’s Periochae, for instance, writes of a 
general belonging to the Cassianarum partium.42 Aulus Gellius, the author of Noctes 
Atticae, also notes this party.43 And Appian frequently refers to ὁ τοῖς ἀμφὶ τὸν 
Κάσσιον (e.g., B Civ. 2.116). It may be objected, however, that these are fairly 
generic references, and that there are other occasions when the ancient authors refer 
either to Cassius and Brutus as the leader of their cause, and instances where they are 
conjoined.44 Certainly, Cassius and Brutus worked in concert after the Ides in an 
attempt to combat the Caesarians. But the strongest evidence still points to Cassius 
having brought the conspirators together first. This is because his resistance to 
Caesar predated that of Brutus.     
In late January 45, Cassius had already characterised Caesar as a dominus; 
Brutus, in contrast, still quixotically believed as late as August that the dictator 
would reinstate the Republican government and ‘re-join’ the boni.45 Cassius clearly 
had no illusions about what Caesar was or intended to be. It is no surprise, then, that 
the earliest trace of senatorial opposition to Caesar in February 44 came also from 
Cassius, who, along with a few other dissident supporters (but not Brutus, notably) 
refused to vote new honours to Caesar.46 Dio reports that everyone had voted in 
favour of the distinctions ῾πλὴν γὰρ τοῦ Κασσίου καί τινων ἄλλων (44.8.1.). This 
public rebuke of Caesar by Cassius and a circle of his supporters caused a stir, and 
Dio reports they were much talked about: οἳ περιβόητοι ἐπὶ τούτῳ ἐγένοντο. 
Caesar, who at this time angered the nobility for failing to rise for a senatorial 
delegation, overlooked the slight, probably remembering the awkward matter of 
Cassius not having attained the urban praetorship. For the purpose of this discussion, 
it is important to emphasise that Cassius and a circle of likeminded dissidents were 
active before the conspiracy.   
In fact, Cassius’ subversive efforts may have gone further still. Nicolaus 
reports that Cassius and some allies were the true masterminds of the Lupercalia 
 
42 Liv. Per. 123.  
43 Gell. NA. 3.9.5.  
44 Party of Brutus, e.g.: Vell. Pat. 2.72.1, but cf. 2.74.1; App. B Civ. 2.16.115, 2.19.142, 3.1.4, 3.1.7, 
3.3.23, 3.14.96; Party of Cassius: App. B Civ. 2.116, 2.121, 2.122, 2.142, 3.1.8, 3.9.64, 4.8.57, 4.9.71, 
4.11, 86, 4.11.87, 4.11.87, 4.12.88; Party of Brutus and Cassius: Vell. Pat. 2.74.1; Plut. Ant. 13.1; App. 
B Civ. 4.8.57; Eutr. 7.4. Nicolaus also uses this construction: 130.124; cf. 130.52.   
45 Cic. Fam. 15.19.2; Att. 13.40.1. 
46 Cass. Dio 44.8.1. Moles (1979) 120, also notes Brutus’ notable omission from Dio’s list.   
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incident, in which Caesar was offered a diadem, an odious symbol of monarchy. If 
Nicolaus is correct about Cassius’ role, this would again provide compelling 
evidence of the primacy of the tyrannicide in Caesar’s assassination. However, the 
account of Nicolaus must be considered carefully.    
 
 
6.4 LUPERCALIA 
On 15 February 44, it is reported by the ancient sources –with few variations or 
discrepancies– that M. Antonius (consul) offered Caesar a diadem, a detested symbol 
of monarchy before the Roman people. This incident, which occurred during the 
festival of the Lupercalia, is undoubtedly one of the most famous events in all of 
classical antiquity, and, as such, has received much scholarly attention.47 However, 
while there has been much debate about Antonius’ motivations for offering Caesar the 
‘kingly crown’, less attention has been paid to a variant historical tradition preserved 
in Nicolaus of Damascus.48 In this account, Cassius too is said to have been involved 
in this curious political stunt, and offered Caesar the diadem by placing it on his 
knees. The political ramifications of this story would be incredibly important if this 
anecdote is authentic. But, as will be argued here, there are good reasons to question 
the historicity of Nicolaus’ narrative, not least because he wrote an encomiastic Bios 
of Augustus. Thus his account may promote anti-Republican propaganda. As such, a 
thorough investigation of Nicolaus’ accuracy is required.  
               Nicolaus of Damascus has never been regarded as a profound historian; in 
fact, rather the opposite is true.49 E. Schwartz dubbed him a mendacious rhetorician, 
and even scholars who have sought to place him in his Hellenistic historiographical 
tradition concede that his most famous work, the Bios Kaisaros, is nothing more than 
 
 47 On the event’s fame, immortalised by Shakespeare, see the recent article by North (2008) 144. The 
best scholarly treatment of the episode is still Weinstock (1971) 331-40. See also, for example, Meyer 
(1922) 520-3; Denniston (1926) 151-2; Rossi (1959) 44-9; Gelzer (1968b) 320-2; Carter (1970) 6; 
Yavetz (1983) 34, 200-1; Brunt (1988) 52; Pelling (1988) 145-7; Rawson (1991) 169; Ramsey (2003) 
282-7, (2004) 163n.9; Goldsworthy (2006) 499; Cristofoli (2008) 140-52; Pelling (2011) 450-6. For 
information on the festival itself, see Sachs (1963) 266-79; OCD3 (1996) 892; Ramsey (2003) 283; 
Beard et al. (2003) 2.119-21; BNP 7.509-10; and again North (2008) 144-60. For a useful summary of 
early scholarship, see Welwei (1967) 44-69.     
48  Nic. Dam. 21.71-2. Dismissed by most modern scholars, for example, Weinstock (1971) 331-2: 
“The more extensive and more colourful narrative of Nicolaus of Damascus, which is rightly criticised, 
is ignored here” [in Weinstock’s discussion of the Lupercalia]. Cf. Rawson (1986) [1991] 497.  
49 On Nicolaus, Toher is seminal: (1985), (1989), (2003), (2006), (2009). See also, Wacholder (1962); 
Scardigli (1983a); Bellemore (1984); cf. R. Laqueur, RE (1936) s.v. “Nikolaus” 17.1: 362-423 [20].     
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a “propagandistic document”.50  Since he was, according to the Suda, a friend of 
Augustus, perhaps this should not cause surprise.51 But such knowledge does call into 
question the integrity of his account of the Lupercalia, as the modern historian may 
well suspect him of bias. The reason for this charge –which is not made lightly– is 
best demonstrated by comparing Nicolaus’ singularly anomalous account with the 
main historical tradition.  
             All sources except Nicolaus agree that Antonius first offered Caesar the 
diadem.52 Nicolaus, by contrast, relates that a certain Λικίνιος initiated proceedings 
(Nic. Dam. 21.71).53 Why the discrepancy? There are several possible explanations. 
The few scholars who argue for the integrity of Nicolaus’ account believe that this 
Licinius was marginalised out of the main historical tradition to reduce the Lupercalia 
incident to an encounter between Antonius and Caesar.54 Since Cicero is the only 
contemporary to describe the Lupercalia and he was seeking to discredit Antonius, it 
would certainly serve his purpose to forget that other men had been involved. As M. 
Toher has noted, however, it would have been remarkable if the tradition had 
completely forgotten that a Licinius, P. Casca, and especially Cassius had played a 
leading role in the diadem incident. 55  Another possibility is that, given the 
fragmentary nature of the extant text, ‘Licinius’ is the creation of a scribal error or a 
manuscript corruption.56 Nicolaus may never have written about any ‘Licinius’ at all. 
Indeed, scholars have even gone so far as to emend this name, some proposing L. 
Cinna, others Antonius.57 So because questions have been raised over the reliability of 
the text it may be unfair to assess Nicolaus on this detail alone.  
 
50 Hägg (2012) 199; cf. Meiggs (1965) 137, who calls Nicolaus a “poor historian”; Toher (1989) 172, 
states that he was “not a profound writer”. Nicolaus himself outlines in his proem to the Life of 
Augustus (1-2) that his work is encomiastic.      
51 Suda s.v. Νικόλαος Δαμασκηνός T1; FGrH 90 T1. Toher (2003b) 136-7. An anecdote preserved in 
Athenaeus (14.66) indicates that Augustus was on such good terms with Nicolaus that he named a date 
after him.  
52  Nic. Dam. 21.71-2. Cf. Cic. Phil. 2.84-7; Liv. Per. 116; Vell. 2.56.4; Plut. Caes. 61.1-7, Ant. 12.1-4; 
Suet. Caes. 79.2; App. B Civ. 2.109; Cass. Dio 44.11.1-3.      
53 The identity of this man –if he ever existed at all (see below)– is obscure: Münzer, RE 13.1.218 [10]; 
Scardigli (1983a) 157-8; Bellemore (1984) 106; Toher (2003b) 142n.25. 
54  Schmidt (1884) 675-6; Duttlinger (1911) 102-3; cf. Hall (1922) 96-7; Toher (2003b) 142n.24. 
Balsdon (1958) 83, accepted Nicolaus’ account.  
55 Toher (2003b) 142n.24. This issue is further addressed below.  
56 Bellemore (1984) 106, argues that the text should be emended to read “Antonius”; Toher (2003b) 
142, prefers to suggest that a Constantinian excerptor has confused L. Cinna for Licinius (Λικίνιος for 
Λ. Κίννας). Scardigli (1983) 157-8.  
57 Bellemore (1984) 106: Antonius; Toher (2003b) 142: L. Cinna. Cf. Scardigli (1983) 159.  
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In other respects, Nicolaus’ narrative does share some common ground with the main 
tradition –and may be preferred over it. For instance, like Cicero, he notes Lepidus’ 
presence on the Rostra at the Lupercalia (Cic. Phil. 5.38; Nic. Dam. 21.72).  He states 
that some in the crowd urged Lepidus to place the crown upon Caesar’s head, yet he 
was hesitant (ὁ μὲν ὤκνει), whereas Cicero suggests Lepidus pointedly turned his face 
away, groaning and weeping, as Antonius sought to perform this peculiar investiture.  
Cicero’s account, proffered in an impassioned speech that sought to portray Lepidus 
as an honest Republican, may be exaggerated or distorted; by comparison, Nicolaus’ 
version is unadorned and rings true. 58  Nevertheless, even on this detail where 
Nicolaus should be preferred to Cicero, Lepidus’ supposed hesitation may serve an 
artistic end: it is in this moment of delay that Cassius, who was supposedly colluding 
with P. Casca, came forward and placed the diadem on Caesar’s knee. Nicolaus writes 
the following (21.72): 
βοῶντος δὲ τοῦ δήμου ἐπὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν τίθεσθαι καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτο Λέπιδον 
καλοῦντος τὸν ἱππάρκην, ὁ μὲν ὢκνει. ἐν τοῦτ̣ῳ δὲ Κάσσιος Λογγῖνος, εἷς τῶν 
ἐπιβουλευόντων, ὠς δῆθεν εὔνους ὤν, ἵνα καὶ λανθάνειν μᾶλλον δύναιτο 
ὑποφθὰς ἀνείλετο τὸ διάδημα καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ γόνατα αύτοῦ ἔθηκεν.      
The crowd began to shout that the crown be placed upon Caesar’s head and were 
urging Lepidus, the master-of-the-horse, to do this; but he hesitated. Meanwhile, 
Cassius Longinus, one of the conspirators, so that he might easily escape 
detection by acting as if he were well-disposed towards Caesar, got in first, 
picked up the diadem and placed it upon Caesar’s knee.59          
Logically, there are a limited number of possibilities regarding the veracity of 
Nicolaus’ account: the story may be authentic, and (a) Nicolaus is correct in 
explaining the incident as an attempt by Cassius to persuade Caesar of his goodwill, 
thus concealing his true plans; or (b) a genuine attempt by Cassius to bring odium on 
Caesar. Conversely, the story is inauthentic, and (c) anti-Republican propaganda 
designed to depict the conspirators as cowards and liars (so Hohl);60 or (d) Nicolaus’ 
own embellishment, added for artistic purposes (so Jacoby).61 Ultimately, it will be 
 
58 On Lepidus’ tears, see Cic. Phil. 13.17. For discussion: Manuwald (2007) 2.684; Weigel (1992) 40.  
59 Trans. Bellemore (1984) 34; Cf. Scardigli (1983a): “In quel momento Cassio Longino, uno dei 
congiurati, come se fosse veramente benevolo e anche per poter meglio dissimulare le sue malvage 
intenzione, lo prevenne prendendo il diadema e ponendo glielo sulle ginocchia.”       
60 Hohl (1941) 92-117; cf. Moles (1979) 109, who describes the account as a “malicious fabrication”. 
61 Jacoby, FGrH 2.276; cf. Scardigli (1983a) 158. On Nicolaus’ tendency for embellishment, see Jakob 
(1911) 35, 48, apud Toher (1989) 159-72, (p. 163nn.18-19). Toher further demonstrates that Nicolaus 
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argued here that the story is more than likely inauthentic, representing both a hostile 
anti-Republican source and perhaps Nicolaus’ own literary embellishment. His goal, 
in producing such an account, was to characterise the events of the Lupercalia not as a 
failed Caesarian coup de théâtre –which it most probably was62– but rather as the 
malicious brainchild of the assassins (cf. 20.67).    
               Nicolaus has plainly followed a source outside the mainstream historical 
tradition, which evidently had an anti-Republican bent. Yet he has attempted to 
conflate this source (not very successfully) with the dominant historical record, as 
demonstrated by his awkward narrative in which Antonius and the diadem play 
peculiar roles.63 An additional inconsistency as a result of this source conflation is 
that Nicolaus notes the assassins had colluded beforehand, yet the success of their 
plan depends entirely on the chance hesitation of Lepidus,64 which does not suggest 
great forethought compared with the preparation they eventually put into the 
assassination. This is to say nothing of the fact that Antonius then appeared to place 
the crown upon Caesar’s head, thus returning to the main historical tradition. As a 
result of this jarring narrative, F. Jacoby observed what he perceived to be the 
dramatic embellishment of the diadem’s progression, from Caesar’s feet, to his knees, 
then on to his head.65 He concluded that Nicolaus, who wrote tragedies in his youth, 
had overdone the theatrics; the story was an “erfindung”.66       
 
did, on occasion, alter his source material for the purposes of his own emphasis and artistry. This is 
accepted by Hägg (2012) 198n.38: “Nicolaus’ technique in his History of transforming his sources in 
the direction of ‘ἐνάργεια and pathetic embellishment” has been demonstrated by Toher. See Toher 
(2004) 174-84, showing how Nicolaus could also omit pertinent, knowable historical details if they 
contradicted his own historical portrait. Other scholars, who have studied different fragments of 
Nicolaus, have also noted his ability to alter his source material for dramatic presentation: R. Laqueur, 
RE s.v. “Nikolaus” 17.1: 389 [20]; Wacholder (1962) 122-3. But cf. Biltcliffe (1969) 85-93; and Toher 
(1989) 170-2, in response. Even in antiquity, Josephus accused Nicolaus of biased writing, especially 
regarding Herod: Joseph. Ant. 16.184.      
62 Gelzer (1969b) 321, argues Caesar was simply trying to put an end to the rumours that he wished to 
set himself up as king. Thus it was a staged political stunt: North (2008); Tatum (2008).    
63 Toher (2003b) 142, notes that Nicolaus has obviously conflated two contradictory source traditions:  
“That would explain why the crown seems to migrate mysteriously back to Antonius after it was [sic] 
been thrown away and ordered away.” And Hohl (1941) 101:  “das unverwüstliche Diadem”.    
64 As has been seen, Lepidus, the master of the horse, was urged by the people to crown Caesar, though 
how the assassins could have anticipated such prompting or Lepidus’ subsequent hesitation is 
unknown. Nicolaus may imply that Cassius seized the opportunity to place the diadem on Caesar’s 
knee but this is different from orchestrating the whole enterprise. (It is possible that Cassius seized the 
chance to offer the diadem to Caesar, though as Bellemore has pointed out, if he did he was acting 
inconsistently with his previous public posture.)  
65 Jacoby, FGrH 2.276; cf. Scardigli (1983a) 158.  
66 Jacoby, FGrH F125-30, 2.276. Textual problems were also discussed: cf. Scardigli (1983a) 159.  For 
the reference to Nicolaus’ tragedies, see Jacoby, FGrH 132. See also Lintott (2009) 72-3. 
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Nicolaus’ narrative also conflicts with other, more credible, source evidence. As J. 
Bellemore notes, Cassius and P. Casca are “badly cast” by Nicolaus: the former had 
previously opposed excessive public honours for Caesar (so Cass. Dio 44.8.1), while 
the latter did not hold a magistracy in 44 and thus “would not have been present on 
the Rostra”.67 Though in fact it was possible for Casca to be on the Rostra (if invited 
by Cassius or anyone with imperium),68 Bellemore is right to point out that this would 
have been a radical shift in Cassius’ intransigent former position. If he now offered 
the diadem to Caesar so as to garner the dictator’s favour (concealing his true 
feelings) as Nicolaus suggests, it must surely have surprised Caesar, if not made him 
downright suspicious.69 But in Nicolaus’ account Caesar is problematically cast as 
“guileless” (ὁ δὲ ἅτε ἁπλους ὢν) and “inexperienced” (ἄπειρος) in politics.70 This is 
certainly not a convincing portrait of the man who was possessed of all the talents of 
war, letters, and politics. But it allows Nicolaus to claim the assassins undermined 
Caesar’s authority by pretending to offer him high honours (Nic. Dam. 20.67). As it is 
hard to believe that Cassius could obsequiously offer the diadem to Caesar, there is 
little to commend Nicolaus’ story as plausible. 
               One cannot fail to notice also the potential artistic dimension of Nicolaus’ 
Bios; he may employ literary parallelism (or foreshadowing) in his treatment of the 
Lupercalia. The same men who place the crown on Caesar’s knee, Cassius and Casca, 
also initiate the dictator’s murder (Nic. Dam. 23.89). On that occasion, Casca acts 
first but Cassius is a close second, delivering a blow to Caesar’s face (cf. App. B Civ. 
2.117). Nicolaus’ Lupercalia, then, serves as a preamble, foreshadowing a later 
tragedy. As such, he can lay the blame for Caesar’s murder squarely at the feet of the 
assassins and Antonius. Although clearly untrue, his narrative is the perfect rewriting 
of history from an Augustan perspective.   
               In sum, Nicolaus’ account of the Lupercalia incident is unconvincing. His 
anomalous account is contradictory and must reflect his conflation of competing 
historical traditions. But in addition to synthesizing these traditions, he also had 
specific artistic intentions. His arrangement of his source material clearly suggests to 
 
67  Bellemore (1984) 106. Possibly Nicolaus may simply have confused Publius Casca with his brother 
Gaius, as Toher (2003b) 142 suggests. Cf. Scardigli (1983a) 160; Cass. Dio 44.52.2.   
68 It is unclear whether this was a formal occasion at which procedure for mounting the rostra applied. 
69 Caesar knew he was unpopular with some: Cic. Att. 14.1.2, 14.2.3; and he supposedly expressed 
concerns about both Brutus’ and Cassius’ loyalty: Plut. Brut. 8.2, Caes. 62.5-10, Ant. 11-12, Mor. 
206F.  
70 Nic. Dam. 20.67, with Bellemore (1984) 103; Toher (2003b) 140-2, Toher (2006) 29-44.  
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his readers that the Lupercalia was primarily an act of Caesar’s enemies, which 
undoubtedly led to the murder of the dictator. It is for this reason that Cassius –the 
instigator of the conspiracy– finds a ‘role’. There may also have been an element of 
literary parallelism in the account: Cassius instigated the conspiracy against Caesar 
and P. Casca was the first man to wound Caesar in the Temple of Pompey. 
Accordingly, we can conclude is that it is highly unlikely that Cassius offered Caesar 
the diadem at the Lupercalia – either maliciously or sycophantically. If Cassius had 
offered the crown to Caesar at the Lupercalia it would be the second example of him 
taking a public stand against the dictator; he had previously opposed senatorial offers 
for Caesar in early 44. But Nicolaus’ account is thoroughly untrustworthy, and so it 
cannot be maintained.  
  
6.5 BRUTUS’ RECRUITMENT 
According to Plutarch, the other conspirators were reluctant to proceed against Caesar 
without first securing the participation of Brutus. 71  Plutarch may exaggerate this 
point, but Cassius well knew the importance of gaining the support of his brother-in-
law. The problem for Cassius was that their relationship was not in good health.    
Even before the race for the urban praetorship (see below), Cassius and Brutus 
had been at odds for an unknown duration. Plutarch, the only source for this 
information, probably knew of this prior falling-out from supplementary biographical 
material, which may have been furnished by Empylus, Brutus’ philosopher-in-
residence, or Bibulus, his stepson. 72  What the cause of their differences was is 
unspecified, although political disagreements should not necessarily be ruled out. 
Nonetheless, for W. Huß the tradition of Brutus and Cassius as united brothers-in-
law-cum-Republican-patriots is a myth. Rather, he believes the two men had vastly 
different motives and objectives in conspiring against Caesar and in taking up arms 
thereafter.73 True though this is up to a point, inasmuch as Brutus and Cassius have 
far too often been conjoined by the source tradition, the ancient evidence is hardly 
compelling one way or the other on the issue of their closeness and friendship.  
Plutarch provides the most information on the pair’s relationship. At the 
beginning of the Life of Brutus, Cassius is described as Brutus’ friend (φίλος) in 
 
71 Plut. Brut. 10.1.  
72 Plut. Brut. 7.1-5; Pelling (1979) 86.    
73 Huß (1977) 115-25; cf. Pelling (2011) 461-2.  
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addition to being his brother-in-law. 74  For his part, Brutus is later said to have 
petitioned Caesar to pardon Cassius after Pharsalus.75 This notwithstanding, in the 
course of their political careers they appear to have had several notable 
disagreements, not that this is any way disproves they were close friends.76 In their 
contest for the praetorship, for instance, the words used by both Plutarch and Appian 
to describe their rivalry are particularly strong.77 This was no healthy competition, but 
a bitter scrap. That two brothers-in-law were competing against one another at all is in 
itself interesting, and one may justly wonder if Caesar really did wish to drive a 
wedge between the two men, as Plutarch reports.78 Far less surprising is that two men 
of considerably different characters and temperaments would be repeatedly at odds. 
Even between friends disputes are to be expected.        
Other evidence concerning their friendship is circumstantial at best. Their 
earliest contact may have occurred under the tutelage of Staberius Eros, but, even if 
they had studied together under the renowned grammaticus, it does not follow that the 
two became close friends as a result.79 Nor does Cassius’ marriage to Brutus’ half-
sister, Junia Tertia, indicate anything other than a business-like union between two 
distinguished families.80 At any rate, Brutus is unlikely to have had much (if any) 
input into the marriage arrangement. Before the assassination, Cicero speaks of Bruto 
tuo, when addressing Cassius, but this is quite generic.81 However, Brutus himself, in 
a letter to Cicero speaks of Cassius noster, which indicates a degree of intimacy and 
common cause.82 While there is surprisingly little concrete evidence of the pair’s 
friendship and closeness, this may be an illusion created by the source material. Huß’s 
revisionist view of Brutus and Cassius may go too far.  
Several reasons are given as to why Brutus took a leading role in the 
assassination –his ancestry, his family connections, and his reputation.83 However, 
little attention has been given to exploring why Cassius ceded a leading role to his 
younger brother-in-law. Was it because, strictly speaking, Brutus was the most senior 
 
74 Plut. Brut. 1.4.  
75 Plut. Brut. 6.5.  
76 Plut. Brut. 7.1-5, 10.3, 28.3, 34.2-4, 35.2-4.  
77 Plut. Brut. 7.1-2; Caes. 62.4; App. B Civ. 2.112. See further Pelling (2011) 462. 
78 Plut. Brut. 7.1-5. 
79 Suet. Gram. 13. See Chapter 3, Section 2. 
80 Cassius’ marriage to Junia is discussed in Chapter 3, Section 9.  
81 Cic. Fam. 15.14.6.  
82 Cic. Ad. Brut. 2.3 (3.1.3). Cf. Cic. Ad. Brut. 24.5 (1.18). 
83 See, e.g., Plut. Brut. 10.1. 
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magistrate after Caesar and Antonius, both of whom Cassius wished to see murdered 
on the Ides? Was Brutus more popular, especially among the group of disaffected 
Caesarians who rallied to the conspirators’ cause? Or was Cassius concerned about 
his own family’s uneven record of Republican service? The last of these suggestions 
has received very little attention, but it should have. In many ways, Cassius’ ancestry 
and relatives provided much fodder for opponents who would seek to characterise 
him as a self-aggrandising assassin aiming at his own regnum. For instance, two 
family members, Sp. Cassius (cos. I 502) and L. Cassius Longinus (pr. 66), had been 
convicted of trying to overthrow the Republic. Worse, Cassius’ own motives in 
wishing to see Caesar dead were not entirely above suspicion, and he was a far easier 
target to assail than Brutus, who enjoyed an almost impregnable reputation in 44; 
Cassius, by contrast, was later accused of seeking his own kingship.84 Indeed, the 
patchy evidence strongly suggests that after the assassination Cassius was the 
principal target of Caesarian invective.85 Thus he had every reason to seek out his 
brother-in-law, whose connections with the Caesarians would prove crucial if they 
were to achieve anything after the assassination. Brutus’ respectability and well-
known integrity were reasons enough for Cassius to seek a parley with the man who 
had been awarded the urban praetorship.  
 
6.6 MOTIVES 
This chapter has so far argued that Cassius was the chief architect of the conspiracy. 
But, if this interpretation is accepted, it raises a fundamentally important question: 
what were his reasons for conspiring against Caesar? As the ancient sources offer 
various reasons for his doing so, it may be useful to preface this discussion by briefly 
reviewing the opinions of Caesar’s two chief biographers, Plutarch and Suetonius. 
Then there follows an assessment of Cassius’ motives.  
Plutarch considers Caesar’s quest for royal power to have been his undoing. In 
his Life of Caesar, he argues that the dictator’s regal ambitions caused the gravest 
offence among his enemies (μάλιστα μῖσος καὶ θανατηφόρον). 86   If Plutarch is 
correct, Caesar’s ambitions would have provided a powerful rationale for the 
 
84 See, for example, Plut. Brut. 30.3, esp. 29.5-6. He had accused Caesar of being a king: Cic. Fam. 
11.3.4, “regnarit”. 
85 See e.g., Plut. Brut. 1.4. 
86 Plut. Caes. 60.1.  
 
 
205 
conspirators to act on the Ides, the day it was rumoured the senate would vote to 
appoint Caesar king.87  False rumours swirled about that the Sibylline books had 
foretold that only a king could conquer the Parthians.88  And yet, whether or not 
Caesar was made king may have been of little importance to Cassius.  
As noted above, a letter written to Cicero in early 45 reveals that Cassius 
already considered Caesar a dominus, a choice of word that has clear implications. 
While in a general sense the word means “master” –an idea antithetical to a Roman 
noble– it can also reference a “sovereign ruler” and even “despot”.89 The insinuation 
is plain: Caesar already transcended the authority of the now servile senatorial order. 
This compromising position was insufferable to any self-respecting aristocrat. As 
dictator perpetuo, Caesar already enjoyed many of the powers of a king; thus his 
exact title probably bothered Cassius less than the autocratic authority he already 
wielded over the nobility. Indeed, in a letter Brutus and Cassius wrote to M. Antonius 
(cos. 44) after the assassination, it is clear that they considered Caesar to have 
exercised unseemly authority: neque quam diu vixerit Caesar sed quam non diu 
regnarit fac cogites.90 Caesar had not officially been declared a king at Rome, but the 
use of the word regnarit clearly indicates that the conspirators felt that he wielded de 
facto regal power. In the wider historical tradition, there is further proof that Caesar 
was already deemed a monarch in all but name.91 The issue of Caesar’s supposed 
quest for the kingship may well have played a role in drumming up support for the 
conspirators’ cause, but Caesar’s existing power and status troubled Cassius every bit 
as much as his regal ambitions.   
Suetonius believes that Caesar’s failure to stand for a senatorial delegation 
aroused the greatest enmity against him (Iul.78.1):92 
 Verum praecipuam et exitiabilem sibi invidiam hinc maxime movit. 
Adeuntis se cum plurimis honorificentissimisque decretis universos patres 
conscriptos sedens pro aede Veneris Genetricis excepit. 
 
87 Plut. Brut. 10.3; Plut. Caes. 60.2.  
88 Suet. Iul. 79.5; cf. Cic. Div. 2.110; Plut. Caes. 60.2; Cass. Dio 44.15.3; Horsfall (1974) 191. 
89 OLD, s.v. “dominus” 3a, 571.  
90 Cic. Fam. 11.3. See also Cic. Att. 10.8.7, in which as early as 49 Cicero predicts Caesar’s regnum 
will only last six months.   
91 App. B Civ. 2.108, 110; Cass. Dio 43.45.1. 
92 Cass. Dio 44.8.2, also notes it was a “chief excuse” to justify his assassination. Liv. Per. 116, also 
places this issue at the head of a list of causes for the assassination. Caesar’s failure to rise is also 
discussed by Nic. Dam. 130.78-9; Plut. Caes. 60.4-8; App. B Civ. 2.107; Cass. Dio 44.8.1-4; Eutrop. 
6.25.1.     
 
 
206 
But it was the following action in particular that roused deadly hatred 
against him. When the Senate approached him in a body with many 
highly honorary decrees, he received them before the temple of Venus 
Genetrix without rising.  
To modern readers, such a statement may seem far-fetched. Given the many reasons 
put forward to explain Caesar’s assassination, how could a momentary lapse in polite 
ceremonial courtesy lead to the dictator’s death? And yet, for Caesar’s contem-
poraries, evidently this episode was striking. This importance is demonstrated by the 
fact that Suetonius records various opinions about the incident, an indication that it 
fostered debate.93 He writes that some think (quidam putant) that Caesar attempted to 
rise (assurgere), but was held back by Cornelius Balbus (retentum a Cornelio Balbo). 
This explanation appears exculpatory in nature, and neatly shifts the blame away from 
Caesar and on to his parvenu secretary Balbus. Thus, according to this account, the 
fault for this misstep lay with Balbus. Inherent in this apologetic version of events, 
however, is a clear awareness that Caesar’s failure to rise was very imprudent. A less 
sympathetic version, however, paints the incident quite differently. Others (alii), 
Suetonius writes, say that Caesar had no intention of rising at all, and became angry 
when C. Trebatius urged him to do so. The episode was thus no accident, but a 
deliberate insult to the approaching senators. And in this variant account Caesar 
compounds his haughty behaviour with the look of displeasure he gives Trebatius 
(Suet. Iul. 78.2).   
 Evidently, Caesar’s failure to stand when receiving the senatorial delegation 
rankled. His action was not perceived as some careless lapse in good etiquette, but 
rather as a deliberate affront to the dignitas of the senators.94 With the exception of 
Cassius and a few of his allies, these senators had just voted Caesar many new and 
unprecedented honours.95 Caesar’s autocracy must already have been hard for some 
senators to swallow, but it would be harder still if his actions disrespected and 
embarrassed them publicly. As praetor, Cassius would presumably have been near the 
front of this delegation. The dictator had already slighted him when he had failed to 
attain the urban praetorship, and he probably seized on Caesar’s impertinence to rally 
more senators to his cause. Indeed, as he had already publicly opposed Caesar’s new 
 
93 Other ancient authorities also record this incident: e.g., Plut. Caes. 60.4-8; App. B Civ. 2.107; Cass. 
Dio 44.8.1-4; Eutr. 6.25.1. 
94 On the concept of dignitas, see, for example, Tatum (2008) 137-40. 
95 Cass. Dio 44.8.1-4, a passage that also discusses Caesar’s failure to stand, with variant traditions.  
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honours, it follows that this episode only contributed to his decision to move against 
the dictator. To a degree, then, Suetonius is correct to say that Caesar’s 
discourteousness contributed to his assassination. Caesar’s snub was symbolic of a 
wider problem he had created for himself: his position was antithetical to the dignitas 
and aspirations of a small band of nobles.  
The accounts of Plutarch and Suetonius, therefore, provide credible triggers 
for the conspiracy, but they likely only hint at the true cause of Caesar’s assassination. 
An examination of Cassius’ motives, then, as the man who first set the conspiracy in 
train, will hopefully shed fresh light on the cause of Caesar’s demise.96   
  
6.7 PERSONAL MOTIVES 
There can be no denying that personal grievances –or private grudges– may well have 
incited Cassius to conspiracy. Caesar is alleged to have wronged him on several 
occasions, although in each case there is some doubt as to either the veracity of the 
insult or, in the one snub beyond historical reproach, its actual impact. Every affront 
neatly involves Caesar depriving Cassius of something that is rightfully his –whether 
lions, his wife’s honour, or a magistracy. Were these slights all historical, they would 
give Cassius strong grounds for enmity against Caesar. 97  They may even have 
weighed on his decision more profoundly than any ideological reasons, which are 
often trumpeted by modern scholars as the root causes of the assassination.98 But 
while there can be no denying that personal animosities –and private feuds– fuelled 
Roman politics on many different levels, at least some of these insults against Cassius 
may in fact be post eventum embellishments or slanders of hostile witnesses. 
Nevertheless, even if some anecdotes in the ancient sources are exaggerated or slurs, 
Caesar’s treatment of Cassius may well have kindled feelings of personal resentment. 
And these feelings may very well have spurred the tyrannicide to conspiracy.   
 That Cassius had a strong personality and was sensitive to personal slights is 
beyond doubt. His fiery display at a family consilium after Caesar’s assassination 
supports this supposition. 99  Cassius was headstrong and clearly conscious of his 
 
96 This is not to imply that everyone who joined the conspiracy did so for the same reasons as Cassius; 
there were no doubt as many reasons as there were participants. The purpose of this section is to try to 
understand what conditions and causes led Cassius specifically down the path to conspiracy. 
97 As Epstein (1987a) 566-70, contends.   
98 Some scholars believe that personal grievances mattered far more than ideological ones: Epstein 
(1987a) 566-70; Storch (1995) 45-52; cf. Pelling (2011) 464. 
99 Cic. Att. 15.11.1.  
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dignitas. Any affront to his person, then, was a serious matter. Cassius also referred to 
Caesar as the “wickedest” (nequissimus, Cic. Fam. 12.2.1) man in history. Cicero 
reports his remark second-hand, but its accuracy is not disputed, and it demonstrates 
the tyrannicide’s strong personal dislike of Caesar. It is quite possible that Cassius 
may have nursed several private grudges against the dictator.100   
 In his Brutus, Plutarch briefly digresses from his narrative to discuss Cassius’ 
reasons for conspiring against Caesar. As mentioned above, Plutarch notes that more 
than one report alleges that the tyrannicide was motivated by the loss of some lions.101 
These are lions that Cassius had left at Megara, probably in anticipation of aedilician 
games he hoped to host.102 Some time after Pharsalus, however, Caesar appropriated 
the lions for himself, as he aspired to put on celebratory games of his own (held in 
46).103 Plutarch, the sole authority for this anecdote, notes that his sources say that 
Caesar’s confiscation of the lions was the “chief reason” (μάλιστά αἰτίαν) Cassius 
began to plot (ὑπάρξαι τῆς ἐπιβουλῆς) against Caesar.104 As noted in Chapter One, 
however, Plutarch rejects this suggestion: οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγοντες.105  
At first glance, such an allegation may seem petty and improbable. Surely a 
Roman would not instigate a conspiracy over the loss of some exotic animals. And 
perhaps this allegation was designed as a slur against Cassius, meant to trivialise or 
distract from his loftier Republican motives. However, as Epstein and others have 
noted, such affronts to an aristocrat’s dignitas were taken seriously.106 And Caesar’s 
actions may hint at a more political motive. In listing the reasons for the dictator’s 
demise, Nicolaus notes that many of the Pompeian conspirators were motivated by 
great loss –loss of money, property, and office.107 Caesar’s confiscation of Cassius’ 
lions not only deprived him of his property but also scuppered any chance he had of 
putting on impressive aedilician games, which, at the very least, amounted to a loss of 
 
100 On Cassius’ personal vendetta, see the insightful comments of Belliotti (2011) 94-5.  
101 The historicity of this episode, and whether or not the issue related instead to Lucius Cassius, has 
been debated. Strauss (2015) 76, noted the story must be considered “inconclusive”. Cf. Ryan (1999) 
145-54; Pelling (2011) 464.  
102 Some scholars believe that Plutarch has confused Cassius with his brother Lucius. For references, 
see Pelling (2011) 464. The issue is discussed in Chapter 5, Section 11. 
103 He hoped to outshine Pompey’s famous efforts in 55. Caesar’s games: Cass. Dio 43.22.3-4. 
104 Plut. Brut. 9.1. Note that Plutarch (or his source) again attributes the forming of the conspiracy to 
Cassius.    
105 See further Chapter 1, Section 4.  
106 Epstein (1987a) 566-70; cf. Moles (1979) 125, who accepts the historicity of the episode, and notes 
the incident would certainly have “angered Cassius”.  
107 Nic. Dam. 19.59. 
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face, if he did hold the aedileship as one scholar maintains. Moreover, the seizure of 
property, and the control of offices, is likely the substance of the accusation 
(ἔγκλημα)108 that Cassius levelled at Caesar. The story of Caesar’s confiscation of 
Cassius’ lions should therefore been deemed historical until proven otherwise, and 
reveals a truncated version of a genuine criticism of Caesar: he engaged in a high-
handed abuse of his power. The critics of Cassius, however, have perhaps distorted or 
filtered this argument to diminish its impact. It was not simply the loss of the lions 
that upset Cassius, then, but that the act effectively deprived him of putting on 
spectacular games as an aedile. As will be seen below, Caesar hampered Cassius’ 
career on several occasions.    
 
6.8 URBAN PRAETORSHIP 
The contest for the urban praetorship, which eventually saw Cassius passed over in 
favour of his younger brother-in-law Brutus, looms too large in the lead-up to 
Caesar’s assassination to be overlooked. Quite justifiably, not a few historians have 
seen in Cassius’ ‘loss’ the potential trigger that impelled him to conspire against 
Caesar.109 The one historical source to describe his reaction, Plutarch, certainly claims 
that the defeat made Cassius angry, although his anger is a leitmotif of Plutarch’s 
Brutus.110 Nevertheless, the fact that Cassius missed out on this position –despite the 
dictator himself conceding that he deserved the post– so soon after returning from 
self-imposed political retirement to play a part in Caesar’s new government cannot 
but have stung. Even more frustratingly, he had been surpassed by a man who, in the 
normal course of events, would neither have stood against him, nor prevailed if he 
had. Caesar alone was responsible for this miscarriage. There can be little doubt that 
the decision to make Brutus urban praetor would have offended Cassius greatly.  
The elections for the praetorships of 44 were apparently held in December 
45.111 By now, Caesar had raised the number of praetors for a given year to 16, in 
large part to reward his many loyal and expectant followers. In addition, he had also 
been granted the authority to nominate half of all magistrates (except the consuls), 
 
108 Plut. Brut. 8.6. Moles (1979) 123, notes that Plutarch does not mention other complaints Cassius 
made, other than about the urban praetorship.    
109 Grant (1978) 191; Epstein (1987a) 566-70;     
110 Plut. Brut. 7.1-5; cf. Caes. 62.7.   
111 December: Cic. Fam. 7.30.1-2; Phil. 2.79. 
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and so he could recommend whomever he wished to fill many of the praetorships.112 
That he ignored the lex annalis on several occasions is beyond doubt; a number of his 
supporters were afforded dispensations to hold office.113 Irrespective of whether these 
changes diminished the standing of the praetorship, the post of praetor urbanus was 
still a coveted and distinguished position.114 Competition for this senior office may 
have been fierce, even if Plutarch suggests that Brutus and Cassius were the leading 
contenders.115 Both were well-connected nobiles who had fought for the Republican 
cause in the civil war; both had accepted a Caesarian pardon thereafter; and both met 
the age qualification.116  They were also kin. That two brothers-in-law would compete 
against each other for the senior office is in itself interesting, especially as they were 
amici; canvassing against one another would thus appear to be a violation of the rules 
of their political friendship. 117  Certainly Plutarch implies Cassius thought so. 
However, delays to their careers, which had come to a crashing halt during the civil 
war and after, probably compelled both to stand as candidates for the praetorship, 
particularly if Caesar gave encouragement. Cassius could hardly object to Brutus’ 
campaign for a praetorship, and may initially have pleaded in his behalf. Yet he 
probably did not think that Brutus would win the urban praetorship, and it may have 
been Caesar who gave Brutus encouragement to aim for the more prestigious office so 
as to drive a wedge between the brothers-in-law.118    
Even before the contest for the praetorship, the two had been at odds. Plutarch 
does not go into details, but it is possible to suggest a reason: Cassius thought Brutus’ 
support for Caesar was excessive.119 Indeed, in a period of détente between the two, 
friends of Cassius tried to persuade Brutus to free himself from Caesar’s clutches.120 
 
112 Nic. Dam. 130.67; Cass. Dio 43.51.4, 43.47.2, indicates that increasing the number of positions 
allowed him to reward his many loyal supporters. Pelling (2011) 432 (with references), notes that 
Caesar was in complete control of the elections in reality; cf. Gelzer (1969b) 309.  
113 Sumner (1971) 364-6.  
114  Sixteen praetors: Cass. Dio 43.49.1, 43.51.4. For issues relating to the identity of the sixteen 
praetors elected, see Sumner (1971) 364-6; Ryan (1995) 357-9. Distinguished post: Plut. Brut. 7.1, 
Caes. 62.4. See also Kondratieff (2010) 89–126.  
115  Plut. Brut. 7.1. Plutarch’s claim that Brutus and Cassius were the frontrunners may be a 
narratological convenience for simplicity’s sake.   
116 Plut. Brut. 7.1. As the list of praetors in Broughton MRR 2.319-21 shows there were other important 
politicians standing at this time also, e.g., L. Marcius Philippus (cos. suff. 38) and the Caesarian 
patrician and brother-in-law of Caesar L. Cornelius Cinna. On the latter, see Sumner (1971) 365.  
117 Lacey (1986) 159, points out that it was thought that amici should not stand against one another.  
118 Plut. Brut. 7.2. Cf. Moles (1979) 99, who detects Caesar’s hand in this divisive contest.   
119 Moles (1979) 99.  
120 Plut. Brut. 7.7.  
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Evidently, there was a perception that the noblest Roman was too friendly with the 
dictator, which would definitely be sufficient to cause tensions with Cassius.  
While Brutus was not entirely unworthy of the urban praetorship, Cassius –as 
even Caesar admitted– had a fairer claim to the office. Not only was Cassius older 
than his brother-in-law (and thus the senior senator, if only by a year), his record of 
service to the state and military distinction (λαμπρὰ) put Brutus in the shadows.121 In 
fairness, Brutus had played a small but not insignificant role in the annexation of 
Cyprus and had diligently and honestly administered Cisalpine Gaul as a legate.122 
But these deeds pale in comparison with Cassius’ military feats in Parthia, Judaea, 
and off the coast of Sicily. Success in warfare would always eclipse diligent 
governance, which is perhaps why Plutarch concludes that Brutus campaigned for the 
office “supported only by his fair name and virtue”, whereas Cassius could trumpet 
his “brilliant and spirited” acts in Parthia.123  
The preoccupied but tireless Caesar appears to have held a hearing at which 
Brutus and Cassius put forth their respective cases for office.124 Having listened to the 
petitions of each, Caesar is said to have remarked to a council of friends, among 
whom it is possible the historian Asinius Pollio numbered, “Cassius makes the fairer 
plea, but Brutus must have the first praetorship.”125 Cassius could not fail to see that 
Caesar had put friendship before fairness. It was bad enough that Caesar now acted as 
the de facto arbiter of Roman elections, but it was intolerable that, rather than 
officiating in an impartial manner, he acted arbitrarily. Unfairly deprived of the urban 
 
121 Plut. Brut. 7.3, with Moles (1979) 100.  
122 Plut. Brut. 3, 6.10, with Clarke (1981) 15-20. On Brutus’ closeness to Caesar, see Cic. Att. 13.40.  
123 Plut. Brut. 7.3.  
124 Plut. Brut. 7.4 with Moles (1979) 99. Based on the language that Plutarch uses in his Brutus (7.4), it 
would appear that Brutus and Cassius had to plead their respective cases before Caesar himself: ἐν τοῖς 
φίλοις εἶπε [sc. Caesar]· δικαιότερα μὲν λέγει Κάσσιος, Βρούτῳ δὲ τὴν πρώτην δοτέον. Cf. Plut. 
Caes. 62.4-5. One of the friends referred to here may have been Asinius Pollio, who could have 
recorded Caesar’s dictum in his lost “Historiae”. Asinius was still in Rome in 45. If Cassius and Brutus 
had to plead their case before Caesar himself –as happened in imperial times– again this would be a 
radical departure from previous Republican practice. In the legal sphere, at least, Cicero had to argue 
before Caesar at the dictator’s house in his defence of King Deiotarus. Caesar’s response –his 
judgement– seems to have been offered to both men in their presence. Caesar was so busy it was hard 
to gain access to him, as Matius’ letter reveals: Fam. 11.28. 
125 Plut. Brut. 7.4, and n.124 above for the Greek. For discussion, see Huß (1977) 116. For Epstein 
(1987a) 567-8, Caesar’s remark is deliberately manipulative and infuriating, and designed to further 
alienate Cassius from Brutus and himself. A cause for great offence it may have been, but whether 
Caesar was so nefarious is doubtful. His later actions towards Cassius seem rather to indicate an 
attempt to extend the olive branch. This dictum seems to indicate a real predicament on his part, not 
superior gloating. Of course, regardless of Caesar’s intentions, Cassius’ reaction was anger all the 
same. It is possible that Asinius Pollio was already absent from Rome.    
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praetorship, Cassius’ resentment quickly festered into anger.126 Had there been no 
interference –had Caesar not commended Brutus to the voters– Cassius may well have 
expected to come in at the head of the polls. Now he would have to settle for the 
lesser office of praetor peregrinus, which, as Plutarch remarks, did not so much 
appease Cassius but rather inflame him against Caesar.   
Some may question whether such an appointment would truly bother Cassius. 
After all, he was still a senior praetor ensconced at Rome, who would inevitably 
ascend to the consulship. Did it really make a difference, then, if he was urban or 
peregrine praetor? Appian, for one, does not think so. On the contrary, he believes 
that Cassius’ anger was nothing more than dissimulation (a recurring theme in his 
Bella Civilia), designed to fool Caesar into thinking that the brothers-in-law were at 
loggerheads, when in reality they were even then conspiring against him.127 Intriguing 
though Appian’s account is, it is incompatible with more reliable accounts and 
probably reflects his own inference based on his understanding of Cassius.  
Appian aside, legitimate reasons for Cassius’ anger are not in short supply. 
Just because the political milieu had changed does not mean that Cassius’ outlook had 
transformed. Competition for office –to equal or excel the deeds of his ancestors– 
would still have been important to Cassius. As the best candidate, he would expect the 
most prestigious office, and the ancient sources leave no doubt that that was still the 
urban praetorship. For Cassius, then, the distance between praetor urbanus and praetor 
peregrinus was much the same as between first and last. As a result of his tumultuous 
early career, Cassius’ election to the praetorship was really the first office in which he 
could make a name for himself at Rome. In making this canvass for office, he was 
hankering for senatorial respectability. Any slight would blemish that. The timing of 
Caesar’s decision was also significant. Only recently Cassius had come back from 
self-imposed political retirement (or, rather, effective exile) to take up a role in 
Caesar’s new government. In late January 45, Cassius had said to Cicero “expect me 
back quickly” if Caesar were to triumph.128 His expectations may not have been high, 
but to reconcile himself with the new regime only to be passed over for Brutus would 
be enough to leave most men smarting. His brother, a loyal Caesarian who probably 
 
126 Plut. Brut. 7.5. See Tatum (1999) 38: “One man’s success was always another man’s failure, out of 
which emmerged invidia, an emotion that could sour relations even between the dearest of friends.”   
127 App. B Civ. 2.112. For modern discussion, see Canfora (2007) 310n.4; Moles (1979) 102. Both 
consider Appian’s passage unrealistic and an unsupported inference.    
128 Cic. Fam. 15.19.4.  
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passed a bill that allowed Caesar to adlect new families into the patriciate, may even 
have encouraged the two men’s détente. But it had all been for nothing. Failure to 
secure the post of praetor urbanus would have given Cassius cause to take great 
offence, regardless of whether or not he expected Caesar to treat his petition fairly. It 
was an unmistakable dent to his dignitas. In short, attaining the second most 
influential praetorship deeply affected Cassius.   
There were other reasons that Cassius would have been angry. One tradition, 
albeit a hostile one in all probability, holds that Caesar had further promised Brutus 
but not Cassius the consulship of 41 (see below). 129  Whatever the truth of this 
statement, even the failure to gain the urban praetorship had taught Cassius that 
advancement under Caesar would be difficult. Nor can it have pleased him that some 
less-deserving individuals, particularly Dolabella, had been advanced all too easily, 
even though he did not meet the age requirement. And the ascension of new men, too, 
like Hirtius and Pansa, in such great numbers must also have offended Cassius’ 
sensibilities. As in the case of Caninius’ one-day consulship, Caesar’s actions made a 
mockery of an office that had been venerated by generations of aristocrats. 
For his part, Caesar was tied by personal as well as political obligations. When 
one considers his friendship with Brutus and his attachment to Servilia (herself a 
political force of no small note)130 his decision to appoint Brutus to the senior post is 
understandable. The decision may have been a real quandary for him, as his reputed 
dictum seems to convey. As a consummate politician, he may have felt he could 
rectify the situation. But if he thought he could mollify Cassius by designating him 
proconsul of Syria for 43 –an olive branch of the first order– a post far more desirable 
than Brutus’ prospective province of Macedonia (on account of its close proximity to 
Parthia and Cassius’ existing connections there), he miscalculated.131 Indeed, Caesar 
appears to have passed over Cassius for military command against the Parthians. If 
unintended as a slight, this is a surprising omission, and a further blow, as Cassius 
was the only Roman officer to have inflicted a defeat on the Parthians, and he had 
first-hand knowledge of the territory and enemy tactics. This too would have stung, as 
the tyrannicide would have wanted to further avenge the defeat at Carrhae. But Caesar 
was not a man who could brook an equal, and Cassius knew this all too well.   
 
129 Vell. Pat. 2.56.3; Plut. Caes. 62.2-4; cf. Cic. Fam. 12.2.2, Phil. 8.27; App. B Civ. 2.112.  
130 On Servilia’s influence, the locus classicus is Cic. Att. 15.11.2.  
131 Cassius as proconsul-designate of Syria: App. B Civ. 3.2,5, 4.57. See Fröhlich, s.v. “Cassius” [59] 
RE 3.1729 (1899). 
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6.9 CONSUL DESIGNATE 
Matters may only have got worse for Cassius when Caesar selected the candidates to 
hold public office whilst he would be on campaign in Parthia. It is often contended 
that Caesar officially selected Cassius and Brutus to hold the consulships for 41.132 
However, the ancient sources offer contradictory evidence on this question and not a 
few modern scholars have raised serious doubts as to whether Caesar had formally 
nominated the two conspirators in his acta.133  Even more importantly, one strand of 
the historical tradition claims that whilst Caesar designated Brutus consul for 41, he 
passed over Cassius.134 Obviously, if this variant tradition were true –and at least one 
historian certainly accepts its veracity–135 it would have tremendous bearing on any 
assessment of Cassius’ motives for originating the conspiracy against Caesar. A re-
examination of the ancient sources is thus in order.    
The majority of the ancient evidence would appear to suggest that Caesar had 
only gone so far as to designate consuls for 43 and 42.136 Dio notes that the dictator 
intended to be absent on campaign in Parthia for about three years (thus until 42),137 
and Cicero, Nicolaus and again Dio all support the view that Caesar had made the 
consular appointments in biennium, which given the prospective timeframe of the war 
against the Parthians is thoroughly logical.138 No doubt Caesar envisaged returning to 
Rome to oversee the elections for 41. Dio’s evidence is particularly important as he 
claims that for the second year of Caesar’s absence (42) only the consuls and tribunes 
had been selected, but that for the third year (41) nobody was selected. Based on most 
 
132 See, e.g., Gelzer (1969c) 414; Ryan (1998) 248n.18; cf. Tatum (2008) 154, who notes that although 
certainty is elusive, “there can be little doubt” that Caesar designated Brutus and Cassius consuls for 
41. See also Gelzer (1969b) 304.    
133 Ancient evidence: Cic. Fam. 12.2.2, 12.3.2, 12.9.2, Phil. 8.27; Nic. Dam. 77; Plut. Caes. 58.1, 62.4; 
Cass. Dio 43.51.2. Broughton, MRR 3.50, 112, lists neither Brutus nor Cassius as consuls-designate for 
41. For those scholars who express reservations or complete doubt, see Girardet (1987) 323n.163; 
Dettenhofer (1992) 233-4; Manuwald (2007) 2.1014-15; cf. Syme (1939) 95; Pelling (2011) 432.     
134 Vell. Pat. 2.56.3; Plut. Caes. 62.4. 
135 Huß (1977) 116: “Caesar sah nicht Cassius, sondern wiederum Brutus für das Jahr 41 als Consul vor 
Daß sich seit dieser Zeit der Zorn und die Erbitterung des Cassius nicht allein gegen Caesar, sondern 
auch gegen Brutus richteten, ist so gut wie sicher.”   
136 There is debate as to when these decisions were made, but it seems clear the consular appointments 
were either finalised in December of 45 or early 44: Nic. Dam. 77; Suet. Caes. 76.3, 80.3; App. B Civ. 
2.107, 128; Cass. Dio 43.51.2-4.  
137 Cass. Dio 43.51.2; but cf. Pelling (2011) 432. The most detailed assessment of Caesar’s prospective 
Parthian campaign is Malitz (1984) 21-59. Gelzer (1969b) 309, accepts that Caesar hoped and intended 
to complete the campaign within three years (i.e., 41). Weinstock (1971) 305, is non-committal. 
138 Cic. Att. 14.6: etiamne consules et tribunos pl. in biennium quos ille voluit? See Shackleton Bailey 
(1968) 6.218; Nic. Dam. 22.77, with Bellemore (1984) 108; Cass. Dio 43.51.5: οἱ μὲν οὖν τῷ πρώτῳ 
μετ' ἐκεῖνο ἔτει ἄρξοντες πάντες προκατέστησαν, ἐς δὲ δὴ τὸ δεύτερον οἵ τε ὕπατοι καὶ οἱ δήμαρχοι 
μόνοι· τοσοῦτον ἐδέησε καὶ ἐς τὸ τρίτον τινὰ ἀποδειχθῆναι.   
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of the present evidence, then, it is probable that Caesar had only officially designated 
consuls for the years 43 and 42.     
However, in Plutarch’s Life of Caesar it is implied that Brutus was to hold the 
consulship for 41, having been preferred over Cassius: ὑπατεύειν δ' ἔμελλεν εἰς 
τέταρτον ἔτος, ἐρίσαντος Κασσίου προτιμηθείς.139 But the significance of Plutarch’s 
statement depends entirely upon how one interprets his wording here. Ultimately, it is 
most likely that Plutarch means Brutus was promised the consulship for 41, which the 
context certainly permits. Indeed, Plutarch’s probable or derivative source, Velleius 
Paterculus, also made the same point:  
coniurationis auctoribus Bruto et Cassio, quorum alterum promittendo consulatum 
non obligaverat, contra differendo Cassium offenderat… 
Brutus and Cassius were the leaders of the conspiracy. He had failed to win the 
former by the promise of the consulship, and had offended the latter by the 
postponement of his candidacy.140 
Brutus had been promised (promittendo) the consulship at the expense of Cassius.141 
Both of these statements align with another passage in Plutarch’s Life of Caesar: Τῶν 
δὲ δυνατῶν τοῖς μὲν ὑπατείας καὶ στρατηγίας εἰς τοὐπιὸν ἐπηγγέλλετο. 142  Of 
course, that Brutus had been promised the consulship for 41 does not necessarily 
mean that Caesar had made his offer official by enshrining it in his acta; he may 
simply have unofficially given him promises.143   
Some scholars have been inclined to view the evidence of Cicero as 
conclusive, and it must be conceded that in several places he speaks of Cassius’ future 
consulship.144 In Fam. 12.2.2, Cicero remarks to Cassius that a certain individual, 
identified by Shackleton Bailey as L. Marcius Philippus (cos. 56), hoped that his son, 
praetor in 44 like Cassius, would attain the consulship in 41, described by the orator 
as vestro anno. There are two obvious ways to interpret Cicero’s phrase.  (i) Cicero is 
 
139 Plut. Caes. 62.4. 
140 Vell. Pat. 2.56.3. 
141 Vell. Pat. 2.56.3.  
142 Plut. Caes. 58.1.  
143 Plut. Brut. 7.1. At Brut. 9.9, Plutarch refers to his biography of Caesar. (In the Brutus Plutarch only 
discusses the rivalry for the praetorship and makes no reference to Caesar’s offer of the consulship. 
The Brutus was written after the Caesar.) 
144 Cic. Fam. 12.2.2, 12.9.2, Phil. 8.27. Ryan (1998) 248n.18, cites these Ciceronian passages as proof 
that Brutus and Cassius had been designated consuls for 41 in Caesar’s acta. However, see Huß (1977) 
116, on Fam. 12.2.2: “[es] ist nicht zu schließen, daß Caesar auch dem Cassius den Consulat des Jahres 
41 versprochen hat. Es handelt sich hier nur um einen Blick Ciceros in die Zukunft.” 
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referring to an officially designated consulship, which may be connected to his 
previous talk about Caesar’s acta; (ii) Cicero may simply use vestro anno as a similar 
formulation of suo anno –indicating the year Cassius was eligible for the consulship. 
As Cassius and Brutus were the senior praetors in 44, most onlookers would probably 
have assumed that 41 would be their year. Yet the fact that Philippus thought his son 
might also stand as a candidate for 41 seems to suggest that arrangements were not 
concrete, unless one believes Cicero implies that in so doing Philippus is disregarding 
Caesar’s acta. In Philippic Eight, Cicero also gives the impression that Cassius and 
Brutus were to be consuls in 41, even citing Antonius to support his point.145 Here 
again, however, there may only be an indication of expectation. Even Antonius 
expected Brutus and Cassius to be consuls in 41, despite the fact that his brother 
would technically be eligible for the office as well. Cicero uses Antonius’ statement 
to embarrass him. But he may have twisted the contents of Antonius’ demands; the 
latter may only have said that he would retain his legions and command were Brutus 
and Cassius to hold consulships and proconsular provinces.   
In summary, Caesar had made promises to Brutus and (perhaps) Cassius about 
a future consulship in 41 (Cf. Plut. Caes. 58.1, 62.4); but there had been no formal, 
concrete acknowledgment in his acta (despite Cic. Fam. 12.2.2, Phil. 8.27).146 Indeed, 
the most impartial sources seem to indicate that Caesar only made consular 
appointments in biennium for 43 and 42 (Cic. Att. 14.6.2; Nic. Dam. 77; Cass. Dio 
43.51.5), and Dio indicates that only the consuls and tribunes had been selected for 
the second year (i.e. 42) and no decisions were made about 41. (This coincides with 
how long Caesar anticipated being absent from Rome.) The evidence that seems to 
imply Cassius would be consul in 41 may (i) be Ciceronian wishful thinking, or (ii) 
reflect the belief that Cassius and Brutus were expected to be consuls for that year as 
the most senior praetors of 44, although some (like Philippus) thought that the 
expectation could be overturned. Cassius Dio (46.30.4 and 46.35.3) seems to imply 
that Antonius offered to make Brutus and Cassius consuls as a means of currying 
favour rather than because it was part of Caesar’s acta.  Still, if Caesar had promised 
Brutus the office in 41 but not Cassius, this too would surely have added to the 
tyrannicide’s chagrin. 
 
145 Cic. Phil. 8.27. Pelling (2011) 462, opines that the comments about the consulships are “possibly 
Ciceronian wishful thinking, but it does not sound like that.”   
146 It is possible that Caesar had written in his personal papers that Cassius and Brutus were to hold the 
consulships of 41, but that this remained an unconfirmed or unimplemented part of his acta Caesaris.   
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Caesar, then, had consistently hampered Cassius’ recent career. His plans for the 
aedileship had been scuppered; he had been unfairly passed over for the urban 
praetorship in favour of Brutus; and he had potentially been passed over as consul 
designate for 41. His career had been dealt several blows at the hands of Caesar, and 
his future successes and failures now depended on the dictator’s whim. As early as 
46, Cicero had foreseen the danger of Caesar’s unprecedented political influence on 
public life: 
nec praestari quicquam potest quale futurum sit, quod positum est in alterius 
voluntate, ne dicam libidine.  
nor can the future nature of anything be guaranteed which depends on another’s 
[sc. Caesar’s] will, not to say whim.147  
Cassius’ political failures had been the result of Caesar’s caprice. Magistracies were 
the yardstick by which aristocrats were measured, and Cassius had been denied three 
offices, all whilst Caesar designated new men (like Hirtius and Pansa) as future 
consuls, and boasted of his clementia.148 If the story about the confiscation of the 
lions is grounded in truth, the real point of Cassius’ charge was probably that Caesar’s 
actions were symbolic of his stifling autocracy. Caesar’s political dominance, and the 
damage it had wreaked on Cassius’ political aspirations, must be considered his most 
powerful motive in forming the conspiracy. Cassius’ political setbacks provided him 
with a timely and unpleasant reminder of all that had been lost as a result of Caesar’s 
triumph in the civil war. Caesar had to be removed.    
 
6.10 PHILOSOPHY AND POMPEY’S STATUE 
Cassius’ Epicurean philosophy cannot be considered the most compelling factor in his 
decision to form the conspiracy, although Greek thought did provide considerable 
justification for the act itself.149 As noted in the previous chapter, A. Momigliano 
famously argued that Cassius’ conversion to the Garden closely preceded –and was 
instrumental in– his decision to conspire against Caesar. But Momigliano dated 
Cassius’ adoption of Epicureanism too late. If anything, Cassius’ Epicureanism 
played a role in his retirement from public life, not his return to it.150 It is unlikely, 
 
147  Cic. Fam. 9.16.3. 
148 See Welch (1990) 53-69. Caesar’s trivialisation of public office, as in the case of the one-day 
consulship of C. Caninius Rebilus, offended many of the old nobility. 
149 On the importance of Greek philosophy in rationalising the conspiracy, see Sedley (1997), and 
Tatum (2008) 154-62.  
150 On this aspect of his Epicureanism, see Sedley (1997).  
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then, that Cassius’ Epicurean philosophy weighed heavily on his decision to conspire 
against Caesar. However, Brutus’ philosophical tendencies appear to have been very 
important in rationalising his decision to join the conspirators.151 
Plutarch, in fact, hints that Cassius’ Epicureanism was little comfort to the 
tyrannicide at the time of the assassination. In an anecdote recounted only by 
Plutarch, Cassius seeks inspiration from a statue of Pompey immediately prior to 
leading the grisly events (Brut. 17.2):152 
καὶ Κάσσιον μὲν λέγεται τρέποντα τὸ πρόσωπον εἰς τὴν εἰκόνα τοῦ 
Πομπηΐου παρακαλεῖν ὥσπερ αἰσθανόμενον. 
and Cassius is said to have turned his face towards the statue of Pompey and 
to have invoked it, as if it had understanding. 
As P. FitzGibbon has noted, Plutarch employs the anecdote to portray Cassius as an 
“irresolute adherent” of Epicureanism, which the biographer often derides as a hollow 
philosophy.153 When faced with the prospect of killing Caesar, Cassius’ Epicureanism 
offers inadequate psychological protection. Hence his invocation of Pompey.154  
The use of λέγεται suggests that Plutarch found this anecdote in his 
sources.155 If so, he has clearly appropriated it for his own anti-Epicurean purposes,156 
as the story is unlikely to have derided Cassius’ philosophical worldview 
originally.157 Plutarch fleshes out the details in his Caesar (66.2-3):  
καὶ γὰρ οὖν καὶ λέγεται Κάσσιος εἰς τὸν ἀνδριάντα τοῦ Πομπηΐου πρὸ τῆς 
ἐγχειρήσεως ἀποβλέπων ἐπικαλεῖσθαι σιωπῇ, καίπερ οὐκ ἀλλότριος ὢν τῶν 
Ἐπικούρου λόγων ἀλλ᾽ ὁ καιρὸς, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἤδη τοῦ δεινοῦ παρεστῶτος 
ἐνθουσιασμὸν ἐνεποίει καὶ πάθος ἀντὶ τῶν προτέρων λογισμῶν. 
Indeed, it is also said that Cassius, turning his eyes toward the statue of Pompey 
before the attack began, invoked it silently, although he was much addicted to 
the doctrines of Epicurus; but the crisis, as it would seem, when the dreadful 
 
151 On Brutus and the importance of philosophy in the lead-up to the conspiracy, Sedley (1997) is 
fundamental. Cf. Tatum (2008) 145-166. 
152 Cf. Plut. Caes. 66.2.  
153 FitzGibbon (2008) 457. See also Pelling (2011) 479, on the alleged incompatibility of Cassius’ act 
with his Epicurean beliefs. Moles (1979) 190-1, too discusses Cassius’ “un-Epicurean” behaviour. On 
Plutarch’s dislike and mischaracterisation of Epicureanism, see Armstrong (2011) 105-28.  
154 Plutarch certainly emphasises this in Caes. 66.2-3. 
155 Moles (1979) 190, notes that it also signifies “scholarly caution about the veracity of the tale.” 
156 The anti-Epicureanism is even more pronounced in his Caesar (Caes. 66.2). See also FitzGibbon 
(2008) 457. 
157 Moles (1979) 190, suggest a source favourable to the Liberators, but notes the incident may have 
been a “propaganda move” by Cassius.  
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attempt was now close at hand, replaced his former cool calculations with 
divinely inspired emotion. 
The setting of the account perhaps provides important clues. Before entering a portico 
of the Theatre of Pompey on the Ides, Cassius appeals silently (ἐπικαλεῖσθαι σιωπῇ) 
to the statue of his former commander. C. Pelling translates the phrase as “called him 
silently to his aid”.158 As an Epicurean, Cassius should supposedly not credit life after 
death, or divine interest in human affairs.159 But the point of this anecdote is political, 
not spiritual. Indeed, this anecdote seems concerned with avenging the mortal 
Pompey’s –and, by extension the nobility’s– defeat in the civil war. 160  As the 
architect and co-leader of the conspiracy, it is significant that Cassius dedicates his 
mission to Pompey, whose cause he had served but also abandoned after Pharsalus. 
Cassius thus calls upon the statue of Pompey as a witness to a deed that will avenge 
his defeat –and repay the debt Cassius owes. This interpretation neatly explains the 
import of the original story. Unlike Cassius’ Epicureanism, the Pompeians’ defeat in 
the civil war should be considered one of the long-term causes of Caesar’s 
assassination.161 The change in the political environment deeply affected men like 
Cassius and Brutus, whose careers were now stunted, cast into the shade by Caesar’s 
all-consuming dominance.     
 
6.11 REPUBLICANISM 
Cassius was also increasingly alarmed by Caesar’s autocratic behaviour.162 Caesar’s 
treatment of the tribunes C. Epidius Marullus and L. Caesetius Flavus is a case in 
point. The man who ostensibly crossed the Rubicon in defence of tribunician rights 
had no qualms in 44 about exiling two tribunes for political dissidence.163 There are 
two confused traditions about what led to their removal. One version has it that the 
 
158 Pelling (2011) 125. 
159 Pelling (2011) 479.  
160 In Caesar, Plutarch cites this anecdote as evidence of divine intervention (Caes. 66.3); see again 
Moles (1979) 190.   
161 Nicolaus, too, stresses that many of the Pompeian conspirators were motivated by the personal and 
financial losses they had suffered in the civil wars. On Nicolaus’ description of these motives, see 
Bellemore (1984) 101. 
162  Space does not permit a detailed discussion of Republican Libertas, the post-assassination 
watchword adopted by the conspirators in explaining their actions. The conspirators’ use of Libertas 
has been discussed by many scholars before; see, for example, Mommsen (1887) 3.63; Kloesel (1935); 
Syme (1939) 59; Wirszubski (1950) passim; Clarke (1981) 76. Cf. Hollstein (1994) 113-33, on 
Libertas on the coins Brutus and Cassius’ minted after the assassination.  
163 Defence of tribunes: Caes. B Civ. 1.7.8; cf. Suet. Iul. 30. Cf. Plut. Caes. 28. 
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tribunes arrested one of the men who crowned Caesar’s statue with a diadem;164 
another that they arrested the man who first acclaimed Caesar king.165 Both events 
may have been historical, and perhaps Caesar intervened after the second incident.166 
Velleius writes that Caesar banished the tribunes reluctantly (2.68.4-5), but 
Nicolaus notes no such remorse. Like Valerius Maximus (5.7.2.), Nicolaus detects in 
the tribunes’ actions a malicious attempt to bring odium on Caesar.167 In Nicolaus’ 
account, Caesar arraigns the tribunes before the senate. They, Caesar argued, had 
orchestrated the placing of diadems on his statue as a pretext to insinuate that he 
clamoured for royal power (or that he had already assume it in practice). Caesar’s 
accusations, as recounted by Nicolaus, should be viewed with great scepticism. But 
Caesar no doubt compelled the senate to exile the tribunes, for reasons that seemed 
highly irregular. Caesar’s disregard for tribunician authority is certainly noted by the 
ancient sources as a primary cause of his assassination (see e.g., Liv. Per. 116). 
Caesar also saw fit to recall certain exiles.168 As noted last chapter, Cassius was far 
from happy with this decision. Recalling exiles was not something done lightly, as 
Cicero could attest. Caesar was yet again trampling over Republican traditions and the 
senate’s authority. 
     Caesar was also appointed dictator for life (dictator perpetuo), a title with 
which he is designated by 9 February 44.169 It was clear to all that he would not lay 
aside power as Sulla had done, and as dictators had done in the past.170 Traditionally, 
the office of dictator was a temporary position only to be exercised in an emergency; 
Caesar’s appointment as dictator perpetuo was both paradoxical and a clear sign that 
he cared little for the traditions (or trappings) of the Republic. Caesar’s assumption of 
the dictatorship for life likely confirmed Cassius’ deepest fears. If Caesar were to 
remain in control at Rome permanently, Cassius’ career and reputation would surely 
suffer, as it already had in the case of the praetorship. And it is interesting that after 
the Ides the office of dictator was abolished forever, according to Livy’s epitomator: 
 
164 App. B Civ. 2.108; Cass. Dio 44.9.2.  
165 Suet. Iul. 79.1.  
166 Val. Max. 5.7.2; Weinstock (1971) 319. 
167 Nic. Dam. 130.69-70. 
168 Strab. 10.455; App. B Civ. 2.107; Cass. Dio 43.50.1-2. 
169 Liv. Per. 116; Joseph. AJ. 14.211; Plut. Caes. 57.1; Suet. Caes. 76.1; Flor. 2.13.91; App. B Civ. 
2.106; Gell. 19.8.3; Cass. Dio 44.8.4, 46.17.5; [Aur. Vict.] De vir. ill. 78.10; Zonar. 7.13. See Gelzer 
(1969b) 320-1, on February as the earliest confirmed use of the title. Cf. Zeev (1996) 251-3, who 
argues for 9 February as the terminus ante quem for the bestowal of the title. 
170 Gelzer (1969b) 320-1.  
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Dictaturae honos in perpetuum sublatus est.171 Philosophy and Republicanism were 
undoubtedly important factors that contributed to Caesar’s assassination.  However, to 
a large extent these ideas were window-dressing: self-exculpatory justification for 
Caesar’s murder. Cassius was motivated by his own political self-preservation. He 
feared his political career would continue to suffer under Caesar, and he responded 
accordingly. 
 
6.12 CONCLUSION 
On the Ides, the majority of the conspirators met at Cassius’ house on the pretext of 
celebrating his son’s assumption of the toga virilis.172 It was a fitting meeting place 
for the assassins. Cassius had been responsible for initiating the resistance against 
Caesar, recruiting a group of sympathetic adherents, and persuading Brutus to join the 
conspirators’ fold. More than Brutus and D. Brutus (or anyone else), Cassius emerges 
as the architect of the conspiracy against Caesar. His motives for forming it were 
certainly mixed, but ultimately he was driven by a desire to regain control over his 
political career, which had been repeatedly frustrated by Caesar. 
Cassius and Brutus famously changed the course of history on the Ides of 
March. Just as the Roman world appeared to have regained some semblance of peace 
and stability, albeit under the dictatorial control of Julius Caesar, these conspirators 
(who dubbed themselves ‘Liberators’) set in train an unintentional and unforeseeable 
bloody chain of events, which ultimately led to Augustus and the principate. Cassius 
and Brutus had hoped that by removing Caesar they would restore the Republican 
government of their ancestors. But this proved naïve. Caesar’s death, like Alexander’s 
before him, only created a power vacuum, as no one Roman strongman (or 
movement) had both the resources and the charisma to fill the dictator’s red shoes. As 
secrecy was paramount in the lead-up to the assassination, the Republicans forewent 
amassing a military force, which meant they had to rely instead on persuasion to make 
their case before the people.173 However, they received an unsympathetic reception. 
Most of the people, and the majority of the army, were firmly in step with Caesar, or 
at least indifferent to the cause of the Liberators.      
 
171 Liv. Per. 116.7.  
172 Plut. Brut. 14.4.  
173 D. Brutus had gladiators at Rome in 44 for the purpose of upcoming public games. These gladiators-
cum-bodyguards would prove insufficient against the forces of Lepidus, not that there is any reason to 
believe that aristocrats would have employed gladiators in any capacity other than as bodyguards.    
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As F. Millar has demonstrated, even if democracy did not exist at Rome in a modern 
sense, aristocrats were still forced to act in certain ways and take note of 
constituencies they would rather have ignored.174 Unfortunately for them, the con-
spirators could not ignore the Roman people (especially Caesar’s veterans), who 
forced them out of the city and into exile. Caesar had always enjoyed tremendous 
popularity; his followers, despite initial internal disputes, still enjoyed the ascendancy. 
It is to Cassius’ and Brutus’ credit that they managed to field prodigious armies at 
Philippi (helped by the plunder of the East and, it should be noted, the very unpopular 
proscriptions) but ultimately the Caesarians triumphed. How close they came to 
success cannot be explored here. Defeat on the field of battle need not diminish what 
they were fighting for –even if this was the self-interested preservation of a timocratic 
meritocracy– a governmental system where a politician’s successes and failures were 
his own.       
 
174 See generally Millar (1998).  
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CONCLUSION 
 
When historians discuss Caesar’s assassination, there has been a tendency to ascribe 
to Brutus the leading part in the dictator’s downfall; Cassius, if mentioned, is usually 
relegated to a supporting role. And yet, as this thesis has argued, he was the 
mastermind and co-leader of the conspiracy. Accordingly, his career merits 
investigation, inasmuch as he matters every bit as much as Brutus in the Late 
Republic, perhaps more so. For a number of reasons,1 however, Cassius has not 
received the same level of attention from scholars as Brutus. This thesis, in offering 
the first detailed study of Cassius’ career down to 44, attempts to redress this 
imbalance in focus. It also strives, especially in this conclusion, to illuminate the 
tyrannicide’s historical significance. 
  Several arguments have been advanced throughout this thesis. The most 
salient of these concerns Cassius’ place in Late Republican history. Traditionally, he 
has been viewed as an ancillary figure to Brutus. Indeed, Cassius has often been 
described as less influential and less respected than Brutus.2 These conclusions are 
predominantly based on standard readings of the source tradition. However, as 
Chapter One explained, detailed scrutiny of the ancient testimony reveals a far more 
complicated story: Cassius, in fact, was considered dux partium by some. Moreover, 
as Chapter Six explained, it was Cassius who made one of the earliest stands against 
Caesar in 44, and Cassius again who began recruiting disaffected men into the 
conspiracy. That Cassius brought Brutus into the conspiracy is certain.3 Here he 
demonstrates political astuteness, putting his own differences with Brutus aside for 
the cause. Though the ancient sources report he was estranged from his brother-in-
law, Cassius understood that Brutus’ participation was crucial for the conspiracy’s 
success: Brutus was the most senior magistrate after Caesar, Antonius and Lepidus. 
And Brutus had important connections and standing amongst the Caesarians, most 
notably with D. Brutus. Though Cassius drew upon Brutus’ reputation and influence, 
he still remained firmly in control of the conspiracy. The bulk of the conspirators met 
at his house on the Ides. Cassius, then, should be considered the father and joint 
leader of the conspiracy to assassinate Caesar. 
 
1 See Introduction, Section 1.   
2 For an example of this tendency, see the comments of Cadoux and Seager, OCD4 289.   
3 Pace Sedley (1997) 41, who speaks of the “joint decision to form the conspiracy against Caesar”.  
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Nevertheless, despite forming the conspiracy against Caesar, Cassius cannot be 
adjudged an uncompromising Republican in the mould of Cato. Whilst Plutarch and 
Valerius Maximus preserve a questionable anecdote that suggests Cassius had 
despised tyranny from boyhood, his actions after the civil war (in seeking a pardon 
from Caesar) belie this. In addition, Cassius’ correspondence with Cicero reveals his 
anxiety about how the Republicans who continued to fight after Pharsalus would treat 
him, if they triumphed over Caesar. Unwilling to join the remaining Republicans, and 
unable to swallow Caesar’s authority, Cassius retired from public life and adopted 
Epicureanism. These actions suggest that Cassius should not be considered a 
consistent, diehard Republican. 
 Nor was Cassius motivated to conspire against Caesar purely out of personal 
spite. This view, that he was jealous of Caesar’s success, stems (in part) from a host 
of anecdotes in the ancient sources. Plutarch, in the Life of Brutus, records a story in 
which one of his sources proclaims that Cassius was provoked to assassinate Caesar 
after the latter confiscated lions that the tyrannicide had acquired for future aedilician 
games. Yet, as Chapter One explained, even Plutarch rejects this assertion as untrue. 
Nonetheless, it is fair to suggest that Cassius had personal as well as political motives 
for conspiring against Caesar: not being appointed as urban praetor would have riled 
him and dented his dignitas. Still, in a letter to Cicero Cassius alludes to Caesar’s 
increasingly draconian political actions with clear distaste. And as mentioned above, 
Cassius also publicly opposed voting additional honours to Caesar. Good evidence, 
then, suggests Cassius objected to Caesar’s increasingly open autocracy. 
This thesis has also regularly challenged modern scholars’ interpretations in 
other respects concerning Cassius. A brief catalogue of these arguments is in order. 
Of most importance regarding family4 connections, this thesis has brought into 
serious question the long-held belief that Q. Cassius was the tyrannicide’s cousin 
rather than his brother (he is termed frater by Cicero). As has been argued, the 
evidence supporting this idea is based on the wrongheaded notion that brothers could 
not hold office –and the tribunate at that– in the same year. Moreover, archaeological 
and philological evidence provide strong support for their fraternity. Another opinion 
that seems untenable concerns Cassius’ childhood. One scholar suggests that Cassius 
 
4 This thesis also examined two questionable views about the Cassii Longini: one, that they were 
consistently populares; and two, that their clan belonged to the Pomptina tribe (on this issue, see 
Appendix D).  
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was removed to Rhodes at an early age to protect him on Sulla’s return to Rome. This 
hypothesis, based on a highly rhetorical passage in Appian, is not credible because 
Cassius’ father appears to have thrived after the deadly reformer’s return. Cassius is 
also known to have studied in Rome under the grammaticus Staberius Eros.  
 An equally unlikely interpretation, this time related to Sulla’s son, Faustus, 
posits that Cassius fought the dictator’s heir at the school of Staberius Eros. However, 
as has been seen, it is implausible that Faustus would have attended a school that 
admitted sons of the proscribed; some altercation is of course possible, but this story 
has evidently been embellished with a view to Cassius’ later deeds. It is also clear, 
based on the scant evidence currently available, that there is insufficient data to 
identify Cassius as a priest of the Quindecimviri sacris faciundis. Here, again, the 
only evidence to support this assertion involves ambiguous coins struck after Caesar’s 
assassination. There is no certainty that Cassius had any input into the tripod 
iconography displayed on these coins, and, even if he did, the coins in question 
probably only reference Apollo, a deity the Republicans wished to invoke as they 
prepared to confront Caesar’s political heirs. There is, therefore, no compelling reason 
to place Cassius in any of the major Roman priesthoods.    
No positive evidence supports the claim that Cassius penned memoirs of his 
time on campaign in Parthia. This hypothesis was mooted on the grounds of the 
favourable depiction of Cassius in Plutarch’s Life of Crassus. And yet, it does not 
follow that because Cassius’ treatment is complimentary it must derive from his own 
first-hand account. As outlined in Chapter One, other reasons for his prominence are 
equally possible. Despite the overall positive account in Plutarch’s Crassus, modern 
scholars have also accused Cassius of desertion –a serious charge in Roman times, as 
it is now. Though more than one scholar has proposed the idea, there is insufficient 
evidence to prove that Cassius deserted Crassus after Carrhae. No ancient source 
charges him with desertion, and his contemporary Caelius Rufus spoke only of 
rumours of Cassius’ provincial malfeasance, not military desertion. This does not 
prove that Cassius did not desert, of course, because deserting and being charged with 
desertion are two separate things. But to accuse Cassius of the most serious military 
misconduct requires further evidence.  
It is also far from proven that Cassius enjoyed a friendship with Pompey, 
though scholars have advanced the idea repeatedly. If anything, the present state of 
the evidence suggests that a remarkable degree of independence defines Cassius’ 
 226 
early career. Alliances could be quite fluid in the Late Republic: Cassius’ brother 
Quintus, for example, appears to have enjoyed Pompey’s favour in the mid-to late 
fifties, yet became one of Caesar’s most ardent supporters shortly before the civil war. 
At the same time, Cassius’ friendship with Brutus has also been questioned. It has 
been argued that, though they are often inextricably linked in the ancient sources, 
there are no grounds to view Brutus and Cassius as close before 44. However, to point 
to the absence of evidence as proof there was no friendship or relationship is hardly a 
compelling argument. Moreover, as has been noted in Chapter Six, Plutarch does refer 
to the friendship of Brutus and Cassius.       
Caesar’s account of Cassius’ naval exploits during the civil war has also been 
explained in terms of an attempt at public reconciliation with the future tyrannicide. 
Yet, if anything, Caesar’s narrative in his Bellum Civile is ambiguous in its praise. 
Cassius is unlikely to have viewed it as a wholly laudatory assessment. In fact, Caesar 
goes to great lengths to emphasise the advantages Cassius enjoyed when attacking 
one of Caesar’s fleets –favourable wind, the enemy’s disorganization and an 
unsuspecting and divided fleet. Cassius, despite limited personal skill, enjoyed the 
upper hand in this conflict. And despite his initial successes against the Caesarian 
fleet, Caesar’s troops still rallied, and almost captured the tyrannicide. Therefore, the 
view that Caesar’s narrative should be understood as a carefully designed literary 
rapprochement has little to commend it.   
Finally, there is also no convincing evidence that Cassius served as aedile in 
47. One scholar cites a passage in Plutarch’s Life of Brutus to support this claim, but 
the biographer’s language is ambiguous, and most likely refers only to Cassius’ 
expectation of being aedile rather than suggesting he was aedile-elect.  
Often, then, this thesis has challenged or questioned the interpretations of 
modern scholars. If these rebuttals are accepted, a clearer picture of Cassius and his 
career can begin to emerge.    
This thesis has also discussed Cassius’ military career before 44. Many 
sources concur that Cassius was an able soldier.5 Supporting evidence from the wider 
ancient tradition, especially Frontinus’ Strategemata, paints a vivid picture of him as 
a tactician of no mean ability.6 Repulsing the Parthians, defeating Caesarian warships, 
 
5 For example, Vell. Pat. 2.72.2; App. B Civ. 4.123, 133.  
6 See, for example, Front. Str. 2.5.35; App. B Civ. 4.60; Cass. Dio 42.13.  
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and (outside our study) besieging Dolabella,7 all canvass his aptitude as a commander. 
He could be cautious and pragmatic: shutting his army inside the walls of Antioch so 
as to withstand the more numerous Parthians proved effective, as the frustrated 
invaders despaired of capturing the city, only later to be lured into a devastating 
ambush. But he could also be decisive when required: his timely and successful attack 
on the Caesarian naval commander M. Pomponius attests this quality.8 Still, though 
he enjoyed a reputation as an excellent soldier and officer, there is a danger in 
pressing this point too far –or making Cassius out to be greater than he was.9 The Late 
Republic was littered with capable military commanders equal to, if not better than, 
Cassius. He was not, for instance, in the league of men like Caesar and Pompey, nor 
even lesser generals like M. Antonius, as Philippi was to prove.10  
* * * 
It is now time to offer an assessment of Cassius’ character and historical significance. 
A man’s character and personality are of no small importance to the biographer.11 
This is particularly true in the case of Cassius, whose temperament (to cite just one 
example) has attracted plenty of scrutiny from historians, ancient and modern.12 
Given his controversial career, most appraisals of Cassius can be separated into two 
categories: flattering or disparaging. But what was the reality? To answer this 
question is not straightforward.  
Cassius was allegedly a man of hot temper. Plutarch characterises him as 
θυμοειδὴς, albeit a common trait in his so-called deterrent portraits.13 In this case, 
however, the wider historical tradition supports the Chaeronean. The elder Seneca, for 
 
7 Cic. Fam. 12.13.4, 14.4, 15.7; Liv. Per. 121; Strab. 16.752; Vell. 2.69.2; Sen Suas. 17; Joseph. BJ. 
1.231; App. B Civ. 4.60-2; Gell. 3.9.4; Cass. Dio 47.30.1-6; Oros. 6.18.13. 
8 Caes. B Civ. 3.101.  
9 Appian describes Cassius as πολεμικώτατον: App. B Civ. 2.88; Plutarch states that Cassius was 
δεινὸν ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς: Plut. Brut. 29.2. Cicero commends Cassius as gallant and skilled (Phil. 
11.35), though he had also used this formula in his Pro Fonteio 43, on which see Dyck (2012) 75. 
Occasionally literary design plays a part in these assessments of Cassius’ abilities.      
10 At Philippi, Cassius had the advantage of terrain, but not tactical superiority to Antonius, who could 
count Philippi as his greatest military accomplishment. However, Messala Corvinus promotes a version 
of events in which Cassius (like Pompey before him) is forced to commit to battle unwillingly. This 
tradition is perhaps exculpatory, and does not change the events themselves.   
11 Biographers can be prone to suffer from what might best be described as ‘Historical Stockholm 
Syndrome’, in which they strive to emphasise and rehabilitate their chosen historical figures. This is 
certainly not the intention here in regard to Cassius. The primary focus has been to alert the reader to 
suspicious characterisations of the man. There has been no attempt to mask what may be deemed his 
character flaws.  
12 Vell. Pat. 2.72.2; App. B Civ. 4.123, 4.133; cf. Plut. Brut. 29.1-2, 5-6.   
13 Plut. Brut. 8.5. Cf. 1.3-4, 7.5, 29.5 with Moles (1979) 102-3. Cf. Plut. Rom. 16.2, Arist. 17.2. 
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instance, confirms that one declaimer of his time (Varius Geminus) seems to have 
regarded violentia as Cassius’ defining attribute.14 Josephus, too, writes of Cassius’ 
ὀργή, which is seen in his dealings with Jewish potentates.15 Moreover, Cicero 
provides the classic and most reliable (although slightly contrived) picture of Cassius’ 
temperament, when describing the famous consilium at Antium in 44, in which the 
assassin is said to have looked as if he was “breathing war” (Martem spirare diceres) 
–a reference to his anger at and contempt for the quandary the conspirators found 
themselves in.16 Well before the problematic Plutarch, then, there is strong evidence 
of Cassius’ uneven temperament. That he was remarkably different to Brutus in this 
regard requires no argument. That his anger was incompatible with the principle 
doctrines of Epicurus (which he adopted in c. 48) is also notable. But a man cannot, or 
should not, be judged by his temperament alone.     
Cassius could be cruel and ruthless. He had no qualms about the mass 
enslavement of rebellious Jews in the wake of the disaster at Carrhae (admittedly after 
a military emergency), nor about plundering Rhodes and much of the rest of the 
Roman East in 43/42.18 He is even alleged to have encouraged a hesitant assassin who 
did not wish to stab Caesar.19 Considering these details, it is no wonder that a 
contemporary of the elder Seneca recognised violentia as a Cassian trait.20 However, 
Cassius had no issue lecturing Cicero on the distasteful (even intolerable) nature of 
crudelitas, as embodied (he argued) in the figure of Cn. Pompeius junior.21 Such a 
vast discrepancy between his thoughts and deeds is not to his credit, although he 
might have argued in the former cases that his cold actions were the result of wartime 
necessity.22 Moreover, the hostile Velleius Paterculus insists that, unlike Caesar, it 
was normally repugnans naturae suae for Cassius to show clementia. And yet, he 
 
14 Sen. Suas. 6.14: Cassii violentiam. Violentia does not here imply violence so much as 
aggressiveness, vehemence or furiousness. 
15 Joseph. BJ 1.221: αὐταῖς ἐθυμοῦτο ταῖς πόλεσιν. 
16 Cic. Att. 15.11.1. Shackleton Bailey (1968) 6.258, argues that Cicero implies Cassius looked 
courageous; contra Hutchinson (1998) 133-5.   
18 Enslavement of around 30,000 Jews: Joseph. BJ. 1.8.9; Rhodes: Vell. Pat. 2.69.6; App. B Civ. 4.60-
74; Plut. Brut. 30.3; Cass. Dio 47.33.1-4. He may have ordered the crucifixion of Theodotus of Chios, 
the sophistic adviser of the Ptolemies who counselled for Pompey’s execution: App. B Civ. 2.90. In 
fairness, military practice probably dictated the actions of Cassius in both instances.    
19 [Aur. Vict.] De vir. ill. 83.  
20 Sen. Suas. 6.14. See further below. 
21 Cic. Fam. 15.19.2 with Rawson (1986) [1991] 506. 
22 There is often a convenient semantic difference between an enemy’s crudelitas and one’s own 
‘righteous’ severitas, a family trait of the Cassii Longini. 
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supposedly did so in one case before Philippi.23 Cruelty, of course, was not a trait 
unique to Cassius. Caesar, for all his culture and learning, was (in effect) a mass 
murderer; Pompey, in much the same guise, was adulescens carnifex; and even 
Cicero had Catilinarian blood on his hands. So it would be unwise to censure Cassius 
too harshly, as cruelty and ruthless behaviour were prerequisites of Roman politics. 
Even so, this thesis has highlighted episodes which show Cassius could also exercise 
compassion and show concern for others, as when he served as intercessor for fellow 
Republicans in limbo after the civil war.24 
There are also accusations that Cassius was selfish and rapacious.25 
Admittedly, he may have abandoned his commander M. Licinius Crassus in the 
aftermath of the Battle of Carrhae in order to save himself.26 His surrender after 
Pharsalus, an action completely opposite to the bitter if futile resistance that Cato 
continued to spearhead, can hardly be deemed heroic.27 Cassius also appears to have 
been rapacious in the provinces, not that that distinguishes him greatly from many of 
his peers.28 As has been noted above, certain of his actions in the aftermath of 
Pharsalus indicate that he could and did on occasion care deeply for the safety and 
wellbeing of others, particularly those likeminded Republicans in Greece who were 
seeking Caesar’s pardon, whom he strove to assist after securing his own pardon.29 
This is a side of Cassius’ character that has often gone unappreciated.30  
Cassius was also a focused and determined man. In the lead-up to Philippi, he 
devoted himself entirely to the war effort (ἀμετάστρεπτος), with Appian comparing 
his gritty perseverance to that of a gladiator sparring against his antagonist.31 Cicero, 
too, speaks of Cassius’ determined spirit, which he implies is well known to the 
senate: nec enim animum eius potestis ignorare nec copias.32 No one could deny that 
 
23 Vell. Pat. 2.69.6. 
24 App. B Civ. 4.64, 4.69, drawing on a more favourable source to Cassius (Messala?), cites examples 
showing Cassius’ compassion rather than cruelty.  
25 Plut. Brut. 29.5-6.  
26 Plut. Crass. 29.4; Joseph. AJ. 14.119. 
27 Although, in fairness, he had been a conscientious objector with regard to civil war from the outset. 
28 [Aur. Vict.] De vir. ill. 83; Joseph. AJ  14.270, BJ. 1.218; App. B Civ. 4.62; Cass. Dio 47.31.3, 
47.33.4; Plut. Brut. 29.5.  
29 Cic. Fam. 15.15.2. Scholars who charge Cassius with selfishness include Tyrrell and Purser, TP 
VI2.xciv. 
30 Flor. 2.17, describes Cassius and Brutus as sapientissimos ac fortissimos viros, perhaps quoting or 
paraphrasing Livy.    
31 App. B Civ. 4.133. Cassius’ military ability is consistently emphasised by Gowing (1992) 176; App. 
B Civ. 2.88, intends to speak of the tyrannicide as πολεμικώτατον. 
32 Cic. Phil. 11.32.   
 230 
he was strong-willed, a characteristic amply illustrated by the fact that he was a 
teetotaller all his life, which must be assumed to have been a philosophical choice 
rather than a constitutional one, and hence Seneca’s drawing the detail to his reader’s 
attention.33  
When the occasion demanded, he was not afraid to speak his mind to men of 
greater seniority. Plutarch’s anecdote about Cassius standing up to Pompey after the 
Faustus episode is a classic example of this boldness. At several points in Crassus’ 
campaign against the Parthians, he forcefully urged the dynast to reconsider his plans 
or to adopt a more cautious approach.34 In the early months of 44, he was one of the 
few senators to oppose increasing honours for Caesar, a bold action to which he could 
not foresee how the dictator would respond.35 And he contemptuously scorned the 
corn commission of 44, asking Cicero, “Should I have taken an insult as though it had 
been a favour?”36 In sounding out Brutus and the other conspirators Cassius also 
demonstrates his frankness and fearlessness.37 Evidently, forthrightness was not 
something with which Cassius struggled.  
Cassius was also fond of witty banter and prone to laughter.38 In one letter to 
Cicero, his archness and badinage are clearly on display, even if the likes of Tyrrell 
and Purser dismissed his repartee as “frigid”.39 And several of his bons mots survived 
for posterity.40 Two of these jokes reveal that he had a predilection for punning: his 
clever wordplay on Archer (Sagittarius) following the defeat at Carrhae is memorable, 
as has already been noted.41 His joke at P. Sulla’s expense is likewise clever.42 Even 
in the heat of battle he found the time to quip, reportedly ordering a swordless soldier 
running into the fighting somewhat hastily, heus, commilito, pugno bene uteris.43 Like 
Tyrrell and Purser, perhaps, today’s reader may not be left in stitches, but the artistry 
 
33 Sen. Ep. 83.12. 
34 Plut. Crass. 18.4, 20.2, 22.4.  See also Moles (1979) 102, on Cassius as a stickler for his rights.     
35 Cass. Dio 44.8.1, provides the most detailed context for the tribunes’ exile.  
36 Cic. Att. 15.11.1; Shackleton Bailey (1968) 6.258. Consider, too, his offhand remarks about Cn. 
Pompeius, which are hardly cautious or diplomatic. He eventually accepted the corn commission. 
37 Plut. Brut. 10.  
38 Plut. Brut. 29.1-2: πρὸς δὲ τοὺς συνήθεις ὑγρότερον τῷ γελοίῳ καὶ φιλοσκώπτην. Cf. Plut. Brut. 
34.7, 40.1.   
39 Tyrrell and Purser (1933) 6.xci-xcvi; see, e.g., Cic. Fam. 15.19. Cf. 15.18.1. Tyrrell and Purser were 
not, of course, experts on Roman humour. For a more detailed description of Roman joking, see in 
general Beard (2014); cf. Corbeill (1996).  
40 Quint. Inst. 6.3.90; Plut. Crass. 29.4; Sen. Suas. 1.5.  
41 Plut. Crass. 29.4. See also his wordplay at Cic. Fam. 15.19.3, on bonum...bona. 
42 See Chapter 5, Section 13. 
43 Quint. Inst. 6.3.90. The source of Quntilian’s information may have been Messala. 
 231 
is there. These bons mots exhibit the culture and learning of the urbane and 
sophisticated aristocrat, not the jester at a theatre.44 Cassius, then, could be witty and 
engaging. But like Cicero, Cassius sometimes went too far and overstepped the 
boundaries of polite humour. Seneca, for example, advised against referring to 
someone as a fatuus, Cassius’ description of Cn. Pompeius jr.45 Again, however, 
Cassius’ wit is another side of the tyrannicide not heretofore appreciated.  
* * * 
The tyrannicide’s character was obviously far more complex than Plutarch’s Life of 
Brutus reveals. But what of politics? Cassius did not demonstrate the constancy and 
fervent anti-Caesarism of Cato, nor the humanitas of Brutus; he does not appear to 
have possessed the intellectual brilliance of Caesar, nor the oratorical gifts of Cicero; 
and his military ability, while far superior to many Republican figures (e.g., Bibulus 
and Brutus), was no more impressive than that of several other contemporaries. What, 
then, if anything, is Cassius’ historical and political significance?   
Cassius failed in his attempt to restore the Republic; and yet, he cannot be 
judged by results alone. In masterminding the conspiracy against Caesar he could not 
be confident of success. That he still sought to remove the dictator at great risk to 
himself, his friends, and his family, demonstrates the conviction with which he 
believed in his mission. Like Cato, he came to the realisation that it was better to fight 
for the res publica than to wither away under Caesar’s stifling power. Though his 
motives may have been less noble than those of Brutus, in the end Cassius was indeed 
fighting for something greater than himself –a government made up of his elite peers, 
held in check by each other, all scrambling for honours on an equal footing. If such a 
position seems untenable or quixotic by 44,46 that is no matter. Cassius, at least, 
evidently thought he could still restore the res publica, and perhaps the trajectory of 
his own career.  
One final question merits consideration: had Cassius not lived during the final 
days of the Republic, would Caesar have been assassinated in 44? Of course, there is 
 
44 Quintilian, after all, considered the greatest joke of all Cicero’s infamous “sero” double-entendre 
quip at the trial of Milo: see Beard (2014) 99-101, on this joke for an explanation.  
45 Sen. Suas. 1.5.5. This may be implied in Plut. Brut. 29.2: φιλοσκώπτην, which can have pejorative 
connotations. See further Moles (1979) 339-40. Cassius was also part of a sophisticated set of Romans 
who were fond of philosophy. In a highly rhetorical passage, Appian describes Cassius as φιλέλλην 
ἀνήρ:  B Civ. 4.67. As we have seen, Cassius engaged in philosophical banter with Cicero during the 
period of his political retirement.    
46 For Wiseman (2009) iii, 9-10, Caesar’s assassins were “arrogant aristocrats”.   
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no certain answer to this counterfactual question. Some, however, may wish to argue 
Caesar’s death was predestined by 44. Several Roman politicians, indeed, claimed 
after the assassination that they had tried to (or were plotting to) assassinate Caesar.47 
Perhaps, then, the dictator’s fall was inevitable. But historical inevitability is a 
dubious notion. If Cassius had not moved against Caesar in early 44, there is no 
certainty that another figure would have had the confidence and influence to set a 
conspiracy in train, or pull off an assassination before Caesar’s long campaign against 
the Parthians. Arguably then, Cassius’ actions changed the course of history. Yet 
though he successfully orchestrated Caesar’s removal, restoring the res publica and 
dismantling the dictator’s political legacy proved too great a challenge. In the end, 
however, Cassius’ momentous decision to make a stand against the increasingly 
autocratic Caesar –despite the dangers involved– distinguishes him from many, if not 
most, of the Republican nobility of 44. For this reason alone, Brutus (who joined the 
conspiracy only after his brother-in-law had persuaded him to do so) could aptly 
eulogise Cassius as ultimus Romanorum at Philippi.            
 
 
 
47 For references, see Chapter 5, Section 8.  
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A:  PATRICIAN OR PLEBEIAN? 
 
The Cassii Longini were plebeian nobiles.1 However, as has long been noted, it is just 
conceivable that their ancient gens had once been patrician. The reason for this possibility is 
the existence of the early Republican figure Sp. Cassius (cos. I. 502), who was executed in 
485 for aiming –allegedly– at regal power.2 This issue is not a matter of scholarly pedantry; if 
this Cassius were patrician then it would follow that the rest of his gens were patrician also, 
or had been so once. However, if he were in reality plebeian, as some scholars have 
suggested, this fact would explode the Livian tradition (which has come under increasing 
scrutiny) that L. Sextius was the first plebeian consul.3 It is all the more significant because, 
as a result of an allusion in Cicero’s Second Philippic (2.26), scholars have repeatedly 
suggested that the Cassii Longini claimed descent from Sp. Cassius, or, to be more precise, 
his patriotic father, who condemned his son as an aspiring tyrant.4  
Thus, it is necessary to attempt to elucidate whether or not the Cassian gens had ever 
been patrician. Admittedly, the issue is a historiographical quagmire, fraught with insur-
mountable source problems. But in proffering this brief reconstruction, the nature and status 
of the Cassii Longini will hopefully become much clearer, even if fixing a definite answer 
remains difficult. That Sp. Cassius was patrician had been surmised by prominent scholars of 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, despite their realisation that Tacitus attested the 
 
1 Plebeian nobiles: Tac. Ann. 6.15: Cassius plebeii Romae generis, verum antiqui honoratique; Asc. Tog. Cand. 
82C, on the Catilinarian Cassius: …quattuor plebeios ex quibus duos nobiles, C. Antonium, M. Antoni oratoris 
filium, L. Cassium Longinum. Their plebeian status has been accepted by Münzer, RE “Cassius” 3.1678 (but see 
note 5 below); Broughton (1991) 10; Dettenhofer (1992) 123.  
2 Those scholars who believe the Cassii were (or were once) patrician: Drumann-Groebe (1964) [18992] 2.94; 
Smith (1844) I.621-2; Babelon (1885) 323; Willems (1968) [1885] 79; Shatzman (1955) 154n.7; Ranouil (1975) 
78, 212; Brunt (1982) 6; Broughton, MRR 1.8, but cf. Broughton, MRR 3.52, who is equivocal: “Plebeian 
Consul?”. This controversy dates back as far as Bayle (1734) II.343. There is some debate over the exact 
spelling of Cassius’ cognomen, Vecellinus. On this, see Mommsen (1864) I.107n.82; Hertz (1871); Münzer, RE 
“Cassius” 3.1749; Richard (1978) 524n.281; it was perhaps affixed to him long after his death. On Spurius’ 
execution, see Appendix B below. 
3 Those scholars who argue Cassius was plebeian are: Beloch (1926) 326-8; Fracarro (1956) 1.1-23; Richard 
(1978) 523-7; Ogilvie (1965) 277-8; Smith (2006b) 49-50. Drummond, CAH2 VII2.175 and Cornell (1995) 252-
6, are unsure. On L. Sextius (cos. 366) as the first plebeian consul: Liv. 6.42.9.  
4 Drumann-Groebe (1964) [18992] 2.94: “Cicero bezieht sich auf die Sage, gegen welche schon Dionys und 
Livius Zweifel erhoben, er sei von seinem Vater getötet, um zu beweisen, dass diesem Geschlechte bis auf den 
Mörder Caesars hinab Tyrannengewalt verhasst gewesen sei.”; see also King and Clark (1908) 33; Denniston 
(1926) 113; Ogilvie (1965) 336-9; Lacey (1986) 177; cf. Ramsey (2003) 201, who is more sceptical and 
proposes Ravilla as the possible subject of the allusion (note in Loeb text). On whether the Cassii Longini 
claimed descent from Sp. Cassius, see Appendix B below.  
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Cassian clan as plebeian.5 Not unsurprisingly, they followed the Livian tradition which holds 
that no plebeian had been consul before 366. As a result, Sp. Cassius was dismissed as an 
anomaly; or, as was first proposed by G. de Sanctis, it was held that the patrician line of his 
clan suffered extinction, leaving only unrelated plebeians.6 However, B.G. Niebuhr, who 
firmly believed the clan had been patrician initially, offered two plausible explanations as to 
why the gens metamorphosed from patrician to plebeian. Citing the ignominious death of Sp. 
Cassius, he argued that the sons (or descendants) of Vecellinus, who were reputedly protected 
from recrimination,7 had either been expelled from the patriciate order, or, less drastically, 
had performed a transitio ad plebem after the Decemvirate.8 There is, however, no supporting 
evidence for either of Niebuhr’s theories; and in the final analysis genuine transitiones during 
the early Republic seem unlikely.9 
  Nevertheless, P. Brunt has also tentatively proposed that the Cassii Longini laid claim 
to patrician status, rather than plebeian gentility.10 Brunt believes that no matter “however 
fictitious” an assertion that they were descendants of Sp. Cassius may have been, that it 
would nonetheless have been accepted. Evidence that proves this point conclusively was not 
 
5 Drumann-Groebe (1964) [18992] 2.94: Spurius was “Cos. 502 v. Chr. und daher Patricier”; Münzer (1899) RE 
“Cassius” [91] 3.1749: Spurius was “der einzig Patricier dieses Namens”: Even Broughton MRR 1.8 initially 
listed him as patrician. Cf. Ranouil (1975) 76-81.    
6 Sanctis (1960) [1907] 2.10-12; cf. Momigliano (1967) 308: “Meno inverosimile è una terza spiegazione, che 
trovò favore con Gaetano De Sanctis, secondo cui i Cassii, Volumnii, Sempronii etc. del V secolo sarebbero 
stati dei membri di genti patrizie più tardi estinte e solo omonime delle genti plebee.” However, it is also 
possible that the Cassii Longini were descended from clients of the Vecellini: Drumann-Groebe (1964) [18992] 
2.94; Suolahti (1963) 153; Cody (1968) 7. This supposition would explain the vast gap between Sp. Cassius’ 
death and the appearance of the next Cassius in the fasti. See also, Broughton MRR 3.52-3; Heurgon (1973) 165. 
A similar line of argument had previously been made by Mommsen (1864) I.107-8, who proposed that Sp. 
Cassius was unrelated to later members of the Cassii clan. It was thus mooted that the attribution of Vecellinus 
as the first Cassius and a patrician was a falsification of history by later Cassii. Cicero confirms it was not 
uncommon for plebeian nobiles to make such grandiose claims: see Münzer (1999) [1920] 126 with n.101; 
Tatum (1999) 92. But the historicity of Sp. Cassius is no longer seriously questioned by scholars: Mommsen 
(1879) II.155.    
7 Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 8.78.4; 8.80.1. Cf. Ranouil (1975) 151, 171.  
8 Niebuhr (1838) [1827] II.173; cf. also Smith (1844) I.621; esp. Suolahti (1963) 153n.11. On the process of 
transitio ad plebem, see Kübler (1937) RE “Transitio ad plebem” 6A: 2154-7; Tatum (1999) 92-4; Brunt (1982) 
5-6; Badian (1984) 49-71. Babelon (1885-86) 324, argued that the Cassii Longini prided themselves on being 
expelled from the patrician order: “Au revers [of a coin of C. Cassius Longinus (cos. 96)], figure le quadrige de 
la Liberté, symbole des idées démocratiques des Cassii qui, pour cette raison, avaient été expulsés de l’ordre des 
patriciens.” 
9 Mommsen (1864) I.107; Brunt (1982) 5-6; Tatum (1999) 90-102. Mommsen did not list the Cassii as an 
example of a family that transitioned from the patrician to the plebeian order. However, considering it is most 
likely that the Fabii orchestrated Sp. Cassius’ fall from grace, it is not inconceivable that they took steps to expel 
Cassius’ three sons from the patriciate, in an attempt to inhibit them from seeking a reprisal. See Fracarro (1956) 
63; Heurgon (1973) 164; esp. Flower (2006) 45, on the Fabii’s role in Sp. Cassius’ downfall.     
10 Brunt (1982) 5-6. Shatzman (1975) 440, appears to consider the first Cassius Longinus to reach the 
consulship a plebeian nobilis rather than a novus homo. Cf. Chapter 2, Section 2, on the consul of 171.   
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adduced by Brunt, as he himself conceded.11 Nor does claiming descent from Sp. Cassius, if 
they did so, prove that he was, in fact, a patrician; merely that the Cassii Longini professed to 
be illustriously antique (as Tac. Ann. 6.15).12   
An alternative interpretation is that the long-held Livian tradition is fallacious; 
plebeians may have held the consulship before 366, including Sp. Cassius.13 This hypothesis 
would harmonize the inconsistency between Cassius and all later known members of his clan. 
A. Momigliano ingeniously modified this theory, instead suggesting that the early Republican 
figures like Cassius whose gentes are attested later as plebeian represent the conscripti (Liv. 
2.1.11), who were originally neither patrician nor plebeian, but amalgamated over time into 
the latter order.14 These hypotheses offer a better solution to the discrepancy between Sp. 
Cassius and later Cassii; they also provide a more probable explanation than the notion that 
the clan was initially patrician. However, of more importance is to establish whether the 
Cassii Longini claimed the ambivalent figure of Sp. Cassius as their progenitor.   
                                    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11 Brunt (1982) 5-6. For a critique of this theory on nobilitas, see Burckhardt (1990) 77-99; cf. Broughton, 
ANRW (1972) 1.250-65.  
12 On the family’s prestige, cf. also Liv. 4.15.5:   
13 See n.3 above. Fracarro (1956) 1.1-23; Richard (1978) 523-7; Ogilvie (1965) 277-8; Momigliano (2005) 173-
7. Other plebeian clans in a similar position were, as follows: Cominii, Genucii, Iunii, Minucii, Sempronii, 
Tullii and Volumnii. But see Momigliano (2005) 177, for caveats.       
14 Momigliano (1967) 297-312, esp. 308: “Noi riteniamo che esistesse tra patrizi e plebei un gruppo intermedio 
di conscripti, da cui venivano scelti dei senatori. Non sembra inverosimile che dallo stesso gruppo di conscripti 
provenissero i pochi consoli non patrizi della prima metà del V secolo: non patrizi, ma nemmeno plebei, se 
guardati dal punto di vista dei contemporanei.” See further, Broughton, MRR 3.53; Momigliano (2005) 177-8; 
Richard (1978) 525-7: “En d’autres termes, rien ne peut justifier l'hypothèse selon laquelle Sp. Cassius aurait 
appartenu au patriciat. Ce que nous entrevoyons de sa carriere suggere au contraire qu’il tint dans le groupe des 
conscripti une place de premier plan et que son prestige lui valut la confiance des patres (d’ou peut-etre la 
tradition qui en fait à tort ou à raison le premier magister equitum) et celle de la plèbe, puisque, après avoir été 
choisi comme consul en pleine sécession, il fut chargé de dédier le temple de Cérès.” (525).    
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APPENDIX B: SP. CASSIUS AS PROGENITOR? 
 
Did the Cassii Longini claim descent15 from Sp. Cassius?16 This question is in need of 
address as it has been mooted repeatedly by scholars –often without sufficient supporting 
evidence– that the Cassii Longini were treated as descendants (or, at the least, promoted 
themselves as such) of Sp. Cassius. While P. Brunt suggested the Cassii Longini appropriated 
Sp. Cassius in order to enjoy the benefits of his “patrician” status, E. Gjerstad has argued 
strongly, inter alia, that they would not have claimed descent from a man who was 
condemned and executed for his attempt to seize regal power.17 This is not insignificant when 
one considers the tyrannicide’s leading role in the murder of Julius Caesar, for which some 
lauded him as a tyrant-slayer, and others condemned him as a budding despot. As has been 
seen already, many interconnected questions hinge on this issue.18 It is thus necessary to re-
examine the ancient evidence (both textual and numismatic) in order to evaluate arguments 
for and against the contention that the Cassii Longini claimed descent from Sp. Cassius. 
The only literary source that connects the Cassii Longini and Sp. Cassius is an 
allusive passage in Cicero’s Second Philippic (2.26):19 C. Cassius in ea familia natus quae 
non modo dominatum, sed ne potentiam quidem cuiusquam ferre potuit. The cuiusquam (‘any 
man’) has been interpreted as an allusion to Sp. Cassius, who was, according to one tradition, 
executed by –or as a result of the testimony of– his father.20 But several points need to be 
clarified. Cicero proffers his comments during a rhetorical refutation of a false Antonian 
charge that he insidiously inspired Cassius to murder Caesar. Unsurprisingly, Cicero seeks to 
 
15 This issue may, at first, appear confusing. While the Cassii Longini were related to Sp. Cassius in terms of 
clan kinship –see Smith (2006a) 36, for a definition– they may have been completely unrelated in terms of 
agnatic descent, which is of chief importance for a family progenitor.   
16 Eminent aristocrats occasionally went to extraordinary lengths to foreground their descent from distant (and 
sometimes highly questionable) progenitors; on the falsification of aristocratic genealogies, see Münzer (1999) 
[1920] 126 with n.101. Cicero was critical of M. Brutus’ attempt to appropriate L. Brutus (cos. 509 BC) as an 
ancestor. Other well-known examples –Caesar and Antonius– come readily to mind: Suet. Iul. 6 (Venus); Plut. 
Ant. 4.1 (Hercules). So if the Longini sought to link themselves to a distant ancestor they were hardly different 
in this regard. On the importance of semi-legendary (or mythical) ancestors, see Wiseman (1974) 153-64.         
17 Brunt (1982) 5-6; Suolahti (1963) 388 with n.5; Cody (1968) 7; cf. Münzer (1999) 122; Contra Gjerstad 
(1973) V.85; Palmer (1970) 289-99; cf. Mommsen (1879) 2.155; Ranouil (1975) 78, who both think an agnatic 
connection is improbable. Litchfield (1914) 26n.1, notes Sp. Cassius is included as one of the great “enemies” 
of Rome (similar to, although not the same as, Coriolanus). It should be obvious, therefore, that Sp. Cassius was 
an ambivalent, one could say problematic, figure.  
18 For one thing, the significance of the Cassii Longini’s status, origins, and consular and triumphal 
achievements would change drastically if Sp. Cassius was accepted as their progenitor. At the same time, they 
probably would have been stigmatized by his execution –politically embarrassing to say the least– unless they 
could mitigate the fallout.   
19 Scholars who take this to indicate a conscious link are: Drumann-Groebe (1964) [18992] 2.94; King and Clark 
(1908) 33; Denniston (1926) 113; Balsdon (1958) 94; Ogilvie (1965) 336-9; Lacey (1986) 177; cf. Ramsey 
(2003) 201, who is more sceptical, and proposes Ravilla (as noted above).  
20 For example, Denniston (1926) 113: “The reference is to Spurius Cassius”. 
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demonstrate that Cassius needed no prodding to lead the assassination – his family had a 
well-known history of opposition to those (even within the family) eyeing excessive power. 
Thus his information is not impartial, verified testimonium; Cicero may use the guarded 
allusion to Sp. Cassius for his own rhetorical purposes. Accordingly, his rebuttal far from 
proves the Cassii Longini actively linked themselves to the ambivalent, historical Sp. 
Cassius, it shows only that Cicero could expect his audience to make the connection between 
Sp. Cassius and the Cassii Longini.  
However, the numismatic evidence is far more convincing. Two members of the gens 
Cassia, one of whom is likely the Catilinarian L. Cassius Longinus (pr. 66),21 minted coins 
that appear to allude to Sp. Cassius, specifically his consecration of the Temple of Ceres, 
Liber, and Libera:22            
                                            
                        Figure 523                                                                                      Figure 624 
 
The first coin (Figure 5), issued by the otherwise unknown L. Cassius Caecianus25 in 102, 
depicts the goddess Ceres on the obverse and complementary yoked oxen on the reverse.26 It 
is not hard to conclude, therefore, that the moneyer wished to recall the foundation of the 
Temple of Ceres, Liber, and Libera, and in so doing associate himself with Sp. Cassius.27 
 
21 Broughton, MRR 3.51, is sceptical about the attribution; cf. also Crawford, RRC 1.325.  
22 The numismatic evidence is Crawford, RRC 1. 325, no. 321/1; I. 403, no. 386/1. Scholars who argue this is 
evidence of a conscious link of the Cassii are: Cesano (1942) 145-7; Crawford, RRC 1.403; Brunt (1982) 5-6; 
Ryan (2009) 35-41. On the coins minted by the Cassii, see Babelon (1885) 323-37; Seaby (1989) 29-30. For 
references to Sp. Cassius’ consecration of the Temple of Ceres, Liber, and Libera, see Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 
6.94; Liv. 2.41.10; cf. Tac. Ann. 2.49. Mattingly (2004) 136, suggests that Liber was the patron deity of the 
Cassii Longini, but, even accepting this, the coin refers to much more than simply their patron god.         
23 Babelon (1885-86) 323, no.4; Grueber (1910) 1.1725; Sydenham (1952) 83, 90-1, no.594; Co    
24 Babelon (1885-86) 328-9, no.6; Grueber (1910) 1.3152; Sydenham (1952) 128, no.779; Crawford, RRC 403, 
no.386/1.   
25 Ranouil (1975) 79n.1, suggests Caecianus may have been the L. Cassius Longinus who was tribune of the 
plebs in 89, though this is far from certain.  
26 Ranouil (1975) 79, suggests the reverse is either an allusion to the agrarian land bill sponsored by Sp. Cassius 
or else commemorates C. Cassius Longinus’ assistance distributing land in Liguria in 173: see Chapter 2, 
Section 2. Ryan (2009) 35-41, argues Caecianus promoted the land distribution law which Sp. Cassius first 
proposed as his family legacy, especially after the defeat of the Gracchi.       
27 Crawford, RRC 1.326; Brunt (1982) 5-6; Ryan (2009) 35-41. Cf. Bonniec (1958) 213-14.    
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(This was certainly R.M. Ogilvie’s opinion.28) Ceres enjoyed a central place in the pantheon 
of Roman deities as the goddess of corn and agriculture (and the patroness of plebeians).29 As 
such, it would have been a coup for the Cassii to point out that their ancestor had consecrated 
Ceres’ temple: [sc. Sp.]  Κάσσιος δ' ὁ ἕτερος τῶν ὑπάτων ὁ καταλειφθεὶς ἐν τῇ Ῥώμῃ τὸν 
νεὼν τῆς τε Δήμητρος καὶ Διονύσου καὶ Κόρης ἐν τῷ μεταξὺ χρόνῳ καθιέρωσεν.30 
Ironically, after being convicted and executed for aiming at regal power, Sp. Cassius was 
then subject to a consecratio bonorum,31 which was offered to Ceres, the goddess who B.S. 
Spaeth argues was responsible for punishing aspiring tyrants.32  
The second coin (Figure 6), issued by the Catilinarian Cassius in 78, depicts both 
Liber and Libera, which again strongly suggests a desire to recall the founding of the 
eponymous temple and Sp. Cassius.33 Here, then, seemingly is solid evidence that at least one 
member of the Cassii Longini sought to associate himself with Sp. Cassius and/or his public 
benefactions. It could be argued, however, that the focus of the issues is, if anything, on the 
public benefaction rather than Sp. Cassius specifically, who by the Late Republic had become 
a stock rhetorical figure – a paragon of anti-Romanism.34 The moneyers may simply be 
accentuating the fact that their family had dedicated a temple that was of great significance to 
plebeians.35  
But this thesis is slightly unsatisfactory. Moneyers consistently commemorated the 
deeds of their ancestors on coinage, as they understood the profound propagandistic value of 
such self-promotion.36 As it is unlikely that the gens Cassia wished to link themselves to Sp. 
Cassius –unless they wanted to highlight his agrarian bill– it can best be concluded they 
sought to foreground his execution and consecration to Ceres by his own father, a legend 
 
28 Ogilvie (1965) 278, says Caecianus “certainly claims” Spurius Cassius as his ancestor.  
29 On Ceres, see generally Bonniec (1958), esp. 370-8, for Ceres’ presence on denarii, and Spaeth (1996), 71-3, 
on Sp. Cassius and his consecratio to Ceres.  Bonniec’s belief that the goddess’ presence on coins sought to 
secure the sympathy of the people did not find favour with Crawford, RRC 2.730n.2. See further, Beard, North, 
and Price (1998) 1.64-5, on the significance of Ceres to plebeians.    
30 Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 6.94.  
31 On consecratio bonorum, see Flower (2006) 47-8; Mustakallio (1994) 37-8; cf. Liv. 2.41.10: Cereri 
consecravisse, with Ogilvie (1965) 343.  
32 Spaeth (1996) 71-3. Cesano (1942) 145-7, famously argued that it was this consecratio which is com-
memorated on the coins.    
33 Crawford, RRC I.403; cf. Seaby (1989) 29.   
34 On Spurius as a rhetorical figure of anti-Romanism, see, for example, Cic. Phil. 2.87; Dom. 101; cf. Litchfield 
(1914) 26n.1. 
35 Liv. 2.41.10: eum cognita domi causa uerberasse ac necasse peculiumque filii Cereri consecrauisse; signum 
inde factum esse et inscriptum: ‘ex Cassia familia datum.’ On this, see Ogilvie (1965) 443-4. The Temple of 
Ceres, Liber, and Libera housed the plebeian archives. For a detailed discussion of the coin, see Hollstein (1993) 
23-8.    
36 On the propagandistic use of coins to promote one’s family and the increasing trend of honouring family 
ancestors see generally, Cheung (1998); Williams and Meadows (2001).  
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their family had a vested interest in promoting.37 Most aristocrats could lionise the deeds of 
illustrious ancestors, but for the increasingly prominent Cassii Longini it seemed best to 
accentuate the fact that the black sheep of their clan, Sp. Cassius, had been condemned and 
executed by his own father, a story which, like the consecration to Ceres, mitigated the stain 
of an ancestor trying to set himself up as tyrant.    
It should thus be clear now that the Cassii Longini did not, according to the present 
skimpy state of the evidence, actively associate themselves with Sp. Cassius. On the contrary, 
it appears they sought to highlight his execution and consecration to Ceres, or alternatively 
his dedication of the Temple of Ceres, Liber, and Libera. The existence of various stories 
surrounding Sp. Cassius’ demise also highlights a family desire to smooth over the career of 
a black sheep. Of course, it is also possible that these coins allude to Sp. Cassius’ alleged 
proposal of the first agrarian land reform bill. But it seems more likely that they seek to 
address the crimes of a problematic ancestor.      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
37 See further, Chapter 2, Section 2.   
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APPENDIX C:  CLAN ORIGINS 
 
Unlike most other prominent gentes, the Italian origins of the gens Cassia are shrouded in 
obscurity. But despite the silence of the sources, scholars have not refrained from proposing 
numerous potential locations. Many of these hypotheses are based on an etymological 
analysis of Sp. Cassius’38 cognomen, Vecellinus, which is generally understood to have been 
formed from a place name (not an uncommon practice).39 It is thus necessary to analyse 
briefly current scholarship in an attempt to clarify, as much as possible, the geographical 
origins of the clan. While certainty on such points is often elusive, it is at least possible here 
to rank the probable theories and direct the reader away from those that are dubious.    
In 1904, W. Schulze proposed Sp. Cassius Vecellinus hailed from Etruria.40 He 
argued the cognomen Vecellinus –itself the source of fierce scholarly debate41– was 
linguistically related to the Etruscan word vecu; but this link appears tenuous, and, in more 
recent times, scholars have questioned its veracity.42 Nevertheless, the archaeological 
discovery of the Forum Cassii in Etruria also appeared to suggest, at first, that the Cassii had 
strong Etruscan roots.43 In hindsight, however, the settlement was seemingly small and 
clearly connected to the construction of the via Cassia. As such, its existence hardly provided 
conclusive evidence that the Cassii came from Etruria, merely that they may have had clients 
in the region.44 Nonetheless, J. Suolahti also initially suspected that the Cassii Longini 
emigrated from southern Etruria to Rome, either at the time of unification or during the First 
 
38 It must be established immediately that, even if the Longini are not direct descendants of Sp. Cassius, they 
were related to him in terms of clan kinship: Smith (2006a) 36, and Appendix B (n.15) above.  As such, common 
geographical origins should not be considered impossible.  
39 Mommsen (1864) 2.290-1; Ogilvie (1965) 277. Cf. Syme (1964) 105, who is more cautious: “At first sight a 
cognomen might appear to disclose a regional or ethnic origin.” But this is not always the case. On cognomina, 
see Mau RE (1900) IV.225; Douglas (1958) 62-66; Badian (1963) 130; Kajanto (1965) 120-2; Wheeler (1988) 
166-95; Salway (1994) 127-8. It must be remembered that Spurius’ cognomen potentially was affixed to him 
long after his death: the earliest attested cognomina come from the fourth century: Salway (1994) 127-8. 
Kajanto (1965), is seminal.      
40 Schulze (1966) [1904] 250, 445, 423, 561; cf. Suolahti (1963) 153; Richard (1978) 524n.281. 
41 On Spurius Cassius’ cognomen, see Mommsen (1864) I.107n.82; Hertz (1871); Münzer, RE (1899) “Cassius” 
[91] 3.1749; Kajanto (1965) 163; Ogilvie (1965) 277-8; D’Ippolito (1975) 204; Richard (1978) 524n.281.  
42 On the word vecu, see Schulze (1966) [1904] 250; Chase (1897) 123; cf. Bonfante (2002) 210. Vecu was also 
the name of an Etruscan nymph. See, however, Ogilvie (1965) 278, who is emphatic: “neither nomen or 
cognomen suggests Etruscan forebears.” Cf. Gjerstad (1973) 5.84n.3: “Schulze connects this name with the 
Etruscan vecu (op. cit. p. 250) but that by no means proves that the word was Etruscan; place names are often of 
Mediterranean, native origin”. However, the Cassii Longini would not be the only aristocratic family with 
Etruscan roots: the Licinii Crassi may also have hailed from Etruria: Ward (1977) 49; Keaveney (1992) 1.         
43 On the Forum Cassii, see Bonfante (1986) 59; esp. Johnson, Keay, and Millett (2004) 69-99.       
44 On the Cassii’s Etruscan clients, see Appendix E below.  
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Punic War.45 But after much equivocation he changed his mind and instead tentatively 
proposed that the Cassii Longini came from northern Latium, as did families like the Iulii, 
Iunii, and Servilii.46 Given the present state of the evidence, this supposition appears to be the 
most probable, based solely (and problematically) on clan migration patterns. It is perhaps 
supported by reinterpretations of Sp. Cassius’ cognomen, which the majority of scholars now 
take to indicate Latin origins. Indeed, within Latium itself two areas have been proposed as 
potential ancestral seats of the gens Cassia.     
The first of these two suggestions is an area near the now unknown Vecilius mons 
(Liv. 3.50.1). This site has naturally been mooted repeatedly because of its name’s similarity 
in form to Vecellinus.47 Unhelpfully, Livy only mentions it once, but it was clearly in the 
vicinity of Mons Algidus, on the periphery of Latium. Obviously, confirmatory evidence has 
not emerged linking the Cassii to Vecilius mons. Though it is an ingenious theory, it must, 
ultimately, remain just that. The second suggestion, complicating this scholarly debate, is F. 
D’Ippolito’s argument that Sp. Cassius’ cognomen was in fact Vitellinus and that he therefore 
hailed from the Latin town of Vitellia, the second suggestion.48 Both Livy and Pliny mention 
this place, but once again no additional evidence suggests it.49    
Thus, the places conjectured as the ancestral seat of the Cassii in many ways prove 
unsatisfactory. Overall, it has to be conceded that the sources fail to provide sufficient 
evidence that would allow a definitive area to be assigned as the Italian epicentre of the 
Cassii clan. In the final analysis, it is unlikely that the Cassii Longini came from Etruria; but 
although Latium seems more likely (especially as there are two districts from which 
Vecellinus’ clan may have sprung) nothing concretely ties the clan to the area. Whatever their 
origins were, however, the Cassii Longini had been established at Rome for a long time by 
the tyrannicide’s birth; even discounting Sp. Cassius, they had enjoyed a presence at Rome 
 
45 Suolahti (1955) 155. Based on Q. Cassius (mil. tr. 252 BC). Cf. Suolahti (1963) 388. Rawson (1978) 136n.40, 
also seems to suspect the Cassii Longini initially had Etruscan roots, although by 49 these do not appear strong.    
46 Suolahti (1955) 155, 351; (1963) 153, esp. 708. This was in line with other scholars: Ranouil (1975) 76; Gagé 
(1976) 146-7; Mustakallio (1994) 33; cf. Shatzman (1975) 19n.31. Wiseman (1971), noted in his seminal study 
on novi homines that the majority of new families in the second century came from Latium.     
47 Those scholars who opt for Vecilius mons: Weissenborn (1871) 97; Hertz (1871) 474-5; Gjerstad (1973) 
V.84-5; cf. Ogilvie (1965) 277-8.    
48 D’Ippolito (1975) 204: “Il Broughton lo identifica come Spurio Cassio «Vecellinus» che però comporta 
l’accoglimento di una tarda (ed errata) lettura di «Vitellinus». Questo «cognome» è latino e deve essere riferito 
alla città di Vitellia sita, appunto, nel Lazio. Non è eccesso di ardimento  trarre, da tale elemento, l’affermazione 
che la gens Cassia giunse in Roma dal vicino Lazio e ciò spiegherebbe l’interesse prolungato e constante del 
console per i Latini e il suo manifesto desiderio di perfezionare con essi stabili alleanze.” On the Vitellinus 
variant, see Willems (1878) I.80; Münzer, RE (1899) 3.1749.   
49 Liv. 2.39; Plin. HN 3.5.  
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since the middle of the third century and were certainly entrenched there by the early 
second.50    
A coda must be inserted. Based on Livy (45.42.4), I. Shatzman proposed that the 
Cassii Longini had property in Alba Fucentia.51 Naturally it would be tempting to assign Alba 
Fucentia, located in Latium, as the epicentre of the Cassii clan. Regrettably, Shatzman has 
likely misinterpreted the evidence. Q. Cassius, praetor in 167, had been directed by the senate 
to escort and detain King Perseus at Alba Fucentia.52 Possibly following the common belief 
that elite enemies of Rome were detained in the houses of leading senators, Shatzman 
presumably concluded that Cassius escorted Perseus to an estate in Alba Fucentia.53  
However, it is certain that the Romans used Alba Fucentia as a detention centre because of its 
impressive fortifications and natural defensive position.54 Other enemy kings were held 
there.55 As such, the area of Alba Fucentia must be discarded as both an ancestral seat and an 
estate of the Longini. This is not to say that the Cassii Longini never had property in Alba, 
simply that Shatzman’s deduction is unconvincing.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
50 The sudden appearance of Q. Cassius (mil. tr. 252) is slightly anomalous, but from C. Cassius Longinus (cos. 
171) the Cassii Longini were a consistent presence in Rome.      
51 Shatzman (1975) 440. Alba Fucentia is also referred to as Alba Fucens.  
52 See also Diod. Sic. 31.9.  Cf. Plut. Aem. 37.2-3, for a nuanced version of Perseus’ incarceration.    
53 In Cicero’s day, elite enemies could be detained by leading men of the state: Sall. Cat. 47; Plut. Cic. 22; App. 
B Civ. 2.5. See also the example of Tigranes, held at the house of Flavius, who escaped from custody: Plut. 
Pomp. 48.6; Cass. Dio 38.30.1-2.  Such actions were “customary practice”: Millar (1998) 111.  
54 MacKendrick (1962) 95-8; See also Str. 5.13 (240); Diod. Sic. 31.9.5. It is, however, just possible that the 
Cassii owned a large estate with an ergastulum (cf. Cic. Cluent. 21) at Alba, but no evidence supports this 
interpretation.      
55 Enemy kings: Syphax of Numidia (Liv. 30.17.2); Bituitus, king of Arverni (Liv. Ep. 61). See MacKendrick 
(1962) 97-8; Braund (1984) 167. Perseus may have been moved from Alba Fucentia as a result of the  
intercession of Aemilius Paulus (Plut. Aem. 37.2-3.) But his initial incarceration is historically sound. See Polyb. 
36.10.3; Vell. Pat. 1.11.1; Val. Max. 5.1.1.   
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APPENDIX D: THE TRIBE OF THE CASSII  
In her seminal study on voting districts, L.R. Taylor conceded that the tribe to which the 
Cassii Longini belonged was unattested in the sources.56 Yet she did list two problematic 
members of the gens Cassia whose tribal affiliation is known: C. Cassius Parmensis (Pollia); 
and an anomalous M. Cassius M.f. (Pomptina).57 In this regard, it is the latter who has been 
the source of trenchant scholarly debate. The reason for this attention is that, if this M. 
Cassius, a praetor, were a Longinus, then it would show not only that the Longini employed 
Marcus as a praenomen but also that they belonged to the Pomptina tribe. However, in 1963, 
E. Badian, following generations of scholars,58 argued the Republican Longini never appear 
to use Marcus as a praenomen and that this man is nowhere else attested in the sources.59 
Accordingly, he concluded not only that M. Cassius was not a Longinus, but also that he 
could not be a Cassius. Badian therefore emended M. Cassius to M. Ca<e>sius (arguing for a 
stonemason’s error).60 Broughton accepted his hypothesis.61 As such, M. Cassius is 
considered a spurious creation of an incompetent stone-cutter. Crucially, this development 
undermined the idea that the Cassii Longini belonged to the Pomptina tribe.               
However, this view changed with a ground-breaking note by J.M. Cody in 1969.62 
She discovered an Augustan gem (Fig. 7) surrounded by the legend: M. CAS. M.F. LONGINI.63     
 
Figure 7 
 
56 Taylor (1960) 279. The Cassii Longini were not, as she noted, the only great plebeian house that is unattested; 
so, too, are the Lutatii Catuli and the Sempronii Gracchi.  All members of the Cassii Longini would, except in 
some circumstances, belong to the same tribe: Taylor (1960) 7, 207. There is no extant eulogia of a Republican 
Cassius, which is typically where tribal information was recorded.    
57 M. Cassius is attested only on an inscription noting members of a consilium: SIG3 747 (Line 8): Μάαρκος 
Κάσιος Μαάρκου υἱὸς Πωμεντίνα; IG 7.413; FIRA I2 36; Taylor (1960) 176, 202; Sherk (1969) 133 [23], for 
bibliography and commentary.   
58 Drumann-Groebe (1964) [18992] 2.138; Mommsen (1885) 282; Münzer, RE “Cassius” 3.1678: “Ihre 
Angehörigen in der letzten Zeit der Republik führen den Beinamen Longinus ziemlich unregelmässig; als 
Praenomina sind C. L. Q. bei ihnen in Gebrauch.” Taylor (1960) 202.     
59 Badian (1963) 135; Broughton MRR 3.44-45. 
60 This Caesius was connected to another member of the consilium, C. Licinius Sacerdos, attested in the 
inscription. See preceding note for references. In the Greek of SIG3 747, from Κάσιος to Κα⟨ί⟩σιος. Caesius was 
praetor in 75 BC: Broughton MRR 2.96.   
61 Broughton MRR 3.44-45.   
62 Cody (1969) 177-8. Shackleton Bailey (1992) 31, accepted as “probable” Cody’s thesis. But cf. Broughton 
MRR 3.45, who is more cautious and favours Badian’s emendation.     
63 Photograph of gem: Furtwängler (1900) 1.pl. 47.59; cf. Cody (1969) 178.  
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Based on an apparently early portrait of Augustus, the gem should be dated to between 29 
and 10.64 This, coupled with the fact that the filiation of the Marcus who commissioned the 
gem was M.f., indicates conclusively that the Longini used Marcus as a praenomen during 
the Late Republic.65  Thus as regards praenomina, Cody is indubitably correct: there were 
Marci Cassii Longini. But Cody went on to argue that Badian’s emendation of M. Cassius to 
M. Caesius is therefore unnecessary and, further, that the “M. Cassius included in the list of 
senators in 73 was also a Longinus.”66 While her suggestion is attractive –overturning an 
ingenious (though perhaps flawed) emendation that neatly restores the original reading– 
caution should be exercised. There are obstacles that may preclude her designation.    
That the inscription attesting M. Cassius is problematic, all scholars agree: it is the 
product of potentially inferior stonemasonry.67 And even if the inscription has been rendered 
correctly –even if this man were M. Cassius– it far from proves he was a Longinus. Roman 
nomenclature is so unspecific that it is always difficult to assign individuals to their families, 
especially when based on a single piece of evidence.68 Although there were few senatorial 
Cassii of the Late Republic who were not Longini, without the attested tria nomina it cannot 
be conclusively stated this M. Cassius was a Longinus. Moreover, F.X. Ryan argues 
forcefully against Cody: “The fact that the third man in the consilium could not have borne a 
cognomen”, as there is no gap in the stele, supports Badian’s emendation.69 This reality 
seems to have escaped Cody; in addition, C. Cassius Longinus, the father of the tyrannicide, 
was consul in 73 and his cognomen is listed on the second line of the inscription. Bearing this 
in mind, it seems best to uphold Badian’s emendation, as a Longinus would have recorded his 
cognomen as a matter of propriety.    
Consequently, on the present skimpy state of the evidence, it cannot be ascertained 
with any certainty to which tribe the Cassii Longini belonged. But there is no doubt that the 
reconstruction of J.M. Cody is inconclusive.70      
 
64 The informal view of C.H.V. Sutherland: Cody (1969) 178n.12.  
65 Cody (1969) 178. Cf. Ryan (1995) 307n.6; Broughton MRR 3.44-5.   
66 Cody (1969) 178; Broughton MRR 3.44-5. 
67 Taylor (1960) 176. Badian (1963) 134-5, who (135) quotes Mommsen’s damning assessment of the inscr-
iption, which, he stated, was defined by “zahlreichen und schweren Schreibfehler”. The inscription also bears 
the signs of dittography. Badian further suggests that the omission of the iōta is almost expected, as Κάσιος is so 
familiar compared to Καίσιος; he cites other precedents for the mistake: Badian (1963) 135. See also Sherk 
(1969) 133-8.     
68 As has been noted in another context, this is especially the case with the Cassii Longini: Sternkopf (1904) 
396-7. On this ‘M. Cassius’ specifically, see the brief comments of Elvers, BNP 2.1164.   
69 Ryan (1995) 307n.6.  
70 This still leaves unanswered the question of the Marci Cassii Longini. Employing Ockham’s razor, we may 
posit simply that an extraordinary number of sons (four) were born to one family, forcing them to employ an 
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APPENDIX E:  THE CLIENTS OF THE CASSII 
A brief justification is necessary for a study of the Cassii Longini’s clients as the patron-
client relationship, once considered the methodological cornerstone of Roman sociology, has 
increasingly lost favour with scholars.71 Although the importance of patronage is not 
disputed, it is now apparent that client relationships were often fluid and changeable, neither 
exclusive nor necessarily permanent.72 So while it can no longer be irrefutably claimed that 
patrons could deploy monolithic blocks of hereditary clients to do their electoral bidding,73 
knowledge of the Cassii Longini’s clientage can provide some insight into their political 
connections in the provinces, and, occasionally, foreign fields, as well as within the Roman 
business community. Such connections were crucial for the political grandee, and reflect his 
resources and dignitas. If such knowledge is the first justification, the second is that at 
present there is no available catalogue of their clients, which considering the paltry state of 
the evidence is quite understandable.74 As such, a short exposition is clearly warranted; it is 
arranged by region (see further, Table A).      
ITALY: In late 44, Cicero remarked that both Sidicinum and Puteoli had sought Brutus 
and Cassius as their patrons, because they had freed the state from tyranny (Phil. 2.107).75 
This was clearly a symbolic gesture, loaded with political meaning, and, if Cicero is to be 
believed, it was not long before M. Antonius coerced these municipalities into also 
designating himself and L. Minucius Basilus as additional patrons. It may be concluded, 
therefore, that Cassius was not a traditional patron of these towns, although it is likely that he 
had an estate nearby in Naples, and, as such, had a base of clients in the region, which 
explains why he stayed there after abandoning Rome in 44.76 Three generations later C. 
Cassius Longinus (suff. cos. AD 30) was still a patron of Puteoli, which indicates that the 
patron-client relationship endured.77 It is also very likely that the Cassii Longini had clients in 
Etruria, considering the presence there of a Forum Cassii and the penetration of the via 
 
additional, new praenomen. Cassius, for instance, had at least two known brothers; a third is possible.    
71 See Jehne (2006) 12-13; cf. Deniaux (2006) 401-417. Brunt (1988) 382-442, is magisterial.   
72 Brunt (1988) 398-400; Wallace-Hadrill (1989) 63-85, esp. 78-81.  
73 Gelzer (1969a) 139, argued that whoever had the most clients would enjoy the greatest political success. See 
similarly, Scullard (1951) 12-18. Contra Brunt (1988) 385, 398-400 and 424-31, who overturned this mistaken 
thesis; and Tatum (1999) 21-2.    
74 Badian (1958) provides no information on their clients; Deniaux (1993) has some useful information on 
Cassius’ letter of recommendation for M. Fabius, but no detailed treatment of the family.   
75 Cic. Phil. 2.107: Quid ego illas istius minas contumeliasque commemorem quibus invectus est in Sidicinos, 
vexavit Puteolanos, quod C. Cassium et Brutos patronos adoptassent? See also Denniston (1926) 165; Ramsey 
(2003) 317.  
76 Cic. Att. 16.3.6; D’Arms (1970) 58n.102, suspected Cassius had an estate in Naples, which he believed would 
be in line with other Epicureans across Campania.  
77 On C. Cassius Longinus (suff. cos. AD 30) as a patron of Puteoli, see D’Arms (1970) 58, 155-65. 
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Cassia.78 Moreover, if not a nom de plume (or satirical fabrication) the existence of a Cassius 
Etruscus may also signify the Cassii Longini’s patronal footprint.79 Another individual, C. 
Cassius Parmensis, perhaps hailed from Parma (his tribal affiliation seems to confirm this 
fact) and his name could indicate that the Cassii Longini also had clients in that region.80 
Shakier designations are Messana –based on the existence of an M. Cassius81– and Pompeii 
and Sicily.82 Ultimately, Puteoli, Sidicinum, and Etruria seem certain; everywhere else is 
little more than speculative.   
GAUL: Cicero states that Cassius had clients among the Transpadani. In a letter written 
in early February 43, he reassures Cassius that even his Transpadani clients are thoroughly 
behind the cause of the Liberators.83 While M. Gelzer accepted Cicero’s remark, D.R. 
Shackleton Bailey queried it as ironic.84 He argued the Transpadani were indebted to Caesar 
because he had been responsible for their enfranchisement.85 How, he wondered, could they 
be clients of Cassius?86 But as T.P. Wiseman had seen, Cassius’ father had been proconsul of 
the Transpadanes region in 72, and clearly garnered clients there at that time.87 C. Cassius 
Longinus (cos. 96) had also exercised command in that region, when chosen by the senate to 
relieve a dying Cn. Pompeius Strabo of his command.88 As Cicero’s letter reveals, this had 
serious ramifications because at least some Transpadani appear to have sided with their 
 
78 Forum Cassii: Johnson, Keay, and Millett (2009) 66-99; via Cassia: Hardie (1965) 129; Harris (1965) 114; 
Wiseman (1970) 136. See also Appendix C above.  
79 Macfarlane (1996) 242-3, tentatively suggests that Cassius Etruscus’ name may suggest he was a cliens of 
some Cassius, and that he was one of the many Etruscans enfranchised after 150 who assumed his Roman 
patron’s gentilicium. Cf. Harris (1971) 208-10. See also Giardina (1965) 24-44, who regards Cassius Etruscus 
and Cassius Parmensis as probably the same man.     
80 Wiseman (1971) 222. On Cassius Parmensis’ tribal affiliation, see Taylor (1960) 202.   
81 Badian (1958) 254 with n.2, 303, for M. Cassius. Badian, as has been seen in Appendix D, did not believe the 
Cassii Longini used the praenomen Marcus, which, as Cody demonstrated, is untrue. But this far from proves 
that this M. Cassius was connected to the Cassii Longini.    
82 Pompeii: some Cassii struck a marriage alliance with the owners of the so-called ‘House of the Faun’: Gordon 
(1927) 167. Sicily: Shatzman (1975) 192, notes Cassius’ mother had inherited property there.         
83 Cic. Fam. 12.5.2: tuos etiam clientis Transpadanos mirifice coniunctos cum causa habebamus. 
84 Gelzer (1969) 97; Shackleton Bailey (1977) 2.505, (1978) 544n.910 (a note in the Letters); cf. also Brunt 
(1988) 399; Tyrrell and Purser (1933) 6.65, who found it “strange” that the Transpadani would be attached to 
Cassius when they owed their enfranchisement to Caesar. But they conclude that the provincials’ loyalty was to 
“Rome” rather than an individual, a thesis which seems very convenient.      
85 On the enfranchisement of the Transpadani, see Ewins (1955) 83-95; cf. Gruen (1974) 410. Gruen believed 
that they would become Caesar’s clientelae when they became citizens in 49. But as mentioned, clients were not 
necessarily static: some towns beyond the Alps may have had pre-existing patrons or may have sought out 
additional patrons as well as Caesar. See Brunt (1988) 398-9.   
86 Shackleton Bailey (1977) 2.505. Eutr. 4.22 is erroneous: Broughton MRR 1.512n.1.    
87 Wiseman (1971) 39 with n.5, for comprehensive ancient references. Cf. Keaveney (1992) 202. C. Cassius 
Longinus (cos. 96) had also finished off the campaign of Cn. Pompeius Strabo, which even Brunt (1988) 398 
failed to see. Before this, C. Cassius Longinus (cos. 171) may also have campaigned there. On this, see Morgan 
(1974) 193-4; cf. MRR 3.51. It is even possible that Cicero refers to Cassius’ clients among the Histri (see 
below), using the term Transpadani in a very loose sense.          
88 Gran. Licin. Fr. BK 35. 22F; Wiseman (1971) 39 with n.5; Seager (2002) 23; Carlsen (2006) 134.  
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patron rather than M. Antonius in the post-Caesar environment. The Cassii Longini also had 
clients in Gallia Narbonensis, although it is not clear from what time this connection dated. 
Evidence from the era of Tiberius indicates they were patrons of Arelate (Arles), as this 
inscription on a trapezophora demonstrates (see Fig. 8):89                         
 
Figure 8 
Whether or not L. Cassius Longinus (suff. cos. AD 11)90 inherited these clients cannot be 
known with certainty, but it is probable. As has been seen with Puteoli, patronal obligations 
to towns and whole communities were usually hereditary, and though Augustus reorganized 
Arelate as a military colony, the town itself had been under Roman control since 123.91 
Indeed, Caesar admitted a Cassius Barba into the senate in 45, and based on additional 
inscriptional evidence this man may have hailed from Narbo, indicating the presence of 
potential Cassian connections in the region.92 In contrast to Gallia Narbonensis, the presence 
of the rapacious and unpopular Q. Cassius Longinus (tr. pl. 49) in the nearby province of 
Hispania Ulterior probably did nothing to boost the Cassii Longini’s client base.93     
ILLYRIA AND BITHYNIA: T.P. Wiseman also demonstrates the Cassii Longini had been 
longstanding patrons of the Istrians.94 C. Cassius Longinus (cos. 171) had campaigned in the 
region of Illyria during his consulship, at which time he had notoriously tried to invade 
Macedonia. Four generations later an inscription attests that a L. Cassius Longinus (C.f.), the 
 
89 CIL. 6.41045 (AE 1930 70). For discussion, see Nicols (1990) 87n.26, 99; Eck (2010) 96-8.    
90 PIR2 C350. Van Buren (1961) 378, errs in identifying him as the consul of AD 30.    
91 On Arelate, which had been under Roman influence since 123, see Drinkwater, OCD3 151. See also, Christol 
and Goudineau (1987-88) 90-2. For hereditary patronage: Dion. Hal. 2.10.4 with Brunt (1988) 384, 392, 
395n.34; cf. (1971) 332-42, on land distribution and resettlement after Actium.  
92 Wiseman (1971) 8, 222; cf. CIL. 12.4686, for a L. Cassius Barba at Narbo. And Syme (1964) 123, for ancient 
references to the equestrian Cassius Barba. Cf. Pflaum (1966) 3-23, for unique inscriptions.      
93 On Q. Cassius’ unpopularity, see, e.g., Caes. B Alex. 48, 50, esp. 52-3, for the assassination attempt. Brunt 
(1988) 393n.23, shows that many clients in Spain were attached to Pompey, which, in part, explains their 
recalcitrant resistance to Caesar. However, Loyzancé (1986) 273-84, demonstrates that Cassii inhabited the 
Iberian peninsula in the first century AD.         
94 Wiseman (1971) 40 with n.3 for inscriptional evidence.  
248 
 
tyrannicide’s brother (tr. pl. 44), was one duumvir at Pola (Pula).95 Our Cassius himself is 
also supposed to have granted citizenship to an unquantifiable number of Bithynians as he 
marched through Asia Minor on his way to Philippi in 42, including (according to W. 
Ameling) the family of the historian Cassius Dio.96 If this were true it would automatically 
make him their patron. But while this hypothesis does explain the concentration of Cassii in 
Bithynia, F. Millar suggests the cluster may simply represent the emigration of one family of 
Cassii to the region early in the first century AD.97 Nonetheless, C. Cassius Longinus (cos. 
96) was an active governor of Bithynia and Pontus who likely gained clients in addition to 
the publicani connections he made.98  
RHODES AND MACEDONIA: Cassius also likely amassed clients by force when he 
successfully campaigned against Rhodes in 42.99  This is not insignificant: the island had 
famously repelled both Demetrius the Besieger and Mithridates VI.100 Having captured the 
island, the Rhodians would have been compelled to offer unconditional surrender (deditio) 
and enter into a bond of fides with Cassius as their patron.101 Appian relates that even some 
slave-informers gained citizenship, but this would have been Rhodian rather than Roman 
citizenship.102 It is obvious that the Rhodians were neither longstanding nor willing clients of 
the Cassii Longini, and, in some cases, probably also had pre-existing patrons. Nevertheless, 
technically they were initially their clients in 42. Finally, Cassius’ presence in Macedonia in 
42 is well documented, so it is no surprise that epigraphic evidence shows he left a significant 
patronal legacy in the region.103 He showed more clemency there than Brutus.104        
What conclusions can be drawn from this information? Despite limited evidence, it is 
clear that even with woefully incomplete data the Cassii Longini’s patronal footprint is 
 
95  For Cassius’ campaigning in the Istrian war, see Liv. 43.1.4-12 with Hardie (1965) 114; Harris (1979) 232; 
for the inscription, cf. Wiseman (1971) 40n.3, who cites ILLRP 639 and Nicolet (1974) 2.830; BNP 6.431.    
96 Ameling (1984) 123-38: “Die Familie der Cassii hat das Bürgerrecht vermutlich von dem Caesarmörder 
erhalten, als dieser zusammen mit Brutus in Kleinasien den Widerstand gegen Antonius organisierte.” (125) See 
also 137n.106; Corsten (1990) 97; Şahin (1978) 16-18; Marek (1997) 81-4; cf. Gowing (1992) 170n.23; 
Fröhlich, RE (1899) III.1732-3. Millar (1964) 8-10, does not discuss this link, though he noted that the Domitii 
in Bithynia probably received citizenship from Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus (cos. 32). Corsten (1990) 97: “Die 
meisten bithynischen Cassii haben das römische Bürgerrecht von dem Caesarmörder C. Cassius erhalten, als er 
durch Kleinasien zog”.     
97 Millar (1964) 8-10.  
98 On Cassius’ governorship of Bithynia and Pontus, see Shatzman (1975) 174.   
99 Ancient sources: Liv. Per. 121; Vell. Pat. 2.69.6; Joseph. AJ. 14.378; App. B Civ. 4.67-73; Cass. Dio 47.33.4; 
Oros. 6.18.13.      
100 See OCD4 (2012) 1278-9.  
101 This process is described by Deniaux (2006) 404.  
102 App. B Civ. 4.73 with Treggiari (1969) 19. Bleicken (1964) 186, has argued that Cassius also amassed clients 
in Syria, while there as acting governor in the aftermath of Carrhae. This may explain how he came into 
possession of lions for aedilician games, as mentioned by Plut. Brut. 8.6-7: see Chapter 5, Section 11.  
103 On the Cassii in Macedonia and Cassius himself, see Collart (1937) 201-2; Tataki (2006) 165-9.  
104 Vell. Pat. 2.69.6.   
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evident. They were patrons of towns and communities all over the Roman empire, which 
must reflect their sustained political influence, numerous estates, and prodigious financial 
resources. Possessing such clients befitted their position as one of the great plebeian noble 
houses at Rome. For a political grandee like Cassius, a web of connections –economic, 
social, and political – was essential. Indeed, while the number of clients each aristocrat had 
probably did not dictate election results, they were a potent signifier of one’s dignitas as well 
as a powerful tool for self-fashioning. Below is Table A, which may serve as an additional 
illustration of the geographical spread of the Cassii Longini’s clients, as well as providing a 
summary of ancient evidence and modern scholarship.   
Table A:  The Cassii Longini’s Clients 
   
     Region 
 
Communities 
                
Ancient Sources/Scholarship 
It
a
ly
 
Puteoli Cic. Phil. 2.107; Cic. Att. 16.3.6. 
Sidicinum Cic. Phil. 2.107. 
Etruria Forum Cassii; via Cassia 
Parma? Wiseman (1971) 222. 
G
a
u
l 
Transpadani Cic. Fam. 12.5.2. 
Gallia 
Narbonensis 
(Arelate) 
CIL 6.41045 (= AE 1930 70); CIL 12.4686. 
Il
ly
ri
a
 
Istria 
(Pola) 
Liv. 43.1.4-12 with ILLRP 639. 
Wiseman (1971) 40.  
B
it
h
yn
ia
 
Unspecified 
Ameling (1984) 125, 137; Corsten (1990) 97; 
Shatzman (1975) 174. 
R
h
o
d
es
 
Rhodians 
Liv. Per. 121; Vell. Pat. 2.69.6; Joseph. AJ 
14.378; App. B Civ. 4.67-73; Cass. Dio 47.33.4; 
Oros. 6.18.13.      
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APPENDIX F:  THE WEALTH OF THE CASSII LONGINI 
Prosperity and property were essential prerequisites for the Roman aristocratic family. This 
was especially the case in Republican Rome, politically speaking a timocratic meritocracy. 
Although satisfying the wealth qualification for senatorial politics far from guaranteed 
success, abundant capital, as the career of M. Licinius Crassus aptly demonstrates, often 
made the aristocrat’s path up the cursus honorum much smoother; conversely, financial 
difficulties could prevent even the most blue-blooded families from obtaining high office.105 
In the case of the Cassii Longini, their sustained political success would appear to indicate 
they had both the talent and the resources required to maintain their public careers.106 
Nonetheless, it is necessary to scrutinize the ancient sources in an attempt to provide support 
for this fair assumption.  
  PROPERTY: The Republican nobilis tended to own several estates, which, depending 
on their size and function, would be scattered across Italy, although statistically they 
preferred their country villas to be located in Latium and Campania.107 This is certainly the 
case with Cassius, who had estates in Formiae and probably Naples also, and doubtless more 
which are not attested by the sources.108 In addition to these retreats, it has been inferred he 
had an estate at Brundisium, from the extended period of time he stayed there in the 
aftermath of the civil war.109 From his mother, he may have inherited Sicilian property; but 
that land in Leontini may just as easily have been sold and the profits redistributed among her 
children, if not previously unloaded.110 As one would expect, Cassius also had a house at 
Rome, although Suetonius and Plutarch only mention it in passing.111 Its location must 
 
105 Plut. Crass. 2, 3.1, 7.2. Slender resources could prevent political success: Asc. Scaur. 23C. Both Sulla and 
M. Antonius are supposed by the ancient sources to have cohabited with wealthy commoners because their 
fathers had left them with palty inheritances: Sall. Jug. 95; Plut. Sull. 1.3-4, 2.4; [Aur. Vict.] De vir. Il. 75; Cic. 
Phil. 2.3, 2.44, 3.17, 13.23; cf. Att. 16.11.1. But these mésalliances are maybe the result of distorted invectives, 
or, in Sulla’s case, self-fashioning: Tatum (2011) 168. On Crassus’ wealth, see Marshall (1976) 3: “Wealth and 
success in politics went hand in hand among the Roman nobiles, and Crassus was a supreme example of this.”          
106 Patrimonial inheritance did not, as a rule, go to the eldest son in Rome. In fact, it appears often to have been 
split between sons, daughters, dependants, and friends. As a result, after a few generations, the sons of senators 
occasionally received insubstantial inheritances: Scullard (1951) 8; Jolowicz (1952) 123-34; Shatzman (1975) 
51; cf. Rawson (1976) 85-102.        
107 Latium and Campania: Shatzman (1975) 26, 32; Rawson (1976) 90 (estates close to Rome were preferred).   
108 Formiae: Cic. Att. 7.23.1; Naples: Cic. Att. 16.3.6 with D’Arms (1970) 58, 178; Rawson (1985) 24n.32. 
Perhaps Rhodes: App. B Civ. 4.67-8.      
109 Brundisium: Cic. Fam.15.17.9; Att. 13.22.2; Shatzman (1975) 318. Silvestrini (2007) 1355, shows that the 
imperial Cassii Longini had property in Puglia. Wiseman (1971) 191-6, lists no Tusculum estate for the Cassii, 
though this may be a failing of the patchy evidence. It is possible, however, that Cassius stayed at the estate of a 
friend or family member; but he remained in the area for a rather long time for such hospitality.   
110 Leontini, Sicily: Cic. Verr. 2.3.97. Cassius’ ignota mother was the wife of the consul of 73.     
111 Rome: Suet. Iul. 85; Plut. Brut. 14.4. See further, LTUR 2.77-8. Willems (1899) 1.178, suggests it was a legal 
requirement for a senator to own a home in Rome, although the issue is by no means settled.   
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remain unknown, but, at that time, most attested nobiles had houses on the Palatine, which is 
the likeliest district.112  But he did not merely own country estates and at least one house; it 
seems he was also in possession of horti (suburban gardens at Rome), which he decided to 
sell in 45.113 All in all, it is clear that he, and his family, owned considerable property, even if 
the suggestions of some scholars should be discounted, especially the so-called Tiburtine 
“Villa of Cassius”.114 What is more, one has to imagine that in addition to houses, villas, and 
gardens, Cassius also owned fundi, deversoria, and even insulae. These, however, the sources 
do not record.     
INHERITANCE, LEGACIES, AND A DOWRY: Like all aristocrats, Cassius would have 
received an inheritance from his father, who clearly did not disinherit his son, or leave him 
penniless.115 Because of his prominence, however, Cassius could also expect to inherit 
legacies from grateful clients and family friends.116 His marriage to Junia Tertia, moreover, 
contracted by 59, must also have yielded a lucrative dowry.117 Daughter of the indomitable 
Servilia, Junia was, at least by the end of her life, fabulously wealthy. Tacitus records (Ann. 
3.76) that she left a share of her vast wealth to every leading citizen, making legatees of every 
aristocrat except –in a conscious act of political defiance– the emperor Tiberius.118  
  EQUESTRIAN BUSINESS CONTACTS: It is clear that Cassius, and his family, had strong 
links to Equestrian businessmen. An example of this is that he sent a letter of 
recommendation to Cicero for his Equestrian friend M. Fabius, who, embarrassingly for 
Cassius, had been an acquaintance of the orator for some time.119 Even more strikingly, C. 
 
112 Popularity of  the Palatine: Shatzman (1975) 22-3. Cf. M. Livius Drusus: Vell. Pat. 2.14.3; Plut. Mor. 800F. 
However, Marius famously bought a house near the Forum in the centre of Rome: Plut. Mar. 32.1. Nonetheless, 
Cicero speaks of his house on the Palatine as conferring prestige: Att. 1.13.6. 
113 Horti: Cic. Att. 12.21.2; Grimal (1969) 120n.6; Shatzman (1975) 22n.43, 318.     
114 Shatzman (1975) 440: Alba Fucentia, based on Livy 45.42.4. On this problematic theory, see Appendix C 
above. M. Della Corte: Pompeii, based on the existence of a Cassia who perished in the so-called Casa del 
Fauno. Contra Gordon (1927) 167; Meyboom (1995) 167-72. Several scholars have argued that a Tiburtine 
house with a statue of Harmodius the Greek tyrannicide belonged either to Brutus or Cassius, which is hardly 
convincing, though an interesting hypothesis: Ashby (1905) 191, 193; Pietrangeli (1949) 157-81; Zaccaria 
(1983) 97-131; cf. Presicce (2003) 143n.52.  
115 Cf. n.103 above. Cassius may also have received inheritances from other relations, especially agnatic ones. 
Atticus had inherited a large fortune from his uncle, Q. Caecilius: Cic. Att. 3.20.1-2; Nep. Att. 5.1-2; Val. Max. 
7.8.5. But again the sources are deficient on this matter.   
116 Shatzman (1975) 52: “The bigger clientela a senator had, the more he would receive under wills.” Cicero 
reveals that it was almost unheard of not to receive such legacies from friends: Cic. Phil. 2.40 with Ramsey 
(2003) 220. Some examples of will omissions: Att. 1.16.10, Dom. 49, Sest. 111. See also note 118 below, on 
Cassius’ wife Junia’s omission of Tiberius.  
117 On the marriage, see Syme (1987a) 326. See also Chapter 3, Section 9.  
118 Tac. Ann. 3.76: testamentum eius multo apud vulgum rumore fuit, quia in magnis opibus cum ferme cunctos 
proceres cum honore nominavisset Caesarem omisit. See further Champlin (1991) 13-14, which includes a 
discussion of the social and cultural significance of will omissions. 
119 Cic. Fam. 15.14.1-2 with Shatzman (1975) 189n. 58. Deniaux (1993) 28; D’Arms (1970) 179. 
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Nicolet argues that Cassius’ probable first cousin once removed, L. Cassius Longinus (mil. tr. 
69), and even his own brother, L. Cassius Longinus  (tr. pl. 44), were formal members of the 
Equestrian order.120 While both these figures later embarked on senatorial careers, initially 
they may have purposely delayed the cursus honorum to focus on the accumulation of 
capital. So the Cassii Longini may have enjoyed strong equestrian contacts. It may also be 
significant in this regard that Q. Cassius (tr. pl. 49) counted Atticus among his friends.121       
CASSIUS’ PROVINCIAL PROFITEERING: Finally, the principal evidence for Cassius’ 
financial situation comes from knowledge of his public career. Overall, the sources –even if 
one allows for exaggeration– reveal that Cassius was, if not unscrupulously rapacious, 
assuredly an aggressive provincial administrator, whose capacity for profiteering knew few 
limits. As has already been observed, as quaestor and proquaestor in Syria between 54 and 
51,122 Cassius’ extortions were reputedly so great that some at Rome were lining up to 
prosecute him.123 From the De viris illustribus (83.3), it is evident Cassius took the 
opportunity to engage in commerce, and, if the source is accurate, received the sarcastic 
sobriquet Caryota (‘The Date’), because he was ruthlessly trafficking in dates and other local 
products.124 An even more unsavoury source of income may have been derived from his 
insouciant sale of some 30,000 Jews into slavery, or so Josephus reports.125 The number 
seems suspiciously large, but it likely reflects a real if more limited operation. Based on this 
evidence, it is not difficult to see why certain men back at Rome made sport of Cassius’ 
provincial plundering.126 Evidently he made vast profits in Syria and Judaea, his provincial 
 
120 On the military tribune of 69: Nicolet (1974) 2.828-9. For the tyrannicide’s brother Lucius (tr. pl. 44), see 
Nicolet (1974) 2.829-30, and (1976) 22 with n.12. His analysis of the latter was based on Cic. Planc. 58: tua fuit 
perelegans et persubtilis oratio, digna equitis Romani vel studio vel pudore.   
121 Cic. Att. 5.21.2. Atticus may have served as the procurator of Cassius and his brothers; as mentioned, he was 
a familiaris of Cassius’ younger brother Quintus. Cic. Att. 5.21.2: Cassius, frater Q. Cassi familiaris tui. But cf. 
Nep. Att. 8. It would appear that Atticus was on more intimate terms with Brutus, though this does not discount 
the possibility of an association with Cassius (and his family) also. This assumes, quite correctly given the 
slender evidence, that Cicero does not employ the word familiaris ironically. 
122 The date of Cassius’ quaestorship is controversial: see Chapter 4, Section 1. Cf. Harlan (1995) 143.  
123 Cic. Fam. 8.10.2, 15.14.4, on which see Tyrrell and Purser (1933) 6.104; Drumann-Groebe (1964) [1899] 
2.101; Shatzman (1975) 318. Such prosecutions, however, were almost to be expected: Taylor (1941) 118-19. 
124 [Aur. Vict.] De vir. Ill. 83.3: Dein eo quod coemptis Syriacis mercibus foedissime negotiaretur, Caryota 
cognominatus est. On the significance of dates, which did not grow in Italy, see Varro, Rust. 2.1.27. But as 
Rawson (1991) 104, notes this reference may simply be from a tendentious account of Cassius.  See further 
Dettenhofer (1992) 127n.35; Shatzman (1975) 318. 
125 Joseph. BJ. 1.8.9: καὶ Ταριχέας μὲν ἑλὼν εἰς τρεῖς μυριάδας Ἰουδαίων ἀνδραποδίζεται. After the defeat of 
Crassus at Carrhae, Cassius captured Tarichaea in Judaea. On the significance of Josephus’ use of ἀνδράποδον, 
see Gibbs and Feldman (1986) 291-2.  
126 See Caelius’ letter to Cicero in which he speaks of Cassius inventing the war with Parthia to cover up his 
provincial misdeeds: Cic. Fam. 8.10.3.   
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spheres of influence. Over the extended three or four years he was in the provinces, he 
certainly had the time, mechanisms, and disposition to amass a fortune.   
A variety of source indicators (all of which furnish incomplete data), make it clear 
that in the period before 44 Cassius owned considerable property and slaves. The literary 
sources also demonstrate the many avenues of wealth from which Cassius derived his capital. 
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APPENDIX G:  VIA CASSIA 
An enduring scholarly debate that is yet to be resolved centres around the question of which 
member of the Cassii Longini oversaw the construction of the via Cassia, a patchwork 
Roman road which initially extended from Rome to Arretium.127 Although such a question 
may at first seem trivial, even contrived, there are significant reasons for wishing to identify 
the road builder. Aside from the fact that it would allow scholars to fix a more precise date 
for the Cassia’s construction –as well as placing the road in its social and political context– it 
would also shed light on one Cassius’ career because a sound way to trumpet political 
success or garner the people’s favour was through public benefactions (euergetism).128 Roads 
were certainly not the most high profile of public amenities, but their construction provided 
even the most incapable of aristocrats with a means by which to proclaim personal glory.129 
Another reason for this debate is that the traditional views that L. Cassius Longinus Ravilla 
built the road, or that C. Cassius Longinus did so during his censorship (154), are perhaps 
mistaken.  Thus, a short discussion is very much required.       
The earliest extant literary reference to the via Cassia is from Cicero, who notes in his 
twelfth Philippic (12.23) that the road runs through the centre of Etruria.130 Based on 
additional literary and archaeological evidence, a sound reconstruction of its route can be 
proffered. Sandwiched between the via Clodia (c. 287) and the via Flaminia (c. 187) the via 
Cassia left Rome heading north through Sutrium, Volsinii, and Clusium until it reached its 
terminus at Arretium. Its chief function was to provide a more direct route north than the pre-
existing roads.131 This much is known. But on the most crucial questions –who constructed 
the road and when– there has been a flurry of scholarly debate. Dates suggested have ranged 
 
127 The bibliography on the via Cassia is extensive. Pertinent works are: Hülsen, RE 3.1669-70; Martinori 
(1930) 154-6; Rubinstein (1942) 226; Perkins (1957) 142-3; Hardie (1965) 122-30; Harris (1965) 113-33, 
(1971) 114; Toynbee (1965) II.664-6; von Hagen (1966) 101; Hinrichs (1967) 169; Wiseman (1970) 122-35; 
Hemphill (1975) 118-72; Degrassi (1982) 155-74, (1984) 247-9; Arnold (1990) 134-58; Chevallier (1997) 179-
80; Mosca (2002) 60; Cf. OCD4 (2012) 1594-5; ARW (1986) 38; BAGRW Map-by-Map Directory 1.633; RE 
Suppl. 13: 1640-3. Fundamental now is Mosca (2002) 53-63.   
128 On euergetism, see generally Cornell and Lomas (2003). As has been identified, there is often some 
uncertainty over whether public amenities were completed on private or state initiative by magistrates. See 
Pobjoy (2000) 89-9; Lomas (2003) 28-9.        
129 Wiseman (1985) 5-6. In Wiseman’s memorable phrase, if the Roman senator cannot “enumerate enemy 
casualties, miles of road will have to do.” Enumeration of one’s greatness was crucial, especially for those 
families who had not celebrated triumphs, like the Cassii Longini. See also Wiedemann (2003) 13-14, on the 
Roman need to quantify. Cf. Plut. Caes. 5 (Caesar was a curator viarum and understood the importance of road-
building). See also Cic. Att. 1.1.2, on a certain Thermus.    
130 Cic. Phil. 12.23.1: Tres ergo, ut dixi, viae: a supero mari Flaminia, ab infero Aurelia, media Cassia...  
Etruriam discriminat Cassia. Festus (41) mentions only that the road was constructed by a Cassius, which is 
self-evident: Cassia via a Cassio strata. On this, however, see below.    
131 Harris (1965) 114n.6; Perkins (1957) 142: Wiseman (1970) 136. 
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from 171,132 154,133 127,134 125,135 and even 124.136 The intention of this note, then, is to fix 
a more precise date, which has been made easier by the appearance of A. Mosca’s important 
study Via Cassia: Un Sistema Stradale Romano Tra Roma E Firenze.137 However, while 
Mosca plumped for 154 as the probable date of construction, as did T.P. Wiseman, it will be 
argued here that the road’s construction should be re-dated to 171 or 164, during the 
respective consulships of the first two members of the Cassii Longini to reach high office. 
This proposal is based on the controversial observation that censors do not appear to have 
built many, if any, public roads in the Republic (see below).  
It is still unclear exactly who built public roads (viae publicae). Traditionally it was 
thought censors were chiefly responsible for their construction, the most famous –perhaps the 
only Republican example– being Ap. Claudius Caecus (cens. 312).138 Recently, however, 
scholars have begun to question this tradition, as both literary and epigraphic evidence appear 
to indicate that consuls almost always built public roads.139 There are legal reasons for this 
pattern. Naturally a via publica had to be built on public land, but when roads went through 
private land, this could be expropriated only by the exercise of the ius publicandi, and only 
by those magistrates who wielded imperium. It seems that censors did not have this 
authority.140 It is, therefore, more likely that the via Cassia was constructed during the 
consulship of one of the Cassii Longini. Accepting this premise, as one must at present, the 
years 154 and 125 (dates favoured by most scholars) should be rejected as possible dates, 
when two of the most prominent Cassii Longini enjoyed censorships. Nonetheless, five 
family members attained the consulship during the second century in 171, 164, 127, 124, and 
107.141 Of these, the last two candidates can cautiously be eliminated because, as A. Mosca 
 
132 Hardie (1965) 122; von Hagen (1966) 101; Harris (1971) 167.  
133 Harris (1965) 114; Wiseman (1970) 136; Hinrichs (1967) 165; Cornell, ARW (1986) 38; Mosca (2002) 60.      
134 Martinori (1930) 154-6; Degrassi (1984) 247-9.  
135 Chevallier (1997) 179; cf. (1972) 152. 
136 Degrassi (1984) 247-9. Mosca (2002) 53-62, has explained that the construction period could conceivably 
have been between 171 and 107. However, at 61 she notes that it is extremely unlikely that the via Cassia was 
constructed as late as 124.  
137 Mosca (2002) 53-62. 
138 Pina Polo (2011) 136, whose discussion the reader will be directed to.  
139 Ulp. 43.8.2.22; see again Pina Polo (2011) 136-7.  
140 On the controversial issue of ius publicandi, see Perkáry (1968) 14-15; Degrassi (1984) 247-9; Staccioli 
(2003) 55; Pina Polo (2011) 136-7, with additional bibliography. Contra the notion censors did not build public 
roads or have the right to exercise ius publicandi, see Wiseman (1970) 122-30; Herzig, ANRW 2.1.597 (1974); 
Kunkel and Wittmann (1995) 458. Suolahti (1963) 67-70, notes the powers of censors changed frequently. For a 
general discussion of ius publicandi and publicatio, see also Taylor (2000) 101-6. Often, however, viae publicae 
were also called viae consulares but never via censoria.  Praetors most likely built minor provincial roads.  
141 Arnold (1990) 134-58, places the via Cassia’s construction firmly in the second century.  
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has argued, it is extremely unlikely the road was constructed so late in the second century.142 
When weighing up the cases for the first three candidates, however, it is difficult to find a 
compelling reason to favour one over the others. It is necessary, then, to proceed by a process 
of elimination. Reduced to ratiocination, it is doubtful that L. Cassius Longinus Ravilla 
constructed the via Cassia as late as 127 because the Romans needed a trunk route in the first 
half of the second century to provide their army quick access to Arretium – it was a military 
necessity.143 It is also likely that the road was built in the first two decades after the 
construction of the more recent via Flaminia (187), to complement it.144 If this is accepted, 
then two candidates remain for the builder of the via Cassia.     
C. Hardie argued that the construction of the via Cassia should be dated to 171.145 At 
that time, the Romans were in the process of subjugating both the Ligurians and the Cisalpine 
Gauls, which could explain why they wished to build a more direct route to Arretium.146 In 
addition to providing quicker military access to these hostile regions, the road would 
naturally also speed up the process of Romanization. But T.P. Wiseman (and indirectly A. 
Toynbee) has objected to Hardie’s dating because Cassius was infamously active in northern 
Illyria during his consulship. They believe this eliminates 171 as a possibility because he did 
not have sufficient time to begin the construction of a public road.147 However, as Livy is our 
only (tendentious) source for Cassius’ campaign –and considering his chronology is vague– 
there may be room to argue for 171 after all.148 If Cassius followed precedent, he may have 
pressed his 12,000-strong army into service.149  
But, if the consul of 171 is eliminated as a candidate, this leaves only Q. Cassius 
Longinus (cos. 164) who died sometime during his tenure as consul.150 Given that nothing is 
known about this man’s consulship, it is impossible to firmly designate him as the via 
Cassia’s builder. Perennially overlooked, Q. Cassius had famously conveyed King Perseus to 
his prison cell in Alba Fucentia.151 In 164, he became only the second member of the Cassii 
Longini to hold the consulship. Ultimately, only the historical context may suggest Q. 
 
142 Mosca (2002) 60-1. 
143 Toynbee (1965) II.665-6; Harris (1965) 114. Degrassi (1984) 247-9, attempts to link the via Cassia to the 
founding of Florence, but this has not found general acceptance.  
144 Mosca (2002) 61-2.  
145 Hardie (1965) 122. So, too, Bandinelli (1925) 508. Cf. Harris (1971) 167.    
146 Hardie (1965) 129.  
147 Wiseman (1970) 136n.115; Toynbee (1965) II.665. Cf. Mosca (2002) 62. See Chapter 2, Section 2.   
148 On this Cassius’ career and campaign, see Chapter 2, Section 2.  
149 Cassius’ army was 12,000 strong: Liv. 43.1.4. Cf. Liv. 39.2.6, which demonstrates that the army could be 
pressed into service to furnish public roads.  
150 Broughton, MRR 1.439; Brennan (1994) 429-30n.19.   
151 Liv. 45.42.4. On Q. Cassius and Alba Fucentia, see Appendix C above.   
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Cassius as the road’s builder. The Romans celebrated significant victories over the Ligurians 
and Cisalpine Gauls in 166/165, for which triumphs were awarded.152 This may have 
provided Cassius with the justification for building a new trunk route to Arretium in order to 
accelerate the process of Romanization (or provide the army rapid access to the regions 
should they revolt). Certainty on this point is, of course, elusive. But by a process of 
elimination it is possible to suggest that the via Cassia was either built –or, better, begun– by 
C. Cassius Longinus while consul in 171 or by his distant cousin, Q. Cassius Longinus while 
consul in 164. This narrows the date of the road’s construction to an eight-year period.            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
152 On the defeat of the Ligurians and Cisalpine Gauls: Liv. Per.46; Obseq. 12.  
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APPENDIX H: FAMILY TREE 
Reconstructing the family tree (stemma) of the Cassii Longini is a task fraught with 
difficulty.153 But although the task is challenging –and the problems of prosopography all too 
familiar– a new reconstruction is long overdue. The primary reason for offering another 
family tree is that even the excellent (and authoritative) stemma of G.V. Sumner in his classic 
prosopography of Cicero’s Brutus unfortunately contains at least one demonstrable error.154 
Accordingly, this section has several aims: to provide a register of the most prominent family 
members; to demonstrate or deduce how members relate to each other; and lastly to emend 
prosopographical errors where they exist, utilizing new evidence which was not available to 
scholars of previous generations. It is to be hoped that this new stemma of the Cassii Longini 
provides the most accurate and clear analysis of their genealogy.  
 
Q. Cassius (mil. tr. 252). Ignoring Sp. Cassius,155 the earliest attested Cassius served in 
Sicily during the First Punic War. His existence is confirmed only by the epitomator Zonaras 
(8.14).156 However, the fact that the filiation of Q. Cassius Longinus (cos. 164) was L.f.Q.n. 
strongly suggests the military tribune was the consul’s grandfather.157   
 
C. Cassius Longinus C.f.C.n158 (cos. 171; cens. 154). The attested filiation of this man 
indicates that he was only distantly related to both of the aforementioned Quinti Cassii. This 
demonstrates that even at this early stage there were two distinct branches of the Longini, 
which Sumner codified major and minor respectively based on their future political success. 
This Gaius belonged to the so-called successful, major branch.159 But this schema only holds 
if L. Cassius Longinus Ravilla (see below) was his son, which is not beyond doubt.  
 
153 The difficulty of reconstructing the relationships between members of the family has long been observed: 
Sternkopf (1904) 396-7. Generations of scholars have endeavoured to produce an accurate stemma of the Cassii 
Longini: Smith (1844) 2.789; Drumann-Groebe (1964) [18992] 2.93; Cody (1968) 16; Mattingly (2004) [1972] 
135; Sumner (1973) 49-51; Chausson (2003) 114. However, Münzer (1999) [1920], does not appear to have 
produced a stemma of the Cassii Longini. 
154 Many scholars have utilised Sumner’s interpretations: e.g., Paul (1984) 104. Katz 31n.10, argues that his 
stemma is not beyond question. Indeed, there are areas where Sumner’s interpretation should be subject to 
cross-examination (for example, the fact that he considers Q. Cassius Longinus the cousin of Cassius). 
155 For Sp. Cassius, see Appendix A.  
156 On John Zonaras’ historical accuracy, see Banchich and Lane (2009) 1-20. One scholar who questions the 
account of Zonaras is Billows (1989) 123: “no earlier Cassius [sc. cos. 171] is known as magistrate or senator 
except the dubious military tribune Q. Cassius in 252.”  See also Ranouil (1975) 78: “le premier [sc. member of 
the Cassii Longini] est peut-être Q. Cassius (20)...mais seulement cité par Zonaras. But cf. Develin (1985) 284.  
157 Smith (1844) II.798; Drumann-Groebe (1964) [18992] 2.94-95; Suolahti (1963) 212, 388; Sumner (1973) 49-
50. Cf. Münzer, RE 3.1740, who cautiously suggested the possibility that they were related.    
158 For filiation, see, e.g., Fast. Cap. Degrassi (1954) 66-7. 
159 Sumner (1973) 50-1, (1978) 160.   
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Q. Cassius Longinus L.f.Q.n.160 (cos. 164†). Little information survives on this man.161 His 
father was a Lucius, though the extant sources do not credit him with holding office. (It is 
possible that this Lucius died before becoming a magistrate.) Quintus’ grandfather was 
probably the military tribune of 252. Like his distant cousin Gaius above, the most important 
question regarding Quintus is whether or not he was the father of Ravilla. 
 
Thus the first generations of the Cassii Longini can be reconstructed satisfactorily: 
 
 
 
L. Cassius Longinus Ravilla (cos. 127; cens. 125). Ravilla was by far the most distinguished 
member of the Longini, and, as will be seen, most likely the great-grandfather of Cassius the 
assassin. But his filiation is unattested in the sources, which obscures his ancestry. However, 
this did not prevent W. Drumann from misleadingly designating him the son of Q. Cassius 
Longinus (cos. 164), Q.f.L.n.162 As a nobilis,163 he had to be the son of one of the two former 
consuls and, almost predictably, arguments for both have been tendered. Given the prevalent 
naming conventions employed by both so-called “branches”, it is understandable why 
Drumann suspected that Ravilla was the son of the consul of 164. Yet based on numismatic 
evidence, G.V. Sumner argued that Ravilla was in fact the son of C. Cassius Longinus (cos. 
171). Coins minted by C. Cassius Longinus (cos. 124, see below) celebrating Ravilla’s lex 
tabellaria indicate to Sumner that these two men were brothers.164 Sumner’s observation is 
astute. As H. Mattingly concedes, it is unlikely that C. Cassius Longinus (cos. 124) would 
 
160 For filiation, see Fast. Cap. Degrassi (1954) 66-7; a later hand noted that Cassius died in office. 
161 For the fundamental bibliography on Cassius, see Drumann-Groebe (1964) [18992] 2.94-95; Smith (1844) 
2.798; Münzer, RE s.v. “Cassius” [69] 3.1740; Elvers, BNP 2.1167. 
162 Drumann-Groebe (1964) [18992] 2.93: “Sohn von Nr. 3 [Cos. 164]”. Münzer, RE 3.1742 [72] did not address 
the issue of Ravilla’s parentage. Mattingly (2004) [1972] 134-5, also argues that Ravilla was “evidently” the son 
of the consul of 164. Shackleton Bailey (19922) 31, was unsure.   
163 Cic. De Leg. 3.35; Sumner (1973) 48.   
164 Sumner (1973) 49-51; Crawford, RRC 1.290, no. 266. 
           C. Cassius Longinus 
Q. Cassius Longinus 
      (mil. tr. 252) 
C. Cassius Longinus 
 L. Cassius Longinus 
   C. Cassius Longinus 
     (cos. 171) C.f.C.n. 
 Q. Cassius Longinus 
     (cos. 164) L.f.Q.n. 
   Major                                                                                                                       Minor 
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have celebrated Ravilla’s law if they were only distant cousins.165 Moreover, Lucius was the 
commonest praenomen used by the Longini, which means that neither branch had a 
monopoly on it. In addition, one of Ravilla’s probable sons was C. Cassius Longinus L.f. 
(cos. 96), which suggests that he belonged to the Gaius-Lucius branch of the Longini, as 
Sumner observed. Based on these considerations, it seems most likely that Ravilla was the 
son of C. Cassius Longinus (cos. 171), although this is certainly not proven.              
 
C. Cassius Longinus (cos. 124). Although his filiation is unattested, there is general 
scholarly agreement that Gaius was the son of C. Cassius Longinus (cos. 171).166 His 
praenomen and dates make this likely. The fact that it was probably this man who celebrated 
Ravilla’s lex tabellaria as a moneyer indicates that they were brothers, and by inference, both 
the sons of the consul of 171.  
 
Thus the second generation of Cassii Longini can be reconstructed as follows: 
 
 
 
L. Cassius Longinus (cos. 107). The filiation of this man does not survive, but as he attained 
the consulship most scholars have (perhaps rightly) suspected that he was a son of L. Cassius 
Longinus Ravilla (cos. 127).167 Sumner believes that this assumption is further supported by a 
passage in Sallust (Iug. 32.5).168 This reads too much into the text; other explanations are 
 
165 Mattingly (2004) [1972] 134-5.  
166 Drumann-Groebe (1964) [18992] 2.97: “Vorname und Zeitverhältnis machen es wahrscheinlich, dass er der 
Sohn des vorigen [cos. 171] war.” See also Suolahti (1963) 389; Sumner (1973) 48-51; cf. Crawford, RRC 
1.290.   
167 Drumann-Groebe (1964) [18992] 2.93, 95; Mattingly (2004) [1972] 134-5; Sumner (1973) 48-51. 
168 Sumner (1973) 49; cf. Paul (1984) 105, for a commentary on Sallust. The passage which Sumner alludes to –
talis ea tempestate fama de Cassio– has been viewed by some Sallustian scholars as an allusion to Cassius the 
assassin, as Iug. was written around the time of Philippi.   
C. Cassius Longinus 
 (cos. 171) C.f.C.n. 
  
Q. Cassius Longinus 
   (cos. 164) L.f.Q.n 
C. Cassius Longinus 
       (cos. 124) 
              L. Cassius Longinus Ravilla 
                          (cos. 127) 
  [L. Cassius Longinus] 
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possible.169 Nevertheless, his success alone suggests him as a candidate, as no member of the 
minor branch had attained the consulship since 164. As will be evident, however, this 
reconstruction is based on the shakiest of inferences. F. Rossi argued that he was the same 
man as Cassius Sabaco, an ally of Marius who was expelled from the senate in 115.170 Yet 
Cichorius ingeniously proposed that Sabaco was the inspiration of a Lucilian verse directed 
against a C. Cassius.171 On balance, it is very unlikely that these two figures were one and the 
same man.             
 
L. Cassius Longinus L.f.172 (tr. pl. 104). This man has a far better claim to being the son of 
Ravilla than the consul of 107: his filiation. Indeed, it led Fr. Münzer to moot the possibility 
in the first place.173 But Sumner countered this by suggesting that the tribune’s father, a 
Lucius, was not necessarily Ravilla, but perhaps instead an unattested member of the minor 
branch of the Longini. Given that there were two contemporary Lucii Longini (the consul of 
107 and this tribune of 104) the solution has merit. However, to infer from this that the consul 
of 107 has to be the son of Ravilla rather than this tribune is far from a watertight argument 
(see above). The tribunate of this man was certainly similar to Ravilla’s, and he may simply 
have perished before attaining higher office. Still, Sumner’s proposal is better than the bizarre 
hypothesis of W. Drumann who made this tribune the son of the consul of 107, and thus a 
grandson of Ravilla.174   
  
C. Cassius Longinus L.f.175 (cos. 96). Judging by his filiation and his dates it is very likely 
that this man was the son of Ravilla.176 His political success and his praenomen suggest that 
he belonged to the predominantly Gaius-Lucius branch, which had been ennobled by the 
consul of 171.     
 
Thus the third generation can tentatively be reconstructed as follows: 
 
169 Note that the phrase sets up a vivid contrast, as L. Cassius was later famously defeated by the Tigurini, losing 
his life in the process and bringing palpable ignominy on his family: Caes. BGall. 1.7.12; Liv. Per. 65; Oros. 
5.15.23-4. Sumner, however, believes Ravilla’s fama had transferred to this L. Cassius too.  
170  Rossi (1980) 4.463-5. Contra Katz (1988) 194-6. 
171 Cichorius (1908) 313-15; cf. Gruen (1992) 294.   
172 Filiation attested by Asc. Corn. 78C: L. Cassius L.f. Longinus tribunus plebis C. Mario C. Flavio coss. 
Marshall (1985) 270 and Lewis (2006) 285, offer no insight into this Cassius’ parentage.   
173 Münzer, RE 3.1742 [72]: “Söhne des Ravilla sind vielleicht Nr. 57 [cos. 96] und 63 [tr. pl. 104].” Gruen 
(1964) 107, also considered this a possibility.   
174 Drumann-Groebe (1964) [18992] 2.93, 95. 
175 Filiation: Degrassi (1954) 74.  
176 Drumann-Groebe (1964) [18992] 2.97. 
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C. Cassius (Longinus?) (pro cons. 89-88).177 This man, who may in fact be C. Cassius 
Longinus (cos. 96),178 served as proconsul in Asia.179 Appian, who mistakenly gives him the 
praenomen Lucius (cf. Syll.3 741), lists him among the war captives of King Mithridates 
(Mith. 112), but, as Münzer noted, he contradicted himself by recording that Cassius had 
escaped to Rhodes (Mith. 24), which was never seized by the Pontic king.180 If he were not 
the same man as the C. Cassius Longinus L.f. (cos. 96) –who in 86 replaced a dying Cn. 
Pompeius Strabo as commander against Cinna (Gran. Licin. Fr. 35. 22)– it is very possible 
that he was a son of C. Cassius Longinus (cos. 124).181 
 
L. Cassius Longinus (tr. pl. 89). This man is an enigma. Sumner proposes that he was one of 
the sons of the consul of 107, although he does not appear to provide any reasoning for his 
designation. By his own rationale this Cassius would be a better fit in the minor branch of the 
family, especially considering his popular associations. As tribune, his rabble-rousing 
inspired the plebs to assassinate A. Sempronius Asellio.182 P. Ranouil has suggested that this 
man may have been the moneyer L. Cassius Caeicianus (monet. c. 102),183 but this is far from 
certain. If he were the same man, however, his cognomen would strongly suggest that he had 
been adopted into the Longini clan, which is the inference of Shackleton Bailey.184 Again this 
 
177 Broughton, MRR 2.543; Katz (1983) 359-62, 361n.4. 
178 Drumann-Groebe (1964) [18992] 2.97; Magie (1950) 1100. But Münzer made no such suggestion, RE 3.1680 
[10]; cf. Elvers, BNP 2.1166. Sumner (1973) 48-51, does not include this man in his stemma of the Longini, 
which perhaps indicates he considered him the same man as the consul of 96.  
179 App. Mith. 11, 24; Broughton, MRR 2.34. Cf. Flor. 1.40.3.    
180 Münzer, RE 3.1680 [10]; Elvers, BNP 2.1166. App. Mith. 25-7.  
181 On Pompeius and Granius Licinianus, see Chapter 2, Section 3. 
182 Val. Max. 9.7.4.  
183 Ranouil (1975) 79n.1. Caeicianus is but a name: see Vercoutre (1890) 246-7; Münzer, RE 3.1682; Crawford, 
RRC 1.325-6; Broughton, MRR 2.435, 543; Mattingly (2004) 201-2; Ryan (2009) 35-45.  
184 Shackleton Bailey (1976) 108; cf. Chase (1897) 114.   
     [L. Cassius Longinus] 
C. Cassius Longinus 
     (cos. 96) L.f. 
  L. Cassius Longinus Ravilla 
       (cos. 127)   
  L. Cassius Longinus 
       (tr. pl. 104) L.f. 
    L. Cassius Longinus 
            (cos. 107)  
  
Münzer 
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would perhaps suit the minor branch of the family better as they appear to have struggled to 
regain their former political station.          
 
C. Cassius Longinus L.f.185 (cos. 73). This man is widely regarded as the son of L. Cassius 
Longinus (cos. 107).186 As will be seen, he had at least three sons, one of whom was the 
tyrannicide (pr. 44).187 The others were Quintus (tr. pl. 49) and Lucius (tr. pl. 44).  
 
L. Cassius Longinus Q.f.188 (pr. 66). His father is unknown; there is no record of a Q. 
Cassius attaining office in the previous generation. The Catilinarian Cassius was born summo 
loco according to the author of the Commentiarolum Petitionis (Comm. Pet. 7). Despite this 
designation, he does not appear from his filiation to have belonged to the successful branch 
of the family, although Crawford argues coins he may have issued allude to the Lex Cassia 
Tabelleria of Ravilla.189 Sumner places him in the lesser branch of the Longini, and rebuts 
the suggestion that he be identified as the L. Cassius who was military tribune in 69, an 
argument proffered by generations of scholars, most recently by Shackleton Bailey, 
Broughton, and Elvers.190  
However, there are serious obstacles to equating the tribune with the praetor. Both 
men are characterized in completely different ways: Cicero calls the military tribune a man of 
integritas and pudicitia (Cic. Cluent. 107, cf. Verr. 1.1.30), whereas the praetor is 
disparagingly referred to as stolidus (Asc. 82C) and sine nervis (Comm. Pet. 7). Some 
allowance must be made for rhetorical exaggeration in both cases,191 but this does not 
undermine their credibility completely. Yet Sumner’s hypothesis that two men existed is far 
from definitive. His reasoning is based on two points. One, the military tribune belonged to 
the successful branch of the Longini because Cicero connects him to the familia severissima 
 
185 Degrassi (1954) 76. 
186 Drumann-Groebe (1964) [18992] 2.93; Münzer, RE 3.1727 [58].   
187 Not everyone accepts this attribution; but see Chapter 2, Section 3. 
188 Drumann-Groebe (1964) [18992] 2.135; Sumner (1973) 50; and Crawford, RRC 1.403, for numismatic 
evidence. Crawford “presumes” the moneyer is the praetor of 66.  
189 Cf. Marshall (1978) 281-2, 284. Crawford, RRC I.403, shows that the coins issued by the moneyer of 78 
sought to allude to the Lex Cassia Tabellaria (137), of Ravilla.   
190 Sumner (1973) 48-51; (1978) 160. Cody (1968) 87, was likeminded, but Drumann-Groebe (1964) [18992] 
2.138n.10, believed that the praetor and the military tribune were the same man. Cf., too, Münzer, RE 3.1738 
[64]; Shackleton Bailey (1976) 24; Broughton, MRR 3.50; Elvers, BNP 2.1167. 
191 Dyck (2012) 178, citing Cic. Cat. 3.9, has shown that the Catilinarian was not as foolish as to give his oath to 
the Allobroges or to suffer capture, as did many of the leading conspirators. See also Sall. Cat.  44.1-2, 50.4. 
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of Ravilla.192 Two, it is an unlikely transition to go from a military tribunate to the 
praetorship in the space of three years (69-66).193    
 
L. Cassius Longinus C.f. (tr. pl. 44). Appian (B Civ. 5.7) lists Lucius as the brother of 
Cassius: Λεύκιός τε ὁ Κασσίου ἀδελφὸς. Given the date he held the tribunate, he was likely 
younger than his more famous brother. It was most probably his descendants that attained 
office during the principate; L. Cassius Longinus (suff. cos. AD 11) was probably his 
grandson. His son perished at Philippi (App. B Civ. 4.135; MRR 3.50). The tribune may have 
married a Sulpicia, perhaps a daughter of Ser. Sulpicius Rufus (cos. 51).194  
 
Q. Cassius Longinus (tr. pl. 49).  
As noted in Chapter 2, Q. Cassius was the brother (frater) of the tyrannicide.195 He was likely 
younger than Cassius, holding the tribunate in the same year as his brother whose career had 
been delayed in the Roman East. He was selected sine sorte by Pompey, and served as a 
quaestor in Spain. An inscription from Cordoba Spain, which can be dated to 49,196 provides 
almost conclusive evidence of their fraternity (CIL II2/5 521; AE 1986 369): Q. CASS. C.F. 
LONG TR. PL. PRO. PR.197 The inscription reveals that Quintus’ filiation was C.f. which means 
he, like Cassius, was most likely a son – the second surviving son– of C. Cassius Longinus 
(cos. 73). This discovery has significant implications for our understanding of the 
relationship of these two brothers. In 59, for example, two Cassii appear to have offered their 
services to Q. Cicero, in case he should face prosecution (Cic. QFr. 1.2.13: Cassiis.) It should 
now be clear that Gaius and Quintus both volunteered their services; the fact that they jointly 
offered their services may indicate a closer relationship than anyone has yet conceded, 
despite fighting on opposing sides in the civil war. This also explains Cassius’ consideration 
for defending Quintus when the latter found himself facing prosecution in 50 (Cic. Fam. 
15.14.4).              
 
 
192 Suolahti (1955) 32, 93, 130, surely errs in claiming that the tribune was adlected into the senate by Sulla as a 
successful client of the Cassii Longini. The tribune came from a “collateral branch”.    
193 Sumner (1978) 160.  
194 Cf. ILS 3103: Sulpicia Ser. f. pro Paulla Cassia f. sua.           
195 Cic. Att. 5.21.2: Cassius, frater Q. Cassi familiaris tui.  
196 Amela Valverde (2002) 124.   
197BNP 2.1167; esp. Amela Valverde (2002) 123-4. From the Bellum Alexandrium it is further clear that Quintus 
Cassius Longinus enjoyed these positions at this time (BAlex. 48.1).   
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GAIUS CASSIUS LONGINUS (pr. 44). Given his praenomen, he was almost certainly the 
eldest surviving son of C. Cassius Longinus (cos. 73). He had two brothers, Quintus (tr. pl. 
49) and Lucius (tr. pl. 44). He was married to Junia Tertia, in 60/59. His son, C. Cassius 
Longinus, supposedly donned the toga virilis on 15 March 44 (Plut. Brut. 14.3). His son does 
not appear to have outlived Philippi.    
 
The final generations of Longini can be reconstructed as follows:198 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
198 For a complete stemma of the Cassii Longini, see p. x.  
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APPENDIX I: PHYSICAL APPEARANCE 
 
Any attempt to proffer a description of Cassius’ physical characteristics is hindered by 
several acute problems, the chief one being a lack of physical evidence. No portrait busts, 
coins, gems, or statues exist which can be irrefutably authenticated as depicting Cassius.199 
Nor do the ancient sources afford a specific written description of him, as they do for many 
other prominent Late Republican politicians.200 The upshot of this is that scholars interested 
in identifying Cassius have been reduced to educated deductions. Accordingly, the purpose of 
this section is to examine and evaluate the claims of those scholars who believe they have 
identified either busts or gems portraying Cassius. While it must be concluded that no 
attribution can be made with certainty, there is compelling evidence to designate the Pseudo-
Corbulo bust and a Carnelian intaglio as portraits of Cassius. To begin with, however, it is 
necessary to investigate the evidence that can be gleaned from the literary sources.    
Plutarch provides three details about Cassius’ appearance: he was lean (ἰσχνός), pale 
(ὠχρός), and short-sighted (ἦν γὰρ ἀσθενὴς τὴν ὄψιν).201 This description, although useful, 
hardly provides a vivid portrait. Some additional traits may be conjectured from his family’s 
genetic history. The cognomen Longinus, if not ironic, suggests that one of his ancestors was 
distinctly tall, a hereditary trait that Cassius may have enjoyed.202 And his paternal great-
grandfather, L. Cassius Longinus (cos. 127), whose sobriquet was Ravilla, obviously had 
distinctive grey-blue eyes, which Cassius also may have inherited.203 This, however, is still 
not much to go on.204  
Despite the lack of literary evidence, scholars have repeatedly suggested that the so-
called Pseudo-Corbulo bust, of which there are several variants, may be identified as 
Cassius.205 The reasons for this attribution of course merit discussion. In 1793, two almost 
 
199 In antiquity, images of Cassius were attested. There was (at least initially) a bronze statue of him at Athens: 
Cass. Dio 47.20; and several portrait busts well into the empire: Tac. Ann. 16.7; Plin. Ep. 1.17.3. However, no 
extant coins display his physical appearance (Toynbee 1978, 62), which may have been deliberate.   
200 For example, Plut. Mar. 2, Sull. 2, Pomp. 2. Suet. Iul. 45.      
201 Thin and pale: Plut. Brut. 8.2, Caes. 62.8-10, Ant. 11.6, Mor. 206F. Short-sighted: Brut. 43.4 with Jucker 
(1976) 352; Syme (1939) 205. Famously Shakespeare has Caesar describe Cassius as having a “lean and hungry 
look” (Julius Caesar, Act I, Scene ii, line 194), which paraphrases (with some poetic licence) Plutarch’s 
description. Plutarch reports that Caesar himself contrasted the fat and long-haired Antonius and Dolabella with 
the thin and pale Cassius and Brutus. Moles (1979) 111, shows that the attributes of thinness and paleness 
indicate thinking, and that Cassius was not eating Caesar’s largesse. See also Moles (1979) 440.          
202 On Longinus (longus “tall”), see Kajanto (1965) 230-1; cf. OLD s.v. “longus” 3.   
203 For the sobriquet Ravilla, see Front. Aq. 1.8 with Kajanto (1965) 228; Rodgers (2004) 168-70.   
204 The only other reference to any member of the Cassii Longini is Cic. Cat. 3.16, in which he mocks the 
Catilinarian L. Cassius Longinus (pr. 66 BC) for his heft. 
205 See Jucker (1976) 350-7; Toynbee (1978) 61-2; Kersauson (1986) 24-7; Nodelman (1987) 1.58-9; Pollini 
(1993) 423-446; Varner (1995) 206 with n.102; Poulsen (1962) 13-15. See also Levick (2002) 199-211, esp. 
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identical busts, now housed at the Louvre, were discovered at Gabii, in a hall erected by 
freedmen in honour of Domitia Longina.206 This woman, as her name suggests, was 
descended on her mother’s side from Cassius.207 As a result of the context in which the busts 
were found, H. Jucker first proposed that, if not L. or Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus (coss. 54 
and 32, respectively) the most plausible alternative candidate had to be Cassius.208 Then 
J.M.C. Toynbee, who showed that probable numismatic portraits of both Domitii Ahenobarbi 
did not match the bust,209 advanced Cassius as the chief contender.210 There is, then, some 
justification for believing that the Pseudo-Corbulo bust represents a contemporary portrait of 
Cassius, perhaps made between 50 and 40.211 It has several distinctive features:212  
 
        Figure 9(a)         Figure 9(b)       Figure 9(c)                      Figure 9(d) 
 
The chief characteristics of this bust (and all the other variants213) are as follows: the subject 
has straight, short hair, combed forward into the temple; a furrowed brow; narrow eyes; a 
pronounced, straight nose; prominent cheekbones; hollow cheeks; protuberant nasolabial 
folds; thin lips; a wide mouth; and a pointed chin. The subject is middle-aged, beardless and 
 
200-1; Presicce (2003) 148. On Corbulo variants and the museums in which they are housed, see the judicious 
inventory of Megow (2005) 131-3.    
206 CIL 14.2795. See further, Toynbee (1978) 62. On Domitia, see Levick (2002) 199-211. Of all the variant 
busts of Pseudo-Corbulo, the Gabii are best preserved: cf. however Megow (2005) 135, “Stilistische Abfolge 
und Datierung der Repliken”, for scholarly analysis of the best replica. Basically Schmidt (1944) 28, argued for 
the replica housed in the Museo Nuovo Capitolino; but Jucker (1976) 350, argues the replica in Montreal 
Museum of Fine Arts is  “considerably superior”.   
207 The famous imperial jurist, C. Cassius Longinus (suff. cos. AD 30), himself the great-great-nephew of 
Cassius was likely Domitia’s grandfather: Jucker (1976) 356; Levick (2002) 200-1; Chausson (2003) 101-29.     
208 Jucker (1976) 356. 
209 On the coins of both Domitiii Ahenobarbi, see Toynbee (1978) 60; cf. Megow (2005) 138 with n.470. 
210 Jucker (1976) 356; Toynbee (1978) 62. The bust is of a Republican but does not represent Cato, Brutus, or 
L./Cn. Domitius. By a process of elimination, Cassius emerges as a likely candidate. See Megow (2005) 138: 
“Dagegen wirkt die von Jucker aufgezeigte Alternative, nämlich der Bezug zu dem Caesarmörder Cassius 
wesentlich plausibler, auch wenn diese nicht wirklich zu beweisen ist.”  
211 Toynbee (1978) 62; Megow (2005) 138.   
212 These photographs were kindly supplied by M.J. Rietveld. Inventory: Musée de Louvre, Ma 925 (=MR 453), 
Department of Greek, Etruscan and Roman Antiquities, Denon, Ground Floor, Room 22. Borghese Collection; 
acquired 1807. The bust is 37.9 cm high, and is of white, fine-grain marble. See additionally Kersauson (1986) 
24-7; Simon (1986) 59 (no.66); Megow (2005) 131.   
213 For a photographic catalogue of the Pseudo-Corbulo variants, see Megow (2005) Taf. 68-75a.   
268 
 
betrays no distinguishing facial blemishes.214 Overall, his furrowed brow and narrow eyes 
give the subject a piercing, pensive Nachdenklichkeit, as has been observed by W. R. 
Megow; for K. Kersauson, by contrast, the bust –which is of a “réalisme modéré”– suggests 
firmness of character, although the direction of the subject’s gaze may indicate a slight 
melancholic disposition.215  
One cannot help but note the striking resemblance of this bust to the famous bronze 
portrait of Cato the Younger, which led Megow to suggest that both works may have been 
conceived mutually or, more likely, in reference to one another.216 This point also suggests 
Cassius as a candidate, as Cato was his uncle-in-law; moreover, Cassius had strong grounds 
for wishing to associate himself with Cato, and may have considered himself the political heir 
of the stoic martyr.  
In sum, there are several reasons for designating the Pseudo-Corbulo bust as a portrait 
of Cassius. As is widely acknowledged, the style of this imperial replica is Late Republican, 
and, because there are several extant variants, it is clear that the subject was unusually 
important. His middle-aged mien would also be a good match for Cassius, if composed 
between 50 and 40. Known busts of Cassius are attested well into the imperial period, a result 
of the resilient Cassii Longini’s having persevered (flourished even) under the emperors.217 
And most significantly, one set of variants was found in a hall dedicated to Domitia Longina, 
one prominent descendant of Cassius. Of course, this conclusion is built on a series of 
plausible assumptions, which, given the present state of the evidence, cannot ultimately be 
proved. But Cassius is indubitably the chief candidate, as two gems may confirm.  
Indeed, the Pseudo-Corbulo bust is not the only physical portrait suspected to be 
Cassius. In a study of Late Republican portraiture, A. Alföldi argued that a Carnelian intaglio 
also exhibits a portrait of Cassius.218 His reasons for the attribution were that the gem 
displayed what he adjudged was a ballot box on the bottom right beneath the subject’s head 
(Figures 10a and 10b).219 Alföldi understood this cista-like object to be an allusion to L. 
Cassius Longinus Ravilla’s secret ballot law of 137, which he discerned had become the 
 
214 Toynbee (1978) 62; Megow (2005) 133-5. Kersauson (1986) 24, suggested the subject of the portrait was 
“d’un homme de quarante-cinq ans”. As noted in Chapter 3, Section 1, Cassius was 44 years old when he died, 
on his birthday, c. 2/3 October, 42.        
215 Kersauson (1986) 24. 
216 Jucker (1976) 352-6; Megow (2005) 138.  
217 A case in point is L. Cassius Longinus (suff. cos. AD 11).  
218 Alföldi (1954) 162-3 with Taf. II.6. The gem is part of the Arndt collection in Munich (n.2224).  
219 Photographs of Figures 10a, 10b, and also 11: Vollenweider (1974) 2. Taf. 101.1, 3, 5. 
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emblem of the Cassii Longini.220 As M. L. Vollenweider noted, this thesis was made all the 
more plausible because other members of the family –and only them– also employed the 
cista on coinage they minted.221 In addition, the lightning and star located behind the 
subject’s head are viewed as the personal insignia of Cassius, perhaps signifying the fact that 
his soldiers had designated him Imperator after the ransacking of Rhodes.222 Further, the 
caduceus below the neck is an image frequently appropriated by Hellenistic rulers, and was 
certainly a symbol M. Brutus appears to have utilised.223 Thus, there are some grounds to 
identify this gem portrait as Cassius, although these are certainly not as strong as those of the 
Pseudo-Corbulo. 
 
         Figure 10a                 Figure 10b        Figure 11 
An additional brown Cameo (Figure 11), housed at the Thorvaldsen Museum in Copenhagen, 
has also been put forward by Vollenweider as a potential portrait of Cassius, based on 
similarities to the previous gem.224 It may be that the subject is the same man, but rendered 
through the lens of a different (both in terms of artistic style and talent) artist.225 Intriguingly, 
one cannot help but notice this gem bears some similarities to the Pseudo-Corbulo bust. The 
subject’s hair is short, straight and combed into the temple; his nose is straight and 
pronounced; and his chin is small but pointed. Even on this small gem, his gaze is distinctive, 
 
220 Alföldi (1954) 162-3; Vollenweider (1974) 2.145, who notes that Alföldi described the cista as the Cassii 
Longini’s “wappenartiges”. Cf. also Taylor (1966) 126-7. On Ravilla’s secret ballot law, see, for example, 
Münzer, RE 3.2 “Cassius” [72] 1742; Scullard (1960) 70; Kaster (2006) 328.    
221 L. Cassius Longinus (procos. 48): Babelon (1885-86) 331-3, no.10; Grueber (1910) 1.3931; Sydenham 
(1952) 156, no.935; Crawford, RRC 440, no. 413/1. Q. Cassius Longinus (propr. 49-47 BC): Babelon (1885-86) 
329-30, nos.7-9; Grueber (1910) 1.3871; Sydenham (1952) 152, no.917; Crawford, RRC 452, nos.428/1-2. 
Vollenweider (1974) 2.145 with n.49.  
222 Alföldi (1954) 163; Vollenweider (1974) 2.145 with n.50. Vollenweider argues that the gem can be dated 
fairly precisely: “er müßte dann nicht vor der Zusammenkunft des Brutus und Cassius in Sardes im Jahre 43 v. 
Chr. und kaum nach dem Tode des Cassius im Jahre 42 entstanden sein.”   
223 Seminal is Vollenweider (1974) 2.145-6 with n. 51, Taf. 93.1-3, 99.5. 
224 Vollenweider (1974) 2.146. For cameo details, 1.65, no.5.  
225 Vollenweider (1974) 2.146.  
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as with the Pseudo-Corbulo bust. It may be proposed, therefore, that the gems also perhaps –
though, of course, not certainly– depict Cassius. If this is accepted, then a portrait of Cassius’ 
physical characteristics can be offered, albeit tentatively, reflecting his appearance in the late 
40s: he was likely tall, thin, pale, and short-sighted; he had short although not entirely 
straight hair, which was combed into the temple of his forehead, which itself was furrowed. 
His eyes were narrow; his nose linear and prominent, as were his cheeks around his broad 
mouth. In contrast, his lips were thin, and his chin small but pointed.  
Overall, Cassius may indeed have been lean as Shakespeare had it, but rather than 
looking hungry, the probable portraits identified here portray him in a reflective and dignified 
manner, as befitted a man of his status and achievements.  Even if these works are identified 
as Cassius, however, there are still some problems. Despite the “warts-and-all” realism that 
characterises much Republican portraiture, Roman busts could also present an idealised 
image, especially in the case of important political figures like Cassius who had distinctive 
agendas. That the Pseudo-Corbulo is so similar to a bust of Cato the Younger is itself 
significant; it must ultimately be considered the best candidate for Cassius.    
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